THE TEXT OF THE PRESENT EDITION

The text of the De Clementia is here basically printed from Calvin’s edition of 1532, not from any sort of antiquarian interest, but simply because this Commentary refers very specifically to this text, and to no other. We have, of course, a much better text today than Calvin had four hundred years ago; but if we want to understand his Commentary and that is the aim of the present publication — then we cannot work with any other text than that which he himself prepared for the presses of Louis Blauwbloem in the Rue de St. Jacques, Paris.

In preparing the critical apparatus which is to be found at the bottom of each page, I have not attempted to do anything more than

1. to indicate where, and in what way, Calvin deviated from the standard edition published by Erasmus in 1529, and

2. to indicate the most important differences between Calvin’s text and the texts of current modern editions like that of Hosius (1914), Prechac (1921), and Faider (1928).

In doing so, I have tried to be as explicit as possible, keeping in mind the abhorrence inspired in the mind of a student by a critical apparatus consisting of nothing but single little words or fragments of words. I have therefore consciously deviated from the usual practice, by writing out sentences or parts of sentences as fully as possible, especially in those cases where a whole sequence of words has got jumbled in the manuscripts. Moreover, I have as a rule repeated in the apparatus the reading given by Calvin (which is in most cases an Erasmian reading), in order to contrast this as directly as possible with the readings found elsewhere. To the trained eye of the specialist this will doubtless seem so much trouble and paper gone to waste; but I am convinced that to the average student it must make a difference.

Wherever possible, I have indicated which manuscripts are in agreement with the Erasmian text; but I have definitely not regarded it as part of my
task to prepare, as it were, a separate apparatus for Erasmus: in other words, to investigate in detail where he relied on the earlier printed texts of the incunabula editions, where on the manuscripts (and on which!), and where on his own powers of critical divination. The sign Er. after a reading, therefore, does not mean (as with other names) that such a reading is necessarily a correction or a conjecture made by Erasmus; it simply indicates that that is what Erasmus wrote, no matter where he found it.

**CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM ET ABBREVIATIONUM**

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If there are to be found in our day, Most Excellent Prelate, men born with just a little more than the average quickness of intelligence, they are almost certain to be fired with the ambition to become famous, and to vie with one another in their haste to leave their names celebrated with posterity by publishing the products of their talent without patience and without forethought; thinking, forsooth, that this will be accounted to their credit, that they had thought of posterity, whereas in fact they ought to be thoroughly ashamed of it. So few are there, who are capable of keeping themselves in check; hence, also, the mad and unrestrained passion to write something, which is always immediately followed by regret, as by a close companion. Yet in the midst of all their villainy they still try to do something in order to win the favor of their so called “benevolent” readers; and I must say, they certainly tax their readers’ benevolence to the utmost. Some seek to shield themselves behind their youthful inexperience; others try to justify themselves by stating that their works, though hardly yet begun, had been wrung from them by the wanton insistence of friends; while others just babble all sorts of nonsense in order to clear themselves from error, if in their folly they should have put up themselves as a spectacle before the public.

But I would much rather bring forth no “children” at all than bring them forth before their time; or rather — as usually happens — not so much bring forth such abortions, as cast them forth. Yet I, too, have to contrive something in order to justify this my plan and undertaking before my readers: not only my “benevolent” but also my wary and critical readers; the more so, since I am but an ordinary person from the ranks of the people, endowed with a moderate, nay rather, a very modest learning, and having nothing in me which could possibly excite any hopes of future celebrity. In fact, it was precisely this consciousness of my obscurity, which had induced me so far to abstain from publishing anything.
Neither did I start composing these commentaries of mine, whatever they may be worth, in any hope of their ever coming before the public eye; but one would have said I really did think about publication, so great was the fervor with which I prosecuted my study, having no intention to trifle away my time, like one trifling at leisure with amusements and trifles. So, having not yet altogether come to the end, I read it aloud to a few tried and trusted friends, and when they expressed their judgment upon this, as upon all matters, with straightforward simplicity, they inspired me with some hope that my work was of a quality which would not altogether miss the mark, if published.

And most particularly did I set store by the opinion of my friend Connan, a man of prudence and learning, by whose judgment I stand or fall.

Add to this, that I simply could not tolerate seeing the best of authors despised by most, and held in almost no esteem whatsoever; so that I had long since been wishing that some illustrious champion would stand up to vindicate his cause and restore him to his proper place of dignity. If to any degree I may have succeeded in doing this, I need not regard so much labor as spent in vain; after all, there are certain things (in the text) which have escaped the notice of even Erasmus himself, the second glory and the darling of literature, though he sweated twice in this arena; and which have now for the first time been noticed by me; which I would say without any ill-will.

Concerning the author himself, I shall indeed be rather short, for fear that I might otherwise detract from his real merit through my lack of ability to praise him. Nor have I any intention to extol his merits, lest it might seem as if he himself had too little to show by way of recommendation. I would have kept altogether silent, were it not that a certain small opinion of Seneca had occupied the minds of many, and were now already become a fixed prejudice, namely, that Seneca’s merits as a stylist were none, as a philosopher, few and negligible, lying buried and hidden among his many faults.

Thus, they declare, Quintilian purposely deferred mentioning him (Seneca) in (his discussion of) the different branches of literature, in order thus indirectly to remove his name from the list of approved authors. Thus, they say, Gellius pronounces him, in the words of another, but
nevertheless, in his own proper judgment, a thoroughly useless writer. Now I would not dare openly to refute Quintilian, a man of the keenest and clearest judgment; but I would certainly like these critics also to understand that Quintilian, too, was only human, and that he did not treat Seneca with sufficient good faith, or in any case tried to take revenge for some old personal insults. For Seneca, in the Declamations, had treated Quintilian the Elder with less respect than was his due, and had tried to obstruct the fame of Quintilian the Younger. As regards the things poured out over Seneca by the black bile of Gellius, if they really consider all that as the established truth, they certainly are wide of the mark. Surely it must be plain to everyone, with how unrestrained a fury he attacks him, and how he is, in this part, rather more insulting than really serious.

Certainly, whatever Quintilian and Gellius may have thought, later generations, who have been able to judge without envy and partiality (two sworn enemies of the truth), count him (Seneca) amongst the foremost princes of Latin letters. It was an easy thing for Quintilian to wrestle with ghosts, and get away with it: the dead man could not bite! But had he been alive and alert, it would not have been so easy to shout at him! And yet he did not strip him of all praises so completely, as not to leave him still the highest praise: enumerating all the Latin orators from the earliest times, he singles out Seneca amongst all these, to celebrate him for the copiousness of his style.

But why waste words upon this? The matter is evident. As regards myself, I shall certainly not hesitate to bring forward my opinion; though not in order to bind thereby my readers, as by some sacred obligation. Let them stand by my judgment, if they wish, or let them form their own opinion, or let them fetch for themselves an authority from the ranks of those better fitted to judge than they are. Unless I be then altogether mistaken, I consider Seneca to have been a man of vast erudition and signal eloquence. For what branch of learning is there, which a man of such fruitful genius could not have brought within his grasp? The mysteries of nature, belonging to that part of philosophy which the Greeks call “physics”, he knew to a nicety; but it is when dealing with matters ethical, that he reigns supreme, and runs as it were on his own proper course, having sufficient knowledge of the art of reasoning to maintain a well-ordered style. For historical data, whenever they could serve his purpose,
he could draw at will upon the copious store of his memory; though he did sometimes make a slip here and there, being not over-strict with himself in such matters. But then, his language is pure and polished, though naturally instinct with the flavor of his age; his expression is elegant and florid, his style unlabored and smoothly flowing. In short, he bears the stamp of a moderate writer, such as becomes a philosopher; though on occasion he certainly takes a higher flight, so that it appears that he would not have lacked the sublimer vein, had he chosen to aspire to it. Now most of those critics reproach him for the luxurious verbosity of his language; and I must admit: there is rather too much of that. In fact, I think that these are the “sweet vices” with which, according to Quintilian, the works of Seneca abound. I also miss the orderly arrangement of matter, which is certainly not the least quality of a good style.

But if we weigh now his vices against his virtues, how small they will appear! Let us only remember that well-known word, that no man of genius has ever been altogether acceptable without a little pardoning indulgence. I do not want to dwell upon this any longer, but allow me to say only this, once and for all: our Seneca was second only to Cicero, a veritable pillar of Roman philosophy and literature; for Brutus, and the men of his time, have been lost to us.

That this is so may be proved by all who will spend some good hours in reading him: a reading which will yield them both profit and delight. I warrant that none will regret the trouble, unless it be someone born under the enmity of all the Muses and Graces.

As for you, Illustrious Claude, you certainly had little need of hearing the talents of Seneca pompously proclaimed to you: considering you know all this for yourself so well, as not to need any preacher at all. You have in yourself, and at home, as men say, that lively and generous disposition of the gentleman, for which you are known; a judgment both acute and stable, a memory well-stocked and reliable; to all which may be added a thorough training in these studies. Relying on these counselors, so to speak, you will be able to discern with ease what the difference is between true mint and false, and what a good part of the Latin language depends upon Seneca.
Our Commentary, which commends itself to your protection, you will receive not otherwise than as being the first-fruits of our harvest, dedicated and inscribed to you by right and merit; not only because I owe to you all I am and all I have, but even more since, having as a boy been educated in your house and initiated in the same studies together with you, I am indebted to your most noble family for my first education in life and letters.

And now I shall not exert myself in order to recommend to you (the fruits of) my industry. Knowing your singular benevolence towards me, I know that you have long already graciously accepted it.

As regards the rest of my readers, I cannot know how they will receive it; but even though it may not satisfy every one, I am nevertheless quite confident that it shall not earn me the worst opinions of the best critics. Where such great variety of tastes and characters exist, it would be difficult, perhaps even wrong, to attempt to satisfy all; wherefore I have resolved upon the only alternative left to me, namely, to try to satisfy the best. Of my success in this undertaking, let others judge; for I dare not make too boastful promises regarding myself, for fear of raising the impression that I am arrogant.

Farewell. Paris, 4th April, in the year of our salvation 1532.
L. Annaeus Seneca, born in the station of a simple knight and a provincial [Tacitus, *Ann.* 14.53.5, made illustrious the name of his family more by uprightness of life and strictness of principles than by military exploits, or by any skill in politics. When his native place, Cordova, was captured, he, already bereft of his father, migrated to Rome with his two brothers, Gallio and Mela [16.17.3. There he spent some time in moderate circumstances. At last in the reign of Caligula he began to gain considerable literary repute. From then on his fame grew more and more, so that some believe this was the reason why Claudius exiled him to an island. This exile he bore unflinchingly; he even comforted his mother Albina [Helvia] when she was downcast by his misfortune. Subsequently restored with Agrippina’s help, admitted into the senatorial order, and appointed to the praetorship, Seneca took Domitius [Nero] still a boy [12.8], not yet adopted by Claudius, under instruction, and nurtured his studies and morals to the best of his ability (*bona fide*), until upon Claudius’ death, Nero was vested with imperial rank by right of adoption [12.25f].

Then Seneca did not play the role of preceptor, but diplomatically controlled the youth’s counsels, so that Nero undertook almost nothing by virtue of his office (*pro imperio*) without Seneca’s authority. He was assisted by Burrus, the praetorian prefect, a man noted for military prowess [12.42], upright life and morals [13.2.2], working in partnership with Seneca. These two men effectively supported the youth’s character to keep him from rushing headlong into a worse state [13.2.6]. Burrus’ death [14.51], either from disease or from some crime of Nero’s, greatly weakened Seneca’s position [14.52].

At this point men who unceasingly endeavored with their evil arts to corrupt the emperor’s character, seized the opportunity to charge Seneca with wealth surpassing the limits of a private fortune, with turning the affection of his countrymen to his advantage, with the charm of his gardens, and the splendor of his villas [14.52. Seneca, deprecating envy of
such possessions on Nero’s part [14.54, asked [Nero] for leave of absence [14.53f], and to transfer to another his splendid possessions which he could no longer bear, and his wealth which was bringing only odium upon him. He pied weariness of age and enfeebled health. Yet with these reasons he still could not succeed in obtaining repose for his studies [14.54]. Nevertheless, he changed his former pattern of life. He banished the crowds from his antechambers, shunned his attendants. He appeared rarely in the city, and kept out of public view [14.56]. Again he asked leave to retire to the solitude of the country [14.54], when Nero with frightful punishments uncontrollably raged against the Christians [15.44]. This he requested in order to divert the odium of sacrilege from himself, or because he found out through a freedman’s admission that poison had been prepared, at Nero’s orders, for him. When his request was not granted, he kept to his bedroom, as if sick with neuralgia [15.45].

Not much later Piso’s plot occurred [15.48ff], and Seneca was named by Natalis’ disclosure [15.56], as one of the conspirators; although not convicted of the crime, yet he was condemned as if guilty of treason. First Gavius Silvanus tribune of the praetorian cohort was sent to ask Seneca if he admitted his own words, on which the charge rested [15.60]. When the tribune reported that Seneca had, with courageous mien, admitted and excused them, upon Poppea’s question whether Seneca was preparing for a voluntary death, he replied that he had not noticed any sign of death, since he had detected no sadness either in his words or in his looks. Silvanus was therefore directed to go back and pronounce the death sentence. However, he was so far considerate of his voice and his eyes as to send one of his centurions to announce the last necessity [15.61].

Receiving the message, Seneca asked for the tablets containing his will. The centurion refusing, he turned to his friends [15.62], two of whom were dining with him [15.60]. He said that, since he could not show his gratitude in any other way, he would leave them his fairest possession — the image of his life [15.62]. Then embracing Pompeia Paulina, his wife, he begged her to control her grief [15.63], and tears [15.62]. She refused all comfort, assuring him that she too had made death her choice, demanding to share the executioner’s stroke. Therefore, both made the incision in their arms with a single cut [15.63]. But Paulina’s wound, after much blood had already been discharged, was bound up by her slaves [15.64]; it is
uncertain whether this was done without her knowledge or whether she actually succumbed to the blandishments of life when a milder prospect was offered by Nero [15.64].

Seneca, however, disgusted with his own protracted dying [15.64], since his aged body gave slow escape to the blood, severed (also) the arteries in the leg and behind the knees [15.63]. Since things went no faster, he swallowed the poison provided earlier for this eventuality, but in vain, for his breast was already closed to the action of the poison. At last lifted into a bath and suffocated by the vapor, he was cremated without any funeral rites [15.64]. So he had ordered in his will, at a time when, still enormously rich and powerful, he was planning for his end. He died at the age of 115 or thereabouts, in the eleventh year of Nero’s reign, seventeen years after he had been appointed tutor to the youth.
TO THE EMPEROR NERO ON CLEMENCY

BOOK 1

CHAPTER 1

1 I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of clemency, in order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror, and thus reveal you to yourself as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures. For, though the true profit of virtuous deeds lies in the doing, and there is no fitting reward for the virtues apart from the virtues themselves, still it is a pleasure to subject a good conscience to a round of inspection, then to cast one’s eyes upon this vast mob — discordant, factious, and uncontrolled, ready to run riot alike for the destruction of itself and others if it should break its yoke — and finally to commune with oneself thus:

2 “I of all mortals have found favor with Heaven and have been chosen to serve on earth as vicar of the gods. I am the arbiter of life and death for the nations; it rests in my hand what each man’s fortune and state shall be; by my lips Fortune proclaims what gift she would bestow on each human being; from my utterance peoples and cities gather reasons for rejoicing; without my favor and grace no part of the wide world can prosper; all those many thousands of swords which my peace restrains will be drawn at my nod; what nations shall be utterly destroyed, which ones transported, which shall receive the gift of liberty, which have it taken from them, what kings shall become slaves and whose heads shall be crowned with royal honor, what cities shall fall and which shall rise — this is my jurisdiction.

3 With such great power over affairs, I have been moved neither by anger nor youthful impulse to unjust punishment, nor by the foolhardiness and insolence of men which have often wrung patience from even the most tranquil souls, nor yet by that vainglory which
displays might through terror — a dread but all too common use of great and lordly power. With me the sword is hidden, nay, is sheathed; I am sparing to the utmost of even the meanest blood; no man fails to find favor at my hands though he lack all else but the name of man.

4 Sternness I keep hidden, but clemency ever ready at hand. I so hold guard over myself as though I were about to render an account to those laws which I have summoned from neglect and darkness into the light of day. I have been moved to pity by the fresh youth of one, by the extreme old age of another; one I have pardoned for his high position, another for his humble state; whenever I found no excuse for pity, for my own sake I have spared. Today, if the immortal gods should require a reckoning from me, I am ready to give full tale of the human race.”

5 This pronouncement, Caesar, you may boldly make, that you hold all things in safe trust and guardianship, that through you the state suffers no loss, either from violence or from fraud. It is the rarest praise, hitherto denied to all other princes, that you have coveted for yourself innocence of wrong. Your effort has not been wasted, and that unparalleled goodness of yours has not found men ungrateful or grudging appraisers. Thanks are rendered to you; no human being has ever been so dear to another as you are to the people of Rome — its great and lasting blessing.

6 But it is a mighty burden that you have taken upon yourself; no one today talks of the deified Augustus or the early years of Tiberius Caesar, or seeks for any pattern he would have you imitate other than yourself. Your principate is measured by (this) foretaste. This would have indeed been difficult if that goodness of yours were not innate but only assumed for the moment. For no one can wear a mask long; the false quickly lapses back into its own nature; but whatever has truth for its foundation, and whatever springs, so to speak, from out the solid earth, grows by the mere passing of time into something larger and better.

7 Great was the hazard that the Roman people faced so long as it was uncertain to what course those noble talents of yours would give themselves; today the public prayers are assured, for there is no danger
that you will be seized by sudden forgetfulness of yourself. Overmuch prosperity, it is true, makes men greedy, and desires are never so well controlled as to cease at the point of attainment; the ascent is from great to greater, and men embrace the wildest hopes when once they have gained what they did not hope for; and yet today your subjects one and all are forced to confess that they are happy, and also, that nothing further can be added to their blessings, except that they may endure.

8 Many facts force them to this confession, which more than any other a man is reluctant to make: a security deep and abounding, a justice enthroned above all injustice; before their eyes hovers the fairest vision of a state which lacks no element of complete liberty except the license of self-destruction.

9 Above all, however, alike to the highest and the lowest, extends the same admiration for your quality of clemency; for although of other blessings each one experiences or expects a larger or smaller measure in proportion to his lot, yet from clemency men all hope to have the same; nor is there any man so wholly satisfied with his own innocence as not to rejoice that clemency stands in sight, waiting for human errors.

Not without reason has Plutarch [Ad Principem Ineruditum, Mor. 1,779E] written: *It is difficult to give advice to those in authority* For those who equate unbridled license with the king’s true majesty think living according to reason not at all kingly. They regard it as servile to commit themselves to another’s authority. Consequently, they live by their own laws, their own customs — or rather their own caprice. But if there are some a bit more moderate, even they cannot calmly brook an interrupter — so much has arrogance been implanted in kings and princes as a lasting and inborn evil. They wish to take the whole credit for administering the state well and efficiently: They disdain to let outside counselors share the praise. From this arises the saying: “good advice is costly for friends of kings.” Skillfully therefore does Seneca propose to write about clemency in such a way that Nero may recognize the reflection of his own clemency in the description of that virtue. Thus, under the guise of praise he gets a favorable hearing for his hortatory oration. He says therefore he does not
so much intend to instruct and educate Nero by precepts, as to show him a mirror with the image of virtue, in which he can recognize himself and contemplate his own gifts. For as a mirror displays a man’s face to himself, so in the description of strength does a strong man recognize something of himself; in that of prudence a prudent man; in that of justice a just man. It is in this roundabout way that Seneca insinuates himself into Nero’s good graces. And finally he who has a good conscience can enjoy the pleasure of it. And that is what comes about when he declares him to be one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures.

THOUGH THE TRUE PROFIT OF VIRTUOUS DEEDS...

Long and anxiously have the philosophers disputed about ultimate happiness, the end to which all things are to be referred. Sixteen sects strive among themselves with their different views. While Epicurus always rests carefree in his own pleasure, Croesus looks to his own wealth; finally, others serve their own passions, each for himself. There are two sects more in accord with truth. The former, that of Zeno, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Hecato, Diogenes of Babylon, and the Stoic School — although Augustine [DCD, 8.3] credits Antisthenes as the author of this teaching — consider that virtue undoubtedly is the ultimate end, to which all acts, all works and counsels of human life look. In this sense is this passage to be taken. The Aristotelians go further. For they place the end, not in virtue, but in the use of virtue. See Aristotle, Ethics [1.1, 1095a5]. The meaning is: Although according to the principle of the Stoics nothing is to be considered in virtue but virtue itself, and the estimation of virtue should not depend on something else, but should rest in itself, still it is a pleasure to subject a good conscience to a round of inspection, etc. Cicero has elegantly expressed this thought in his Dream of Scipio [Rep., 6.23.25]: Nor will you... put your trust in human rewards for your exploits. Virtue herself, by her own charms, should lead you on to true glory. And in the Pro Milone [96] he adds these words which are surely true: Brave and wise men are accustomed to pursue not so much the reward of good deeds as good deeds themselves.
THERE IS NO FITTING REWARD FOR THE VIRTUES

It is as if he said, not that there is any other goal beyond virtue, as Perlander thought virtue tended to the end of honor, and the Aristotelians to the practice of virtue; but it is itself the highest goal and to be sought for its own sake. Claudtan [Panegyr. ,17.13] has expressed the thought in almost the same words:

\[
\text{Virtue is itself its own reward, and safe from fortune} \\
\text{Alone it widely shines, nor is it raised by any signs} \\
\text{Of office (honor).}
\]

And Seneca, On Benefits [4.1.3]: The reward of honest dealings lies in themselves.

STILL IT IS A PLEASURE TO SUBJECT A GOOD CONSCIENCE TO A ROUND OF INSPECTION

Well put by Pliny, Ep. [1.8], to Saturninus: I am aware how much nobler it is to lodge the reward of virtue in one’s conscience than in one’s reputation. And Macrobius, Comm. on Scipio’s Dream [2.10]: A wise man reposes the reward of virtue in his conscience, the less perfect man in his reputation.

THIS VAST MOB — FACTIOUS, DISCORDANT ETC

These are the unchanging epithets of the mob: Factious, discordant, unruly; and not groundlessly applied!

FACTIOUS

Virgil, Aeneid [1.148150]:

\[
\text{And as, when oft times in a great assembly tumult} \\
\text{Has risen, the base rabble rage angrily,} \\
\text{And now brands and stones fly, madness lending arms…}
\]

Even though a crowd is everywhere and always swift to pursue newfangled things, still the Roman plebs, composed of a great and varied throng of foreigners, is far more fickle than all the rest. Let us look at history: what tremendous uprisings among the Romans were stirred up by the factions of the plebs, how often did they lead the whole state to the
brink of disaster. Hence arose the proverb, *Crowdy and rowdy* [Varro in *Aul. Gell.* 13.11.3].

**DISCORDANT**

This word refers to a variety of opinions. “There are as many minds as there are heads,” especially where men have no sure plan set before their eyes, but seize with unpremeditated rashness upon anything that presents itself to their giddy minds. *For in the multitude there is no deliberation*, says Cicero in *Pro Plancio* [4.9], *no reason, no discernment*... To Plato [*Rep.*, 9.588f] and Horace [*Epist.*, 1.1.75] then it is a many-headed beast. That is also shown by the derivation of the word; although Ovid [*Armores*, 2.12.11] has in newfangled and over-free fashion used “discordant glory” in the sense of “discrete,” “separate.” *But my glory is a thing apart, separate from any soldier.*

**UNCONTROLLED**

Nonius Marcellus [2, p. 129] glosses *imputens* as “very powerful.” But this word has more force. For it means not only “very powerful” to Cicero when he says [*T.D.*, 5.7.17]:... *Those who do nothing, fear nothing, covet not, and are carried away by no uncontrolled passion,* but it means a certain overconfident boldness. Cicero [*T.D.*, 4.15.34]: *By excessive longing, which we sometimes term ‘desire,’ sometimes ‘lust’, they enkindle a sort of uncontrolled state of soul, clean counter to temperance and self-control.* The Greeks call it *akrateia.* Horace [*C.*, 1.37.1012]:... *a woman uncontrolled enough / To nurse the wildest hopes, and drunk / With Fortune’s favors.*

**READY TO RUN RIOT ALIKE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ITSELF**

It either means “to revel,” as Cicero’s words in *Rep.* [2.41.68]:... *which so thirsts for blood and so exults in every sort of cruelty that it can hardly be sated even by the merciless slaughter of men...* Or it means “to leap up and to be carried away.” Cic., *Rep.* [3.35.49]: *There is therefore in all men a certain restless element in evidence which exults in pleasure and is broken by tribulation.* Nonius Marcellus [4 (p. 300-301)] is the author of both
definitions; but the latter fits better, because the ignorant plebs, which has no restraint upon its liberty, immediately turns to license, and that to its own ruin, as the Roman mob quite often almost destroyed their empire through internal strife. And to the ruin of others as well, because an insane multitude can scarcely be restrained when once it has risen in arms. Livy [24.25.8]: This is the nature of the multitude: they either serve humbly, or lord it haughtily over others. They do not know how with moderation to spurn or to enjoy that liberty which holds the middle course. Curtius [10.7.11]: No deep sea, no vast and storm-swept ocean rouses such billows as the emotions of a multitude, especially if it is exulting in a liberty which is new and destined to be short-lived. Livy [34.49.78]: Quintius advised the Achaeans to use their liberty with moderation: for when regulated by prudence, it was beneficial to them all and to every city individually; but, if excessive, it became a burden to others and to those who possess it headstrong and unbridled.

2. I OF ALL

Prosopopoeia, by which it is pretended that the emperor is talking with himself, and so to speak entering into meditation. Here is the reward of conscience which Seneca was promising him, if he descended into himself, and saw to the composure of his mind. And these words are more appealing through a pretended person, than if conceived as from the person of the author. So Quintilian [Inst. Or., 9.2.29] teaches. For they are effective to arouse the reader, to stir the feelings, to vary the discourse. Some call this figure not prosopopoeia but ethopoea, because the former invents persons who northern exist, whereas the latter fits these words to definite persons. See Romanus Aquila. This statement, moreover, derives from the opinion of the Stoics, who attribute the superintendence of human affairs to the gods, assert providence, and leave nothing to mere chance. The Epicureans, although they do not deny the existence of the gods, do the closest thing to it: they imagine the gods to be pleasure-loving, idle, not caring for mortals, lest anything detract from their pleasures; they deride Stoic providence as a prophesying old woman. They think everything happens by mere chance. But he who professes himself vicar of the gods, surely confesses that the gods look after human
needs. For this reason, Homer [Odyssey, 7.49] calls kings god-nourished, that is, fed by Jupiter; and in the Iliad [9.229] he writes that Agamemnon was made king by Jupiter. Pliny in his Panegyric [80.4] expresses it no less elegantly: It is then, I would think, that the father of the world rules all with a nod of the head, when he has east his glance upon the earth and deigned to count human deeds among the divine occupations. Now, freed of these cares by you, he occupies himself only with heaven, since he has appointed you to function as his vicar for the whole human race. Truly indeed has someone spoken, as Plutarch says in his Doctrine of Princes [Mor., 780D]: Princes are God’s ministers, for the welfare and care of men; as God bestows upon them, they distribute part; keep part. With this agrees Numa Pompilius’ utterance [Plut., Life of N.P., 6.2]: Rule is a ministry of the gods. And in the same Plutarch [Life of Themist., 27.3], one finds a similar saying by Artabanus: Kings, likenesses of God who sustains all. Quite rightly, then, Plato in his Gorgias makes God a sort of commander of the human race, assigning to each his station and military rank. Persius [Sat., 3.7172] has borrowed this idea from Plato:

What person God commanded you
To be; what rank he gave you in the human race.

Our religion, too, has such a confession:

Power comes from God alone, and those that exist have been ordained by God [Romans 13:1].

I AM THE ARBITER OF LIVE AND DEATH

The same thought. Curtius [4.1.22]: And when you sit upon the royal throne, master of the life and death of all the citizens, do not forget this condition in which you are receiving the rule...

Seneca in the Thyestes [607-608]:

You to whom the ruler over sea and land has given Jurisdiction over death and life.

What Curtius calls “dominion,” Seneca “jurisdiction,” here he calls “arbitrage,” that is full and free power without right of appeal. So also does Pompeius Festus [14.6f, 10f] define it.
So speaks Coelius to Cicero [Ep. Faro. 8.6.1]: How far you desire to put him under an obligation rests in your hand. Cicero beautifully expresses the meaning of this phrase in Off. [2.17.60] as if by explanation. That which we receive on the spot, he says, and in the hand, as it were, is so much more satisfying... Therefore we elegantly say a thing which is certain “rests in our hand,” as if grasped by the hand. One also says, “in the hands,” and “to the hand,” and “before the hands,” and “under the hand,” and “within the hands.” The two last are rarer, so I will append examples. Seneca to Lucilius [Ep. Mor. 71.1]: A plan ought to be hatched on the very day... Even this is too late: a plan should be born, as they say, ‘out of hand.’ And Suetonius in Augustus [49.3]: To enable what was going on in each of the provinces to be reported and known more speedily and under his hand, he at first stationed young men at short intervals along the military roads, and afterwards postchaises. Virgil, Aeneid [11.310-311]:

All else, with what wide ruin it lies smitten,
Is before your eyes and within your hands.

In other words Nero says it is easy for him to make rich whom he will and also to impoverish whom he will. We can also interpret “hand” as “sway” or “arbitrage,” as that saying by Suetonius in Nero [23.3]: He had done all things that mere necessary, by way of preparation, but the issue of the approaching trial was in the hand of fortune... .Nevertheless the meaning will be the same.

WHAT EACH MAN’S FORTUNE

Here it is made clear that the prince is nothing but the instrument of Fortune, who by her hand and ministry turns everything topsiturvy. He uses “fortune” for “God,” a term more common than proper. For there is nothing fortuitous for those who subject all things to necessity. Yet he fittingly uses the word “to proclaim,” which means, that he who holds jurisdiction, takes decisions and lays down the law.
FROM MY UTTERANCE PEOPLE AND CITIES GATHER REASONS FOR REJOICING

This is to be referred to the ambassadors of the nations, the emissaries and the negotiators of alliances with the Roman people. For that famous Roman empire was truly a great robbery; to which peoples subjugated by war paid tribute, while those who preferred to make a treaty, paid dearly for that ambitious alliance which was not far removed from slavery.

ALL THOSE MANY THOUSANDS OF SWORDS

A saying of Plautus’ with a different meaning could very truly be applied to the Roman emperor: namely, that he was a sort of earthly Jupiter who caused east and west to tremble at his nod. For as Ovid says [Fasti, 2.136]:

Under this chief each region of the sun is Roman.

and elsewhere [Ibid., 2.684]:

The extent of the Roman City and of the earth is the same.

The disposition of parts is to be noted. First he claimed for himself the right over the private property of all, then over cities and peoples; now he comes to the enumeration of kinds: HOW FROM HIS UTTERANCE PEOPLES AND CITIES GATHER REASONS FOR REJOICING.

WILL BE DRAWN AT MY NOD

He has used “nod” for emphasis, since it would have been enough to say “command.” But this was more expressive, just as if the prince draws all things along with him, and shakes them by his impulsion. Virgil, Aeneid [9.106]:

He nodded assent, and with his nod made all Olympus tremble.

Curtius [3.3.27]: The phalanx of the Macedonians, alert not only to the leader’s sign, but even to his nod. Cicero [Ep. 12.17., 1.1.22]:... so many cities… fix their gate upon the nod of a single man.
WHICH NATIONS SHALL BE TRANSPORTED

It was an ancient custom, when nations conquered in war could still raise up new spirits through some local advantage, to transfer them elsewhere. In the Panegyric to Maximian and Constantine [8.2]: You conquered, accepted the surrender of, and transported the utterly fierce people of Mauritania who relied upon the inaccessible heights and natural protection of their mountains. Livy [8.14.56]: On the Veliternians, Roman citizens of long standing, measures of great severity were inflicted because they had so often rebelled; their mansions were raked, and their senate removed, and they were ordered to dwell across the Tiber; so that the fine of any one of them apprehended on the near side of the Tiber should be upwards of a thousand asses. The same [8.20.9] As to the senate of Privernum, it was decreed, that every person who had continued to act as a senator of Privernum, after the revolt from the Romans, should reside across the Tiber, under the same restrictions as those of Velitrae. Elsewhere he says “to transfer.” [1.28.7]: It is my intention, and may it prove fortunate, auspicious, and happy to the Roman people, to myself, and to you, O Albans, to transfer all the inhabitants of Alba to Rome... After [1.29.1]: During these occurrences the cavalry had been dispatched to transfer the multitude to Rome. This word is also found in the sense of “to deport,” but rarely; I remember only once reading it in Suetonius’ Augustus [65.4]: Agrippa, who was equally intractable, and whose folly increased every day, he transported to an island.

WHAT KINGS SHALL BECOME SLAVES

“Slave” for intensification, for it expresses more than if he had said “to cast down from the very pinnacle to the lowliest condition.” These two — king and slave — are diametrically opposed: the one commands all; the other has been put in humblest servitude.

AND WHOSE HEADS SHALL BE CROWNED WITH ROYAL HONOR

This is a periphrasis for “diadem” which Seneca also has used in Hercules Furens [257-8]: I saw the royal crown that decked his head / Torn from him, head and all. Also in Thyestes [701-702]:… from the king’s head falls
The crown twice and thrice... For it is well-known that the diadem was the insignia of kings. It was a many colored band, its name derived from the Greek verb *diadeo*, meaning to “bind around.” That it differed from the crown, Cicero shows in his *Philippics* [2.34.85; cf. 3.5.12.], when he writes that Antony the consul offered the diadem and rule to Caesar, already crowned. And Valerius [6.2.7, (p. 475)] says of Pompey: *To whom, having his leg bound with a white band, Favonius spoke: “It does not matter on which part of the body the diadem is worn.”* The Persians call it “Cydaris.” Curtius [3.3.19] says: *The Persians called the king’s headdress “cidaris,” this was bound with a blue fillet variegated with white.* Now as regards this unrestrained jurisdiction over kings, those well versed in history are aware that, before the rule devolved upon the monarchy of the Caesars, kingdoms were conferred by senatorial decree. Cicero [Ep. *Faro.*, 9.15.4] to Papirius Paetus: *I would have you know that I have ere now received letters from kings in the uttermost parts of the world, in which they thank me for having given them by my vote the title of king, I being in ignorance not only of their being so entitled, but of their ever having been born.* But the people by “the royal law” transferred all jurisdiction to the Caesars.

**IS MY JURISDICTION**

Here the jurisconsults understand “jurisdiction” to be taken in a general sense, which embraces all sorts of cognizance.

**3. WITH SUCH GREAT POWER OVER AFFAIRS**

“Virtue untried deserves small praise,” as the common saying goes. It was not so remarkable to handle moderate fortune rightly; but not to misuse such great leave to do as one pleases over all affairs — this is indeed wonderful. And by the circumstances he amplifies it, because the very one who proves himself so eminent an emperor is not a man of mature age, to whom age comes as teacher, but is set in that slippery age: because he is harassed by insults which otherwise are wont to disconcert the most peaceful of men. For this reason he mentions that great power of kings, unconstrained by any laws; as Herodian [1.4.6] says:... *where men have
the greatest leave to do as they will, it is hard to exercise self-control, and so to speak, impose a checkrein on the appetites.

**BY ANGER**

It is as if he said: that very savage disposition of mind, which urges nothing restrained, especially never keeping to moderation in meting out punishments — hence called by Ennius “the beginning of insanity”; by Horace [Ep., 1.2.62] “brief madness” and by Cato (what amounts to the same thing) “temporary madness” — yet has not carried me away into destroying anyone. A universal saying among the Greeks is this: “Difficult is the anger of the king,” which Seneca puts forth in Latin in the Medea [495]: *Ever heavy is the wrath of kings.* Therefore a prince free of this common evil should inspire admiration for himself. And so Ovid has not without reason put these words among the praises of Livia [Pseudo-Ovid, Consol. ad Liv. Aug., 47f]:

*You harmed no one, though having power to harm;*  
*Nor threat of prison gave to ought alarm.*

And if what the Hebrew author of Proverbs says [Proverbs 16:14] is true, *The king’s wrath is death’s messenger,* then not to have yielded ever so little to anger in meting out punishments is not the meanest praise. I have no desire here to indulge in longwinded conceited ostentation; I leave declamations to the rhetoricians.

**YOUTHFUL IMPULSE**

This age pleads for pardon for a man. “He has erred,” men say, “he has lapsed because of youthful inexperience; years will add moderation and prudence.” It is natural that this age is more given to anger; when one’s blood is fuller and warmer, as the philosophers say, it gives cause for anger. Yet how but by a miracle could wisdom anticipate age! *For even those who are about to come into possession of virtue, tremble lest they fall,* says Latinus Pacatus [Panegyr., 7.3].

**THE FOOLHARDINESS AND INSOLENCE OF MEN**

How grave insolence to kings is, will appear elsewhere. Consequently, we ought to think highly of a prince whose patience is unbroken by any
foolhardiness, any insolence. In several exemplars one reads “obstinacy” for “insolence”; I do not know which is preferable. Such are the commands of kings (as Cicero says in his Pro Rabirio [11.29]), Take notice and obey my word! Likewise [Ibid.] And those threats: If when the morrow dawns I find thee here, / Thou diest! If a repeated command cannot even be awaited without certain penalty, no wonder then that obstinacy becomes a capital offense.

FROM EVEN THE MOST TRANQUIL SOULS

These words also add an emphasis not to be neglected, because men’s foolhardiness and insolence, which wrested patience from the most patient and unperturbed of men, could not shake this youth’s peace of mind. For this is what tranquillity means to us as can be readily grasped from Cicero’s words [T.D., 4.5.10]: In explaining these [passions] I shall follow the ancient distinction first made by Pythagoras, then by Plato; they divided the soul into two parts, one participating in reason, the other without it. As partner with reason they posit tranquillity, that is a peaceful and quiet constancy: in the other part they place turbulent emotions — now of wrath, now of desire — contrary and inimical to reason. Therefore a tranquil soul is composed, and subject to no emotions, which the Greeks call pathi, that is, passions. Tranquillity itself, moderation of mind, and so to speak equanimity: which our Seneca sometimes calls “security,” sometimes “peace.” The theologians almost always call it “peace.” And this is none other than that very well-known euthymia of Democritus, a so called “joyousness” of which Cicero [Fin., 5.8.23] and Diogenes Laertius [9.45] speak.

DISPLAYS MIGHT THROUGH TERROR

This is customary in tyrants: to think any might they do not wield to the misery of others to be worthless. Often are such persons depicted by the tragedians. So Seneca’s Nero in the Octavia [455]: Him who lies down the crowd do trample on. Thus by their raging, they find out how far they can go.
HIDDEN, NAY SHEATHED

The rhetoricians call this figure _metanoia_, translatable as “repentance,” which removes a statement and replaces it with something more appropriate. See Rutilius Lupus. Quintilian [Inst., 9.1.30,35; 9.3.88] and Cicero call it “correction.” Sometimes corrections are ironical as that of Cicero in his _Pro Caelio_ [13.32]: _Were I not hindered by my personal enmity to that woman’s husband — I meant to say brother..._ This is given, however, the special name of “sarcasm” by Julius Rufinianus.

THOUGH HE LACK ALL ELSE, NO MAN

If one man suffers punishment while another is released from it, you would say this is not so much clemency as corruption in the judge. Thus in our own day judgment is nothing but public bribery: “And a knight who sits in judgment, gives the verdict for which he has been paid.” But when a judge treats all equally kindly, he furnishes real proof of his own gentle-dealing. This is therefore to be understood by way of anticipation, because he says he has a place for pardon toward old age and youth alike, for humble as well as for noble person. Now “anticipation” is to be understood as Quintilian defines it in his _Institutes_ [4.1.49], whereas it means something else for Cicero in his _Rhetoric_ [A.H., 4.27.37]. The sense will be: Some indeed bring the commendation of family and nobility; others will plead their prowess in battle as an excuse for robbery, fraud, adultery. For some, youth or prime of life is an extenuating circumstance. I have devised reasons for myself by which I can help all men. Nobility itself was venerable for its own sake, but the lowliness of the common folk aroused pity. For various reasons they merited favor. I bestowed due favor upon youth, reverence upon old age. Finally I remembered that even those who had no defense whatsoever, were at least human beings related to me by the name, as Augustine says: _Let us prosecute in them their own wickedness, let us have pity on the nature they share with us. Nothing, then, is conceded to private efforts, nothing to meanness._
4. I SO HOLD GUARD OVER MYSELF, AS THOUGH TO THE LAWS

He has well added as though because the prince has been released from obedience to the laws; but it is a saying worthy of the ruler’s majesty for a prince to confess himself “bound to the laws.” And surely there is something greater than rule in submitting the principate to the laws, as it says in the Rescript of Valerius and Theodosius, Chapter “On the Laws” [Cod. Just., 1.14.4]; and in the Rescript of Severus and Antoninus one reads: Although we are not subject to the lavas, we live by the laws. Pliny in his Panegyric [20.5]: Let the emperor be accustomed to render an accounting of his rule; let his goings and comings be as if he were about to cast up his accounts; let him make known what he has spent; thus it will come to pass that he will not spend what he is ashamed to mention. Likewise [Ibid., 65.1]: You wish to permit nothing more to yourself, than to us... The prince is not over the laws but the laws over the prince. Thus also Augustus submitted a reckoning of his conduct of office before the senate. See Suetonius [Aug., 28.1]. Understand “reckoning” for “computation,” as it is commonly called.

WHICH I HAVE SUMMONED FROM NEGLECT INTO THE LIGHT OF DAY

Seneca is here touching on the times of Tiberius and Caligula, under whom fights and laws were banished. For Tiberius, after simulating uprightness for a time, broke forth into every sort of cruelty; Caligula, ever true to his character, never even tried to hide his depravity. Nor did Claudius’ reign recall corrupt morals to a better discipline. Nero was the first then to bring help to decadent conditions.

BY THE FRESH YOUTH [“FIRST AGE”] OF ONE, BY THE EXTREME OLD AGE [“LAST AGE”] OF ANOTHER

Youth is accustomed, says Cicero [Off., 2.13.45], to find favor rather than to meet with enmity. And in ancient times, old age was very highly honored, as much in public morals, as in private duties. Now it is noted how among authors “first age” means childhood, “last” means old age. But
individual ages are divided into three, as Servius says in his Commentary on the Aeneid [5.295]: so that there are the first blossoming, the full grown age and the declining age. As a consequence we often read of “first old age” and “last childhood.” Sallust: *Mithridates, after his mother died of poisoning, assumed rule in the last of his childhood.* Juvenal [Sat., 3.26]: *While my white hairs are recent, while my first old age is still fresh and straight…*

**ONE I HAVE PARDONED FOR HIS HIGH POSITION, ANOTHER FOR HIS HUMBLE STATE**

Thus elsewhere [Clem., 2.6.2]: *He will grant to a mother’s tears the live of her son.* We use this expression when pardon is extended to one who confesses a crime. Livy [2.35.5]:... *if they were unwilling to grant him the acquittal of only one citizen or one senator as innocent, let them give them up, as if guilty, as a favor.* The same [3.12.8]: Among these — Lucius Quintius, surnamed Cincinnatus, without dwelling on his merits, lest he should heighten public hatred, but begging pardon for his errors and his youth, implored of them to forgive his son for his sake, who had not given offense to any one by either word or deed. Likewise [8.35.45]: *It is well… Military discipline has prevailed; the majesty of government has prevailed; both which were in danger of ceasing to exist.* Quintus Fabius, who fought contrary to the order of his commander, is not acquitted of guilt; but after being condemned as guilty, is granted to the Roman people; is granted to the tribunitial power, supporting him with an authority not regular but obtained by prayers.

**TODAY, IF THE IMMORTAL GODS**

As the people ought to temper themselves to the will of the prince, so should the prince see to it that he keeps Jupiter and the gods propitious. Horace has put this elegantly [C., 3.1.58]: *The rule of dreaded kings is over their own peoples; / But over kings themselves is the rule of Jove, / Glorious after his victory o’er the Giants, / And controlling all things with the nod of his brow.* Therefore the prince should consider that he has received his administration of the people from the gods, and is sometime to render an account thereof to them. As Theseus says in Seneca’s
Hercules Furens [745-747]: O judge to be, Abstain from human blood, / Each one of you who rules: more heavily / Our sins are punished...

**IF THEY SHOULD REQUIRE A RECKONING FROM ME**

He alluded to the ancient custom whereby censors required a reckoning of office from those who had held the magistracy. Cicero, *Leg.* [3.20.47]: *And magistrates, after completing their terms, are to report and explain their official acts to these same censors...* And proconsuls used to render their reports to the public treasury.

**5. HOLD ALL THINGS IN SAFE TRUST AND GUARDIANSHIP**

Cicero [*Off.*, 1.25.85] compares state administrators with guardians. Cornelius Tacitus [*Ann.* 1.12.1] seems to be referring to this when he speaks of Tiberius refusing imperial office: *Meanwhile, when the Senate stooped to the most humiliating importunity, Tiberius happened to say, that “as he was unequal to the weight of the whole government, so if they were disposed to entrust him with the guardianship of any part whatever it was, he would undertake it.”* Since it is dangerous for guardians to defraud or even neglect their wards, Seneca says Nero can render to the gods the same satisfactory account required of guardians.

**YOUR EFFORT HAS NOT BEEN WASTED**

It is common for those who had previously very well managed the state, to be led away by the multitude’s ingratitude from the right track. Hence these lines of Homer’s *Odyssey* [5.810], which Erasmus quotes and renders into Latin in his *Adagia* [3.9.82]:

*Never henceforward let sceptered king with a ready heart be kind
And gentle, nor let him heed righteousness in his mind;
But let him ever be harsh, and work unrighteousness...*

Valerius [8.15] attests the same thought: *Nature herself affords us gladness, when we see that honor is striven after with diligence, and is then bestowed with gratitude.* Therefore Seneca admonishes Nero concerning the people’s gratitude lest he seem to have wasted the benefits already
bestowed upon them, or to have ill-placed them; and furthermore to encourage him for the future.

**GRUDGING APPRAISERS**

Or niggardly and stingy. Virgil [G., 2.179] has called grudging hills those that are barren and unfruitful. Quintilian [2.2.6]: *In commending the exercises of his pupils, let him be neither grudging nor lavish.* The opposite, in Donatus on Terence’s *Adelphi* [4.5.68.702]: *Kindly,* he says, i.e., generously and abundantly. So does Horace understand the expression [C., 1.9.68]: *And right generously bring forth / In Sabine jar the wine four winters / Old, O Thaliarchus!* Likewise [Ibid., 1.17.1516]: *Shall generously flow from bounteous/Horn, abundance of the glories of the field.* Or malicious, that is ill-willed. Quintilian [11.1.24]: *In his verses, I wish he had been more modest, since the malicious have never ceased to carp on them...* The opposite expression in Seneca’s *On Benefits* [5.17.7]: *not to reckon up the years of others, but to value one’s own highly...*

**THANKS ARE RENDERED TO YOU**

Yet it seems gratitude is felt, rather than rendered [paid] when benefit is not repaid with benefit. But this should be understood as Cicero’s statement in his speech, *Pro Plancio* [28.68]: *He who repays a benefit feels gratitude; and he who has gratitude renders it by having it.* And *Ep. Faro.* [5.2.3] *What makes a friendship truly mutual is... the acceptance and return of good feeling on equal terms.* Elsewhere [Clem., 1.7.3] “to render thanks” is used for “to make requital.”

**NO HUMAN BEING (NEMO UNUS HOMO)**

An archaism, for the word “nobody” (nemo) contains the word “man” (homo). Terence, *Eunuch* [3.5.1.549]: *Is anyone following me from the house? Not a soul (nemo homo est).* Cicero, *Pro Sulla* [8.25]: *Unless perhaps it seems to you tyrannical so to live that you are a slave to no man (homini nemini) nor even to any passion.* Cato: *No one (nemo homo) harms a truce-flag bearer.* The same in his speech *On Behalf of the People of Rhodes* [Gell., 7(6).3.16]: *If there were no one (nemo homo) for us to
fear, we would do whatever we pleased. This is “exaggeration by comparison,” because it is not so difficult to gain the gratitude of one person as to win over so many human hearts to oneself.

6. BUT IT IS A MIGHTY BURDEN

It is as if he said: You have a serious rival here, firmly established... [Cic. Ep. Faro., 2.4.2]; see that you live up to the opinion men have conceived of you.

NO ONE TODAY TALKS OF THE DEIFIED AUGUSTUS OR THE EARLY YEARS OF TIBERIUS CAESAR

Those princes who have deserved well of their subjects, leave, when they die, a sense of loss to their contemporaries, and an everlasting memory with posterity. Particularly, it almost always happens that the memory of past happiness presents itself in present miseries. But when people do not cast their eyes back upon the past, then doubtless they acquiesce in the present. This very thing pertains to Nero’s great praise. Seneca says, The Deified Augustus according to the original meaning of the word which Servius annotated in his Commentary on the Aeneid [5.45.] The consecration of emperors will be discussed later [Clem., 1.10.2]. Finally, one must not carelessly pass over the fact that he says, Augustus and the Early Years of Tiberius. For one reads that Augustus, after assuming the monarchy, did not act cruelly, but disposed everything so gently that he united all things, high and low. Deservedly, then, it came about that after his death there were those who thought his age ought to be called “augustan,” as it was called a golden age, as Suetonius related [Tib., 59.1]. Tiberius did not live up to the opinion men had conceived of him, when he assumed an almost new character. Not only did he break forth into all sorts of cruelty, but he became inflamed with every kind of base lust, the veritable shame of the Roman empire. See Suetonius [Tib., 41].

WHICH HE WOULD HAVE YOU IMITATE

Before those whom we wish to arouse, as with spurs dug in, to virtue, we are accustomed to set great men for imitation. Hence for Cicero [de Orat.,
2.9.36] History is life’s schoolmistress; in her, as in a mirror, we see our own life. We discern with our eyes what we are to avoid, what to follow. But for those who are naturally upright no external examples are needed. This is what Seneca means here. Cicero writes to Dolabella [Ep. Faro., 9.14.6]: What reason is there then for my exhorting you to obey the dictates of your high position and reputation? Am I, after the usual fashion of those who exhort others, to set before you illustrious examples? I find no more illustrious example than yourself. It lies with you to imitate yourself, and be your own rival Likewise to Curio [Ep. Faro., 2.7.2]:... have a talk with yourself, invite yourself to a consultation, listen to yourself; obey yourself. And [Ep. Faro., 137] to Varro: And now contend not with others, but with yourself. Pliny, Panegyric [13.5]:... Wonderful indeed is it that one among all loves to be faithful to the customs of our ancestors, to the virtue of our ancestors, and without any competitor, without exemplar, contends only with himself... Exemplar (“pattern”) has been properly used here. For as Festus Pompeius says: Example is what we follow or avoid; exemplar, something which we can use as a model Suetonius has used the word improperly in his Life of Tiberius [61.2]: Suffice it to give a few exemplars of his cruelty. Likewise, by Cornelius Tacitus [Ann., 12.37.2]: But if you preserve my life, I shall be an everlasting exemplar of your clemency. They ought to have said “example.”

**IS MEASURED BY THIS FORETASTE**

That is, is conformed and regulated according to the will and desire of all. Livy [34.31.17]: Do not measure by your laws that which is done by Sparta.

**NO ONE CAN WEAR A MASK LONG**

What Seneca previously called a “goodness assumed for a time” he now calls, WEARING A MASK, a metaphor drawn from comedy and tragedy, in which masked persons act in the theater. Hence, “to wear a mask” means to lay aside one’s natural form. And we speak of a counterfeit and hypocritical man as “masked.” Apuleius, Metam. [8.9]:... and masking the matter with passing craft in the midst of his abject gabbling and humble prayers, she said: “You shall understand that yet the comely face of your brother and my husband is always still before my eyes...
THE FALSE QUICKLY LAPSES BACK INTO ITS OWN NATURE

This is an imitation of Cicero [Off., 2.12.43]. Socrates used to say: “The nearest way to glory — a shortcut, as it were — is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be.” For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretense, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretenses soon fall to the ground like frail flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. What? Are there not also in our own age monsters of men, dripping with inner vices, yet putting forth the outward appearance and mask of uprightness? Yet they shall melt like wax when truth, the daughter of time, shall reveal herself. Let them sell as they will sad-faced shows of piety to the public, the time will come that he who has sold smoke will perish by smoke. Cicero [Ep. Att., 7.1.6]: Even as virtue is not easy, so is the perpetual pretense thereof not easy either.

SPRINGS FROM OUT THE SOLID EARTH

A solid body is, among the geometricians, one having three dimensions, length, breadth, and height, as Gellius [1.20.3] states; and according to Euclid [Elem., 11 Del. 1] is the opposite of something empty or a vacuum. Horace [Sat., 1.2.113]: And so to distinguish the empty and the solid? Here, therefore, metaphorically the phrase SPRUNG FROM THE SOLID EARTH is used of that which has not only surface or outer skin but is full and whole, as Donams comments on Terence’s Andria [4.1.23.647]. Thus Curtius [9.2.14]: Even our glory, although it rests on a solid foundation, is greater in name than in fact.

7. GREAT WAS THE HAZARD

Seneca means that Roman affairs had been in great jeopardy before Nero had established a sure way of life; in other words when he had not yet displayed any proof of natural disposition, from which one might infer an upright character. For that age is indeed changeable and slippery, which easily stumbles through inexperience and is also misled by others’ advice, and finally sinks from right and honorable discipline to ease and pleasure, says Herodian [1.3.1]. Yet in the morals of the prince it is a question of
public advantage or peril. No wonder if the hazard that the Roman people faced was great. Now indeed peril has flown; the foundations have been so laid, that the outcome cannot possibly differ from this happy beginning. Dice, it is known, is a game subject to the vicissitudes of chance; from this original meaning is derived by similitude that which signifies each and every kind of hazard. Horace [C., 2.1.6]:

*A task full of dangerous hazard...*

Lucan [Phars., 6.7f]:

*He chose the hazard of destiny*

*That must destroy one head or the other.*

The same word Seneca now uses was employed by Livy [1.23.9]: *Not content with certain liberty, we are incurring the dubious hazard of sovereignty or slavery. Let us adopt some method, whereby, without loss, without much blood of either nation, it may be decided which shall rule the other.* Julius Caesar’s saying is recalled by Suetonius [Jul., 32]: *The die is cast,* meaning: the whole future of the state has been given over into the hands and power of fortune. In Greek, according to Plutarch [Jul. Caes., 32.4]: *errhipthi kybos.* [“The die is cast, the dice have been thrown.”]

**TO WHAT COURSE THOSE NOBLE TALENTS OF YOURS WOULD GIVE THEMSELVES**

That is, to what pursuits he would apply his mind, what method of life he would follow. This is a worthy expression. Cicero [Ep. Art. 13.23]: *So give yourself to speaking, hack away at them, finish them, excite them, attack them, but speak.* And Ep. Fam. [13.1.4]: *... if your feelings have been ever so slightly hurt by the wrong-headedness of certain persons..., give yourself over to leniency, whether because of your own exceptional kindliness, of... for my sake.*

So also here, **TO WHAT COURSE THEY WOULD GIVE THEMSELVES,** that is, to what state he would apply and direct his mind. These two words, “to apply” and “to give,” are used interchangeably in Cicero, Verr. [2.2.70.169]: *He very thoroughly gave himself over to intimacy with Verres.* In his speech, Pro Cluentio [24.66]... *he applied himself to gain the friendship of one who was penniless, brazen, and a past master in the art*
of judicial corruption and, moreover, himself a juror at the time — namely Staienus. The same Cicero has used it in another context in Ep. Fam. [13.10.2]: M. Varro gave himself to candidacy for office.

THE PUBLIC PRAYERS ARE ASSURED

Either he calls PUBLIC PRAYERS those accustomed to be promulgated in a solemn rite, first for the health of the prince, then for the prosperity of the state, as supplications, as Juvenal says [Sat., 10.284f]: But the public prayers of all those cities / Gained the day... Or PUBLIC PRAYERS are simply what each one frames out of affection for the fatherland. The first interpretation is more appropriate.

FOR THERE IS NO DANGER THAT YOU WILL BE SEIZED BY SUDDEN FORGETFULNESS OF YOURSELF

Now all hazard has been removed because it is sure FROM HIS TALENTS what Nero’s character is to be like: just as there was concern about danger so long as his talents had not yet revealed themselves. Therefore an opposite effect follows an opposite cause [cf. Cic., T.D., 5.17.60]. Cicero expresses this notion in a letter to Dolabella [Ep. fram., 9.14.7]: So splendid have been your achievements already, that you have not even the right to fall short oaf your own standard. SUBITA means not only “sudden”, but also “unpremeditated.” Indeed, things done extempore are almost unpremeditated. Accordingly, SUBITUM is used for “unadvised.” Q. Cassius to Cicero [Ep. Faro., 12.13.1]: just as these most recent acts of mine were not indeed precipitate or inconsistent, but quite in keeping with those reflections to which you can testify... And Gellius [9.15.5] calls an extemporary oration subitaria dictio. We elegantly, moreover, describe inconstancy when we say that FORGETFULNESS of self has stolen upon someone. The expression is sometimes transferred to inanimate objects. Cicero [Ep. Faro., 9.12.1]:... unless they are fond of you, they flatter you, and just so long as you are present, have forgotten their former tricks... That is, they have degenerated from their inborn disposition. But Pliny [H.N., 7.24.90] has used a construction different from Seneca’s: One who fell from a very high roof forgot (lit: ‘incurred forgetfulness of) his mother and his relatives and friends...
OVERMUCH PROSPERITY, IT IS TRUE, MAKES MEN GREEDY

A universal saying. For the sake of amplification, he sets it forth in advance in order to subjoin, in lieu of a miracle, the fact that the Roman people are contented with their prosperity. Livy has elegantly expressed this thought in his preface [11f]: The less wealth there was, the less desire was there. Of late, riches have introduced avarice; and excessive pleasures, a passion for ruining ourselves and destroying everything else. And Curtius [7.8.20] in the Scythians’ speech to Alexander: What need have you for riches, which compel you to hunger for them? First of all men, you by a surfeit have produced a hunger so that the more you have, the keener is your desire for what you have not. Ovid’s lines in his Fasti [1.211f, 215f] are well known:

Both wealth increased, and insane lust for wealth:
Possessing overmuch, men would possess still more;
As he who in his thirst has over-drunk himself:
The more he has inside, the more it’s thirsted for.

Juvenal, Sat. [14.139]: As much as wealth itself increases, increases love of gain...

AND DESIRES ARE NEVER SO WELL CONTROLLED

The term “desire” [CUPIDITAS] is variously understood; here it is to be referred to the higher sense. So do the philosophers call the seat of concupiscence, which contains all the passions of the mind, and those inner dispositions not subject to the rule of reason. To make it clearer, let us set forth Epicurus’s division to which Cicero refers [Fin., 1.13.45]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desire</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural and necessary</td>
<td>easily attainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural but not necessary</td>
<td>content with moderate expense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither natural nor necessary</td>
<td>insatiable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since, therefore, there are three kinds of desires, we may understand this passage to be concerned with the third sort or the third member, namely,
desire insatiable. Of this, as Cicero says, *neither measure nor limit can be found*. And Seneca, in many passages, for example *Ep. Mor.* [39.5]: Desire which overleaps natural measure must develop into measureness.

**THE ASCENT IS FROM GREAT**

Seneca expresses the same thought in his *Consolation to Albina* [11.4]:... *every appetite which arises not from real want but from vice is of the same nature: however much you lavish on it, it will not cease, but will only increase further.*

**YET TODAY YOUR SUBJECTS ONE AND ALL**

The meaning is: Although no person of good and equable disposition reflects upon his lot, still the Roman people cannot now conceal their prosperity. Nor are they endowed with such great shamelessness as not to impose a limit upon their desires. This indeed all to a man confess, and with a single voice unanimously proclaim, that they have attained the very pinnacle of fortune.

**ARE FORCED TO CONFESS**

Seneca’s usage here is very significant. For as Donatus on Terence’s *Adelphi* [prol. 4] says, *Confession implies unwillingness*. And *EXPRIMERE* is “to draw forth under pressure.” Terence [*Eun.*, 1.1.22f. 67f]:... *one tiny sham tear, by Hercules, yes; / Which grievous rubbing of the eyes has hardly forced with vigor out of her...* In this passage Donatus interprets the position of the word as for the sake of amplification. I should like to subjoin other examples which better show the elegance of the word. Livy [3.28.10]: *But that the confession may be forced out, that their nation was defeated and subdued, that they should pass under the yoke.* And [21.18.5]: *Now both a confession of wrong is forced from us, and, as though we had confessed, restitution is immediately demanded.* Pliny, *Panegyr* [2.2]: *Let those words... which fear forced out... be far from us.* Suetonius [Tib., 19]:... *who mixing with those about him, and being discovered by his trepidation, was tortured, and a confession of his intended crime forced out.* Latinus Pacatus has said [*Panegyr.*, 43.5]: *exact a confession*. The equivalent among the Greeks is *ekbiazethai*. 
“No good thing on earth is lasting, much less eternal.” And, as they say, “Cheerless is the aftermath of every stroke of luck.” Hence one must ponder the retaining as much as the obtaining. Doubtless the Roman people can rightly desire this addition to their happiness, namely that it may not perish before its time.

8. MANY FACTS FORCE THEM TO THIS CONFESSION

Now he gets down to the reasons which make it impossible for the Roman people to deny their happiness without violating their sense of shame. When he calls this confession MOST RELUCTANT, he is alluding to Horace’s words [Sat. 1.1.13):

_How comes it, Maecenas, that no man lives content_  
_With the lot which either his choice has given him or chance_  
_Has thrown his way, but each has praise for those who_  
_follow other paths?_

JUSTICE ENTHRONED ABOVE ALL INJUSTICE

The term _injuria_ can be variously understood. If you take it to mean “abuse,” the sense will be that those who are liable to suffer injustice are so well protected by the law, that they cannot be oppressed by the power or faction of their enemies. For, as Ovid says [Fast., 3.279]:

_Laws were given that the stronger might not have absolute power._

Still, I prefer in this instance to interpret it as “iniquity,” as if it were non-justice, according to the etymology of the word, as Ulpian teaches [Dig. Just., 47.10.1], so as simply to mean that there is no place for injustice where all matters are administered according to justice and the laws. When _the laws are silenced by arms_, when judges’ verdicts are bought, allies despoiled with impunity, all parts of the state debauched — then injustice stands over justice. Conversely, where the laws are not thrown into utter confusion by license of arms, where courts are uncorrupted, allies un-
oppressed, all parts of the state well disposed — there justice triumphs over injustice.

**WHICH LACKS NO ELEMENTS OF COMPLETE LIBERTY**

Anticipation of an implied objection. For someone could still want liberty for the complete happiness of the people, than which the Roman prized nothing more highly. For they considered that a freeborn man “would rather die twice than be enslaved.” For this reason Seneca adds liberty to those benefits which the people, by their prince’s liberality, enjoyed. Yet he so tempers this liberty that it may not turn into the license of self-destruction. And it is not a question here of preferring monarchy over democracy or aristocracy; but the Roman state (so he wishes us to understand) had reached the point of being unable to stand without some limitation of its liberty. In this vein Lucan speaks [*Phars.*., 1.7072]:

*It was the chain of jealous fate, and the speedy fall
Which no eminence can escape; it was the grievous collapse
of excessive weight, And Rome unable to support her own greatness.*

Horace [*Epod.*, 16.2]:

*And Rome through her own strength is tottering.*

For they imposed the necessity of monarchy upon themselves, when that well compacted body was dissipated by rival factions. Let us now return to the words of our author. Almost all panegyrists list the “liberty” of his times among the praises of the prince; as Martial [5.19.6]: *Under what prince was liberty so great?* They claim for the emperor not so much a rule as a certain civil superintendence. It is to be observed that the word *licentia* is here used in a bad sense, as it is almost always taken among authors; so Valla has annotated it. Quintilian [3.8.48]:... *what is liberty in some is in others called license.* Livy [34.2.14]: *They long for liberty; or rather, to speak the truth, for license in everything.* Yet Erasmus is in error — if I may be allowed the remark — in denying that the word can be used in a good sense without barbarism. To pass over those jurisconsults who are authors of pure Latinity — this word is repeatedly used by them — other classical writers do not abstain from it. Cicero [*Off.*, 1.29.103]: *As we do not grant our children unlimited license to play, but only such as is not incompatible with good conduct.* And Cornelius Tacitus [*Ann.*, 1.26.1f]: 
When Drusus, in answer to this, pleaded the authority of the senate and of his father, clamor broke out: why had he come, when he could neither increase their pay, nor alleviate their grievances; in fact, when he had no license to benefit them. Likewise [Ibid., 14.49.2]: However, for himself, as he would have opposed their making a severe decree, so he would not forbid moderation; they could decide as seemed best to them, even having license to acquit. For I do not wish to cite Julius Capitolinus, who sometimes neglects the ancient purity of the Roman language.

9. IN PROPORTION TO HIS LOT

The word can be read divided into two, pro portione, and also as a single word: the meaning is one and the same. PROPORTION is what the Greeks call analogia. Hence in Aristotle’s Ethics [5.8, 113263334], the law of analogy or proportion (so to speak) which is applied in distributing honors, when a proportion is allotted to each. Therefore Seneca proves the excellence of this virtue from its utility, because it would be especially popular inasmuch as it benefits every class of society. Liberality is indeed a kingly virtue, but is equally not dispensed to all. In choosing magistrates, in conferring offices, the prince ought to have before his eyes this law of analogy, to avoid uneven distribution. As a consequence, he cannot exercise liberality indiscriminately. To clemency do they owe their lives, all those who have been spared, without difference: whether of the senatorial order or of the very dregs of the common folk.

NOR IS THERE ANY MAN

This is anticipation, which makes transition to the next chapter, lest it seem too hastily said, that FROM CLEMENCY ALL EXPECT THE SAME, since the innocent who rely upon their steadfast innocence do not wish to be excused if they commit any sin. Hence that utterance of Cato’s, full of assurance, that he prefers rather to go without the thanks expected from good deeds than not to undergo the punishment due him from evil doing. But Seneca says that no man so obstinately relies on his conscience, that he does not prefer that pardon be made ready for him, in case he should swerve from the way, rather than inexorable severity. Hence also it comes about that he said “errors,” a term for a rather light offense. Ovid, Trist.
[1.2.99f]: My error has carried me away, / And my mind was foolish, but not imbued with crime. And very often elsewhere.
CHAPTER 2

1. I know, however, that there are some who think that clemency upholds the worst class of men, since it is superfluous unless there has been some crime, and since it alone of all the virtues finds no exercise among the guiltless. But, first of all, just as medicine is used by the sick, yet is held in honor by the healthy, so with clemency — though it is those who deserve punishment that invoke it, yet even the guiltless cherish it. Again, clemency has scope even in the person of the guiltless, because at times fortune takes the place of guilt; and not only does clemency come to the rescue of innocence, but often of righteousness also, inasmuch as, from the state of the times, there arise certain acts which, while praised, may yet be punished. Besides, there are a great many people who might be turned back to innocence.

2. Nevertheless, it is not fitting to pardon too commonly; for when the distinction between good and bad men is removed, the result is confusion and an epidemic of vice. Therefore a moderation should be exercised which will be capable of distinguishing between curable and hopeless characters. Neither should we have indiscriminate and general, nor “cut short” clemency; for it is as much a cruelty to pardon all as to pardon none. We should maintain the mean; but since a perfect balance is difficult, if anything is to disturb the equipoise it should tip the scales toward the more humane side. But these matters will be more fitly discussed in their proper place.

He raises an objection as if from an opponent. For there are those who falsely think CLEMENCY TO BE REMISSION OF PUNISHMENT. But [Hot. C., 4.5.24]: Punishment follows close on guilt. So it comes about that clemency seems to be nothing but a kind of impunity. Seneca dispels this false and stupid notion, and at the same time the bad name of clemency which springs from it. For no one of sound judgment would assign clemency a place among the virtues, who thought of it as a sort of right of asylum for criminals and dangerous men, encouraging recklessness by sustaining the wicked.
BUT FIRST OF ALL JUST AS MEDICINE IS USED BY THE SICK

This is the first point in disposing of the objection. Granted that the guilty alone are permitted to experience the benefits of clemency — still it does not for that reason lose the name of virtue among good men. He clinches his argument by a very apt comparison. For medicine, even if none be ill, is ever esteemed as an art necessary for humankind: yet only when occasion demands does it exercise its power.

SO WITH CLEMENCY — THOUGH IT IS THOSE WHO DESERVE PUNISHMENT THAT INVOCES IT

In judicial proceedings the first question to be treated is that of the act itself. When someone accused of homicide denies that he has killed a man, this, as Quintilian says, is the surest defense of the cause. The next best thing is to defend the murder as justly done. When not the act itself but the quality of the act is considered to be in doubt, this becomes a legitimate question. Last of all there is supplication (deprecatio) which can only take place after the crime has been confessed, when we can neither deny the misdeed to have been committed, nor defend it as tightly committed. Then we have recourse to begging for pardon, we elicit the judge’s mercy with tears, without any appearance of defense. Accordingly, deprecation... is extremely rare, as Quintilian says [5.13.5] and before such judges only as are confined to no set form of decision. And the same author [7.4.18]: In the senate, before the people or the emperor, and wherever there is clemency with regard to the lam, deprecation has its place. See Cicero [A. H., 2.17.25ff; Inv., 1.11.15; 2.33.10436.109]. I ought not however to pass over Cicero’s celebrated passage in his Pro Ligario [10.30], for from this single example you can readily understand what deprecation is. I have often pleaded many a cause, Caesar, yea, and at your side too, while the demands of your official career kept you at the bar, but never after this fashion: “[crave your pardon for my client, gentlemen; he blundered — he slipped — he never thought — if ever again... ” That is the tone one adopts toward a parent, but to a jury me say: “He did not do this thing; he never dreamed of it; the evidence is false; the charge is invented.” Hence it is clear enough why Seneca says that THOSE DESERVING PUNISHMENT INVOCES CLEMENCY. And Publilius Syrus: ‘Tis a bad cause that requires mercy.
AGAIN, THIS VIRTUE HAS SCOPE EVEN IN THE PERSON OF THE GUILTLESS

Seneca was previously defending clemency so as to concede it to be an unnecessary virtue among the guiltless. Now he proves that a time comes when clemency serves even these persons. For there are certain matters, rather to be imputed to fortune than to deliberate malice: yet they are not exempted from punishment, if you enforce the law with the utmost rigor. There are other things which take their character from the circumstances of the time, and which recently deserved the praise of virtue, but now are turned to vice. If these are subjected to strict severity they can legitimately be punished; if to equity, legitimately condoned. Ovid has well expressed it [Trist., 1.1.37]:

As it is the judge’s duty to investigate the facts,
So also the circumstances.

In Quintilian, also, “status” pertains to act, i.e., to the actual doing (praxis) of a deed., whether a man did a thing knowingly or unknowingly; from compulsion or by chance. For many identical things are often done but in different ways.

BESIDES, THERE ARE A GREAT MANY PEOPLE

Now comes the third argument to remove the reproach which argued that clemency was of value only to nourish boldness to do evil. Still, says Seneca, there are many who have not yet quaffed deeply of wickedness, who, if you should apply moderate correction, can repent. Should not one try some method by which you could turn such men back to the right path? This is exactly what clemency does. It is of great importance when pleading for mercy, says Quintilian [7.4.18], if there is hope that a man will live innocently in the future, and make himself of use to others. Or, as Cicero says, “repentance is the best haven after shipwreck.” Yet all this can only happen where clemency is practiced. Seneca, On Anger [1.19.5]: He often lets a man go after detecting his crime, if his repentance for what he has done promises good hope, if he perceives that the man’s wickedness is not deeply rooted in his mind, but is only, as the saying goes, skin-deep. He will grant impunity in cases where it will hurt neither the receiver nor the giver. However, what Seneca here calls to be turned back to
INNOCENCE, Terence [And., 1.2.19.190] has termed to return to the path; Cicero, [Cad. 28] to return to better fruit.

2. NEVERTHELESS IT IS NOT FITTING TO PARDON TOO COMMONLY

So far Seneca has discussed how the letter of the law should not always be strictly observed. But since the sages define virtue as the mean which lies, to quote Cicero [Off., 1.25.89], between too much and too little, one must guard clemency, lapsed into excess, from being ascribed to vice rather than to virtue. One must grant pardon, but not to all men. For some persons are improved by pardon, others are corrupted. In this way, if a judge temper punishments, he will know by what boundaries the mean of virtue is to be limited. Vulgo (commonly) is an adverb which means “here and there,” and “indiscriminately,” as Cicero shows in his speech Pro Murena [35.73]: To provide a place at a show or to give an invitation to dinner? ‘By no means, but commonly.’ How do you mean ‘commonly’? ‘Everybody.’ Virgil [G., 3.246f]:

… Never did the shapeless bear
Spread death and havoc so commonly (vulgo)...

Terence [Heaut., 5.2.3.956]: Poor me! What’s so terrible about the thing I’ve done?/ It’s a thing men commonly do. Seneca does not therefore deny that the lowest order of the plebs is worthy of pardon, but he limits clemency, lest it become indiscriminate and excessive, by a definite standard.

WHEN THE DISTINCTION IS REMOVED, THE RESULT IS CONFUSION

Now he marks the reason why pardon should not be commonly given: there are very many persons so depraved and profligate that, unless they are constrained by punishment, they will immediately break down every restraint of shame and decency. Here let the judge remember: By tolerating an old injustice, a new one is provoked. Let him set before himself Cicero’s statement in Pro Milone [16.43]: There is no temptation to crime so powerful as the prospect of impunity. And in In Verrem [2.3.76.176] O
habit of wrongdoing! What pleasure you provide for men without principle or sense of shame, when they have escaped punishment, and found themselves given a free hand! So creeps onward that evil sown in man’s nature by the habit of freely sinning, so that it cannot set a limit to its own boldness. Off. [2.8.28]: *Had we not borne the unpunished crimes of many, never would such unbridled license have come into the hands of one man.* The duty of the judge is this: to wink at peccadilloes which can set no precedent; but to deal harshly with other offenses which will do harm by their precedent as well. Cicero has well put it [Ep. Brut., 1.2.5]: *A salutary severity is better than an empty show of clemency.*

**THEREFORE A MODERATION SHOULD BE EXERCISED**

Now he shows that severity is not just, which punctiliously and inexorably metes out punishments, nor does that clemency seem to deserve inclusion among the virtues, which exhibits itself indiscriminately here and there. It follows that that moderation is praiseworthy which combines a bit of both. Cicero admirably expressed this thought [Ep. Brut., 1.15.3]: *To use the saying of Solon, one of the seven wise men, and the only lawgiver of the seven: the state is controlled by two things, reward and punishment. There is accordingly a measure in both things as in all else, and a certain restraint in both kinds.* Publilius Syrus: *A good judge he who knows what and how much to dispense.* Cicero, Off. [1.25.88]: *And yet gentle-dealing and clemency are to be commended only with the understanding that strictness may be exercised for the good of the state; for without that, the government cannot well be administered.* This is what Pliny means by these words [Panegyr., 80.1]: *What gentle severity! What clemency without weakness!*

**BETWEEN CURABLE AND HOPELESS (DEPLORATI) CHARACTERS**

In this distinction there lies a certain restraint, which has to be observed in all meting out of punishments. Thus the rule of Plato [Laws, 9.6., 862 E]: *Upon those whom the lawgiver recognizes to be incurable, he will inflict the ultimate punishment, not ignorant of the fact that it will be better for the incurable to die rather than to live; and if they are deprived of life, to be doubly beneficial to the rest. For the rest are deterred by their example and*
also the city is cleansed of wicked men. So proclaims Tullius Hosfilius in
Livy [1.28.9] when he censures Mefius, treaty-breaker and traitor: If,
Metius Fuffatius, you were capable of learning fidelity and keeping of
treaties, that lesson would have been taught you by me, while still alive.
Now, since your character is incurable, at least by your punishment teach
mankind to consider those things inviolable which have been violated by
you. Curable persons he has metaphorically set over against hopeless ones,
a figure drawn from the physicians. For when Seneca says “hopeless” it is
equivalent to Terence’s “lamentable” for “desperate.” Thus Livy
[5.40.6]:...following each his own hopes, his own plans, those of the
government being hopeless. And [9.7.1.]: When these things were said and
heard, and the Roman name was almost hopeless in the assembly of the
faithful allies. The word deplorare (to give up as hopeless) is not so
frequently found in this sense; yet Livy uses it [3.38.2]: But this was
unmistakably tyranny. Liberty was given up as forever lost (deploratur).
The expression was derived from the fact that the corpses of the dead laid
upon the funeral pile are lamented, with loud cries uttered now and then.
This sort of utterly profligate man the Greeks call kachektes, as if
depraved by the habit of vices; Cicero uses this word [Ep. Art., 1.14.6]. To
that kind of men can also be applied the word: “Art cures bodily disease,
death alone the soul’s malady.” For it is easier to break, as Quintilian
[1.3.12] says, than to mend.

NEITHER INDISCRIMINATE NOR CUT SHORT (ABSCISSAM)

Seneca sometimes luxuriates in fulsome style. He had just said that pardon
is not to be given to all or indiscriminately: now he repeats the same
thought in other words. CUT SHORT he uses for “abrupt”, “broken off.”
Valerius [2.7.14]: Military discipline requires a harsh and cut short sort of
chastisement. And [6.5.7. Ext 4]: Sometimes the justice of Charondas
Tyrius was sterner and more cut short, even to the point of violence and
bloodshed. See Budaeus [ARP, 359A]. In the same book [Val. Max., 6.4.3]:
Now impressive is the gravity of a man who is shortcut both in thought
and in utterance!
FOR IT IS AS MUCH OF A CRUELTY TO PARDON ALL

One reads in the Mime of Publilius: *Whoever pardons the wicked harms the good*. Not that good men are hankering after blood, but because they cannot elsewhere seek protection than from the laws which, if they permitted everything to the wicked, the safety of all good men would be at stake. Quintilian [12.7.1]: *If it is not allowable to exact punishment for crimes, then it is but one step further to allow the crimes themselves; and that license should be granted to the bad is decidedly contrary to the interest of the good.*

IT SHOULD TIP THE SCALES TO THE MORE HUMANE SIDE

That this metaphorical expression was taken from weighing, I should prefer you to know from the words of Gregory, who speaks as follows in the Motalia: *Everyone who judges justly, holds a balance in his hand; in one pan he carries justice, in the other mercy. Through justice he renders his verdict on the transgression, through mercy he tempers the punishment for the crime: so that by a just balance he corrects in certain cases through equity, while through mercy in other cases he pardons.* Because it is difficult to weigh one’s verdict always with equal balance, Seneca wishes the judge to lean toward clemency rather than towards cruelty. It has also been rightly laid down, that if there is a deadlock between favorable and unfavorable judgment, the accused is to be absolved as if he actually had obtained a majority. Aristotle gives an account of this in his *Problems* [29.13, 951a].
CHAPTER 3

1. Here I shall divide this subject as a whole into three parts. The first will treat of manumission; the second will aim to show the nature and aspect of clemency, for since there are certain vices which imitate virtues, they cannot be separated unless you stamp them with marks by which they may be known apart. In the third place, I shall inquire how the mind is led to adopt this virtue, and how it establishes it and by use makes it its own.

2. That none of all the virtues is more seemly for a man, since none is more human, is a necessary conviction not only among those of us who regard man as a social animal, begotten for the common good, but also for those who give man over to pleasure, whose words and deeds all look to their own advantage. For if a man seeks calm and quiet, he finds this virtue, which loves peace and stays the hand, forthwith suited to his nature.

3. Yet of all men none is better graced by clemency than a king or a prince. For virtues impart to great men grace and glory only when they have a salutary power: it is surely a baneful might that is strong only for harm. He alone has firm and well-grounded greatness whom all men know to be as much their friend as he is their superior; whose care they daily find to stand guard for the safety of each and all; upon whose approach they do not flee as if some monster or deadly beast had leaped from his lair, but rush eagerly forward as toward a bright and beneficent star. On his behalf they are ready on the instant to throw themselves before the assassins’ daggers, and to lay their bodies beneath his feet if his path to safety must be paved with slaughtered men; his sleep they guard by nightly vigils, his person they defend with an encircling barrier, against assailing dangers they make themselves a rampart.

4. Not without reason do dries and peoples show this accord in giving such protection and love to their kings, and in flinging themselves and all they have into the breach whenever the safety of their ruler craves it. Nor is it self-depreciation or madness when many thousands meet
the steel for the sake of one man, and with many deaths ransom the single life, it may be, of a feeble dotard.

5. The whole body is the servant of the mind, and though the former is so much larger and so much more resplendent, while the unsubstantial soul remains invisible, and we do not even know where its secret habitation lies, yet the hands, the feet, and the eyes carry out its business. The outer skin is its defense. At its bidding we lie idle, or restlessly run to and fro. When it commands, if it is a grasping tyrant, we search the sea for gain; if an ambitious one, ere now we have thrust a right hand into the flames, or plunged willingly into a chasm. In the same way this vast throng, encircling the life of one man, is ruled by his spirit, guided by his reason, and would crush and cripple itself with its own power if it were not upheld by wisdom.

Here Seneca gives the division of the work, but I cannot say I have quite understood it yet. I prefer a man to be a teacher of real frankness rather than delude his reader with frivolous subtleties. For he does not set forth his subject matter in the order he proposes. Nor is it apparent what he means by the word MANUMISSION in the first part. The blame for this is to be ascribed not so much to us perhaps as to the author himself. For it was a particular defect of Seneca’s to heap up miscellaneous forests of matters rather than to arrange them in an orderly fashion. And in this particular work, it is certainly a rather bad thing that he does not at all carry out the arrangement which he announces. Yet this defect, great as it is, is outweighed by his greater virtues.

**VICES IMITATING VIRTUES**

This is an imitation of Cicero, whose words in the *De Partitio Oratoria* [23.81] are: *But we must diligently take care lest we be deceived by those vices which seem to imitate virtue. For cunning masquerades as prudence, boorish contempt for pleasure as temperance, pride masquerades as high-mindedness in moments of great courage and enthusiasm and likewise also does superciliousness, in spurning honors; profusion poses as liberality; audacity as bravery, savage hardness as endurance, harshness as justice, superstition as religion, softness as gentleness, timidity as modesty, etc.* Gregory uses almost the same words: *Often vices deck themselves out, and*
deceptively make out that they are virtues: as tight-fistedness wishes to appear as thrift; lavishly, generosity; cruelty as Real for justice; laxity as piety. Juvenal [14.109112]:

*For that vice has a deceptive appearance and semblance of virtue,*
*Being gloomy of mien, severe in face and garb.*
*The miser is openly commended for his thrift,*
*Being deemed a saving man, and a guardian of his own wealth.*

Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 45.7]:* Vices creep upon us under the name of virtues, rashness hides under the label of fortitude. This thought Publilius Syrus has elegantly summarized:* *The timid man calls himself cautious; the miserly thrifty.* *If this was true in olden times, we, to our great grief, experience it to be truer today than ever before.*

**UNLESS YOU STAMP THEM WITH MARKS**

Significantly he has selected this word as if to say: neither description nor picture is enough: so easy is it for one to make a mistake in distinguishing virtues, on account of what Quintilian [2.12.4] calls *a certain resemblance between vices and virtues.* Thus Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 45.7]:*... there is great danger if one goes astray in these matters. So stamp them with special labels.* The opposite expression is *to confuse the marks,* as used by Cicero [cf. *Ep. Art.*, 7.2.2].

**HOW IT ESTABLISHES IT AND BY USE MAKES IT ITS OWN**

Seneca here alludes to the usucaptions and prescriptions of the jurisconsults. So, also [*Ep. Mor.*, 50.8]:*... when once handed on to us, the good is an everlasting possession; virtue is not unlearnt.* This is what the philosophers say: that man’s mind, as it becomes accustomed to virtues or vices, contracts the habit of them. Now habits are acquired qualities by which with regard to our moral character we conduct ourselves well or badly. So do I understand that passage in Aristotle’s *Ethics* [2.1, 1103a16ff], that moral virtue is acquired by habit. *Endeavors pass over into morals,* says Ovid [*Her.*, 15.83]. And Curtius [5.5.21] states: *Habit is stronger than nature.* Marius, in Sallust [*B. J.*, 85.9]:* But to me, who have passed my whole life in the most honorable occupations, to act well has from habit become nature.* And Aristotle [*Problem.*, 28.1.949a] says: *Habit is transformed into a set form of nature.*
2. THAT NO ONE OF ALL THE VIRTUES

Now Seneca artfully begins by commending the virtue itself as equally valued among all men. For it would scarcely be worthwhile, if he were to commend clemency to Nero and other princes by the mere contemplation of the good. We know nature has so arranged it that we are more affected by a show of usefulness and pleasure, than by those paradoxes of the Stoics, abhorrent to popular sense. Either, then, we stand with the Stoics on the bare appeal to probity — clemency can please by its very name, for it is a name that binds together human society — or else we incline to pleasure or are drawn on by the hope of profit. Even here clemency keeps both its place and dignity.

SINCE NONE IS MORE HUMAN

Argument based on related words. For homo and humanus are cognates. There is in the Topics a species of argument derived from the relation between words which the Greeks call “syzygia” and the related words themselves “syzyga,” as, On a common pasture every member of the community has the right to let his cattle grate [Quint., 5.10.85]. Wonder is that this type of argument seems to Quintilian [Ibid.] of so little weight that he should think it ridiculous to add it, had not Cicero employed it, since this argument is very close to that derived from etymology. Therefore, just as Terence’s Chremes thinks that, because he is a man, nothing human is alien to him [Heaut., 1.1.25.77], so does Seneca here argue that this virtue, the most human of all, is most fitting to man. The term humanitas is variously used. In this passage it has the meaning sketched by Gellius [13.17.1]: A certain openness and goodwill toward all men without distinction, called by the Greeks ‘philanthropy’.

AMONG US, WHO REGARD MAN AS A SOCIAL ANIMAL

The same words from the Stoics’ teaching are repeated by Seneca in On Benefits [7.1.7], as if to say that this one reason will be effective enough if someone were to dispute with the Stoics: that clemency is a sort of bond of human society and kinship. For among them it is axiomatic that men have been begotten for the sake of their fellows, to share one another’s toil, to take counsel together, to share themselves and their possessions,
insofar as it is for the public good. But immediately the Epicureans and
Cyrenaics will object: as they wish nothing to detract from their pleasures,
they will contend that this has nothing to do with them to foot the bill for
someone else. To avoid conflict with them, Seneca makes the point that
they can see how this virtue agrees with utility. Cicero speaks fully
enough about this society of the human race [Off., 2.3.122.4.15; Fin.,
2.14.45ff]. And as Plato writes to Archytas: *He should remember that he
was not born for himself alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that
leave but a small part for himself*. A little later: *It is Reason moreover that
has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced conformity
of character, of language and habit; she has prompted the individual,
starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests,
forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind.
Plato’s words, quoted by Cicero, exist also today in his Letter to Archytas
[Ep. 9]. Yet in *Off.* [1.7.22] Cicero attributes these same words to the
Stoics. Also Aristotle, *Pol.* [3.6,1278b19]: *It is said that man is by nature
a civil and social animal, from which it comes about that even if they lack
nothing of mutual help, nonetheless they strive after commonalty of life.
Lest I seem much too wordy, see Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* [6.24; 48.2ff]

**BEGOTTEN FOR THE COMMON GOOD**

So has Lucan [*Phars.*, 2.383] described for us the Stoic Cato: *Born not for
himself, he deemed, but for the world alone*. Likewise [*Ibid.*, 2.390]:
*Concerned for the community...* Seneca, *On Anger* [1.5.2]: *Mankind’s been
created for mutual assistance*. Juvenal [*Sat.*, 15.148150]: *To them in the
beginning our common maker gave Only life; to us gives mind as well, that
fellow feeling Might bid us ask or proffer aid...* Similar to this is
Quintilian’s saying [*Deal.*, 5.6]: *God that artificer of mortality willed that
we succor one another and through mutual interchange of assistance claim
for another what we would fear to ask for ourselves*. And so Quintilian
[*Deal.*, 13.17] complains that *by human vice* it comes about that *each man
puts gain to his own selfish uses.*

**WHICH LOVES PEACE AND STAYS THE HAND**

This is in accord with the Cyrenaics, who in all things are primarily
interested in their personal advantage as has previously been explained.
Moreover, peace, quiet, leisure especially serve pleasure and usefulness, yet all these can scarcely be maintained among men without the benefit of clemency. **Hand** here is to be taken in the sense of “violence,” the meaning of the word in Cicero, *Off.* [1.22.76]: *Yet the matter vas committed by “force and hand” (by main force).* And *In Verr.* [2.4.65.146]: *Nothing was done with more difficulty than the restraining of the people from laying hands on that man who had made the appeal.* The opposite expression is “to come hand to hand.”

### 3. YET NONE BY CLEMENCY

The thread of the discourse holds together well. In what went before he so asserted that clemency agrees with the nature of men, that he would contend that man is not man who is not at the same time of a clement disposition and inclined to gentleness. For clemency is truly humaneness: to partake of which is nothing else than to be a man. Now because it is more proper to his purpose, he adds that it is a heroic virtue, without which princes cannot rule: just as Vopiscus [*Aurel.,* 44.1] says: *the greatest of all gifts.* He proves this by many reasons, which will be separately noted in their places. Yet the first he immediately adds, namely, that the prince cannot, by whatever virtues, win the favor of the populace unless he exercises a **SALUTARY POWER.** Although the king or emperor may excel in other endowments of fortune, of body, or of mind, all these will lose their charm, unless with gentleness he makes himself lovable and gracious toward his subjects. But all his doings and sayings will be received in a kindly manner, if once he has won the people’s favor by this one virtue. This is in accord with the wise saying of the Gymnosophist who, asked by Alexander how he as a ruler might win great personal glory, replied that this would happen if he would not be an object of terror.

**IT IS SURELY A BANEFUL MIGHT**

As he says in another place [*Clem.,* 1.13.3]: A power exercised to the ill of many cannot long stand. This is contention of contraries, for he continues immediately, **HE ALONE HAS FIRM AND WELL-GROUNDED GREATNESS, ETC.**
HE ALONE HAS FIRM AND WELLGROUNDED GREATNESS

The prince ought to ponder not only what is permitted to him, but in what way he should look after his power. He can rage like a mad beast THROUGH HUMAN CARNAGE. But this will be not rule but robbery. And, “to a robber there are as many enemies as there are men.” Therefore, any man who abuses his high station to the ruin of many so that he arms them against himself is doing himself a bad turn. But stable is the rule of him who rules not only for his own sake but for his subjects’ as well indeed he will be a **shepherd of the people**, as Homer [*Il.*, 2.243] calls Agamemnon.

FOR THE SAFETY OF EACH AND ALL

He has in mind that precept of Plato’s [in Cic. *Off.*, 1.25.85], that those who preside over the state **should care for the whole body thereof, lest while they are looking after a part, they forsake the rest.** For those who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part, says Cicero, **introduce into the state a dangerous element — dissension and party strife.**

WHOSE CARE... TO STAND GUARD

Plancus uses another construction in Cicero’s Letters [*Ep. Faro.*, 10.8.5]: *From all this it may be inferred that anxiety to protect the highest interests of the Republic has... kept me sleeplessly vigilant.* This is a metaphor drawn from watchmen, commonly posted in cities, when there is danger from enemies. It is as if he called the prince a sort of public watchman, who stands guard over the people’s safety “round the clock.” Thus Homer wisely teaches [*Il.*, 2.24f]: *To sleep the whole night through be seemeth not a man that is a counselor, / To whom a host is entrusted, and upon whom rest so many cares.* And Julius Caesar used to call imperial rule “the care of others’ safety.”

AS IF SOME MONSTER OR DEADLY BEAST

For if the prince tyrannically rages against his own people, of a populous city he will make a vast solitude. In his *Panegyric* [48.3f] Pliny speaks of Domitian’s times as follows: **After your public audiences neither flight nor devastation follows! We linger at ease, we dwell as if in a common**
household, where recently the fiercest of beasts fortified himself with countless terrors, as if, shut up in a sort of cavern, he sometimes licked up the blood of his neighbors, sometimes lurched out to overthrow and destroy the most eminent citizens. Standing guard at the gates were dread and threats… besides which there was he himself, terrible both to meet and to see: haughty in mien, anger in his eyes… etc.

**AS TOWARD A BRIGHT**

This is extraordinary praise of the good prince: that his subjects, so long as they enjoy the sight of him, think they are gazing on the sun, or some life-giving **STAR**. So speaks Horace in a poem addressed to Augustus [C., 4.5.58]: *To thy country give again, blest leader, the light of thy presence! / For when, like spring, thy face has beamed / Upon the folk, more pleasant runs the day, / And brighter shines the sun.* Nor are the epithets **BRIGHT** and **BENEFICENT** superfluous, since even the philosophers distinguish between stars that are favorable and prosperous, and others that are adverse and harmful. In fact Porphyry holds that some of the heavenly gods — who are the stars themselves — are beneficent; some nefarious.

**TO THROW THEMSELVES ON HIS BEHALF**

Now he explains more fully what he had previously said: that obviously that power is stable which does not serve the advantages of one rather than the common good. Great fortune, as it almost always arouses envy, should be girt with stout defenses. But now, he who takes into his own faithful care the safety of all, rightly commends his own safety to all. Either external or internal and domestic enemies threaten the life of the prince. The latter stealthily attack him, the former rather assemble in open force. Each peril has its own remedy, when the subjects are ready both **TO THROW THEMSELVES BEFORE THE ASSASSIN’S DAGGERS AND TO LAY THEIR BODIES BENEATH HIS FEET**, etc.

**TO LAY THEIR BODIES BENEATH HIS FEET**

This is an elegant metaphor rendered more graceful by rhetorical hyperbole. Properly speaking the way to the ruler’s safety is not paved with human bodies, and it is an exaggeration to say that they lay their
bodies beneath him and prepare a path for him with slaughtered men. But the words go well together, and the metaphors are most appropriate. Among writers the words *sternere* and *instruere* are commonly used for the terms *pavire* or *munire*. Lucan [*Phars.*, 1.3339] seems to allude to this notion, when he ironically scoffs at Nero: *However, if the Pates could not find any other may / For Nero’s advent — if for eternal empire the gods / Pay dearly as only after a War of great Giants / Could heaven serve its Thunderer — /Then me complain no further, o gods: by this reward / Even these crimes are justified. What if Pharsalia filled / Dire fields, and Carthaginian ghosts with blood were gorged, etc.*

4. NOT WITHOUT REASON

“Anticipation” or “occupation,” lest anyone cavil that it is foolhardiness and insanity for so many thousands of men to be marked for death, in order that they may save the life of one man from death; for them to cast themselves into sure danger of death, that they may repel death from one head. Here Seneca answers: “The prince is in the state as the mind is in the body. As the mind governs and regulates all functions of the members, so the subjects look to and observe the prince’s nod in carrying out all their duties.”

**AND WITH MANY DEATHS RANSOM THE SINGLE LIFE**

As if to say: so many deaths are ill-balanced against the life of one, and so much the worse, if an old man is redeemed by the death of youths; an invalid by the death of healthy men. What sense then, is there in incurring such a loss for such small gain? Is it not a terrible mistake both personally and publicly? These things have also been said “by way of anticipation.”

5. AS THE WHOLE BODY

Nothing apter or more appropriate could be devised for the comparison. As the prince is both a single person and sometimes an old man and invalid, so the mind of man is a tiny thing, minute, discernible to no eyes. In contrast is the huge mass of the body, resplendent with the noble
proportion of its members, and the varied distinction of functions. The state consists of an almost infinite number of men, and no less variety of functions. Thirdly, the members of the body have indeed from themselves a vigor and natural force, but the moderation thereof is in the mind’s power. In the common mass there is more than enough strength, but too little counsel, unless it be sustained from outside. Thus we have to investigate severally all the points of similarity that exist between things that are compared to each other. Tacitus refers to this notion [Ann., 1.12] when Tiberius would deny his capacity to govern the whole state, and was asked by Asinius Gallus what part he wished entrusted to himself; but after Asinius had observed his offended look, he said that by this question he did not mean to divide things which could not be separated, but to be convinced, by his own confession, that the commonwealth is but one body, and can be governed only by the mind of one man.

NOT KNOWING WHERE ITS SECRET HABITATION LIES

In passing he lightly touches upon the contradictory notions of the philosophers, who have not yet settled upon a sure and definite location for the soul. Herophilus has located it in the ventricle of the brain; for Plato and Democritus it seems more likely to rest in the entire head, Erasistratus considers it to be around the membrane of the brain, Strato in the space between the eyebrows; Parmenides and Epicurus in the whole breast; Diogenes in the arterial ventricle of the heart; the Stoics assign to it the whole heart or spirit; others the whole cervix of the heart; others the praecordia; Empedocles the concretion of the blood. See Plutarch [Mor., 899A] and further, in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. [1.9.191.10.20].

THE HANDS, THE FEET AND THE EYES CARRY OUT ITS BUSINESS

That is, are prompted by its decision, and serve it. Similarly, Seneca [Ep. Mor., 90.19]: All these arts, by which the city is either aroused or resounds, carry out the body’s business. In many editions there is the very bad reading “of bodies,” even Erasmus agreeing with it in both his editions. In accordance with this notion Cicero [Acad., 2.10.30] has called the mind which discerns objects “the fountainhead of the sensations”; according to its decisions, the sensations follow or flee. As Sallust [Cat. 1.2] truly puts
it: We use the mind as ruler, the body rather as servant. Also pertinent to this is Quintilian’s statement [Deal., 11.7]: Thus our bodies take their movement from the mind alone, and our members are idle until our mind puts them to use.

WE SEARCH THE SEA FOR GAIN

The philosophers posit a threefold appetite: natural, sensitive, and rational. The first they attribute to all natures, the second to animals, the third to rational souls. In turn, they so divide the sensitive appetite that one is the superior, pertaining to the interior affections — hate, love, sorrow, hope, fear, and the like. This passage is to be understood as referring to this upper part. The other, they say, resides in the bodily passions — hunger, thirst, cold, and the like. That, then, of which Seneca makes mention, is the root of all desires, which Plato in the *Laws* [1.644E] describes as being like the sinews in man, or like ropes by which we are drawn; and as they are contrary among themselves, so also are we carried off in various directions, unless Mistress Reason is in charge. Yet because some inclinations [affectus] stand out in some persons and others in others as Propertius [Eleg., 3.9.20] says: Everyone follows the seeds of his own nature, Seneca accordingly sometimes makes it a grasping tyrant, sometimes an ambitious one. If it is grasping, according to its command:

*The diligent merchant rushes to the far-off Indes*
*Fleeing poverty through sea, through rocks, through fire.*

[Hor. Ep., 1.1.45f]

For what Horace [C., 3.1.25f] says is true: *He who desires what is enough, is not / Troubled by tumultuous seas.* Juvenal [Sat., 14.274279]:

*For the sake of a thousand talents*
*And a hundred villas, look you, heedless, to ports*
*And to the sea full of magic ships; more men now there are*
*In the deep; the fleet will come wherever hope*
*Of gain calls; nor will it leap only the Carpathian*
*And Gaetulian seas.*

Propertius [Eleg., 3.7.12]:

*Therefore you, O money, are the cause of troubled life*
*Through you we take our untimely way to death.*
Go curved vessels, and contrive the causes of death;  
Driven on by human hands, that death will come.

The same [3.7.37]:

Nature has laid the sea itself as a snare for grasping man.

IF AN AMBITIOUS TYRANT

Seneca frankly admits what those splendid virtues of the pagans were which are always being rehearsed so fulsomely. Remove ambition and you will have no haughty spirits, neither Platos, nor Catos, nor Scaevolas, nor Scipios, nor Fabriciuses. One reads this same thought in Sallust [B.J., 1.3]: The ruler and director of the life of man is the mind: when it pursues glory by virtuous ways, is sufficiently powerful, efficient, and worthy of honor. Virgil hints at this [A., 6.824]:

Love of country will prevail, and boundless lust for praise.

WE HAVE THRUST A RIGHT HAND INTO THE FLAMES

This is to be referred to Scaevola, on whom see Livy [2.13.1]. When he entered the camp of Porsena and killed a scribe instead of the king, he thrust his right hand into a brazier kindled for sacrifice; from this calamity he received the name Scaevola, for the ancients called “Scaeva” one whose left hand was more adept than his right. Augustine [DCD, 4.20]: Why is Fortitude not a goddess, who was present with Mucius when he thrust his right hand into the flames? Martial [8.30.26] also recalls this.

OR PLUNGED WILLINGLY

Either he is alluding to the history of Horatius Codes, mentioned by Livy in the same book [2.10.211]. When he had withstood the attack of the Etruscans for so long, while the Romans were destroying the Pons Sublicius he threw himself into the Tiber, and amid showers of darts hurled on him, swam across safe to his fellow soldiers. Because of this deed a statue was decreed to him, and an annual subsistence. Plutarch relates this story in his Life of Publicola [16.4]. Or (as seems to me more likely) it should be referred to Curtius, who, as Livy relates [7.6.5] and
Valerius also [5.6.2], cast himself into a deep chasm in the earth, since the oracles stated that it should be filled up with that thing at which the Romans chiefly excelled. See Augustine [DCD, 5.18.2; 4.20]. Propertius [Eleg., 3.11.61]: *When he filled the cracks, Curtius established a monument.*

**WOULD CRUSH AND CRIPPLE**

Other editions have STRATURA [for FRACTURA], but with the same meaning, according with what Horace has said [C., 3.4.6568]: *Blind force with its own might is spent; / Self-tempered force the gods prolong / To higher ends; but they resent / A power that works for wrong.*
1. It is, therefore, their own safety that men love, when for one man they lead ten legions at a time into battle, when they rush forward in the front rank and turn their breasts to the wounds that they may save the standards of their emperor from defeat. For he is the bond by which the commonwealth is united, the breath of life which these many thousands draw, who in their own strength would be only a dead weight and defenseless prey if the great mind of the empire should be withdrawn. If safe their king, one mind to all; / Bereft of him, they troth recall.

2. Such a calamity would be the destruction of the Roman peace; such a calamity will force the fortune of a mighty people to its downfall. Just so long will this people be free from that danger as it shall know how to submit to the rein; but if ever it shall tear away the rein, or shall not suffer it to be replaced if shaken loose by some mishap, then this unity and this fabric of mightiest empire will fly into many parts, and the end of this city’s rule will be one with the end of her obedience.

3. Therefore it is not strange that princes and kings and guardians of the public order, whatever different name they bear, are held more dear even than those bound to us by private ties; for if men of sense put public interests above private, it follows that he too is dearer upon whom the whole state turns. At an earlier day, in fact, Caesar so clothed himself with the powers of state that neither one could be severed from the other without the destruction of both. For while a Caesar needs power, the state also needs a head.

1. If the state cannot stand without rule, if a body gathered from many men is truncated and imperfect without a head, they are defenders of their own safety when they repulse peril from their head, because it would drag them with itself into greater ruin. To defend one man, they arm themselves, but his safety embraces the safety of all; if they desert him, they make themselves a prey for the enemy. In him they possess public and private peace, the majesty of empire, and domestic prosperity. With
him all things perish. Who now would hesitate, when such a reward is held out, to cast himself into a thousand deaths? For they must obey if they would save themselves and their own.

THEY LEAD TEN LEGIONS AT A TIME INTO BATTLE

Actually, Augustus Caesar had many more legions than this. For he not only armed at one time forty-four legions, but he also kept them as regular legions to protect the Roman state. What was a legion? Classical authors are not sufficiently in agreement. Plutarch Romzul., [13.1] is author of the statement that Romulus divided the Roman youth into military orders, each one of which comprised 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and this number was called a “legion.” Livy [8.8.14] testifies that the strength of a legion is 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. Gellius [16.4.6] on the authority of Cincius defined a legion as consisting of sixty centuries, a total of 6,000. If what one reads in the book De Re Militari, circulated under Cicero’s name, is true, and the copies are not defective, a legion consists of 2,515 infantry, and 895 cavalry. But it would seem more likely to me that, whatever changes may have been made in the army organization according to the circumstances of the times, the legion eventually came to consist of ten cohorts, of which the first comprised one thousand men, the rest five hundred each. So it is in Vegetius [2.6]. One must not suppose that those units were so exactly limited to that number. It was simply an accepted way of naming them by round numbers, in the same way as men said “hundredmen” (centumviri) instead of 105, and “the Seventy” (Septuaginta) translators instead of seventy-two.

WHEN THEY RUSH FORWARD IN THE FRONT RANK

“Front” is a military term. For, as Vegetius [3.14] says: An army drawn up for battle is called “aries”; the line that faces the enemy, “frons.” Quintilian [2.13.3]: What if you should direct a general, that whenever he draws up his troops for battle, he must range his front in line, extend his wings to the right and left, and station his cavalry to defend his flanks? Curtius [4.13.28] calls it “face.” This, he says, was the face of the right wing. Then follows [4.13.29]: This was the front of the left wing. He apparently uses “front” and “face” interchangeably. He calls it also “the
first” [4.13.32]: *And so the first rank was no more fortified than the flanks, and the flanks were no more so than the rear.*

**THAT THEY MAY SAVE THE STANDARDS OF THEIR EMPEROR FROM DEFEAT**

From the Romans’ custom, who entrusted to the first cohort the eagle and the images of the emperor, as this cohort excelled in number of soldiers and in preeminence of rank.

**BREASTS TURNED TO THE WOUNDS**

As if this disgrace cannot well be outweighed by remaining alive: if someone allows the standard to be captured or thrown down before his very eyes; or, having abandoned the standard, turns tail and, as Virgil [A., 11.55] says, *receives shameful wounds in the back.* On the contrary those wounds received with the breast turned toward the foe, are praised as honorable tokens of military service. See Plutarch [Mor., 642D]; there is also the simple expression *mound in front.* Sallust [Cat., 61.3]: *Yet all had fallen with wounds in front.*

**FOR HE IS THE BOND**

Fitting metaphors. For if the dignity of the reign is nourished by harmony among the citizens, it is necessary for them to be bound together by a sort of chain. The emperor is therefore the bond, by which they are bound together, that they may not fly apart. If a rector and moderator were lacking, by what chains would a factious and seditious mob be constrained? With what solder, be welded together?

**BREATH OF LIFE**

Another metaphor, by which is meant that people live and breathe in their leaders: from the life of one all hang as if by a thread. One is reminded of that apostrophe of Lucan addressed to Caesar, [Phars. 5.685f]:

*When the life and safety of so many nations depends Upon this life; and so much of the world has made you its head.*
Curtius [9.5.30], speaking of Alexander: *That whole day and the whole following night, the army equipped for battle besieged the palace, confessing that all lived by the breath of one.* But Curtius expresses Seneca’s metaphor more precisely in the person of Philip, Alexander’s physician: *O king, my very breath has always depended upon you; but now, indeed, I think, ’tis drawn by your own sacred and venerable lips.* [Ibid., 3.6.10]. Erasmus imitates this in his *Panegyric to Philip.* Now this has been taken from the philosophers who affirm that the life of man consists especially in drawing and taking in air through the windpipe, which Celsus [4.1.3] calls the *fistula aspera,* and Lactantius [*Opif. Dei,* 11] the *gurgulio,* and which, as Gellius says, is the path of the undulating breath [17.11.5]. Of this Cicero has much to say [*N.D.,* 2.54.133ff.]. For the reason why we have to breathe, see Aristotle, *Problems* [34.12, 964A]. For this reason there are those who consider that life is nothing else than spirit or breath. Servius comments on that phrase of Virgil [A., 2.562] “expiring life:” Virgil, he says, has spoken here *according to those who identify life with wind.* And the same author, commenting on Virgil’s line [A., 4.705], *And into the winds life receded,* says: *He is following those who say life is air.* Still, it is truer to say that all living beings consist of four elements and divine spirit. This was clearly Aristotle’s opinion. For they derive flesh from earth, humor from water, breath from air, heat from fire, and natural disposition from divine spirit. The astrologers, however, think otherwise: that when we are born our spirit derives from the sun, our body from the moon, blood from Mars, natural disposition from Mercury, desire from Jupiter, carnal passions from Venus, humor from Saturn. It is not unreasonable, then, that Seneca applies to spirit the epithet vital. For as Quintilian [5.9.6] says: *Here is a statement with the same force when reversed: that a man who lives breathes and who breathes lives.* So, one finds breath used for life, and breathing for living, sometimes without the adjective.

**IF SAFE THEIR KING**

These two half verses Seneca has quoted from Virgil [G.,4.210214], where he speaks of bees:
Furthermore, neither Egypt nor mighty Lydia
Nor the Parthian tribes, nor Median Hydaspes, show
Such homage to their king. While he is safe, all are of one mind;
When he is lost, straightway they break their fealty, and themselves
Pull down the honey they have reared and tear up their trellised combs.

2. JUST SO LONG WILL THIS PEOPLE BE FREE
FROM THAT DANGER AS IT SHALL KNOW

TO SUBMIT TO THE REIN expresses proverbially the notion of carrying out
obediently what has been commanded, and submitting with moderation to
the command of the master or prince. The opposite expression is “to bite
the rein.” He has even preserved the proper meaning of the word when he
adds: OR SHALL NOT SUFFER IT TO BE REPLACED IF SHAKEN LOOSE. For ‘to
shake loose’ is properly said of horses, as Servius annotates Virgil’s
Aeneid [6.100f]: To the raging priestess he applied / These reins and
spurs. Curtius [4.15.16]: The terrified horses could not come to a standstill
now, who by frequent jerking of their necks not only had thrown off the
yoke, but also had overturned the chariot. Pliny uses the same metaphor in
his Panegyric [11.5]: They had taken heart and shaken off the yoke; they
were not fighting for their liberty now but for our subjection.

3. THEREFORE THAT PRINCES AND KINGS

Friendship, says Cicero, is contracted for various reasons: But the single
society for the carrying on of the state binds together all the needs of all
men. Lentulus to Cicero [Ep. Faro., 12.14.7]: And I, the man who did all
this, was once the crony and most intimate friend of Dolabella, and a close
blood relation of the Antonies indeed it was by their favor that I held a
province; none the less “holding my country clearer than all,” I was the
first to declare war upon all those dear to me. For in degrees of affection
the best men always give the first place to their country and, as Seneca
adds, MEN OF SENSE PUT PUBLIC INTERESTS ABOVE PRIVATE. Deservedly,
then, the ministers of the state are loved far outside the limits of their own
qualifies, as “fathers of their country.” Above we have stated them to be a
sort of public guardians.
WHATEVER DIFFERENT NAME THEY BEAR

As for example, kings, emperors, dynasts, tetrarchs, marquises, satraps; or in our own time, emperors, kings, dukes, barons, counts, viscounts; and among free peoples, consuls, praetors, dictators, censors, and the like.

UPON WHOM THE WHOLE STATE TURNS

Cicero [Ep. Faro., 3.11.4] in different words, expressed the same idea to Appius Pulcher: *All the strength of the state has put itself at the disposal of Pompey*. Therefore, we turn to some one person, that we may lean upon him as upon a wall. Virgil [A., 12.5759]:

*Thou art now the only hope and repose of my miserable old age.*

*The glorious kingdom of Latinus is in thy hand;*  
*In thee the whole house leaning doth repose.*

AT AN EARLIER DAY, IN FACT, CAESAR SO CLOTHED HIMSELF WITH THE POWERS OF THE STATE

Now he is effecting a joining of the head to the body: that is, of the prince to the state, so that there may be between them a mutual sympathy in every respect; *FOR NEITHER ONE CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE OTHER WITHOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF BOTH.* “Caesar without the state is not Caesar; the state without Caesar is not the state.” The ministries of the members are necessary to the head, the body without the head is a useless clod of earth.

THAT NEITHER ONE CAN BE SEVERED

I read *DIDUCI* (instead of *deduci*) against the testimony of the editions, to preserve the sense of “to be divided” or “to be torn apart.”
CHAPTER 5

1. My discourse seems to have withdrawn somewhat far from its purpose, but in very truth, it bears closely upon the real issue. For if and this is what thus far has been inferred — you are the soul of the state and the state your body, you see, I think, how requisite is clemency; for you spare yourself when you seemingly spare another. And so even reprobate citizens should be spared as the weak members of the body, and if there should ever be need to let blood, restraint must be exercised to avoid cutting deeper than necessary.

2. Clemency, then, as I was saying, indeed applies to all men in accordance with nature, but to rulers it is especially becoming, inasmuch as with them it finds more to save, and exhibits itself amid ampler opportunities. For how little harm can the cruelty of a private citizen do? The rage of princes is war.

3. Though, moreover, the virtues are at harmony with each other, and no one of them is better or nobler than another, yet to certain people a certain virtue will be more suited. Magnanimity befits every human being, even him who is the lowliest of all. For what is greater or braver than to beat down misfortune? Yet this magnanimity has freer play under circumstances of good fortune, and is shown to better advantage upon the judge’s bench than on the floor.

4. Every house that clemency enters she will render peaceful and happy, but in the palace she is more wonderful, in that she is rarer. For what is more remarkable than that he whose anger nothing can withstand, to whose sentence, too heavy though it be, even the victims bow the head, whom, if he be greatly incensed, no one will interrogate, nay even entreat — that this man should lay a restraining hand upon himself, and use his power to better and more peaceful ends? When he reflects, “Any one can kill against the law, none but! can save”.

5. A great soul befits a great position, and if it does not rise to that position and even stand above it, the other, too, is dragged downward to the ground. Moreover, the mark of a great soul is to be peaceful and
quiet and to despise injustice and wrongs. It is for woman to rage in anger; for wild beasts doubtless — and yet not even the noble sort of these — to bite and worry their prostrate victims. Elephants and lions pass by what they have stricken down; it is the ignoble beast that is relentless.

6. Cruel and inexorable anger is not seemly for a king, for thus he does not rise much above the other man, toward whose own level he descends by being angry at him. But if he grants life, if he grants position to those who have imperiled and deserve to lose them, he does what none but a sovereign may; for one may take the life even of a superior, but not give it ever except to an inferior.

7. To save life is the peculiar privilege of exalted station, which never has a right to greater admiration than when it has the good fortune to have the same power as the gods, by whose kindness we all, the evil as well as the good, are brought forth into the light. Let a prince, therefore, appropriating to himself the spirit of the gods, look with pleasure upon one class of his citizens because they are useful and good; others let him leave to fill up the number; let him be glad that some of them live, some let him merely endure.

Seneca’s discourse seemed to wander into a digression and the whole preceding paragraph to be an extra embellishment, contributing nothing to the subject in hand, except that it recommends love of princes to their subjects. Now he shows that he was looking to a different end and aiming at another target: to prove clemency appropriate to no one so much as to king and prince. For if peoples, while they defend their prince’s safety by their very bodies, and ransom his life by their death, and turn their breasts toward the wounds [Clem., 1.4.1], profess the soul of the state; in turn he ought to recognize the state to be his body and to repay by reciprocity of function what he owes his members. Let him bear in mind that the public affection shown him by his subjects will have to be transferred to another if he should cease to be what he is now.

FOR YOU SPARE YOURSELF

For whoever the pardoned person may be, he is a part of you. Alexander so speaks in Curtius [6.9.19]: If I make lower than myself those on whom I
have conferred such great honors, I would seem to myself to be tearing out a part of my very flesh.

AND SO EVEN REPROBATE CITIZENS SHOULD BE SPARED

The meaning is: if there are some blameworthy persons among the citizens, think of them as members of your body, which even when they are full of sores are cured by gentler remedies, handled as it were with a light touch — far indeed from cutting and cauterizing them at the first sign of weakness. “Remove, then, vices, not the man.” Nevertheless, if they cannot be plucked out of a man, then one must take care of the whole body rather than of one small part. Then does that saying of Ovid [M., 1.190f] apply:

… An incurable wound
Must be cut out with the sword, lest the uninjured part suffer.

Not to forget Seneca’s statement in his On Benefits [7.30.1]: The wounds of the mind ought to be handled as tenderly as those of the body. And Cicero’s words to Atticus [Ep. Art., 2.1.7]: A remedy which cures… should be as highly esteemed as one that burns away and amputates.

AND IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE NEED TO LET BLOOD

Seneca alludes to the blood lettings of the physicians, which are always carried out within limits. Thus Lucan [Phars., 2.139143] reproaches Sulla, raging after his victory, for not imposing a limit to assigning punishments, with almost the same metaphor:

Sulla also added to the boundless slaughter.
He quaffed what little remained of the city’s Blood, and while he too much does away with the gangrened limbs,
His surgery exceeded the limits, and his hand Followed too closely the beckoning symptoms of disease.

2. THEN, AS I WAS SAYING

Seneca hints that this whole discussion (which seemed, as the proverb has it, to have nothing to do with Bacchus) is to be taken in this sense; now, as is his custom, he summarizes the whole discussion by recapitulation. His
statement that CLEMENCY APPLIES TO ALL MEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATURE is to be referred to this: no virtue befits man more than clemency, since none is more human, etc. The addition, ESPECIALLY BECOMING TO RULERS, relates to the other member.

**IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATURE**

The philosophers call those qualifies which are of natural properties, *according to nature*. Property is to be understood according to the fourth mode, as set forth by Porphyry, *Isagoge* [4.5].

**SMALL THE HARM THE CRUELTY OF A PRIVATE CITIZEN CAN DO**

Why is clemency particularly appropriate to the prince? This is as if to ask, why is liberality especially fitting to a rich man? For the former has the wherewithal to pardon, the latter is supplied with endowments to lavish on others. Yet he preferred to pursue an argument from contraries in this form: If private cruelty does little harm, then also in a private citizen clemency benefits little. If THE PRINCE’S RAGE IS WAR and public ruin, his clemency embraces public wellbeing. Seneca *On Anger* [3.5.6]: *That anger which belongs to the lower classes, and to men of private rank, is a weapon both harmless and powerless.*

**3. THOUGH, MOREOVER, THE VIRTUES**

From the Stoic dogmas. On this connection of the virtues see Cicero [*Off.*, 1.5.15; *Paradox.*, 3.22.; *Fin.*, 5.21.58ff] and our Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 66.10; cf. 109.10]. Perhaps these words can also be taken to refer to the Peripatetics who teach that the external benefits of fortune aid the virtues, and who therefore include them among things to be called “good” because they are helpers of the virtues. The Stoics disagree with this, holding that virtue is content with itself alone, and needs no assistance from fortune.

**MAGNANIMITY BEFITS**

Argument from similarities. A virtue equal and the same in two persons, shines and is more prominent in one than in the other. But before we
explain this we must define magnanimity. Now, it is a virtue by which we learn to bear either kind of fortune with moderation: so that we are not elated by prosperity, our minds raised up; nor are we cast down and depressed by adversity and lose all courage. Therefore the limits of magnanimity are inflation of mind and elation — the excess; dejection and faintheartedness — the defect. See Aristotle, *Ethics* [4.79, 1123a36-1125a37]. Also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* [4.28.61]: *When we say that a man is magnanimous and brave we have in mind a person who is steadfast, calm, serious, standing above all human foibles* etc. Magnanimity therefore befits a man of the humblest and lowliest station, or, to render it more literally, of the very meanest origin. For what is braver than to keep the soul unconstrained in the very straits of fortune? Than to put forth greatness and constancy of soul over all misfortunes? Than to be a despiser equally of wealth and poverty? Still, because it is harder to bear with prosperous than with adverse fortune, how much more justly distinguished will that man be, who, as Horace says [C., 2.3.24], *in good times keeps his mind restrained from immoderate joy*, who neither puts his faith in present prosperity, nor shudders at adverse fortune. Thus clemency, etc.

**THAN TO BEAT DOWN MISFORTUNE**

We beat down the slings and arrows that fortune launches against us, if we make nothing of all the strategies against us. Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 16.5] has said: *resist fortune proudly.*

**4. EVERY HOUSE THAT CLEMENCY ENTERS**

Clemency dwells indeed in private houses; it dwells — if you will — in poor huts and rustic cottages; when the father of the family conducts himself with moderation toward wife, children, and servants, and forgives, overlooks, is kind, and invites rather than compels them to their task. On this account Peter in his Canonical Epistle [*1 Peter 2:18*] does not wish masters to be ill-tempered, that is, peevish and hard on servants.
FOR WHAT IS MORE REMARKABLE

Another reasoning by amplification. The laws govern private citizens. The laws prescribe what is permitted to a husband toward his wife, to a father toward his children, to a master toward his servants. If he transgresses, punishment is immediate. The laws forbid a citizen causing other citizen’s loss. But if a citizen wishes to act with madness and cruelty against a fellow citizen, he cannot, not even with danger of life and property. The license of the prince is different. The king’s words are commands. And, as Homer says in one of his Hymns [4.46]: *Both word and deed at once*. Then he renders his own work acceptable to all, namely to those who praise what they cannot correct. There are no tribunes who intercede; there is no superior to appeal to. He, then, onto whom, with every man’s consent, the supreme power of government has been conferred, with what praises will he be extolled according to his deserts if he should enjoin moderation upon himself, if he should intercede with himself, if he should appeal to himself, but to be more clement?

NO ONE WILL INTERROGATE

The elegance of this word is uncommon. For it is used for “to accuse” and “to prosecute” before a judge. On this account one often uses “to interrogate” with application to “the laws.” Cicero, *Pro Domo Sua* [29.77]: *Who has ever interrogated me under any lava? Who has prosecuted me or named a day for trial?* Sallust, *Cat.* [18.2]: *P. Autronius and P. Sulla, consuls designate, had been interrogated for bribery under the laws and had paid the penalty.* Ibid. [31.4]: *And he himself had been interrogated by Lucius Paulus under the Plautian law.* Livy [38.50.8]: *Others asserted, that no one citizen ought to stand so high above the rest, as not to be interrogated under the laws for his conduct.* Tacitus [Ann., 13.14.1]: *Pallas had, certainly, stipulated that he should be interrogated for no part of his past conduct...* Ibid., 14.46.1]: *During the same consulship, Tarquitius Priscus was, when the Bithynians interrogated, condemned for extortion.* Cicero, *Off.* [1.25.89], uses the expression “to call to account,” and *Philipp.* [2.29.71], “to call upon for the money owed.”
LAY A RESTRAINING HAND UPON HIMSELF

That is, to bring his emotions under control, and keep them within measure. Virgil, *Aeneid* [10.419]: *The Fates have laid their restraining hand. / They have got what is owed them, says Servius, and the author has used a legal term. For it is called a “laying on of hands” whenever, waiting for no authority of the judge, me claim what is owed us. Ovid’s verse [Am., 1.4.40] confirms this interpretation of Servius:

> And I shall say, they are mine; and lay my hand upon them.

And Book Two [*Ibid.*, 2.5.30]:

> I shall lay my hands of rulership upon my rights.

Guielmus Budaeus, the first ornament and pillar of literature, thanks to whom our France has today claimed for herself the palm of learning, has carefully and fully explained the proper meaning of this expression. But when he adds *that there is no* ancient authority for the use of *iniicere manure* in the sense in which some more recent writers employ it, namely as equivalent for *what in Latin is called “afterre” or “infirmre manus” — whether this holds true universally, let others judge. In Horace I for my part interpret “iniicere marius” as “inferre.” The poem goes [C., 1.17.25f]:... *lest he lay rude hands on thee, / A partner illsuited to his cruel ways, / Or lest he rend the garland clinging to thy locks, / And thy unoffending robe. The same in Curtius [10.1.37]: The eunuch, not content with punishment of the innocent person, himself laid his hand upon him as he was about to die.*

KILL AGAINST THE LAW

All is well, when once this thought is recalled to the prince’s mind. For this it is that destroys tyrants: when they wish to raise themselves above the mob by unrestrained rule. So speaks Atreus in Seneca [*Thyestes*, 217f]: *Piety, holiness, faith / Are private blessings; let kings do as they please. How much better the saying: “To kill an innocent person is considered praiseworthy only among thieves and footpads.”!* “Anyone can snatch life away; to bestow it is kingly.”
5. GREAT POSITION (FORTUNE)

This is another argument of the same sort, which can be cast in the form of a syllogism. A GREAT POSITION REQUIRES A GREAT SOUL. A great soul is peaceful and moderate, and one which is not cast down from its level at any offense. Therefore the prince, to sustain the role of the prince, ought with unoffended equanimity to despise offenses and injuries. Here I am not trying overmuch to keep to the laws of the dialecticians throughout the whole matter; I am only seeking to ferret out the meaning as faithfully as I can. [GREAT POSITION] As Cato [Gell., 7.3.14] says, a man exulting and going berserk for joy is by prosperity commonly pushed aside from clear reflection and understanding. Not only for this reason but also because very many are of lowlier spirit and born to rags, they cannot play the part of an illustrious person. For they succumb to their burden and are blinded by their own splendor. So Curtius [3.12.20] speaks of Alexander: Not yet had fortune flooded over, is spirit. Hence also these well-known expressions: He cannot manage his own fortune. Likewise [Horace Ep., 1.8.17]: As you mill bear fortune, so me shall bear you, Celsus. Ovid, in his Consolation to Livia [PseudoOvid, Consol., 349f]:

Fortune has imposed a high place upon you, and ordered you To hold an honored position, Livia; endure the burden.

OF A GREAT SOUL

Definition of magnanimity, which we referred to above, from which is derived a general proof: just as, conversely, from the defined to the definition.

IT IS FOR WOMEN TO RAGE

There is nothing more uncontrolled than woman’s wrath. Juvenal says [Sat., 13.191f]: So gather that no one more rejoices / In revenge, than woman. Where the strength to cause harm is lacking, there blind madness, without selfcontrol, rages and howls.
If cruelty is of beasts, there is a monster in man; if of ignoble beasts, worse than a monster in the king. For this is equivalent to an amplification in sense, even though it is not expressed in so many words. As if to say: “If you have forgotten you are a prince, remember you are a man.” But if even that is too much, then at least try to imitate the nobler beasts; that is the ultimate limit. Quintilian [Decl., 9.18]: Good gracious/the nobler beasts pass by the prostrate. Ovid., Trist. [3.5.3136]:

*For the greater anyone is, the more placable is he in his anger,*  
*And a noble disposition is the more readily impressionable.*  
*It is sufficient for the noble hearted lion to have brought the body to the ground;*  
*The contest is ended when the enemy lies prostrate.*  
*But the wolf and the disgusting bears attack even the dying,*  
*And so does each mild beast that is inferior in nobility.*

**ELEPHANTS**

This statement concerning elephants is confirmed by the testimony of Pliny [8.4(5).9], who writes as follows: *When the elephant notices man’s footprints before it notices man himself, it begins to tremble out of fear of an ambush, stands still and sniffs about, breathes forth fury, does not trample the footprint but digs it up and passes it to the next elephant, and so on, each to the next, to the last of all, with a message.*

**LIONS**

Concerning lions Pliny says in the same book [8.16(19).48]: *Of all mild beasts the lion alone shows clemency to suppliants and to those who lie prostrate; and when it rages, it roars at men before it does so at women; and at infants only when very hungry. Libya believes some understanding of entreaties penetrates to lions.*

**6. AND INEXORABLE ANGER**

This is indeed monstrous savageness: CRUEL AND INEXORABLE ANGER. For if, according to Horace [Epist., 1.2.62], *anger is brief madness*, what else then is obstinate anger but downright madness? Cicero says to Atticus
[Ep. Art., 1.17.4]: that the best of men are often those whose feelings are easy to arouse and easy to appease, and that this irritability… and sensitiveness of disposition are generally signs of a good heart. Also to his brother Quintus [Ep. Q.F., 1.1.39]: Where fits of anger cannot be pacified, you will there find extreme harshness; where they yield to remonstrances, an extremely changeable mind; though the latter, as a choice of evils, is to be preferred to harshness.

NOT MUCH ABOVE

Lest anyone consider himself praiseworthy if he has worn an enemy down with his own might, let him think he has descended to the same level as the man to whom he has paid the tribute of making him the object of his hostility. This is what Seneca says in On Anger [2.34.1]: A contest with one’s equal is of uncertain issue, with one’s superior is folly, and with one’s inferior is contemptible. This is the meaning of Caesar’s words in Lucan [Phars., 3.134137]:

You conceive an empty hope of a glorious Death, said he; my hand will never, Metellus, Pollute itself with slaying you; no office Will make you worth Caesar’s anger.

Applicable to this is that problem of Aristotle which one reads in section 29 [Probl., 29.11.951a]: Why is it more wicked to have killed a woman than a man, although the male is more excellent by reason of nature than the female? Is it because a woman is weaker, and thus less able to cause injury? Likewise, to exert oneself against something far weaker is nothing manly, in fact is senseless and very wicked.

ONE MAY TAKE THE LIFE OF A SUPERIOR

If it is a great thing to kill a man, and if by this one thing we measure a man’s power, [Sen., Ep. Mor., 4.8] let us then consider that both a thief and an enemy can wield the sword to slay us, in the absence of a greater power; that no one not a slave has the power of life and death over us. Let us rehearse the examples of those who have perished by the plotting of servants, either by naked force or guile, and we shall know that no fewer men have fallen victims to the anger of slaves loan to that of kings. To go unkillled by a thief is however no ground for crediting one’s life to him.
The blessing of life is too great and noble to be received from a thief. Life is given to him who, although he can be killed without violating the laws, is nevertheless released from the peril of death. Seneca in the Medea [222225]: *This power kings have, / Splendid and vast, which no day will whisk away: / To help the pitiable and to protect with a steadfast hearth/The suppliants.* Not without reason, then, is that saying of Scipio’s famous which we read was afterward frequently on Antoninus Plus’ lips: *He preferred to save one citizen rather than slay a thousand enemies.* Then there is that tyrannical saying of Nero in Seneca’s Octavia [443]:

*To kill an enemy, this is the leader’s greatest virtue.*

To which Seneca replies [Ibid., 444]:

*To preserve the citizens is a greater duty of the father of his country.*

7. **WHEN IT HAS THE GOOD FORTUNE TO HAVE THE SAME POWER AS THE GODS**

Cruelty makes a king accursed of all men; indeed it makes a tyrant out of a prince. Clemency makes him lovable to all, superior to all, and finally like the gods. Of the gods is the fact that we are born, good and bad men alike; that we enjoy the common sky and air; that we are sustained by the same foods. Why shouldn’t the prince imitate this gentle dealing of the gods? Cicero, Pro Ligario [12.38]: *In nothing do men more nearly approach divinity than in doing good to their fellowmen; your situation has nothing prouder in it than the power your character nothing more notable in it than the wish, to preserve all whom you can.* Claudian to Honorius [Panegyr., 8.277]:

*Only clemency puts the gods on equal footing with us.*

**LET HIM LEAVE THE OTHERS TO FILL UP THE NUMBER**

That is, to make up the number, that there may be, so to speak, some for him to govern. Thus Lucan [Phars., 2.111]: *The majority died to make up a round number.* That is, for this purpose only, that the number of the slain might be great.
CHAPTER 6

1. Consider this city in which the throng that streams ceaselessly through its widest streets is crushed to pieces whenever anything gets in the way, to check its course as it streams like a rushing torrent — this city in which the capacity of three theaters is required at one time, in which is consumed all the produce of the plow from every land; consider how great would be the loneliness and desolation of it if none should be left but those whom a strict judge would acquit.

2. How few prosecutors there are who would not be condemned under the very law cited for the prosecution; how few accusers are free from blame. And, I am inclined to think, no one is more reluctant to grant pardon than he who again and again has had reason to seek it.

3. We have all sinned — some in serious, some in trivial things; some from deliberate intention, some by chance impulse, or because we were led away by the wickedness of others; some of us have not stood strongly enough by good resolutions, and have lost our innocence against our will and though still clinging to it; and not only do we do wrong, but we go on doing wrong to the very end of life.

4. Even if there is any one who has so thoroughly cleansed his mind that nothing can any more confound him and betray him, yet it is by sinning that he has reached the sinless state.

1. Now through description Seneca shows how necessary it is for the prince to leave some to fill up the number and put up with them for the time being. For if anyone should wish to cut out deeply the tumors and ulcers of the city, he would have to remove the larger part of it. But that the reader may more easily perceive this, he sets forth the argument in this form: The magistrates ought above all to keep to this principle: not to harm anyone. But if anyone has been harmed, it follows that more should not be harmed; and for that reason he who has harmed is withdrawn from the midst, because it is more important to preserve the whole group than one or another. Public punishments have this goal and purpose. But those magistrates who with the strictest justice punish the harmful, eliminate a
greater number than they leave. They do not therefore set a lawful end to punishment. Now what in this context I have called “description,” is so called by Cicero in his *Rhetoric* [A.H., 4.55.68ff] and in Greek is called *enargeia*, that is *perspicuitas* and *evidentia*, which conceives images of things as here as if before our eyes Seneca represents a populous city. Examples are given in Quintilian, Book 8.

**IN WHICH THE THRONG**

If we were to compare the still free and standing republic with the state which existed under the rule of the Caesars, the number (of its citizens) increased immeasurably and almost beyond belief. For the census which, while liberty still existed, I read to have been the maximum, was under the censors C. Lentulus and L. Gellius, in which 450,000 citizens were counted. But according to Eusebius [Chron., 2]: *After the victory at Actium, when the census was taken, the number of citizens was found to be 4,170,000; in another census which Augustus took with his adoptive son Tiberius, the population was found to be 9,370,000. But when the last census was taken, nearest to the reign of Nero, there were 6,944,000.*

**HOW GREAT THE LONELINESS**

The meaning is: do you see the city overflowing with such a throng, scarcely able to hold its citizens? If, however, there is a judge whom neither bribes nor favor nor reckoning of equity and goodness can influence, in short, such a one, as has been called *the reef of guilty men*, he would regard all as guilty, then, and in so many thousands of men scarcely a thousandth part would escape the ultimate sentence of death. Either, then, they are to be pardoned or not to be governed at all.

**2. HOW FEW PERSECUTORS**

There is one kind of men that ought to be cleansed of all vice, that is, those who are in charge of morals, and correct the vices of others. Yet the men of this class are, as judges, most unfair toward us, and fair toward themselves; and I know not how it comes about that what they permit grudgingly or not at all to others, they readily indulge in themselves.
Seneca, *On Anger* [2.28.8]: We have other men’s vices before our eyes, and our own behind our backs... [A man] disapproves of the least sign of luxury in another, although he has denied himself nothing. A tyrant is angry with a homicide, and a despoiler of temples punishes thefts. A great part of mankind is not angry with sins, but with sinners. There he also alludes to Aesop’s bag. Seneca the Tragedian in his *Agamemnon* [269272]: Not known to you are the laws, by no means new, of kingdoms: / Judges ill-disposed to us, but fair to themselves./ This they think the greatest surety of kingship,/ That they alone may do, what others may not. Juvenal [Sat., 8.171175]:

... Send your Legate to Ostia,  
O Caesar, but search for him in some big cook shop!  
There you will find him, lying cheek-by-jowl beside a cutthroat.  
In the company of sailors, thieves, and runaway slaves,  
Beside hangmen...

And a little later [8.181f]:

*But you gentlemen of Trojan blood find excuses for yourselves;  
What would disgrace a handicraftsman [cerdo] sits gracefully on a Volesus or a Brutus!*

Now since there were many kinds of quaestors (prosecutors) among the Romans: here understand prosecutors of capital offenses, who, being also the prosecutors of parricide, are in charge of dealing with criminal cases. So Asconius testifies in his Commentary on *Contra Verrem*, and Servius on the *Aeneid* [6.432]. Some writers of no mean erudition confuse them; yet I think the distinction is clear. Let us first look at prosecutors of parricide, the ancient origin of which office is attested by Fenestella and the Jurisconsult Pomponius [Dig. Just., 1.2.23]. Varro, *De Lingua Latina* [5.81], speaks of these same magistrates and asserts that the capital triumvirs took their place. Fenestella and Pomponius add that they were customarily appointed by the people; for without the people’s command it was not permitted to take action against a Roman citizen. We therefore maintain that magistrates of this sort were ordinary, and created by the people. Their powers were afterwards transferred to the triumvirs. The quaestor (prosecutor), however, mentioned by Asconius, called by Cicero both quaesitor and judge of the criminal court, is understood to be the urban praetor, who received the responsibility for all public courts of
justice through the same lot by which he drew the praetorship of the city. Cicero, *Contra Verrem* [1.8.21]: *But lo! on the very days when it fell to the share of Marcus Metellus to preside over trials concerning extortion, information is given me that that fellow was receiving such congratulations, that he also sent servants home to announce it to his wife.* Then he adds [1.9.29]: *Well, then, he will have the two consuls and the quaestor [president of the court], exactly according to his wish.* Plutarch states [Cic., 9.1f] that Licinius Macer was charged with embezzlement before Cicero as praetor, and condemned by the unanimous vote of the judges. Thus, among writers the term “praetor,” is often used for “quaestor.” Cicero, *Contra Verrem* [1.3.10]: *For what reason he is confident to accomplish anything with this Glabrio as praetor and with this scheme, I cannot understand.* Juvenal [Sat., 13.24]:

*… The first punishment is this:  
That no guilty man is acquitted at the bar of his own conscience,  
Even though the corrupt favor of a deceitful praetor may have acquitted him in court.*

Asconius’ Commentary on Cicero’s *Pro Scauro*: *He was arraigned before Marcus Cato the judge (praetor) in charge of extortion cases, as it has been written down in the records.* Also in the *Pro Cornelio*: *Q. Gallus the praetor exercised that judgment.* It is also to be added that, when a case was to be decided outside of regular procedure, quaestors were created by popular vote for this, as Genesis Domitius Ahenobarbus was created by the comitia in the case of Milo, when the charge of homicide was dealt with outside the normal procedure.

**BE CONDEMNED UNDER THE SAME LAW CITED FOR THE PROSECUTION**

We say that a man who has been convicted of treason, of adultery, or parricide, or of one of the offenses under the Cornelian law, is investigated under the Julian Law of Treason, the Julian Law of Adultery, the Cornelian Law of Assassination, the Pompeian Law of Parricide, and the like, and condemned by these same laws.
HOW FEW ACCUSERS ARE FREE FROM BLAME

Cicero, Contra Verrem [2.3.1]: every man, O judges, who, without being prompted by any enmity, or stung by any private injury, or tempted by any reward, prosecutes another for the good of the republic, ought to consider, not only how great a burden he is taking upon himself at the time, but also how much trouble he is courting for the remainder of his life. For he imposes on himself a law of innocence, of moderation, and of all virtues, who demands from another an account of his life… Ibid. [2.3.2.4]: In short, everything which you have impeached in another must be earnestly avoided by you yourself. In truth, not only no accuser, but no reprover even can be endured, who is himself detected in the vice which he reproves in another. If therefore the accuser and judge fall into the same crimes which the one indicts for punishment, the other inflicts with punishment, what is to be hoped from other people?

3. WE HAVE ALL SINNED

Now Seneca speaks not of judges or accusers only; but shows that punishments are to be inflicted upon all if the sins of all are to be avenged, and that there must be no end to punishments, until the judge sentences himself also to the ultimate punishment. Seneca On Anger [2.8.1]: Be assured… that there are as many vices as there are men. And Horace [Sat., 1.3.68f]:

For no man is born without vices: he is best
Who is beset by the least vices.

Although the transgressions of all are not equal or similar, still we all have sinned. Some have sinned out of deliberate ill-will, others out of inconstancy; some more seriously, others more lightly. Seneca, On Benefits [4.27.23]: All vices exist in all, yet all are not prominent in each individual. Also, On Anger [3.26.4]: We all are hasty and careless, we all are fickle, dissatisfied, and ambitious. Why do I cover up this public sore with too light talk? We all are bad. Every one of us therefore will find in his own breast the vice which he blames in another… Let us therefore be more gentle one to another: we live as bad men, among bad men: there is only
one thing which can afford us peace, and that is to agree to forgive one another.

FROM DELIBERATE INTENTION (EX DESTINATO)

That is, “on purpose,” “with intent,” “deliberately,” or, as Plautus says [Cas., 4.3.7.805], “purposely,” which is expressed in common speech as “with deliberate intention.” Suetonius, Caligula [43]: Neither once nor from deliberate intention did he take an active part in military affairs. Seneca, On Benefits [6.10.2]: In order to lay me under an obligation you must not merely do me a service, but you must do so from deliberate intention. Suetonius, Julius [60], has omitted the preposition: He used to take booty not only intentionally, but as occasion offered. It is an adverb. Thus the ancients used to say, “intentionally” (“composito”)” when we say “with intent.” (“de composito”). Virgil, Aeneid., [2.129]:

Intentionally he broke off speech, and appointed me for the altar.

Thus “unhoped for” (“ex insperato”) and “unhoped” (“insperato”), without preposition, both found in Livy, are of the same kind, as we have said, “deliberately.” Yet we have noted in Cicero [Ep. Art., 8.41.1; 10.3.], “deliberately,” used for “expressly,” as the common speech has it. For this reason, he says [Ibid., 11.8.2], I come back to that point. Take care that, for the sake of that affair, you deliberately send someone, etc. Coelius [Cic., Ep. Faro., 8.1.1]: I have deliberately arranged for someone who will pursue every detail. etc.
CHAPTER 7

1. Since I have made mention of the gods, I shall do very well to establish this as the standard after which a prince should model himself — that he should wish so to be to his subjects, as he would wish the gods to be to himself. Is it, then, desirable to have deities that cannot be moved to show mercy to our sins and mistakes? Is it desirable to have them our enemies even to the point of our complete destruction? And what king will be safe from soothsayers gathering up his riven limbs?

2. But if the gods are merciful, and justly yet not instantly avenge with the thunderbolt the shortcomings of the mighty, how much more just is it for a man, set over men, to exercise his power in gentle spirit and to ask himself whether the condition of the world is more pleasing to the eye and more lovely when the day is calm and clear, or when all nature quakes with frequent thunderclaps, and hither and yonder fires flash? And yet the aspect (face) of a quiet and well-ordered empire is not different from that of a calm and shining sky.

3. A reign that is cruel is stormy and overcast with gloom, and, while men tremble and grow pale at the sudden uproar, even he who is the cause of all the turmoil does not fail to shudder. Those in private life, if they stubbornly seek revenge, are more easily pardoned; for they can be harmed, and their resentment springs from a sense of wrong; besides, they are afraid of being scorned, and not to have given thanks to those who harm seems a show of weakness, not of clemency. But the man for whom vengeance is easy, by disregarding it, gains assured praise for gentle-dealing.

4. Those placed in lowly station are more free to use force, to prosecute at law, to rush into a brawl... ; when the odds are matched, blows fall light; but in a king, even loud speech and unbridled words ill accord with his majesty.

1. Lest he seem to pass on to this comparison abruptly, he connects it with the prior ones. For after he said that nothing is so magnificent for the
prince as when AFTER THE EXAMPLE OF THE GODS he tolerates the wicked, and LEAVES THEM TO FILL UP THE NUMBER, and then told something else about those who are to be tolerated for a time in order to fill up the number of the city, he now returns to THE MENTION OF THE GODS. He reminds the prince of the natural law: that he treat his subjects as he would have the gods treat himself, for the gods rule him as he himself governs men. But if he lives and breathes by the tenderness of the gods, why shall man not rather be favorable to men and open to their entreaty? Thus speaks Ovid to Augustus [Trist., 2.3340]:

If as often as mortals sin, Jove were to hurl his lightnings,  
In a little time he would be disarmed.  
When he has thundered, and has alarmed the earth with his peal,  
He makes the air clear by dispersing showers;  
Justly, therefore, is he called both the Father and the Ruler of the Gods;  
Justly has the capacious universe nothing superior to Jove.  
Do thou as well, since thou art styled the Ruler of thy Country and its Father,  
Follow the example of the god who has the same title.

Yet here is the difference: Ovid is flattering Augustus, whereas Seneca is delivering philosophical precepts. Plutarch also in his On the Delay of Divine Vengeance [5, Moral., 551B-]: Since me perceive that God, Best and Greatest, who fears no one, needs nothing, and can be influenced by no repentance, nevertheless suspends punishment, and awaits the due season for recompense of crimes, it befits us also to imitate him, to become peaceful, and to reckon gentle-dealing and forbearance as the divine portion of virtue. See how they apply the same example in varying ways.

AND WHAT KING WILL BE SAFE FROM SOOTHSAYERS GATHERING UP HIS RIVEN LIMBS?

If the gods were severely to avenge the crimes of kings, what king is there who does not sin every hour of the day? What vestige of hope is there, other than sending soothsayers to consult the gods, in case of the surest and immediate tidings of death? Now let kings and emperors go — let them cruelly avenge the crimes of their subjects; but let them recognize that there are gods who can weigh their misdeeds exactly by the same measure. Seneca is speaking according to the superstition of pagan princes, who used to think that their own safety rested in the entrails of beasts, and used to send soothsayers to consult the gods concerning their lives and
fortunes. Yet never was there anything more empty than that sort of man; Cato has tellingly scoffed at the emptiness of them. He used to say it was a wonder a soothsayer didn’t burst out laughing when he saw another soothsayer.

2. NOW MUCH MORE JUST IT IS

Argument from the less. The gods are ready to pardon men. Why are men not all the more ready to pardon men? Either because they owe it to common nature, or because they also desire the same readiness to pardon their sins which deserve punishment.

AND TO ASK HIMSELF WHETHER THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD

He derives the one from the other. The poets attribute lightning bolts to their Jupiter, as javelins of wrath, which from its pure and clear state turn the sky stormy and cloudy, and strike the world with quakes and terror. So the king like an earthly Jupiter, when he is wrathful, lightens and thunders: no repose, no calm.

WITH FREquent THUNDERCLAPS

That is, the crash of thunder. You will find an account of its source in Aristotle, Meteor. [3.6,369a10370a33], in Cicero, Divin. [2.19.44], Seneca, Nat. Quest. [2.12.5f], Pliny [2.20], and Plutarch, Placit. Philos. [3.3, Moral., 893DF]

AND FIRES

That is, lightnings.

AND YEt NOT DIFFERENT IS THE ASPECT (FACE)

Why does not the whole empire show a glad face, when the sun, that eye of the world, clearly shines? For the happiness of the prince is not a private matter; all things rejoice with him. It is therefore fittingly
compared with the calmness of the air, which makes men’s minds also calm and clear.

**FACE**

What the Greeks sometimes call schema, sometimes prosupon. Synesius: *the face of a captured city*. Cicero [*Ep. Faro., 15.17.2*]: *And yet we have lost the face of the city.* For the word “face” is used in sense of “appearance,” not only of human bodies, but also of inanimate objects. Ovid, *Trist.* [1.3.26]:

*Such was the face of Troy when it was taken.*

Virgil, *Georg.* [1.506]:

*So many faces of crimes.*

See Gellius [13.30(29)] and Nonius Marcellus [52.27].

**3.A REIGN THAT IS CRUEL IS STORMY**

For enveloped in dense darkness are those men who are continually faced with lashes, crosses, axes, and a thousand kinds of tortures and punishments. Dulled and stupefied as it were, they freeze with terror at every threat, just as if they were struck by thunder.

**THOSE IN PRIVATE LIFE ARE MORE EASILY PARDONED**

Suppose someone objects: “But look here, each one of us has within himself the feelings of a king, nor is there anyone who would like himself to be harmed with impunity; all stubbornly seek revenge — not only men of favorable circumstances, but also the very humble and despised.” Seneca replies that there are four reasons why those who rather bitterly seek revenge are to be pardoned. These will be noted individually in their places.
FOR THEY CAN BE HARMED

The first cause is: only the bitten bite back; they return the same thing they have suffered. They suffer, moreover, the gravest offenses and insults, which, on account of their humble state they cannot ward off.

BESIDES, THEY ARE AFRAID OF BEING SCORNED

Terence [Adelph., 4.3 14-16. 605-607] puts it well: All who are not so well-to-do are somehow more suspicious than others / They take everything too readily as an affront; / They fancy themselves trifled with on account of their helpless condition... This then is the second reason why they are so eager to avenge themselves: they think themselves hurt when they are touched: and they consider also as part of the insult the fact that they lack sufficient strength to do harm in return. Those unable to kill someone, / Wish that they could, says Juvenal [Sat. 10.96f]. Quintilian [Instit., 2.3.8]: Those of short stature raise themselves on tiptoe, and the weak go in for more threats.

NOT TO HAVE GIVEN THANKS TO THOSE WHO HARM

It is no wonder if lowly and humble men do not too readily condone their own injuries, since what is praiseworthy in more powerful men is considered in them to be a defect. For if someone of them foregoes vengeance, it will nonetheless be rumored among the people, that he wanted to avenge himself, but could not. “To give thanks” is here ironically used for “to return an injury,” or as Curtius says [4.10.29], “to give a turn.” Terence, Eun., [4.4.51.718]: By Pollux, today I’ll find out how to give him thanks. The same [5.3.13.910-912]: Well! what now can suggest itself to my mind? / What, I wonder, in order that I may give thanks to that villain / Who palreed this fellow off upon us? In the same way Coelius fcic., Ep. Faro., 8.8.1] said, “to bestow a small present.” He preferred to bestow this small present on no one but his accuser. [Ep. Faro., 8.12.1]:... and had then approached certain persons openly, and was hobnobbing with Domitius, a man at the present juncture bitterly hostile to me, and was anxious to confer this little present on Cn. Pompeius. And yet Servius in his Commentary on the Aeneid [2. 536-539] takes “thanks” as an ambiguous expression. Virgil [A., 2.536-539]:
May the gods (if there is in heaven any piety which cares for such things),
Render worthy thanks, and give you just reward,
You (Achilles) who have made me behold the death of my own son,
And have befouled with blood the face of his father!

BUT THE MAN FOR WHOM VENGEANCE IS EASY (IN FACILI)

They are those who ought to abstain from vengeance, who from the fact
that they abstain, obtain sure praise, nor is it easier for them to be harmed
in future, because they have once been harmed with impunity. VENGEANCE
IS EASY, that is easy (facilis), prompt, prepared. This is a recognized
expression. Ovid [Ars Am., 1.356]: If she is willing, you will easily get what
you seek.

Seneca, On Benefits [3.8.2] He easily bestowed his benefit. Valeflus
[4.8.1]: To strive beyond one’s powers is a clearer proof of earnest
endeavor than if one were to employ one’s powers easily. Livy [3.8.9]: And
draining them into deep valleys, from which escape was by no means easy,
surrounded them. Quintilian [Inst., 9.2.53]: In the meantime me actually
aggravate those accusations which me mould easily either refute or deny.

4. THOSE PLACED IN LOWLY STATION

If obscure and lowborn persons quarrel among themselves, and revile one
another with insults and curses — this is nothing new. For it is common
with them to quarrel and brawl: afterward, when they have shouted
themselves hoarse, at last they come to hand-to-hand conflict, and decide
the case by punches and kicks. As the common proverb has it, After
words, blows. But the king, if he indulges in loud talk like the common
dfolk, and fights with nails and fists, will he not greatly detract from his
majesty? Note that this is the third reason.
CHAPTER 8

1. You think that it is a serious matter to deprive kings of freedom of speech, which belongs to the humblest man. “That indeed is servitude, not sovereignty.” What? are you not aware that the servitude is ours, not yours? Far different is the position of those who escape notice in a crowd that they do not overtop, whose virtues must struggle long in order to be seen, whose vices keep under the cover of obscurity; but your words and deeds are caught up by rumor, and consequently, none should be more concerned about the character of their reputation than those who, no matter what reputation they may deserve, are sure to have a great one.

2. How many things are there which you may not do, which we, thanks to you, may do? It is possible for me to walk alone without fear in any part of the city I please, though no companion attends me, though I have no sword at my house, none at my side; you, amid the peace you create, must live armed. You cannot escape from your lot; it besets you, and, whenever you leave the heights, it pursues you with its magnificence.

3. This is the servitude that belongs to supreme greatness: that it cannot become less great; but you share with the gods that necessity. For even they are held in bondage by heaven, and it is no more lawful for them to leave the heights than it is safe for you; you are nailed to your pinnacle.

4. Our movements are noticed by few: we may come forth and retire and change our dress without the world being aware: you can no more hide yourself than the sun. A flood of light surrounds you; towards it every one turns his eyes. You may think simply to appear; nay, you rise.

5. You cannot speak but that all the nations of the earth hear your voice; you cannot become angry without causing everything to be oppressed. Likewise you cannot strike any one down without shaking all that is around him. As the lightning’s stroke is dangerous for the
few, though feared by all, so the punishments of a great power cause wider terror than harm, and not without reason; for when the doer is omnipotent, men consider not how much he has done, but how much he is likely to do.

6. Consider, too, that whereas private citizens, by enduring the wrongs already received, lie more open to receiving others, yet kings by gentle-dealing gain a security more assured, because repeated punishment, while it represses the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all.

7. The inclination to vent one’s rage should be less strong than the provocation for it; otherwise, just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches, and as many kinds of plants are cut back to make them grow thicker, so the cruelty of a king by removing his enemies increases their number; for the parents and children of those who have been killed, their relatives too, and their friends, step into the place of each single victim. By an example taken from your own family, I wish to show you how true this is.

Seneca seemed to impose a harsh condition upon kings when he censured them for loud speech and unbridled words. If there is anything free in man, it is his tongue. A man is thrust into utter slavery when his freedom of speech is taken away. In a free city, says Tiberius [Suet., Tib., 28.1] there must be free speech. Only he who is above liberty will devote himself to silence. Here Seneca softens a thing harsh of itself, sometimes by varying the form of the word, sometimes by apt comparisons. He shows that not to defile majesty with scurrilous language is something itself full of majesty; far be it from him to detract anything from its dignity. The princes’ virtues and vices, he says, are in the open. One must beware of vices in order that nothing but pure virtues may stand out: yet the crowd sunk in its darkness lies ingloriously hidden. Thus princes go forth with a great equipage of companions; private citizens have no entourage. In short, this is the destiny of the gods, who cannot be removed from their heaven, just as the prince cannot be dislodged from his exalted rank.
THAT INDEED IS SERVITUDE

This is said in the person of the prince, who does not wish to be deprived of FREEDOM OF SPEECH. As if to say: it is not consonant with reason for him to serve, who ought to rule. In this vein is Publilius Syrus’ saying: *Kings are not half as happy as their servants.* And Sallust, *Cat.* [51.12-14]: *All mortals know the needs of those who, endowed with great power, live their lives in an exalted position. And so the smallest liberty is to be found in the great positions… . What among others is called “anger” is called “pride” and “cruelty” among those who rule.* Even Agamemnon, as Plutarch relates in his *Life of Nicias* [5.4], often spoke in the same vein: *It is our lot to have the crowd sitting in judgment on our lives, / And we are doubtless compelled to serve the multitude.*

FAR DIFFERENT IS THE POSITION OF THOSE

For those who live to themselves in an obscure place, speak freely thanks to their lowly station, and freely do whatever they please. Do you realize how many things of poor men admirably said and done are obliterated not by extreme old age, but in the space of one or two days? The words and works of princes are consecrated to everlasting memory the moment they are published. Conversely, the shameful deeds and sayings of obscure men expire at the same moment of time. For in what way are they to become renowned, when their author is known only to himself and his household? “Thus a lifetime”, as the famous author says, “flows silently by, and days pass away without a sound.”

BUT YOUR WORDS AND DEEDS

Nothing which princes do or say here dies, but spreads among the people, and has it sown interpreters. Therefore, as Herodian [Cf. 1.14.7] says: *The prince’s doings can in no wise be hid.* Pliny, *Panegyr.* [83.1]: *Great fortune (high office) has this characteristic in particular that it leaves nothing hidden, nothing secret; it opens not only the dwellings of princes, but even their chambers and their intimate retreats; it exposes to the eyes of all everything that is hidden.* Claudian, *Panegyr.* [8.269-275]: 
By frequent words I shall, moreover, warn you
To bear in mind that you live
In the midst of the whole earth, that your deeds
Are open to all nations, nor can kingly vices ever be
Kept secret. For fate’s loftiest light
Allows nothing to be hidden, penetrates all
Shadows, and rumor spies out the narrow crannies.

Juvenal [Sat., 8.140f]:

The greater any sinning man is held to be,
The clearer is the guilt within his heart we see.

Sallust [B.J., 85.23]:... the glory of ancestors sheds a light on their posterity which allows neither their virtues nor their vices to be concealed. The same idea is in Plutarch [Praec. Ger. Rep., 11 (Moral., 806B)].

AND CONSEQUENTLY NONE SHOULD BE MORE CONCERNED

For those who sustain a position of high rank, mediocrity is not permitted. From private persons popular virtues are demanded: from the former, excellent and heroic ones, and, as they say, “people always demand more from the highest.” Cicero to his Brother Quintus [Ep. Q.F., 1.1.41]: Now if our sphere of action were so limited as to elicit no more than ordinary talk and comment, nothing extraordinary, nothing beyond the common practice of others, would be demanded of you. As it is, however, owing to the splendor and magnitude of the affairs in which we have had a hand, if we fail to secure the highest praise for the administration of your province, it seems hardly possible for us to escape the bitterest vituperation. This then of necessity rests with them, since willy-nilly they must be great, that they may have a good and in like manner a great name.

2. HOW MANY THINGS THERE ARE WHICH YOU MAY NOT DO

Argument from similarity, lest the prince think he will sacrifice anything of his greatness, if he is not permitted to break out into scoldings and quarrels, when many things are not permitted, yet without violating his majesty. I prefer to read it interrogatively, although it is read without
interrogation in several editions, and the expression is accepted by writers, although Valla disapproves. Coelius to Cicero [Ep. Faro., 8.8.9]: And how clemently be replied. [Ibid., 8.15.2]: I am bursting… to… discuss with you my inmost thoughts! But how many of them I have! Cicero [T.D., 3.34.83]: But how far-reaching the roots of distress, how numerous, how bitter! All of them, if once the trunk is overturned, must be picked out… Seneca himself [Decl., 10.4(33)17]: And because they are ashamed to be men, they do it as though they were how few men. [quam pauci]. Suetonius [Claud., 20.1]: He completed how many great works, which were big rather than useful.

**YOU CANNOT ESCAPE FROM YOUR LOT**

It is the mark of rhetorical skill to turn those things that work against us to our own benefit and to the advantage of our case. For it is something tyrannical for a ruler to provide himself with an armed bodyguard while among his own citizens. Cicero [Philipp., 2.44.121]: Are not then a thousand deaths better than not to be able to live in one’s own community without a guard of armed men? But Seneca says these are rather trappings and insignia of rule than protection of life. Mamertinus, Panegyr. Jul. Caes. [24.4] Arms, then, and youths with swords and spears are not for the protection of the body, but public trappings of the imperial majesty. For what need is there of such, when you are hedged about by the stoutest of walls, the love of your citizens?

**4. TOWARDS IT EVERYONE TURNS HIS EYES**

Ovid [Pseudo Ovid, Consol. Liv. Aug., 351f]:

*To yourself all eyes and ears you draw, your deeds we mark,  Nor can words spoken by the prince’s lips be concealed.*

And Seneca [cf. Ep. Mor., 83.16ff] used to say that drunkenness is shameful in a king, whom the eyes and ears of all follow. True and remarkable as this is, it is also difficult and hard, as Cicero [Philipp., 8.10.29] deservedly exclaimed: *Ye immortal gods! What a task it is to maintain the part of a leader in public affairs! on one who should study, not the feelings alone, but the very looks of his fellow-citizens!"*
5. YOU CANNOT BECOME ANGRY

A very true saying. For all are afraid where such an outburst of uncontrolled temper may lead to when nothing has been closed to it. And when it does eventually, like a calamity, fall on some individual, then others fear the same for their own heads. For how great a plague you think, will come upon the earth, if princes, free of the laws, released from all, as they say, reins and restraints, would only wish to exercise their power for harm? What end would there be to slaughter, robbery, plunder, where unbridled madness can do everything? Well then is it that princes, freed of laws, yet live by the laws. Nay, they are the very law itself.

6. CONSIDER, TOO, THAT WHEREAS PRIVATE CITIZENS

He returns now from the digression to the context of the discourse, and the thread of the argument, and finally gives the fourth reason, why private men are to be pardoned when they punish insults done to them more harshly; since they are subject to injury, by bearing the old, they invite the new. That is what forces them to retaliate injuries, not in order to correct past ones, but to provide for the future. The condition of kings is different; when they remit injuries, they impart to themselves a definite security. And this he proves by argument from contraries. For if frequent vengeance represses the hatred of a few but stirs up that of many, it follows that pardon is a more fitting instrument for punishing injuries.

7. JUST AS TREES THAT HAVE BEEN TRIMMED

Comparison taken from farming practice. For farmers customarily trim off yet tender branches to make trees stronger and more fruitful. So also they grow back leafier and denser. And there are certain kinds of plants which unless they are pruned by the knife, die off and languish. On this matter the writers on farming have written a good deal.
FOR THE PARENTS AND CHILDREN OF THOSE

Hence that famous ancient proverb: *Stupid is he, who, having killed the father, leaves the son alive.*

**BY AN EXAMPLE FROM YOUR OWN FAMILY, I WISH TO SHOW YOU**

These words have more force because they *insinuate themselves better into the ears* and are more readily heard because of praise of family, and leave a sting, when he who is warned thinks it shameful to yield place to his ancestors, and to becloud the splendor engendered by them. Virgil, *Aeneid* [3.342f] makes Andromache say:

*Do Father Aeneas and Uncle Hector arouse him At all to ancient virtue and to manly courage?*

This is repeated [*Ibid.*, 12.438-440]:

*Act then as soon as mature age has come upon you. Be mindful, and bring back to mind your ancestors’ examples, And let Father Aeneas and Uncle Hector spur you on.*
CHAPTER 9

1. The divine Augustus was a mild prince, if one should start to judge him from the time of his principate. However, against the common Republic he already wielded the sword when he was at that age at which you are now, and when hardly past his eighteenth year he had already buried his dagger in the bosom of his friends, he had already in stealth aimed a blow at the person of the Consul, Mark Antony, and had already been a partner in the proscription.

2. But when he had passed his fortieth year and was staying in Gaul, the information was brought to him that Cinna, a dull-witted man, was construing a plot against him. It was exactly stated where, and when, and in what way Cinna intended to assault him: it was one of the accomplices who gave the information.

3. Augustus decided to have his revenge upon Cinna. He ordered a counsel of his friends to be called. He spent a restless night, reflecting that it was a young man of noble birth who was to be condemned, blameless but for this act, and besides a grandson of Gnaeus Pompeius. Now he could not bring himself to kill one man! While he was dictating, with many a sigh, the edict of proscription over his meal,

4. he now and then would burst forth into fitful and inconsistent speech: “What then? Shall I let my murderer walk about in unconcern, while I am filled with fear? Shall he then go unpunished who, sought in vain as my life has been in so many civil wars, and saved unhurt in so many land and naval battles, now that peace prevails on land and sea, is determined, not to murder me, but actually to slaughter me as a sacrifice?” (For the plan was, to attack him while officiating at a sacrifice.)

5. Then again, after an interval of silence, he would scold himself much more loudly than he scolded Cinna. “Why do you live on, if it is vital to so many people that you should die? What end will there be of executions? What end of bloodshed? I am the obvious victim for whom young men of noble birth should whet their swords. If so much must
be wasted, only in order that I may not perish, then my life is not worth the price.”

6. At length Livia, his wife, broke in and said: “Will you also take a woman’s advice? Do what the doctors do! When the usual remedies do not work, they try just the opposite. By severity you have accomplished nothing so far. Salvidienus was followed by Lepidus, Lepidus by Murena, Murena by Caepio, and Caepio by Egnatius, to say nothing of those others of lesser birth, who should have been ashamed to dare so much. Try now, how clemency will work. Pardon Cinna. He has been arrested; he cannot now do you any harm, but he can do good to your reputation.”

7. Happy to have found a supporter, he thanked his wife, then ordered that the request to the friends who had been asked to the conference be at once countermanded, and summoned only Cinna to his presence. Having dismissed everyone, he left his sleeping-room, ordered a second chair to be placed for Cinna, and said to him: “My first request to you is, that you will not interrupt me while I am talking, and that you will not, in the course of my words, utter any protest; you will be given free opportunity to speak.

8. Though I found you, Cinna, in the camp of the enemy, not made, but actually born my foe, yet I spared you, and allowed you to keep the whole of your father’s estate. Today you are so prosperous, and so rich, that your conquerors envy you, the conquered one. When you stood candidate for the priesthood, I gave it to you, passing over several men whose fathers had fought under me. Though such is the service that! have done you, you have determined to kill me.”

9. At this word Cinna cried out that he was far from such madness. Augustus said: “You are not keeping your word, Cinna; it was agreed that you were not to interrupt. You are making ready, I say, to kill me”. And he proceeded to name the place, the accomplices, the day, the scheme of attack, and the man who had been entrusted with the dagger.

10. And when he saw that Cinna had cast down his eyes, and was silent now, not for reason of the compact, but because of his
conscience, he said: “What is your purpose in this? Is it that you
yourself may become the princeps? Upon my word, it goes badly with
the state, if nothing stands in your way to rulership except me! You
cannot guard your own house. Just lately the influence of a mere
freedman defeated you in a private suit. Plainly then, nothing can be
easier for you than to take action against Caesar! Tell me, if I alone
block your hopes, will Paulus and Fabius Maximus and the Cossi and
the Servilii and all that great company of nobles — not those who
swagger with empty names, but they who themselves add glory to
their ancestors’ images — will these put up with you?”

11. Not to fill up a great part of my book in repeating all his words
(for he is known to have talked more than two hours, prolonging this
punishment with which alone he intended to be content) mat last he
said: “Cinna, a second time I grant you your life; the first time you
were an open enemy, now, a plotter and a parricide. From this day let
there be a beginning of friendship between us: let us compete with each
other and see which of us acts in better faith: I, in granting you your
life, or you, in owing it to me.”

12. Later he, unsolicited, bestowed upon him the consulship, chiding
him because he did not boldly stand for the office. He had in Cinna a
most sincere and loyal friend, and became his sole heir. No one plotted
against him any more.

1. The parts of this discourse must be distinguished as follows. To be
pronounced in one breath is the passage: THE DIVINE AUGUSTUS WAS A
MILD PRINCE IF ONE SHOULD START TO JUDGE HIM FROM THE TIME OF HIS
PRINCIPATE. What follows after that, BUT AGAINST THE COMMON REPUBLIC
HE WIELDED THE SWORD, WHEN HE WAS THAT AGE AT WHICH YOU ARE NOW,
is to be pronounced separately. For those writing the history of that time
are unanimous in praising Augustus’ clemency, after, with Lepidus and
Antony removed, he undertook the government of the state by himself. In
the triumvirate he carried on savage proscriptions in a harsh, fierce manner,
and committed certain other deeds full of cruelty, which would take a long
time to enumerate. Suetonius Aug., 51.1: Of his clemency and kindness
there are abundant and signal instances. See Cornelius Tacitus Ann., 1.9,
and many passages in Ovid. I did not wish to tarry here because certain things, as they suggest themselves, will be touched upon in passing.

**BUT AGAINST THE COMMON REPUBLIC HE WIELDED THE SWORD**

Erasmus in his latter edition uses the ablative instead of the accusative. Both readings can be supported. For Caesar was eighteen years old, more or less, when he was sent on an expedition against Antony, who then besieged Brutus at Modena, and finished the business within three months. A little later, when Antony had fled, and when one of the consuls had been slain in battle and the other had died of a wound, he fastened his mind on seeking the consulate. Since there was a general suspicion among men that he (Octavius) had slain Hirtius in the confusion of battle, and that Glyco the surgeon had, at his instigation, smeared poison into Pansa’s wound, so that, after crushing Antony’s forces and denuding the state of its leaders, he might become lord and master of it all, and since the Senate had decided to break his power by calling back the army — terrified, I say, by these tidings, he directed his efforts to seeking the consulship. And when there was doubt about the outcome he moved legions to the city, turning against the state the military force which had been entrusted to him for the protection of the state. At this time Cicero wrote to him: *For what purpose did me send you? From whom do you return? Against whom did me arm you? Whom do you think you are attacking? From whom do you take away the army? And against whom do you prepare for battle? Why is the enemy forsaken? a citizen put in place of the enemy? Why is your camp moved by a halfway march farther from the enemies’ camp and closer to the city?* [Pseudo Cicero, *Ep. Octav.*, 5] A little later he wickedly associated himself with Antony and Lepidus in a triumvirate. Thus he was about nineteen years old when he wielded the sword against the state, and in the state.

**THAT AGE AT WHICH YOU NOW ARE**

The reckoning is to be calculated from Suetonius [Aug., 8.1] as follows: *He lost his father when he was only four years of age; at the age of twelve he pronounced a funeral oration in praise of his grandmother Julia. Four years afterwards, having assumed the toga of manhood, he was honored*
with [several] military awards by Caesar in his African triumph. How much time intervened between this and the death of the dictator Julius must be inferred from another computation. [Suet., Aug., 8.3.]:... he first held the government in conjunction with Mark Antony and Marcus Lepidus, then with Antony alone, for nearly twelve years, and at last in his own hands for forty-four years. [Ibid., 100.1]. He died at the age of seventy-six, less thirty-five days. Sixteen years elapsed to the time he gave the funeral oration for his grandmother [Ibid., 8.1]; then almost twelve years of association with Lepidus and Antony [Ibid., 8.3]; after forty-four, which are assigned to the monarchy, four years remain. During this period Augustus stood partly by the state, partly turned to the side of Antony and Lepidus. From this observation it can also be gathered that this book was composed by Seneca in the second year of Nero’s reign. For Nero succeeded Claudius at age seventeen [Suet., Nero, 8], after which a full year passed, and another was in progress. For he had entered his nineteenth year. The syntax here used by Seneca, although not very common, is used by good writers. Cicero [Ep. Faro., 6.20.3]: And me are now at the age that me ought to bear bravely all those things which do not happen by our fault. De Orat. [1.47.207]: “I ask you then, Antony,” went on Crassus, “as this burden is laid upon people of our age... ” Contra Verr. [2.2.14.37]:... and they launch the most violent attack against a man of that age, mho is by no means litigious... Philipp. [11.7.17]: P. Africanus said that in his brother there reposed the highest virtue and counsel, and that he himself, made officer to his brother, mould certainly not desert him at that age and in those great campaigns. Plautus [Mere., 2.2.19.1901]: Of what age do I seem to you to be? Apuleius, Metamorph., [5.29.6]: So that first you trampled upon the precepts even of your parent, indeed of your mistress, and not only tortured me as if I were your real enemy with filthy loves, but also, a boy of your age, you indulged in licentious and immature embraces.

**AT THE PERSON OF THE CONSUL MARK ANTONY**

It is well known that Antony was consul in the year Julius Caesar was killed by the conspirators. For this reason he had in his possession Caesar’s papers (because it had been decreed by the Senate, that his acts were not to be rescinded), and the money which Calpurnia had left with
him, four thousand talents. When Octarian, the heir designate to three-fourths of this, sought it, he was subjected to abuse. This was the first cause of their falling out: yet it was only temporary. Through common friends they became reconciled at a friendly meeting on the Capitoline. That night a terrible vision troubled Antony in his sleep. It seemed to him that his right hand was smitten from heaven, and shortly thereafter it was announced to him that Caesar was plotting against him. For this reason violent enmity flared up between them once again. Plutarch, Antony [15f]. Suetonius [Aug., 10.3] also recalls it in these words: At the instigation of persons about him, he engaged some ruffians to murder his antagonist. Appian [3.40.16641.167], relates the same story.

**HE HAD ALREADY BEEN PARTNER IN THE PROSCRIPTION**

Enemy of the consul, partner in the proscription. There was no agreement among them, except when they entered into a covenant concerning the triumvirate and the proscription of more than two hundred citizens.

**2. BUT WHEN HE HAD PASSED HIS FORTIETH YEAR, AND WAS STAYING IN GAUL**

That is, in the ninth year of his reign, when he was staying at Milan, in order to help Drusus at the first possible occasion in his campaign against the Germans.

**INFORMATION WAS BROUGHT TO HIM**

Often accusations of this sort are mere false charges, to which princes’ ears are open: but to this report were added all the details of place, time, manner, so that it could be taken for certain.

**CINNA**

I have not found in other writers who this Lucius Cinna was. I was first of the opinion that it was the same Cinna who had gravely and harshly spoken before the people against the deceased Caesar, because it seemed likely that he who was once one of the champions of liberty, would stand
firm in his purpose, and for that reason would exert himself against Augustus. But afterwards I noted it was Cornelius and not Lucius, and that Seneca called him a youth, who would be of the right age. Perhaps he is the one mentioned without name by Valerius [9.9.1; cf. 9.11.4] in his chapter “On Shameful Sayings and Wicked Deeds.”

**ONE OF THE ACCOMPILCES GAVE THE INFORMATION**

“Pointer” is a most appropriate name, as Asconius states [Comm. Cic. De Divin., 34] for the man who *points out the lurking place of crime of which he is aware, when impunity is proffered.* Seneca expresses the original meaning of this word by periphrasis. Yet one finds that even good authors have disregarded it here and there. Curtius [5.11.7]: *Bessus, although he was ignorant of the Greek language, when his conscience was aroused, was of the opinion that Patron had acted as informer.* For, as is certain, Patron never entered into league with the conspirators, nor was impunity offered. *Ibid.* [6.7.23]: *He, while Ceballinus was hidden in the closet, immediately showed the king (as the latter was perchance refreshing himself) what the informer had told him.* Yet Ceballinus was not among the conspirators, and had given information without having impunity offered.

**3. HE SPENT A WRESTLESS NIGHT**

From the custom of those who turn over great matters in their minds, and find themselves stuck mulling over great projects. For as Ovid says: *Troubled by cares in the dead of night.* And Virgil [A., 1.662]: *And under cover of night care keeps coming back.* The same [A., 4.5]: *Nor does care permit peace and quiet to the members.*

In this sense Aristophanes [Clouds, 4.20] elegantly called it *anxious care that makes the bed uneasy.*

**REFLECTING**

Before his mind’s eye there appeared these qualities: the noble birth of the man, on account of which he was endowed with much favor and great resources. Uprightness of life and habits, with this one exception of his treachery. Honesty, which might seem to prove that he had been unjustly
condemned. Kinship to Pompey, which bestowed upon him the favor of all the people, on account of the man’s fame while yet alive, and the grateful memory of him after death. Thus with judgment suspended, Augustus was in doubt whether to kill Cinna or not.

**NOW HE COULD NOT BRING HIMSELF TO KILL ONE MAN**

*Epiphonema or acclamation of something told.* An example of this figure in Cicero *[Quint., Inst., 8.5.11]*: *For the brave youth preferred to act dangerously, rather than have anything shamefully committed.* And in Virgil *[A., 1.33]*:

*So much labor did it cost to found the Roman nation.*

After Seneca had related that Octarian plotted against the consuls’ life, smote the state with arms, was a proscriber of citizens, and was now deliberating over the death of one man, he at last exclaims: “Now he could not kill one man?”

**WHILE MARK ANTONY WAS DICTATING THE EDICT OF PROSCRIPTION**

It would seem that Seneca had made a slip of memory, as he sometimes did. For if Augustus was over forty years of age, it would be about nine years after the defeat of Antony. At that time, as Plutarch *[Cic., 49, fin.]* attests, it was forbidden by public edict for anyone of the family of the Antonii to be called “Mark.” Thus there could be no one at that time named “Mark Antony” who could dictate the edict of proscription. Yet it is scarcely credible that Seneca was so childishly mistaken as regards events which took place in his very own times: as a consequence I prefer to omit the name “Mark Antony.”

**4. WHAT THEN**

Dialogismus, a rhetorical scheme, when someone argues and deliberates with himself. Seneca keeps to the form and style of “pathetic speech,” which proceeds from hatred and indignation, and has an abrupt beginning, as Macrobius *[Sat., 4.2.1.]* says. Juno in Virgil *[A., 1.37f]*: *Then am I*
vanquished? must I yield? (said she) Nor turn the Trojan horde from Italy?

Ajax [Ovid., Metam., 13.5f]:

*By Zeus!*

*Must we beside our ships now plead our cause? Said he,*

*And must Ulysses be compared with me?*

He also arouses indignation when he calls him MY MURDERER, as if he had already perpetrated what he planned. Cinna IN UNCONCERN; Augustus FILLED WITH FEAR.

**IN SO MANY CIVIL WARS**

Augustus waged five civil mars, as Suetonius [Aug., 9] explains. The first was the Mutinensian, against Mark Antony, by which he freed Decimus Brutus the consul designate from siege. The second was the Philippian against Brutus and Cassius, by which he avenged the death of his adoptive father, where previously had also taken place the battle between Pompey and Caesar [Ibid., 13]. Hence Virgil [G., 1.489-492] bitterly exclaims:

*Philippi, then, again saw the Roman ranks*  
*Contend with equal weapons among themselves.*  
*Nor did the gods think it unworthy, to fatten twice with Roman blood*  
*Emathia and the broad plain of Haemus.*

Third was the Perusine, against L. Antony, brother of the triumvir. Fourth came the Sicilian against Sextus Pompey, exercising piracy. Fifth, that of Actium, against Antony and Cleopatra. This Ovid recounted [Metam., 15.822-828]:

*The conquered walls of Mutina, besieged under his auspices,*  
*Shall sue for peace; Pharsalia shall feel him,*  
*And Emathian Philippi, drenched again with gore;*  
*And a great name shall be subdued in the Sicilian waves;*  
*The Egyptian wife of a Roman general shall fall,*  
*Wed with unholy torch; and in vain shall she threaten,*  
*That our own Capitol shall be obedient to her Canopus.*

Of these some were on land: the Muñinensian, Perusine, and Philippian; the remaining two were naval, the Sicilian and that of Actium. Nor were
foreign wars lacking, as the Dalmafic and Cantabrig [Suet., Aug., 10]. The fact that Augustus recalls these perils, has this meaning: him who escaped so many perils of wars, whom fortune chose to preserve from so many dangers — this man wishes to destroy. On the same grounds Alexander excites the feelings of his hearers [Curtius, 6.9.23]: How much more happily would I have fallen as enemy’s plunder, than as citizen’s victim? Now, preserved from perils, which alone I feared, I have fallen into those things which I ought not to have feared.

IN LAND BATTLES

The phrase PEDESTRE PRAELIUM (land battle) is more frequent and usual than pedestrium praelium. Yet here the form pedestrium is used, analogous to Gellius’ use of vulgarium for vulgare and singularius for singularis. See Nonius Marcellus [8, p. 488, 491].

NOW THAT PEACE PREVAILS ON LAND AND SEA

He makes L. Cinna the object of ill-will, for the reason that the author of public peace, after repose had been achieved for all peoples, is himself alone plotted against. Now he refers to that time when, having defeated Antony and Cleopatra at Cape Actium, he closed the temple of Janus, the locking of which was the sign of peace. Livy [1.19], Suetonius [Aug., 22], Plutarch [Numa Pomp., 20.13]. Virgil [A., 1.294-296]:

The gates of war shall close; the imprisoned fury throned
On savage arms, and bound with hundred brazen knots
Behind the back, will rage and shriek with gory mouth.

Ovid., Fasti [1.711-714]:

Draw nigh, sweet Peace! thy locks adorned with Actian boughs,
And in thy gentleness abide in all the world!
While foes are none, let neither wars nor triumphs be:
A glory greater than of war thou to our chieftains art.

NOT TO MURDER BUT TO SLAUGHTER

Murder and slaughter are, of course, the same; but he makes light of the former as if it were of less weight, even though of itself it is a grave offense. This he does in order to exaggerate the heinousness of the crime,
because the crime is committed with the gods present as witnesses and also the pure and holy sacrificial victims are bespattered with human blood.

**TO ATTACK**

According to the proper meaning of the word. For the word *adoriri* [to spring forth, i.e., attack] as Donatus on *Andria* [4.1.46.670] states means: *to rush in suddenly from an ambush, from the fact that the bodies of the invaders loom up suddenly and grow large*. Also on *Adelph.* [3.3.50.404]: *Aggressimur means, we attack from a distance; adorimur, we attack from an ambush*. Cicero, *Pro Mil.* [10.29] Clodius’ party… partly ran to the coach intending to attack Milo in the rear… Livy [7.36.11f]:… they are led onwards to the enemy by a more open path. Having unexpectedly attacked the enemy when off their guard… Livy [21.27.3]:… that when the occasion required he might attack the enemy in the rear. Curtius [8.1.5]: When he was passing through a forest, those who were lurking there together, attacked without warning and killed him with all his companions. Yet this distinction is not maintained everywhere.

**5. AFTER AN INTERVAL OF SILENCE**

Previously he pondered over the death of the man. It was not right for his murderer to be dismissed *unconcerned while he was filled with fear*. The penalty ought to be inflicted upon the assassin who had plotted against the life of him whom fortune had so often spared. Now, however, he turns the accusation against himself, and despises his own life, which draws the death of so many in its train. He concludes that he himself must die, because he cannot live without causing ill to many.

**6. WILL YOU TAKE A WOMAN’S ADVICE**

The words are those of Livia Drusilla urging Augustus, and modestly excusing by this little preface the fact that a woman is mixing herself in serious counsels. In this way did Porcia address Brutus (according to Plutarch [*Brutus*, 13.24]): *I know that woman’s nature is weak as far as*
keeping secrets is concerned. But, O Brutus, my disposition possesses a certain power derived from a good upbringing and excellent traditions, also from the fact that I am the daughter of Cato, and was given to Brutus as wife. Livy in Cato’s discourse [34.2.11]: Our ancestors thought it not proper that women should perform any, even private business, without a director, but that they should be ever under the control of parents, brothers or husbands. For this reason Jupiter strongly reprimands Juno because she boldly intruded upon the serious deliberations of the gods. *Iliad*., [1.545-550].

**SALVIDIENUS WAS FOLLOWED BY LEPIDUS**

He is Q. Salvidienus, to whom Augustus, when about to attack Sextus Pompey on land and sea, entrusted the fleet; he was held in great honor, and advanced as far as the consulate through Augustus’ liberality: Antony/aid bare by his own disclosure this man’s wicked plot against Caesar. Finally condemned, he committed suicide. Livy [127], as stated by L. Florus, *Epitome* and Eusebius, *Chron*. The commentators on Suetonius are dreaming who think Cornelius Gallus was delivered over to the senate for condemnation [Suet., Aug. 66.2] and Salvidienus was only denied access to the provinces. Suetonius’ words [Aug., 66.2] are, One of these, being engaged in plotting a rebellion, he delivered over to the senate, for condemnation; and the other, on account of his., malicious temper, he denied access to his house, and to his provinces. But when, however, Gallus was, by his accusers’ denunciations and senatorial decrees, driven to death, he commended, indeed, the attachment to his person of those who manifested so much indignation. But he shed tears, and lamented his unhappy condition, because to him alone was it not permitted to become angry at friends, as he should have liked. LEPIDUS, not the Pontflex Maximus and colleague of Augustus in the triumvirate, but his son, whom Suetonius calls the younger Lepidus [Aug., 19.1]. L. Florus [Livy, Epit., 133]: When he had put an end to the civil wars, in the thirty-first year, M. Lepidus, son of the Triumvir Lepidus, when a conspiracy was made against Caesar, meditating war, was overwhelmed and killed. Muraena and Coepio were brothers of Proculeius, if we are to believe Porphyryion. Muraena’s treachery was discovered through information given by Castritius. See Suetonius [Aug., 56.4]; the same also [Tib., 8]: He
prosecuted Fannius Coepio, who had been engaged in a conspiracy with Varro Muraena against Augustus, and procured sentence of condemnation against him. Seneca, On Brevity of Life [4.5] While he was extending its boundaries beyond the Rhine, the Euphrates, and the Danube, at Rome itself the swords of Muraena, Coepio, Lepidus, Egnatius, and others were being sharpened to slay him. Livia therefore means: Lepidus was not frightened by the punishment of Salvidienus, nor Muraena by the torment of Lepidus, nor Coepio by that of Muraena. Note the rhetorical scheme, called “climax”, an example of which is that well-known line [Fasti., 3.21]:

*Mars sees this girl; desires the sight, gains his desire.*

**TO SAY NOTHING OF THOSE OTHERS**


**PARDON CINNA HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED**

The sense is: if you pardon L. Cinna, your leniency will become an example and it will redound to your credit. Namely, it will be great proof of your clemency. And now you need not fear his plot. Once arrested he can no longer harm you. DEPREHENSUS (arrested) is, properly speaking, a nautical term, as Servius informs us. Statius, Thebaid., [1.370]:

*And just as the sailor, arrested by the winter seas...*

Ovid, Heroid. Epist. [7.65f]:

*Imagine, pray, yourself arrested by the fury of the storm —
A puny human bung — what will you think of then?*

But it is transferred to other things when we wish to express that someone is so constrained in a narrow place, that no way lies open to flee. Curtius [7.4.4.]: *In so many mountain lairs, among which the enemy, being attacked, would have occasion not even for flight not yet for resistance.* Quintilian [12.2.14]: *Just as certain small creatures, mobile enough in a narrow space, are easily arrested in an open field.* Truly then Cinna had been arrested because his plot was disclosed and where, when, and how he proposed to attack.
8. CINNA... I SPARED YOU

Augustus’ speech to Cinna, full of rhetorical ornament, yet in such a way that the art remains hidden, and as it were flows unaffectedly. He first sets forth his own merits, by which he had obligated Cinna to himself, if he had willed to return favor for favor, as was just. Found as an enemy in the enemy camp, when by right of war he was permitted to kill him, he spared him. He took away nothing of his patrimony, when by the same right he might have taken it as booty. He bestowed the priestly office on him when very many deserving persons sought it. He has nothing, therefore, of his own: life, property, honors — all are Augustus’ benefits. Yet although these things are so constituted he shows how he found out that a conspiracy had been initiated to kill him. And he so binds the man to all the circumstances, that he cannot evade. Now the conspiracy has been proved. He adds that Cinna conceived an empty hope, if by his desire to rule he decided to remove the emperor. For how would he sustain the rule of the world, who could not govern his own family? But if another Augustus is needed, Cinna has not attained such dignity that he is fitted for rule. There are very many persons at Rome, not inferior in the nobility of their family, and superior in all other accomplishments, who would not allow this position of honor to be snatched away before them. Therefore, supposing he committed this crime, it was bound to be of no use to him.

PASSING OVER SEVERAL MEN

A word elegant in this sense. People are said “to pass over” those competing for seats in the comitia, whom they do not support by their votes; and the censors remove a man from the senate when they “pass him over” in their revision of the senatorial list; and in law a father is said to “pass over” his son as heir, whom he does not name as heir. Cicero, *Pro. Plane.* [3.8], repeatedly uses the expression. We shall quote only one example here: *Now I am only discussing the right of the people, who can and are wont sometimes to pass over worthy persons; and if someone who ought not to be, has been passed over by the people, one who has not been passed over ought not therefore to be condemned by the judges.* Livy [4.7.9]:… the leaders of the plebs preferred those elections at which no
account was to be taken of them, to those at which they should be passed over as unworthy.

9. YOU ARE NOT KEEPING YOUR WORD

In the common speech, to acquit oneself of one’s promise. Cicero [Ep. Fam., 1.7.6.]:... So that, if the king had kept faith with those friends of yours who had lent sums of money to him throughout the province under your command, you would assist him with your troops and supplies. Ibid. [5.11.3]: Whatever faith you pledge, I shall keep. The Greeks call it enguasthai, as Budaeus states in his Annotations [AP, 40C].

10. AND WHEN HE SAW THAT CINNA HAD CAST DOWN HIS EYES

With face cast down looking at the earth, either he did so out of shyness or because he was overwhelmed and stunned by fear of punishment. For he had been so driven into a corner that he could not now pretend innocence. For, as Juvenal says [Sat., 9.1820]:

In sickly breast one can discern the soul’s
Deep torments; discern as well its secret joys:
The face takes on the stamp of either.

SILENT... BECAUSE OF HIS CONSCIENCE

Not to clear oneself, not to refute charges, and to receive an indictment in silence ó this is typical of one who confesses. Hence that common saying among the jurisconsults: He who remains silent seems to consent. For when the accused gives up his cause, the accuser wins.

IT GOES BADLY WITH THE STATE

Let him who cannot rule his own house not aspire to public office. For the household is a sort of shadowing and image of the state, as Aristotle says. For in the family wife, children, slaves, freedmen constitute a small likeness of the state. The father of the family stands in the king’s place; if
he is unskilled and ill-suited to what purpose will he strive toward greater things? This is what Aeschines’ words against Ctesiphon mean: *He who hates his children, and is a bad father, can never be a good governor of the people; nor can he who is evil in private ever be good in public life.*

**TELL ME, IF I ALONE BLOCK YOUR HOPES**

I understand this as said by way of “rhetorical permission.” This statement embraces another rhetorical scheme, called “communication,” and is used especially in “conjectures” *when we consult with our adversary.*

**PAULUS AND FABIUS MAXIMUS**

These were families of ancient and noteworthy nobility among the Romans. For the Pauli are more than sufficiently represented by L. Paulus, who as consul fell at Cannae; and the Fabii not only by the illustrious Maximus, but by those 300 men who to a man gave their lives for the state; the Cossi, by Cossus himself who, when Lars Tolumnius was slain, brought back the spoils to Jupiter Feretrius; the Servilii by Servilius Hala, who as master of horse cut down Sp. Melius when he sought to rule as king. What members of each of these families were famous in Augustus’ time I do not know. Quintilian [*Inst.*, 6.3.52] recalls Fabius, who, *complaining of the smallness of the largesses which Augustus used to give to friends, used to say they were “heroinaria.”* And perchance he is the one to whom Ovid addressed elegies in the *De Ponto.*

**COMPANY OF NOBLES, NOT THOSE SWAGGERING WITH EMPTY NAMES**

“Name” among its other significations, has this very elegant meaning, when it is used for “nobility.” Cicero, *Contra Verr.* [1.6.15]: *He confronts me with the empty titles of nobility, that is, the names of haughty men. Pro Cn. Planc.* [7.18]: *You are of consular rank [name] both on your father’s and your mother’s side. Can you then hesitate to believe that your election to the aedileship was supported by all those who uphold the claims of birth, naho count it the most wonderful thing on earth and who are lured by the glamour of your ancestral images and your impressive names?* [*Ep. Faro,*}
3.7.5] Although I had not yet attained those things which are in men’s opinion most glorious, still I never admired these names of yours. I thought those men who had left them to you to be great. Quite often in his oration, Pro Ligario. [e.g., Lig., 7.21]. Juvenal, Sat. [8.272f]:

Trace then your line, unroll the list as far back as you can
You’ll find your race with criminals and runaways began.

So Servius interprets Virgil’s lines [A., 2.89f]:

... We have borne
Some name and honor.

For Nonius Marcellus [4 (p. 354)] “name” also signifies “honor” and “dignity”, as Virgil also has used the word in Aeneid [11.845f]:

Not yet will your queen leave you inglorious,
Now in death’s last throes, nor will this decease be without name.

Perhaps the source of “name” in the sense of “highborn nobility” was that a good name is transmitted from ancestors’ nobility to their posterity. But everyone used to take his “name” from his accomplishments. Ovid, Fasti [1.591-594]:

Gaze upon the waxen images set in noble halls,
Names so great never came to any one man.
Africa calls her conqueror after herself; another hero
Attest by name Isauria conquered; another Crete.

In this way it is also used to mean “family” and “kindred”. Virgil [A., 6.758]:

Who will belong to our name.

And a jurisconsult says that a legacy is given on the condition that it remain permanently under the “name”.

BUT THEY WHO ADD GLORY TO THEIR ANCESTORS’ IMAGES

Explanation. For those who add glory to their ancestor’s images, do not display empty names; those who swell and puff up with the glory of their ancestors, not their own deeds, are said to display empty names, as if so much honor were due the merits of their ancestors, that there was a
surplus to be paid to their posterity. On the “images” I would say what now comes to memory but for the fact that Budaeus has said all that needs to be said. The one thing he has left out I will insert here, since it is especially to the point: the right to have images used to be given among the Romans in the same manner as senatorial rank, and other public decorations. Cicero, Verr. [2.5.14.36]:...*I have received certain privileges: priority of speech in the Senate, the fringed toga, the curule chair, the right of leaving to posterity my image as a memorial.*

11. THIS PUNISHMENT

That is, the reproach of his benefits and of Cinna’s ungratefulness.

A SECOND TIME I GRANT YOU YOUR LIFE

Peroration, in which Augustus reminds Cinna, both for what great benefit he had paid back such ill favor, previously, and how much he would owe him in the future. Once for all he owed his life to Augustus, a life which an enemy had conceded to an enemy. Now he owes it twice, and to the very man whose death he plotted.

A PLOTTER AND A PARRICIDE

Since, as we read in Suetonius [*Jul.*, 881] those who had attacked Caesar in the senate-house were called “parricides,” as killers of the public father, and the Ides of March were named “the act of parricide.” Cicero to Cassius [*Ep. Faro.*, 12.3.1]: *Your friend is exciting more anger every day: first he has inscribed on the statue which he has set up on the Rostra: To the most deserving and best of fathers. So you shall be adjudged not only assassins but also parricides.* Valerius has also referred to it [1.5.7 (p. 134)]: *Also the fate of M. Brutus, worthy of an admitted parricide, was designated by an omen.* And in a number of other places.

FROM THIS DAY

The meaning is: Let us enter into mutual goodwill, as if there were none before: let us relegate all injustice to oblivion, let us imagine that love had never been broken, lest any disgrace occur to obscure present goodwill.
From this day let us compete in acts of good will, provided you understand that you are, as it were, paying your debt, and that I have freely challenged you to this competition without owing you anything.

**WHICH OF US ACTS IN BETTER FAITH**

Thus Curtius [7.2.8] represents Alexander as speaking the following words to his soldiers: *With the same faith, return into favor with me, with which I return to favor with you.* Good faith here means what the Greeks call *epieikeia kai chrestotes*, that is honesty and sincerity in keeping promises. Suetonius [*Aug.*, 42.2]: *When the people demanded a promised gift, he replied that he was a man of good faith.* Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 85.8]: *Vices are never tamed by good faith.*

**12. NO ONE PLOTTED AGAINST HIM ANY MORE**

Clausula which accommodates the example to the present thing. For it was to be proved that kings increase the number of their enemies by removing them, because relatives and neighbors take the place of the deceased.
CHAPTER 10

1. Your great-grandfather spared the vanquished; for if he had not spared them, whom would he have had to rule? Sallustius, and a Cocceius and a Deillius and the whole circle of those admitted to the inner chamber he recruited from the camp of his opponents; and now it was his own clemency that gave him a Domitius, a Messala, an Asinius, a Cicero, and all the flower of the state. How long did not Augustus bear with Lepidus himself until the latter’s death? For many years he allowed him to retain the insignia of a ruler, and only after the other’s death did he permit the office of chief pontiff to be transferred to himself; for he preferred to have it called an honor rather than a spoil.

2. This clemency led him on to safety and security. This made him pleasing and favorable, although the necks of the Roman people had not yet been humbled when he laid hand upon them. Today this preserves for him a reputation which is scarcely within the power of rulers even while they live.

3. We believe prince Augustus to be a benevolent god, but not because we are bidden; that the name “parent” suited him well, this we confess for no other reason than that he did not avenge with cruelty even the personal insults which usually sting a prince more than wrongs; that when he was the victim of lampoons, he smiled; that he seemed to suffer punishment when he was exacting it; that he was so far from killing the various men whom he had convicted of committing adultery with his family that he banished them for their greater safety, and gave them their passports.

4. This is really to forgive, when you know that there will be many to take up your quarrel; and while you could do yourself the favor of shedding an enemy’s blood, then not merely to grant deliverance, but to guarantee it.

What was pertinent to the comparison of the example has now been made clear: Augustus benefited so much by his clemency toward Cinna, that he
made him his friend, and was no longer assailed with any stratagems by anyone. Therefore another example is given, in which Augustus pardoned the vanquished with a happy issue for himself. Seneca hereby attracts Nero to the same gentle-dealing. Ovid [Trist., 2.4548], writing to Augustus, attests to this:

Many even exalted with riches and honors,
I have seen, who had taken up arms against thy person.
The day the warfare ended, ended for thee the wrath of war;
And both sides together bore offerings to the temples.

The same [Ep. Pont., 1.2.123128]:

But a prince, slow to punish, quick to reward,
And who grieves, as often as he is forced to be severe;
One who ever conquers, that he may spare the conquered,
And who has shut up civil warfare with everlasting locks.
One who prevents many a crime by the dread of punishment, but few by punishment itself; And who hurls few bolts, and those with an unwilling hand.

YOUR GREAT-GRANDFATHER

It would not be easy to find someone who could unravel how Nero was related to Augustus by this degree of kinship. For his great-grandfather in the paternal line was the Domitius who, as a praetor, proposed that Caesar, upon the expiration of his consulship, should be called to account before the senate for his administration of that office, which was supposed to be contrary both to the omens and the laws: Afterwards, when he was consul himself, he tried to deprive him of command of the Gallic troops, and having been appointed his successor by a faction, he was made prisoner at Corphinum at the beginning of the civil war., and at last was slain in the battle of Pharsalia. [Suet., Nero, 2.2f] By this reckoning Augustus should have been called not his great-grandfather, but his great-grandmother’s brother. For Octavius the father of Augustus had a daughter Octavia, who was married to Antony, and bore him two daughters; one named Antonia the elder, gave birth, by Domitius the grandfather, to Domitius the father. The maternal great-grandfather was Tiberius Nero the husband of Livia Drusilla who afterward married Augustus. For from her he conceived Drusus, the father of Germanicus. From him in turn Agrippina the mother of Nero was conceived. Nor is it easy to consider him to be an adoptive great-grandfather. For Nero was adopted by
Claudius his great uncle, the son of Drusus, who was the stepson of Augustus. For this reason, not even by a stretching of language, would he be the son of a great-grandchild, but a great-grandson. Nevertheless, in one way, he can be so called by right of adoption: because Augustus adopted Drusus as his stepson, who was the natural great-grandfather of Nero.

Tacitus [Ann., 13.34.1]: With Nero now consul for the third time, Valerius Messala entered upon the consulship; his great-grandfather, Corvinus the orator, was now by a few old men remembered as a colleague in that office with the deified Augustus, the great-great-grandfather of Nero. This is indeed worth noting, from the same Tacitus [Ann., 14.53.2], that in a discourse of Seneca to Nero, Augustus was called Nero’s great-great-grandfather, and [Ibid., 14.55.2] in Nero’s discourse to Seneca, his grandfather. Alciatus winks at this, while at other times he chases after trifles.

**A COCCEIUS**

I identify him as L. Cocceius, who previously being a common friend of Octavius and Antony, had been the author of a pact of peace between them.

**A DEILLIUS**

I read Deillios, without the support of any reading, but by no light conjecture.! take him to be that Deillius whom Messala Corvinus used to call “the deserter of the civil wars”: because (as Seneca, Suas. [1.7], has written) he had gone over from Dolabella to Cassius, entering an agreement to kill Dolabella. Then he had passed over from Cassius to Antony, and at last from Antony to Augustus. In this passage “Deillius” is unquestionably to be read. Plutarch also mentions him in his life of Antony [25.2; 59.4], where nevertheless the corrupt reading Delius is found in common texts.

**AND THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF THOSE ADMITTED TO THE INNER CHAMBER**

That this office was of no mean dignity among the functionaries of the court, I am quite certain. For they were the so-called “admissionals” who as
they pleased, excluded or admitted persons to the royal bedchamber. Lampridius [Alex. Sev., 4.3]: He would be greeted as one of the senators, with the curtain open, the ushers of the privy chamber having withdrawn, or with only those who had been ministers at the door. Suetonius [Vesp., 14]: Being in a great consternation after he was forbidden the court in the time of Nero, and asking those about him, what he should do? or, whether he should go? an “admissions officer” threw him out and bade him go to Morbonia. The master of admissions was in charge of these, as Ammianus Marcellinus recalls [15.5.18]. The Macedonian kings had almost the same sort of persons. Curtius [6.7.17]: Ceballinus stood before the palace entrance (for he did not have the privilege of access thereto) and waited for someone from the first cohort of friends to usher him in to the king. And [Ibid., 8.6.6] he also says that the noblest youth of the Macedonian community were commonly enlisted in that cohort which was the seedbed of leaders and prefects. Now Seneca adds the epithet INTERIORIS (“inner”) for emphasis. Suetonius, Calig. [19.3]: But when I was a boy I heard my grandfather say, that the reason assigned by the courtiers of the inner circle was this... Statius, Thebaid., [1.198f]:

The chosen council of the gods had assembled  
In heaven’s inner depths.

For this reason also Virgil calls the sanctuary the “inner house” [A., 2.483f].

A DOMITIUS, A MESSALA, AN ASXNIUS, A QCERO

All these men supported the forces of Cassius and Brutus. When these were conquered, certain of them even allied themselves with Sextus Pompey. Domitius, along with others concerned in the death of Caesar, was condemned by the Pedian Law, although innocent. He went over to Brutus and Cassius. From them he received the fleet and kept it for a long time. When their fortunes were ruined, he surrendered to Antony, and was restored to his country and filled the highest offices. Finally, when civil war broke out between Octarian and Antony, he withdrew from Antony, and crossed over to Octarian in a small boat. See Plutarch [Ant., 63.2], and Suetonius [Nero, 3.1f]. But Seneca perhaps is referring to another man. For he did not flourish in the city through Augustus’ largesse, because he had been accepted into confidence not by Augustus, but by Antony, and
not as a humble suppliant, but as a person of great merit, as he who
repaired the ravages of the war with great energy, and, shortly after leaving
Antony and going over to Augustus, passed away. Unless you prefer to
believe that Seneca has purposely twisted history to praise Augustus.
Concerning Messala, Plutarch [Brut., 40.1] relates that he was very
intimate with Cassius and the day before his lamentable defeat at Philippi,
had supper with him, when he had very few of his servants at that meal.
Here is sure proof that he was highly esteemed, because after Brutus had
obtained the right wing for himself from Cassius, Messala was added to it,
as he had with him the most warlike part of the troops. Afterward,
reconciled to Augustus, he was made consul, and at the behest of the
Senate, hailed Augustus as “father of his country.” He was also the first
urban prefect, according to Dio Cassius [cf. 5254] and Eusebius [Chron.,
A° 1991]. Now Asinius, whom Seneca mentions, is not Asinius Pollio,
who followed Julius in the civil wars, and furnished strong support to him
against Pompey, whom Cicero in one of his Philippics [13.21.49] included
among the portents of Caesar’s friends, and with whom, as with one’s
closest friend, Julius took counsel concerning the crossing of the Rubicon
(as Suetonius declares [Jul., 31.2]) and who afterward assisted Augustus in
defeating Sextus Pompey, as Plutarch writes [Cato Minor, 53.24]. I would
prefer to identify him with Asinius Gallus, or some other person of their
number who strove for liberty. Understand Cicero here to be the son,
who while his father was still alive was summoned by Brutus to his camp,
and considered among the leaders of the first rank. He did many things
very well, says Plutarch [Brut., 26.3]. He also defeated Caius Antony in
battle near Byllidis. Afterwards he fought in Sextus Pompey’s forces.
When Augustus obtained victory [App., B.C., 4.51.221]: in order to
excuse himself from the betrayal of Cicero, Augustus kindly spared him. At
once he declared him high priest, and not much later appointed him consul,
and praetor of Syria. When later on Antony was defeated at Actium, as
consul he frequently pronounced legal judgment on the people, and sat on
the rostra in that place where the head and hands of his parent had hung.
Plutarch in his Life of Cicero [49] adds that he was adopted by Augustus
as colleague in the consulate in which year the Senate cast down the statues
of Antony and abolished some ornaments, so that by a divine fate the
ultimate vengeance came to Cicero’s house. It is not without reason then,
that Seneca calls these men the flower of the city, for they held no mediocre position.

**LEPIDUS HIMSELF**

The first division of the empire among them took place after the insurrections raised by Fulvius and L. Antony. *All the territories stretching to the east were granted to Antony; Caesar was awarded the parts to the west, so as to make the Ionian Sea the boundary; Lepidus received Africa* [Plut., *Ant.* 30.4]. Already at this time the power of Caesar advanced beyond Lepidus, although up till then Lepidus had been his superior in dignity and honor. Thus they nevertheless remained content until Lepidus called upon by Octavius to assist in defeating Sextus Pompey, taking pride in the loyalty of twenty-two (or as others would have it), twenty legions, laid claim to the leadership for himself. Then Octavius, having entered his camp, although at the risk of death, yet obtained control, having been received with a military greeting. Lepidus, in desperate straits obtained his life by laying down his office, was relegated to Circeri, where he finished his remaining years. This account has been drawn partly from Appian, partly from Plutarch, partly also from Suetonius.

**FOR MANY YEARS HE ALLOWED**

And this ought not to be reckoned among the praises of Octavius, who at his first opportunity despoiled Lepidus of all dignity.

**THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PONTIFF**

Lepidus after the death of Julius Caesar took the office of chief pontiff and discharged it until his death, even after he was exiled. Upon his death, Caesar Augustus took it upon himself. [cf. Suet., *Aug.* 31.1] The chief pontiff used to be created by the college of pontiffs, then during the consulate of Cn. Domitius the right of election had been transferred to the people [cf. Suet., *Nero*, 2.1]. The Priestly office carried with it honor of the very highest order. For the pontiffs so gripped the people’s minds with superstition that they were, publicly and privately, of the highest authority in the city. The Chief Pontiff was notable and preeminent among all the pontiffs.
FOR HE PREFERRED TO HAVE IT CALLED AN HONOR

Epiphonema.

2. PLEASING AND FAVORABLE.

Here it has a passive meaning, which use is more familiar to writers. Suetonius [Calig., 4]: He was so favorable with the people, that many authors relate, the crowds who went to meet him upon his coming to any place, or to attend him at his departure were so great, that he was sometimes in danger of his life... Quintilian [Inst., 12.6.6]: I should wish [him] to commence with as easy and favorable a cause as possible. Yet the active sense is found, against the observation of Valla and Beroaldus, in Livy [22.26.4]. For speaking of Terentius Varro, Livy says, After he had brought their minds to the hope of the consulate, not a little shrewdly he courted the breeze of the favorable people from a hatred of dictatorship. Thus Virgil [G., 1.93] says: penetrable cold, and elsewhere [A., 10.481], penetrable spear. Thus Valerius [1.1.15 (p. 115); 2.4.4 (p. 192)] calls the senate more venerable [reverential] toward the gods. Ibid. [2.4.4 (p. 192)]: the youth, by more venerable rites toward the gods. In Cicero [N.D., 2.62.155] insatiable means what can never sate or cloy: For there is no sight of which it is more impossible to become satiated, none more beautiful, nor more excellent in wisdom and skill. Ammianus [14.11.11]: He alone of all, by means of flattering words mingled with serious matters, with a hypocritical countenance, enticed him to set out.

TODAY THIS PRESERVES

Clemency kept Augustus secure during his lifetime; after his death it has kept his reputation alive. Decrees of the senate made in praise of living princes can seem to be either forced out by fear, or precipitated by rashness. Servile rites which are performed by the people, acclamations also, as someone has called them “slavish acclamations,” serve the presence of a ruler. The praises given to a dead man are spontaneous and thus to be preferred. [3] So the Roman people believed Augustus a god, not because they were bidden to do so, but because they knew by experience that he was a good prince. It was a solemn custom of the
Romans to place their Caesars amongst the gods through apotheosis. Valerius: *The other gods we have received; the Caesars we have made.* Herodian [4.1.3ff] sets forth the rites and ceremonies for the consecration of emperors. As often as I reread that passage, I cannot keep from laughing, so silly was that religion of the Romans. Moreover, not only after death was the name “god” bestowed upon Augustus. When he was still very much alive he was not reluctant to allow divine honors to be conferred on himself. Horace [*Ep.*, 2.1.15f]: *Upon you, however, while still among us, we bestow / Honors betimes, set up altars to swear by in your name...* And [C., 3.5.13]: *We believe that Jove is king in heaven / Because we hear his thunders peal;/Augustus shall be deemed a god on earth...* Yet publicly this religious status was not decreed for him until after his death.

### 3. THE NAME “PARENT” SUITED HIM WELL

Suetonius [*Aug.*, 58.1]: *The whole people, suddenly and with unanimous consent, offered him the title of “Father of his Country.”* He was hailed by Valerius Messala on behalf of the whole senate. Ovid, *Fasti* [2.127130]:

*Sacred Father of your country! on you the people, on you the senate Conferred this title; this also we knights conferred. But long before, reality conferred it; late you received your true Name; long since were yu father of the world.*

And *Tristia* [2.181f]:

*Spare me, Father of your country! do not, forgetful of this title, Deprive me of the hope of appeasing you one day.*

This was done on the Nones of February. Yet Bapfista Egnatius, a meritorious scholar of ancient literature, errs in his history of the Caesars, when he declares that the Title, “Father of his Country,” was first attributed to Augustus, when it previously had been bestowed upon the dictator, as will be seen elsewhere.

### EVEN THE PERSONAI, INSULTS

It is to be noted here that he says princes bear insults more bitterly than injuries. An injury, as Ulpian says, whether by deed or by word, is no different from an insult. This statement does not at all agree with this
passage of Seneca. Therefore it is to be referred to Marcellus’ [Non. Marc., 5 (p. 431)] distinction. He says that an injury differs from an insult in this respect, that an injury is a lighter matter. Pacuvius, *Peribea*: *I easily bear an injury, if it is free of insult. I can easily suffer hardship if injury is absent.* Even injury, unless, on the contrary, insult agrees with it. For as the same Ulpian [*Dig. Just., 47.10.1.1*] states: *Contumely* [insult] is derived from the verb to *contemn*. There is nothing princes bear more grudgingly than to be contemned. *For insult has a sort of sting,* says Cicero [*In Verr., 2.3.41.95,* which good men cannot bear. And Publilius Syrus: *Neither a strong nor a freeborn man can bear insult.* Aristotle, *Ethics* [4.8,1125a 110] thinks it servile to put up with insults. If this is true of other men, it must be doubly true of the prince. Nazarius, *Panegyric to Constantine* [12.2]: *What sharp pang of sorrow have come to you from the insult which an inferior imposes upon you!* This expression, “his insults,” is used in the same way as Cicero speaks in his *Philipp.* [13.19.40]: *He proceeds to my abuse, as if his former gibes have enjoyed the fairest success.* Thus also Coelius said with a passive meaning, “your memory.” Cic., *Ep. Faro.,* [8.1.1]: *It is not that anything in the world would be more delightful to me. than to exert myself on behalf of your memory.* It was an insult when [Suet., *Aug.,* 54] Labeo Antistius, in *reading the names of the senators...*, read also the name of M. Lepidus... in exile at Circeii, to taunt Augustus. Another insult was when some infamous libels against him were passed round in the senate-house [Ibid., 55]; also when a certain senator addressed him in these words, “*I would contradict you, if I had the chance,*” and others: “*The senators ought to be allowed to speak on public matters.*” [Ibid., 54].

**BECAUSE, WHEN HE WAS THE VICTIM OF LAMPOONS, HE SMILED**

Plutarch praises that saying of Alexander: *It is kingly for him who does good to suffer blame.* Augustus followed this dictum, for he patiently listened to vile abuses and lampoons which were heaped upon him. Macrobius also recounts this [*Sat., 2.4.20f*]. We shall quote a few bits. After he had asked jokingly a youth from the provinces who closely resembled him, whether his mother *was ever at Rome, he said “no”*; *but not content with this, added, “My father often.”* And Pollio, [*Sat., 2.4.21*]
when Augustus had written Fescennine verses against him, said: “But I remain silent; it is not easy to inscribe verses against one who can proscribe.” For other examples of this sort, see Macrobius [Sat., 2.4] and Seneca, On Anger [3.22ff]. Augustus himself wrote in a letter to Tiberius [Suet., Aug., 51.3]: Do not..., be so indignant that any person should speak ill of me. It is enough if we can prevent any one from really doing us harm.

WHOM ON ACCOUNT OF ADULTERY WITH HIS FAMILY

It is well known that the two Julias, his daughter and granddaughter, contaminated the house of Augustus with every sort of lewdness and on that account were banished. [Aug., 65.1] See Suetonius and Seneca, On Benefits [6.32.1], and Pliny [H.N., 7.13(11)57; 7.45(46). 149]. Of these persons Seneca therefore now speaks, who were accustomed to indulge in debauchery with the daughter and granddaughter, or who were accomplices in the adulteries. He says they were treated rather gently, because after condemnation they did not receive the ultimate punishment but were only subjected to banishment: in fact, he first gave them their passports and then packed them off. Nevertheless it is not true that they were as gently treated by Augustus as Seneca declares. In actual fact, some were subjected to the ultimate penalty of death: among them, Julius Antonius. See Tacitus [Ann., 4.44]. Erasmus here divines that the reading should be filiae [for familiae] — a matter of no moment.
CHAPTER 11

1. Such was Augustus when he was old, or just upon the verge of old age. In youth he was hotheaded, flared up with anger, and did many things which he looked back upon with regret. To compare the mildness of the deified Augustus with yours no one will dare, even if the arms of youth shall be brought into competition with an old age more than ripe. Granted that he was restrained and clement — yes, to be sure, but it was after Actium’s waters had been stained with Roman blood, after his own and an enemy’s fleet had been destroyed off Sicily, after the altars of Perusia and the proscriptions.

2. I, surely, do not call sated cruelty clemency. This, O Caesar, is true clemency, that you display, which arises from no regret for violence done, that bears no stain, and never shed a cornpatriot’s blood. In a position of unlimited power this is in the truest sense self-control and an inclusive love of the human race — not to be perverted by any low desire, or to be kindled by rashness, nor by the corrupt example of previous princes to be tempted into testing by experiment what license one may employ against fellow-citizens, but rather to dull the edge of supreme power.

3. You have achieved, Caesar, a state unstained by blood, and you have made true your proud boast that in the whole world you have shed not a drop of human blood — which is the more significant and wonderful because no one ever had the sword put into his hands at an earlier age.

4. Clemency, then, makes rulers not only more honored, but safer also. It is at the same time the glory of sovereign power and its surest light. For why is it that kings have grown old and have handed on their thrones to children and grandchildren, while the sway of tyrants is accursed and short? What is the difference between a tyrant and a king, (for they are alike in the mere outward show of fortune and extent of power), except that tyrants are cruel for their pleasure, kings only for good reason and by necessity?
To understand the plan of this chapter it is worthwhile to summarize the previous material. Nero was to have been admonished by example that cruelty is ruinous for kings, for when one enemy has been disposed of, it arouses many more; and that by gentleness and clemency security is assured. Augustus was put forward as an example, who, while as yet a young man, and inclined to wrath because of his youth, used his power to the destruction of many. Conspiracies rose up against him, which he punished with great harshness, without getting any further. After L. Cinna got off unpunished, no one rose up to ambush him. Then other examples of clemency are added, which made him beloved and favored by his subjects; this earned him safety while still alive and favor after his death. Now from the comparison Seneca increases Nero’s gentleness. For if Augustus’ vices are weighed with his virtues, hatred of cruelty obliterates the grace of gentleness. Therefore of the two Nero ought to be by far the more pleasing, since he has mixed no vices with virtues.

**EVEN IF THE ARMS OF YOUTH SHALL BE BROUGHT INTO COMPETITION**

That is to say: if the gentleness of Augustus, already old, already moderated by the tempering of age, is compared with your youthful gentleness. Amplification from age. Moderation is proper to old age; intemperance is natural to youth. Therefore it is all the more remarkable that a youth should excel an old man in moderation.

**GRANTED HE WAS RESTRAINED**

An example of Confession: when we concede something, then mention something which invalidates our own statement.

**YES, TO BE SURE, BUT IT WAS AFTER ACTIUM’S WATERS**

Much Roman blood seems to have been shed at Actium, a promontory in the Gulf of Arabracia where Caesar defeated Antony. For a long time the fighting was a draw, both sides struggling most bitterly, until sixty ships of Cleopatra, which had been placed behind the large ships, took flight, and brought terror upon the others. Yet if what Plutarch [Ant., 67] writes is true, of the followers of Antony not over 5,000 fell in that battle. For this
reason, it is strange that Seneca, having passed over the disaster of the battle of Philippi, in which the flower of Roman nobility perished, remembered this as noteworthy.

AFTER HIS OWN AND AN ENEMY’S FLEET HAD BEEN DESTROYED OFF SICILY

Augustus scarcely ever ran more or greater risks in any of his wars, says Suetonius [Aug., 16.3], than in the Sicilian war against Pompey. Twice he lost a fleet, overwhelmed in storms. And that in summer, as Pliny [7.52 (53) 178] and Appian [5.98.406ff] write. Attacked by Demochares and Apollonophanes, Pompey’s admirals, he escaped with difficulty and with one ship only. Even with these difficulties he defeated the enemy in no bloodless victory. Hence Seneca says: AFTER HIS OWN AND AN ENEMY’S FLEET HAD BEEN WRECKED OFF SICILY.

AFTER THE ALTARS OF PERUSIA

He speaks elsewhere of the Perusine war, which Augustus undertook against Lucius Antony: he (Lucius Antony) had rebelled both at the prompting of Fulvia his audacious wife, and with the assurance of the consulate, which he was then occupying. The opportunity arose: the multitude having been deprived of its possessions by the veteran soldiers, to whom the farmlands had been assigned, flowed upon him from all sides and hailed him as emperor. Having gathered a force, he occupied Perusia, the richest city of Etruria, which, besieged by wall and ditch, Augustus forced to capitulate. All these events are fully described by Appian. From Suetonius [Aug., 15], however, we learn why Seneca mentions THE ALTARS OF PERUSIA: Some authors write, he says, that three hundred men of both orders, selected from the surrendered, were slaughtered, like victims, before an altar raised to the Divine Julius, upon the ides of March.

AND THE PROSCRIPTIONS

Juvenal [Sat., 2.28] well calls the triumvirs “the pupils of Sulla” on account of the proscriptions. For nothing more frightful was ever seen at Rome than those three beasts sitting in the Forum, destining by name to slaughter all those who excelled in wealth, honor, friendship — and not
men only, but (disgraceful to say) also women. Octavius, [Suet., Aug., 27.12] although he for some time opposed his colleagues’ plan for a proscription, once it was begun, prosecuted it with more determined rigor than either of them. While they were often prevailed on through favor and entreaty to show mercy, he alone strongly insisted that no one should be spared. He even proscribed C. Toranius, his guardian... When... Marcus Lepidus made an apology in the senate for their past deeds, and gave hopes of clemency in the future, since enough punishments had been imposed, Augustus declared the only limitation he had fixed for the proscription was that he should be free to act as he pleased.

2. THIS, O CAESAR, IS TRUE CLEMENCY

Augustus’ clemency was repentance for cruelty and savagery. That clemency, however, in which you excel, is sprinkled with no spot of blood, comes from the truest temperance of mind, and from a charity with which you embrace the human race.

NOR BY THE CORRUPT EXAMPLES OF PREVIOUS PRINCES

Before Nero, Claudius ruled, C. Caligula preceded Claudius, Tiberius Caligula. Of these, C. Caligula burned with fierceness and impatience. Tiberius, as if from some general hatred of human kind, actually invented occasions for cruelty. Claudius sinned not so much deliberately as by stupidity and the laziness which his freedmen abused in order to practice cruelty, although he was by character bloodthirsty. All dared to commit the sort of atrocity to which there is no need to refer. The reader will look up in Suetonius and Tacitus what pertains to this passage.

3. YOU HAVE ACHIEVED CAESAR

Take it in this sense: you have achieved, Caesar, a state which knows no bloodshed. Not his only, but you have also achieved something about which you have with great courage boasted, that you have shed no drop of human blood. For perchance Nero had boasted of this either in the senate or in a speech to the people.
WHICH IS THE MORE SIGNIFICANT

Again, amplification from age. For if these changes of rule, by their very nature, are pregnant with changes in all things, then great of itself is the fact that Nero shed not even a drop of human blood, when he took over the rule of the empire. But this increases the greatness of it, that almost still a boy, he tempered his age with prudence. For aged seventeen at Claudius’ death, he took up the rule.

4. CLEMENCY, THEN, MAKES RULERS NOT ONLY MORE HONORED

Minor premise. For the proposition had already been put forward that for kings security becomes surer through clemency. The argument from utility is very powerful in hortatory speeches. Quintilian: In persuading, honor is first to be considered, then utility. There are those who think the consideration of utility alone should form part of deliberation.

THE GLORY OF SOVEREIGN POWER

Interpretation.

FOR WHY IS IT THAT KINGS HAVE GROWN OLD, AND... TO CHILDREN

They who obtain a lawful rule and accommodate it to the public good, die their own death, not before their time, but often grow old in leisure and peace. At last, when they have to yield to the laws of nature, they leave their rule to the inheritance of their family. It passes to their sons and thence to their grandsons. But tyrants so long as they live are execrable, and are often dispatched by the sword rather than by illness. They so exercise violent power that it is not permanent. This, then, is a locus ex contrariis: first the proposition is laid down: KINGS GROW OLD, THE POWER OF TYRANTS IS BRIEF — thus the contraries are contrasted with one another. There follows the difference between king and tyrant. Then is subjoined an illustration of that difference. Seneca’s statement that kings pass on their rule to their children and grandchildren as if from hand to
hand is drawn from the *jus gentium*. Homer elegantly signifies this by the verse in the *Iliad* [2.46]: *And he grasped his father’s scepter, ever unstained.*

**OF TYRANTS IS... SHORT**

Juvenal [*Sat.*, 10.112f] meant this: *Few the kings who without blood and slaughter, / Few the tyrants who without a savage death, / Descend to Ceres’ son-in-law. And Seneca the Tragedian in his *Medea* [196]: Unrighteous kingdoms cannot lasting be. And in his *Thyestes* [215217]: Where there is no shame, / No care for right, no piety, virtue, faith, / Sovereignty is insecure. That noble saying of Theopompos King of the Spartans comes to mind: [Plut., *Moralia*, 779E]:... when his wife reproached him because he would hand down to his children a less powerful kingdom than that which he had received he said: “nay, more powerful rather, inasmuch as it will be more lasting.” For it was during his reign that the ephors had been instituted, to prevent royal whim from going to excess. See Cicero [*Off.*, 2.23.80].

**WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TYRANT AND A KING**

Whatever difference there is, usage rather than etymology or original meaning determines it. *Tyrannus* is a Greek word, derived from the neutral verb *tyranneg*, which to the Greeks meant “to rule.” Hence Isocrates in his oration on Evagoras said *tyrannikon* for the one skilled in governing. And Aristophanes, *Clouds* [563f], says: *Zeus, ruling on high,/King [turrano]s* of all the gods. Sophocles [Fr. 12]: *Tyrants raise by conversation with the raise. This Servius also attests in his Commentary on the *Aeneid* [A., 7.266]. His words are: *Among the Greeks there is no distinction between tyrant and king, although among us a usurper of rule is styled a tyrant. These references sufficiently refute Verrius Flaccus’ error, who wrote that tyrants were so called from the Etruscans, who were also called “Tyrrhenians from Tyrrhenus, leader of the Lydians, because that nation was noted for its cruelty.” Consequently, Latin authors also often use this term in the good sense. Virgil [A., 4.320f]:

*For thee the Libyan tribes and Nomad tyrants Hate me.*
And [Ibid., 7.266]:

To me it shall be a pledge of the peace to have touched your tyrant’hand.

Horace [C., 3.17.69: Who first is said to have held the walls / Of Formiae and Liris where it floods/Marica’s shores, possessing/Lordship [tyrannus far and wide. Statius [Theb., 2.444f]: Lest they should suffer so oft the uncertainty of fortune,/ Groaning submit to orders, and unwillingly obey a doubtful tyrant. See Augustine [DCD, 2.21.2; 5.19]. Now the use prevailed of calling a tyrant one who rules against the will of his subjects or intemperately exercises power, so that it has become a term for a vice. And thus for the Greeks tyrannus and basileus are distinguished as with us, king and tyrant. Solon accordingly writes in a certain poem that he was horrified at the infamy of the term, when he despised a tyranny offered to him voluntarily by his citizens.

ARISTOTLE, ETH. [8.12,1160BL

considers tyranny a transgression of the true limits of kingship. And in the Pol. [3.5.2, 1279ab9]; Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims at the common advantage is “kingship”; for a government of more than one yet only a few “aristocracy”... while when the multitude govern a state with a view to the common advantage, it is called “a republic.” But all such forms of government are likely to be unstable, and to transgress their proper bounds: Kingship becomes tyranny, aristocracy becomes the absolute sway of a few men (oligarchy), and democracy becomes a government of the rabble. Now there are many sorts of tyranny of which Aristotle treats [Ibid., 5.10-12, 1310a35-1316629]. Cicero, Top., [22.85]: In the other class which we divided into two parts, one applies to resemblance and difference, for instance: What is the difference between a friend and a flatterer, between a king and a tyrant? Seneca, Agamemnon [125f]: Mycenae’s king he was;/He will come back her tyrant... Wherever Seneca uses the word, it is to be taken in the bad sense.
1. “What then?” you say: “are not kings also accustomed to kill?” Yes, but only when they are induced to do so for the public good. Tyrants take delight in cruelty. But the difference between a tyrant and a king is one of deeds, not of name. For the elder Dionysius may justly and deservedly be counted better than many kings. What keeps Lucius Sulla from being styled a tyrant? His killing was stopped only by a dearth of foes;

2. yet he abdicated the dictatorship and resumed the toga. Yet what tyrant ever drank so greedily of human blood as he, who ordered seven thousand Roman citizens to be butchered at one time? And who, as he sat nearby at the temple of Bellona and heard the outcry of the many thousands moaning beneath the sword, said to the terror-stricken senate, “Let us attend to business, Gentlemen of the Senate; only a few seditious persons are being killed by my order”?

3. This was no lie; to Sulla they seemed a few. But concerning Sulla we shall presently investigate how we should become angry toward enemies, particularly if fellow countrymen, cut off from the body politic, have taken the name of enemies. Meanwhile, as! was saying, it is clemency that makes the distinction between a king and a tyrant as great as it is, though both are equally fenced about with arms; but the one uses the arms which he has to fortify peace, the other to curb great hatred by great fear. And yet the very hands to which he has entrusted himself he cannot view without concern.

4. Conflicting causes force him to conflicting courses; for just as he is hated because he is feared, so he wishes to be feared because he is hated. And he uses that accursed verse which has driven many to their fall: Let them hate, so long as they fear. He does not know what frenzy is engendered when hatred increases beyond measure. Now fear in moderation restrains men’s minds, but the fear that is constant and sharp and brings desperation arouses the sluggish to boldness, and urges them to stop at nothing.
5. In the same way with ropes and feathers you may keep wild beasts hemmed in, but let a horseman come upon them from behind with javelins, and they will try to escape through the very objects that had made them run, and will trample down their fear. No courage is so bold as that forced out by utter despair. Fear should leave some sense of security, and hold out much more of hope than of peril; otherwise, if an inoffensive man is made to fear the same peril as others, he takes pleasure in rushing into peril and blindly taking the life of another. [c. 13 Section 1]: A peaceable and gentle king has trusty guards, whom he employs for the common safety; and a proud soldier is seen to devote himself to public security, willingly shouldering every hardship as a protector of the parent of his country; but he that is harsh and bloodthirsty inevitably gets the ill-will of his own henchmen.

WHAT THEN?

An interrogation, which aids the arrangement and arouses the hearer. For since he is later on going to treat exhaustively of those differences between king and tyrant which he has now briefly summarized, it would hardly have been in good style, if he had just gone on, without a break, in this fashion: FOR KINGS ALSO ARE ACCUSTOMED TO KILL... BUT ONLY WHEN... ETC.

FOR WHILE THE ELDER DIONYSIUS

Dionysius the Elder is commonly called not king but tyrant of Syracuse. And yet many who have been called kings have exercised their kingship far more harshly than he did his tyranny. He therefore was a king, they more truly tyrants, if we judge them by their conduct. Yet Dionysius was not of himself gentle or restrained: for whom dreams before his birth portended a dire and destructive future, as Valerius [1.7.8. ext. 6] relates. And Macrobius [Comm. Somn. Scip., 1.10] calls him the merciless usurper of the Sicilian palace, who having disposed of his friends, put barbarous and utterly savage men in their place, whom he intimately associated with himself. But his cruelty, when compared with the savagery of some, has almost the look of clemency. Thus it came about that he exercised supremacy for thirty-eight years, while very many kings, toppled from their high pinnacle, have been roughly treated either by banishment or
death. He flourished in the time when thirty tyrants were imposed upon the Athenians. At almost the same time in Rome the military tribunes were created with consular power, in the 347th year after the founding of the city, as Gellius [17.21.19] reckons. Livy [4.7.1] states, A.U.C. 310. And he calls him Dionysius the Elder on account of his son who received the tyranny as it were by hereditary right from his father. Afterwards, expelled by a faction, he opened a school for boys at Corinth. What a mockery of fortune, this — having experienced both sorts of fortune, he bore the adverse more moderately, while he intemperately abused the prosperous. Livy speaks against Valla’s observation when he says “elder” (major) rather than “former” (superior); as Valeflus [3.2.16, (p. 254)]:

Happier in his offspring was the former Cato, from whom flowed the ancestors of the Porcian family. The same [3.7.7 (p. 291)]: But Cato the Former (Elder) very often summoned by his enemies to appear in court, was never convicted of any crime.

AND L. SULLA

Although Sulla reveled in more than tyrannical fashion in slaughter and robbery, he was never styled a tyrant. He retained the name “dictator,” an office which free people used to impose upon themselves. And yet who would deny that he was truly a tyrant, if a tyrant is he who lords it unrestrainedly, who feeds upon the slaughter of his own citizens, who exercises his dominion violently beyond what is fair and good?

WHOSE KILLING WAS STOPPED

Indeed, not even this made him stop. For many who had nothing to do with Sulla, and who had held aloof from party politics, were executed for private enmities under the pretext that they had been followers of Marius, although they had never associated with Marius. Afterwards Sulla, asked by a certain senator to state whom he intended to sentence to punishment, in order that he should not slaughter so many innocent people, proscribed eighty citizens. When the senate took this ill, he added two hundred twenty. [Plutarch, Sulla, 31] Thirdly, he added almost as many; In a harangue to the people he said, with reference to these measures, that he had proscribed all he could think of, and as to those who none escaped his memory, he would proscribe them at some future time. If any man received
and assisted a proscribed person, and delivered him from death, he was to suffer death as punishment for his piety. There was no exception for brothers, children, or parents. Neither temple nor hospitable hearth nor father’s house was free from murder. The proscriptions were carried on not only in Rome, but in all the cities of Italy. Brought to Praeneste, they were first tortured man by man, after the fashion of the law courts. Then twelve thousand men were murdered in cold blood. Only the man in whose house Sulla stayed, was offered impunity; but with true manliness he refused the offer, declaring that he could never possibly enjoy such a continued existence, if he had to share it with the destroyer of his country.
You will read a thousand other things of this sort in Appian [BC., 1.95-96] and Plutarch.

2. THOUGH HE ABDICATED THE DICTATORSHIP

When he so conducted himself in governing the state, he assumed the dictatorship, an office previously customary with the Roman people, and to which was entrusted the supreme authority. For the dictators held free sway over the lives of the citizens, nor did they comply with the interpositions of the tribunes, and they were almost above the laws, practically endowed with royal power. For this reason care was taken that the dictators give up their office in the sixth month from the time they had taken office, lest their great power, which was believed dangerous, might become permanent. But Sulla took the office upon himself for a period of 120 years. Julius Caesar followed his example. But the latter having once received the power, never relinquished it; while the former gave it up in the assembly of the people, venturing if anyone should ask, to set forth a reckoning of his conduct of office. For this reason Caesar cavilled at him, saying: Sulla was an ignorant fellow to abdicate the dictatorship [Suet., Jul. Caes., 77]. And the rhetoricians among their declamatory exercises, used to discuss Sulla’s address to the people on laying down the dictatorship [Quint., Inst., 3.8.53]. Juvenal alludes to this [Sat., 1.1517]: I too / Have counseled Sulla to retire from public life / And sleep his fill. Since those who assumed rule to this degree abused the license of this power, the name (“dictator”) was abrogated forever during the consulate of Antony. This was the reason that Augustus afterward [Suet., Aug., 52] when the people
strongly importuned him… bent down on one knee, with his toga thrown off his shoulders, and his breast exposed to view, begging to be excused. Seneca’s words therefore have this meaning: although contrary to the custom of tyrants he finally withdrew from the tyranny and returned to the status of private citizen, yet there was no tyrant who, even preserved in office until death, was more greedy to quaff blood than he.

**AND RESUMED THE TOGA**

Lucan [*Phars.*, 7.266f] makes Caesar use the same expression:

> My own desire is to return to private life  
> And, in plebeian toga, to live as an ordinary citizen.

The toga signifies private status, for the praetexta was the sign of magistracy. Asconius [*Comm. Cic. Verr.*, 5.36]: *The toga was the common dress of men and women, the praetexta of honorable persons, the toga of persons of low station*. Yet this is not enough. For Sulla, after giving up the dictatorship, retained senatorial rank. It seems appropriate to touch briefly on what I think. First of all, the wearers of the praetexta were magistrates, as was said, and Pliny shows this in his *Panegyr*. [56.4]: *Shall I admire the consulate discharged by you yet not willingly accepted by you? It was not an office discharged in the quiet of Rome and in the innermost bosom of peace, but in the face of barbarous nations, after the fashion of those men accustomed to exchange the toga praetexta for the military cloak.* [Ibid., 61.8]: *They have just put off the toga praetexta; let them put it back on. They have just ordered their lictors to depart; to them recall them...* And Livy [10.7.9] lists the insignia of those receiving a triumph and of magistrates: *curule chairs, the toga praetexta, the tunic embroidered with palm branches, the colored toga, the triumphal croton, the laurel*. Some others also commonly used the praetexta, that is consular and praetorian men, and like persons serving high offices, or those who had attained that honor in the state by their own merits. Cicero [*Verr.*, 2.5.14.36], when he speaks of his aedileship: *Priority of speech, the praetexta, the curule chair, the right of leaving my portrait as a memorial to those who follow me...* Also in his *Pro Cornelio Balbo* [25.57]: *... who secure by privilege of the laws the right of giving their opinion amongst the praetors and of meaning the praetexta*. Not even they always appeared in public wearing the praetexta, but when celebrating supplications, or other solemn rites and
certain other public festivals. Cicero, *Philipp.* [2.43.110]: *Why are me not meaning the praetexta? Why do me permit an honor granted to Caesar under your lain to be neglected?* By the wearing of the toga, we therefore very clearly understand private citizens, either senators or plebeians.

**YET WHAT TYRANT DRANK SO GREEDILY OF HUMAN BLOOD**

This expression is frequently used when writers wish to describe someone who delights in punishments: They say “he thirsts after and drinks blood.” Pliny [14(22). 28.148]: *He vomited the book, so that anyone can see he is drunken with the blood of citizens, and therefore a thirst for more.* Hence that poem flung against Tiberius [Suet., *Tib.*, 59.1]:

*Instead of wine he thirsted for before,  
He mallows now in floods of human gore.*

Caesar in Lucan [*Phars.*, 1.330-331]:

*Accustomed so to lick the blade of Sulla,  
You still retain, 0 Great Pompey, that thirst.*

**WHO ORDERED SEVEN THOUSAND ROMAN CITIZENS**

Augustine [*DCD*, 3.28] recounts this same history, and Plutarch also in his *Life of Sulla* [30.2f]. Plutarch disagrees with Seneca on the number. He writes that six thousand were killed: nor does he quote Sulla’s proud and cruel reply. In Augustine one reads that certain wicked persons were punished, not a few. But Seneca adds this *ad auxesin* in order to increase our hatred of Sulla. Augustine agrees with Seneca on the number.

**AT THE TEMPLE OF BELLONA**

In this temple the senate was often convened, especially when it received the emissaries of a foreign power, who were not permitted to enter the city, or when generals were about to claim a triumph; these customarily did not enter the city unless in triumph. There are examples of both kinds in Livy [30.21.12], concerning the ambassadors of the Carthaginians: *As they mere forbidden to enter the city, they were lodged in an inn on the public highway, and given an audience before the Senate at the temple of Bellona.* [*Ibid.*, 28.38.2]: *Having obtained an audience of the senate outside*
the city, in the temple of Bellona, he gave an account of the services he had performed in Spain. For it was located near the Circus Maximus outside the city, consecrated by Appius Pulcher, according to Ovid, *Fasti* [6.201205]:

*On this day Bellona is said to have been enshrined, during the Tuscan War; she, auspicious ever, favors Latium.*

*Appius was the builder: he, who, when peace was refused to Pyrrhus, Saw clearly in his mind, though blind in eye.*

*The small temple area looks on the Circus from behind.*

e tc. Understand that day as the day before the Nones of June or June fourth. That Appius Pulcher vowed it, is attested by Livy [10.19.17], but by whom it was consecrated, or at what time, he does not recall. Nevertheless one reads in Livy that the first decree of the senate made there was when Marcellus returned as victor from Syracuse and demanded a triumph on account of his accomplishments. C. Calphumius the Praetor convened the senate [Livy, 26.21.1]. On the Goddess Bellona, read Cicero [*In Verr.*, 2.5.16] and Lactantius [*Div. Inst.*, 1.21]. To return to Sulla: he could easily have heard the clamor. For those seven thousand men who had given themselves up and entrusted themselves to him, had gathered in the Circus Maximus, not far from the temple of Bellona.

3. TO SULLA THEY SEEMED A FEW

The others, as we have said, do not mention this reply of Sulla, but Seneca adds this to provide an opportunity for a rhetorical “schema” called *anadasis* by the Greeks, when we twist to another sense what was said by somebody else. *Of this sort is that common saying of Proculeius* [Quint., *Inst. Or.*, 9.3.68]: when his son said to him that he was not waiting for his father’s death, obviously meaning that he was not longing for the inheritance, the father contradicted him: *Nay,... I desire that you may wait for it, but not that you hasten to try to make me die more swiftly.* Sulla had said that only a few were being killed, to allay the terror which the senate had conceived from such great clamor; Seneca refers to his bloodthirstiness.
AND CUT OFF FROM THE BODY POLITIC

Skillfully he infers that those who do not share in the life of the community are not citizens. What is a state? It is an assembly or gathering of men associated by law, says Cicero, [Rep., 6.13.13]. This definition he has taken from Aristotle’s Politics [3.1, 1274b1275a]. If then not every society constitutes a state, but only that one which lives by upright morals and fair laws, those who do not obey the laws are not citizens, out are CUT OFF FROM THE BODY of the lawful state. etc.

TAKE ON THE NAME OF ENEMIES

In the same sense Cicero elsewhere [Pro Cluent., 53.146]: As our bodies without the mind, so also a state without law, cannot use its parts, which are analogous to sinews and blood and members.

MEANWHILE, AS I WAS SAYING

As if to say: That is said in passing: we are warned by the example of Sulla what enemies we ought to pursue. Meanwhile, what is proper to our subject: clemency readily distinguishes a tyrant from a king.

THOUGH BOTH ARE EQUALLY FENCED ABOUT WITH ARMS

Paradiastole, which Quintilian [9.3.64-65] calls distinction, which [Rut. Lup., FS, 1] separates two or more things that seem to have the same force and meaning, and indicates how much they differ, by appending the proper meaning of each. Thus Ovid [Trist., 2.271f], on a similar matter:

Both the robber and the wary traveler are girt with the sword;  
But the one plans treachery, the other carries a protection for himself.

Of the same sort is what follows [Rut. Lup., FS, 1]: I do not wish any more to call you thrifty, inasmuch as you are wirerly. For he who is thrifty uses what is enough ;you, on the contrary, on account of avarice — the more you have, the more you need. Thus there follows not so much the fruit of industry as the poverty of riches.
THE ONE USES THE ARMS WHICH HE HAS

The king, obviously, whose duty is to ward off with arms the violence that is imposed upon his subjects, using arms only for the protection of the peace.

THE OTHER... BY GREAT FEAR

Obviously, the tyrant, who, since he is detested by all, constrains hatred with terror. Suetonius [Dom., 3.2] meant this when he said of Domitian: *Inclined to avarice through want, and to cruelty through fear*. And Claudgan: *He strikes all, while he fears all*.

AND YET THE VERY HANDS

He who fears all, trembles at every motion — why should he not fear his own retainers? He sees armed men, but he does not know for sure whether they are girding the sword for or against him. In this sense Thyestes is introduced by the tragedian Seneca [Thyestes, 447-449]: *While I stood high in power, / Never did cease to dread, yea to fear / The very sword upon my thigh*.

4. FOR SINCE HE IS HATED BECAUSE HE IS FEARED

The tyrant is stirred by conflicting causes to conflicting courses. For he wishes to be feared because he is hated. And yet he is hated because he is feared. No need for fear if there were no hatred. What he thinks is the remedy of an evil is therefore exactly his one great evil.

BECAUSE HE IS HATED

For as Ennius says: *He whom they hate, they also fear*: whoever fears someone, wishes him dead. Seneca, *On Anger* [2.11.43f]: *How can we explain how terror always works back to him who inspired it, and that no one is feared who is himself at peace? At this point it is well that you should remember that verse of Laberius, which, when pronounced in the theater during the height of the civil war, caught the fancy of the whole people as*
though it expressed the national feeling: “He must fear many, whom so many fear.” Thus has nature ordained, that whatever becomes great by causing fear to others is not free from fear itself.

**HE WISHES TO BE FEARED**

For what else do they do but inspire terror in all when they think every sword is hanging over them and threatening their life? Read Seneca’s tragedy, called the “Octavia,” into which he has transferred sentences almost wordforword from this work Truly spoken, then, is that tyrannical saying of Dionysius, which boasted [Plut., Dionys., 7; 11] that fear, violence, a fleet and ten thousand armed men were adamantine chains.

**THAT ACCURSED VERSE**

This verse is spoken by Atreus in some ancient tragedy, whether of Accius or of some other author: as Cicero mentions in two places [Off., 1.28.97]: If Aeacus or Minos had said, “Let them hate so long as they fear,” or let the parent be his offspring’s tomb, it would have seemed inappropriate, because we have been taught these men were just; but when Atreus says it, he evokes applause. And Philipp. [1.14.34]: We see this even in the play: the very man who said, “Let them hate, so long as they fear,” found that it was fatal.

**LET THEM HATE, SO LONG AS THEY FEAR**

Suetonius, Calig. [30.1]: He repeatedly vaunted that tragic utterance: “Let them hate, so long as they fear.” The same in Tib. [59.2]: He repeatedly vaunted that tragic saying: “Let them hate me, so long as they approve of my conduct.” Seneca, On Anger [1.20.4]: that foul and hateful saying... which you may be sure was written in Sulla’s time, “Let them hate me, if only they fear me.” With this sentiment Lucan [Phars., 3.82f] heaps odium upon Caesar, in the following words:

... Yet he was glad to be so greatly
Feared by the people; and preferred not to be loved.
WHEN HATRED INCREASES BEYOND MEASURE

The tyrant often thinks things go prosperously, if he is feared by his own subjects, thinking that their hatred has nothing to do with him, because it succumbs to terror. Meanwhile the hatred grows, and at last turns to madness, which can no longer be quelled by fear. At this point swords or retainers can do nothing any more; here the wretch is deserted by his bodyguard, which he had appointed for this very emergency.

NOW FEAR IN MODERATION

For good princes also have to restrain criminal men by fear, that their harmful propensities may be curbed by the rule of law: and they must inflict those punishments which the laws prescribe, lest impunity increase boldness. But they practice restraint; since they show themselves open to the entreaty of many, and are loved by even more. That tyrannical terror, which knows neither moderation nor pause, nor distinction, so stings to the quick that it irritates more than it compels.

IN THE SAME WAY ROPES AND FEATHERS

The comparison is most appropriate; it is used by this selfsame Seneca, Controv. [9.6.2]: Certain wild beasts, says he, eagerly bite the weapons, and, though wounded, rush upon the author of their death. But this applies more expressly and fittingly to what he had said. For as that terror, which he had posited, is SHARP AND CONSTANT, AND BRINGS DESPERATION, thus on all sides despair moves wild beasts, hemmed in by the net, when the hunter brandishes his weapon.

ROPES AND FEATHERS

By periphrasis he designates an enclosure, that is, a series of nets set upright on forked poles.

THEY WILL TRY TO ESCAPE THROUGH THE VERY OBJECTS THAT HAD MADE THEM RUN

For while they are fleeing the hunter’s weapon, they get caught in the rope nets. While they are trying to extricate themselves from these, they turn
their course back upon the hunter, and lay hold of his hunting spear with their teeth. And thus arises ultimate despair. The hunter’s art is: to arouse some hope of escape, if they flee, in order that they may rush more easily into the nets.

**NO COURAGE IS SO BOLD…**

Gnome or proverbial saying, which is frequently placed in conclusions. This one is simple and related to the matter in hand. Yet this is just as true a saying as popular and common. Porcius Latro in Seneca, *Declamations*, [1, Pref.]: *Grievous indeed are the stings of aggravated Ivant.* Q. Curtius [5.4.31]: *Necessity spurs on even cowardice, and despair is often a cause for hope.* The same author elsewhere [4.3.24]: *But necessity, more inventive than any art, introduced not only the usual means of defense, but also more novel ones.* Hence that exhortation of Hannibal to his soldiers, than which nothing more powerful can be said [Livy, 21.43.5]: *We must conquer or die, soldiers.* Livy [21.44.8]: *You must be brave men. Since by despair every alternative except victory and certain death has been destroyed, you must either conquer or, if fortune wavers, seek death in battle rather than in flight. No stronger incentive to victory has been given to man by the immortal gods.* A similar saying is found in Sallust [*Cat.*, 58.19], put on the lips of Catiline.

**FORCED OUT**

A word elegant in this sense: to designate the violent effort. For it means “to draw out by pounding”, as Nonius says, who also reads Virgil, *Georgics* [1.133] as follows:

*That by experience man might gradually force forth [extunderet] the various arts.*

Although Servius [*Comm.*, ad loc.] and Festus prefer to read here not *extunderet*, but *excuderet* (hammer out). Suetonius, *Vesp.* [2.2]: *He had for a long time a distaste for the laticlavium, though his brother had obtained it; nor could he, by any one but his mother, be persuaded to seek it; she at length forced out his consent more by reproach than by entreaty.* Seneca himself [*Ben.*, 1.3.1]: *Who forced thanks even out of a hard and thoughtless heart.*
SHOULD LEAVE SOME SENSE OF SECURITY

A good prince is feared as upholder and guardian of the laws, which decree punishment not to all but to those who cannot otherwise be corrected. The wicked and criminal fear him; the good love and revere him.

IF AN INOFFENSIVE MAN

The sense is: a tyrant not only metes out punishment upon those who have conspired to kill him; but he also appoints accusers who oppress the innocent with false charges. Whether, therefore, you plan something great, or remain at rest, you always live in the same mortal danger though it is certainly preferable to be dragged into court by a true accuser than by a calumniator.

AND TAKING (ABUSING) ANOTHER’S LIFE

This is according to the difference which Donatus observed in Terence’s Phormio [2.3.66.413]: We abuse with injury and contumely. Curtius [8.7.11] also understands it in the same way: These, then, are the rewards of the Macedonians, whose blood you abuse as if it were superabundant and mean.

[C. 13 § 1] A PEACEABLE AND GENTLE KING

So far he argued in this manner: even if a tyrant has some protection in armed guards, it is not firm or strong enough, because it is overcome by public hatred. Now he argues that even in them also there is no protection, namely in those who serve unwillingly as his guards.

BLOODTHIRSTY

That is, cruel and seeking after blood. Suetonius, Claud. [34.1]: His cruel and bloodthirsty disposition was exhibited upon great as well as trifling occasions. Pliny the Younger [Ep., 4.22.6]: At take all spoke together about his wickedness and bloodthirsty utterances. Thus Pliny the Elder [H.N., 19.8.53 (169)] calls Tarquin’s reply bloodthirsty, and Seneca, On Anger [3.41.1]: speaks of a bloodthirsty beast. For the Greeks the
corresponding terms were: *haimatoeis*, *haimatgdgs*, and *haimateros*. Politianus in his translation of Herodian renders them by *sanguinarius*. 
CHAPTER 13

2. No one can ever hold the loyalty and good will of his servants when he employs them to operate instruments of torture, the horserack and various implements for killing; when he flings men to them as he would fling them to wild beasts. Such a man must feel more guilt and anxiety than any prisoner found guilty in court, seeing that he is driven by fear of men and gods, the witnesses and avengers of his crimes, to the point that he cannot change his conduct. For among other things, this is the worst thing about cruelty. One must persist in it, and no return to better things is open. For crime must be safeguarded by crime. But what creature is more unhappy than the man who now cannot help being wicked?

3. A wretch to be pitied, at least by himself! For that others should pity him would be a crime a man who has utilized his power for murder and pillage, who has caused mistrust of all his dealings whether at home or abroad, who resorts to the sword because he fears the sword, who trusts neither the fidelity of friends nor the piety of his children; who, when he has surveyed what he has done and what he intends to do, and has laid bare his conscience burdened with crimes and torturings, often fears to die but more often prays for death, more hateful as he is to himself than to his servitors.

4. On the other hand, there is the man whose care embraces all, who does not guard here with greater vigilance, there with less, yet fosters each and every part of the state as a portion of himself; who is inclined to the milder course even if it would profit him to punish, showing thus how loath he is to turn his hand to harsh correction; whose mind is free from all hostility, from all brutality; who so covets the approbation of his countrymen upon his acts as ruler that he wields his power with mildness and for their good; who thinks himself abundantly happy if he can publish his good fortune. He is affable in speech, easy of approach, lovable in countenance, which most of all wins the affection of the masses, well-disposed to just petitions and harsh to the unjust, whom the whole state loves, defends, and reveres.
What people say of such a man is the same in secret as in public. They are eager to rear up children and the childlessness once imposed by public ills is now relaxed; no one doubts that his children will have cause to thank him for permitting them to see so happy an age. Such a prince, protected by his own good deeds, needs no bodyguard; the arms he wears are for adornment only.

This chapter is the appendix of the previous one. For Seneca gives the reason for what he had said: that henchmen cannot but bear ill-will toward a harsh and bloodthirsty prince. Now he adds that there can be no loyalty or good will from the side of those whom he keeps busy with constant slaughtering, as if they were wild beasts. Seneca alludes to the ancient custom of the Romans, who either cast to wild beasts those sentenced to death, that they might immediately be torn limb from limb, or forced them to fight with beasts. The latter were called “condemned to the beasts.” The former, who were turned over to immediate death, were in a worse condition.

2. MORE GUILTY THAN ANY PRISONER FOUND GUILTY IN COURT

He who is accused and guilty must also be anxious. For when of itself it is a fearful thing to come before a judge as Plautus [Most., 5.1.52.1101] says, it is most fearful of all to stand trial in a capital case and a bad case, in which you expect the sentence concerning your very life to fall out in favor of your adversary. The comparative, used by Seneca, cannot be squared with the form commonly used by other authors, but examples are not lacking. Plautus, Most., [1.2.71-72.150-151]: Not one of your young fellows was more diligent / In gymnastic art. Juvenal [Sat., 11.12]: The poorest of them dines more luxuriously and daintily. Cicero in his speech Pro Domo Sua [11.27]: Who has ever dwelt upon his merits more diligently before the Roman people, or more frequently before the Senate?

THAT HE CANNOT CHANGE HIS CONDUCT

For the tyrant thinks his final destruction has come if he shows himself just a little bit more friendly than usual. For he always has death before his
eyes, which he believes cannot be avoided, unless he ward it off by force of arms. Thus encouraged, even if he would, he yet dares not remit anything of his wonted cruelty. Hence Phalaris, in one of his letters [Ep. 38] says: *It is more perilous to lay down the ruler’s office than to occupy it.* And Dionysius [Livy, 24.22.9] says: *One should leave off the tyrant’s office, not on horseback, but dragged by the feet.* Plutarch recalls Solon’s reply [Plut., *Solon*, 14.5]: *Beautiful indeed is the tyrant’s position, but it has no exit.*

**FOR CRIME MUST BE SAFEGUARDED BY CRIME**

This is the custom of those who when they cannot defend crimes admitted, seek remedies in new evil deeds. Now this is the crime: that the tyrant breaks in upon public liberty and tumultuously disturbs the peace of the city; then, to keep possession once taken, he is compelled to remove all who are of any rank in the city, who can arouse the people to recoup their liberty. When he has committed these deeds, he sees to it that no avengers or champions stand up. Therefore he sheds all hightborn blood. At last he knows himself to be cursed and detested by all; and while he wishes to remove such curses from his head, he *safeguards crime by crime.* Thus there is neither limit nor end of evil doings. Seneca, *Againem.* [115]: *Crime’s only path of safety leads through crime.* Persius [Sat., 338] elegantly says: *That they may look on Virtue, and pine away because they have lost her!*

**3. NEITHER THE FIDELITY OF FRIENDS**

So we read of Dionysius who, *having removed his friends, substituted in their place men of the most barbarous nations, and very strong slaves chosen from the households of the wealthy, to whom he entrusted his personal safety.* Valerius Max. [9.13.3 ext. 4]. Cicero also [T.D., 5.20.58] speaks of the same: *Although he came of good-parentage and was born in a respectable position (though as to this accounts differ) and although he had many friendly relations with contemporaries and enjoyed the intimacy of kinsfolk, and certain youths were attached to him in the lover-like fashion recognized in Greece, he trusted none of them, but committed the care of his person to slaves whom he had selected from the households of*
wealthy men and whom he personally had relieved of the name that marked their servile condition, as well as to certain foreigners and uncivilized barbarians. On Alexander Phereus read Cicero, *Offic.* [2.7.25].

**NOR THE PIETY OF HIS CHILDREN**

This also refers to Dionysius, who, since he did not wish to allow himself to be touched by a barber’s hands, *taught his daughters to barber*. Later suspecting them of fraud, *he arranged to singe his beard and hair with glowing walnut shells*. We must not lightly pass over the fact that Seneca said *fidelity of friends* and *piety of children*. For thus their duties are distinguished. Pliny, *Panegyr.* [42.2]: *Fidelity has been restored to friends, piety to children, obedience to slaves*. Cicero in his speech *Pro Quintio* [6.26]: *For friendship is maintained by truth, partnership by fidelity, and kinship by a sense of piety...* Do not wonder that in one place one reads “truth” and in another “fidelity.” For they have nearly the same meaning, namely what the Greeks call *chrastotas*. Cicero, *Pro Plancio* [33.80]: *What is piety, if not a benevolent gratitude to one’s parents?* Quintilian [5.10.12]: *Just as those things that are admitted by the general consent of mankind, such as that there are gods, and that piety is to be shown to parents.* Yet in order that my readers may understand what piety really is, I shall append Cicero’s words from the *Topics* [23.90]: *Equity is also said to have three parts: one pertains to the gods in heaven, the second to the spirits of the departed, the third to men. The first is called “piety”, the second “sanctity”, the third “jusitce” or “equity”.* Thus far Cicero. But since parents are for us so to speak in the place of the gods, to them is diverted what Augustine hints at [DCD, 10.1.3]: *Piety, properly speaking, is commonly understood as worship of God, which the Greeks call eusebeia. Yet this eusebia also is said to be exercised by way of obligation toward parents also.* But we also use this term when we wish to express a particularly forceful love. Cicero [*Ep. Faro.*, 1.9.1]: *I was very much pleased with your letter, which made me realize that you fully appreciate my piety toward you; for why should I say “my good will” whenever the term “pie(y)” itself, most solemn and sacred as it is, does not seem to me impressive enough to describe my obligation to you?*
WHO, WHEN HE HAS SURVIVED

So far he has shown that the tyrant is most miserable, who has such fear of GODS AND MEN, WITNESS AND AVENGERS OF HIS CRIMES, that he cannot trust himself either to the fidelity of friends or to the piety of children, who must needs take refuge in armed protection, and even then is not secure enough. Now he adds, what is more serious, that he has the witness of conscience, which gnaws and lacerates him like a worm inside. For conscience is a thousand witnesses, as the proverb has it. Juvenal [Sat., 13.193-198]:

But why must those be thought to escape, who feel Those rods of scorpions, and those whips of steel Which conscience shakes, when she with rage controls And spreads are aging terrors through their souls? Not sharp revenge, not Hell itself can find A fiercer torment than a guilty mind, Which day and night doth dreadfully accuse, Condemns the wretch, and still the charge renews. Latinus Pacatus in his Panegyr. [43.5]: The wicked mind has some sort of internal tormentors, nay, the conscience is its very own tormentor. Cicero, Pro Roscio Amer. [24.67]: Do not think, as you often see in plays, that those who have committed some impious and wicked act, are pursued and terrified by the burning torches of the Furies: each one is especially troubled by his own fraud and his own terror; each is stirred by his own misdeed, and affected by his own madness. His own evil thoughts and bad conscience frighten him. These are the constant and intimate furies which beset the impious. That passage of Statius [Theb., 1.52] is to be understood in the sense of Cicero’s words,... and the Avenging Furies of his crimes assail his heart. Cicero, Pro Milone [23.61]: Great is the power of conscience, great for bliss or for bane; it makes the innocent fearless, while it haunts the sinner with the ever-present vision of retribution. Seneca has more in the same vein [Ep. Mor., 97.12ff].

4. IF HE CAN PUBLISH HIS GOOD FORTUNE

The difference between kingdom and tyranny is this: one is directed toward public usefulness: the other toward private advantage. Where Seneca says “publish,” Curtius uses the verb “divulge” (spread). His words are [9.10·13]:... in addition the labor of marching and anxiety of
mind had spread diseases... The same [9.10.1]: .. and the contagion of the ailment was spread also to others.

AFFABLE IN SPEECH, EASY TO APPROACH

Truly kingly virtues, to exhibit a certain sweetness of speech which allures rather than frightens away, and to show oneself friendly and open to all, etc.

WELL-DISPOSED TO JUST PETITIONS

The prince should observe both principles: What is fair he should allow to be granted ungrudgingly; and he should not too leniently indulge his subjects, in order that they may not make unfair demands upon one another.

5. OR SUCH A MAN IS THE SAME SAID IN SECRET

Praises are extracted by evil princes through force and fear: honorary decrees of the senate, public panegyrics, theatrical acclamations. But what men dare not proclaim openly, they whisper in one another’s ears. A good prince whom they praise they love. For they praise him out of affection, and do not secretly curse him, as they do a tyrant. Almost the same statement is in Pliny’s *Panegyr*. [2.2]: *Let us not praise the prince publicly in the same terms as before; for we do not speak the same in secret as before.*

THEY ARE EAGER TO REAR UP CHILDREN

It behooves the state to pay attention to the matter of children: surely it would last only the age of a man unless parents provided new offspring in turn. Hence the law of Metellus, mentioned by Gellius [1.6]; Augustus urged the same. Also the laws concerning children among the Romans And in Plato’s *Republic* [6.17,774A], celibacy is punished. Therefore, the fact that the citizens desire to rear children under his rule is praise for the emperor. Pliny includes this very thing among the praises of Trajan *[Panegyr.], 22.3*: *Supreme happiness it was for the women in their*
fruitfulness to see that for such a prince they had brought forth subjects; for such a commander, soldiers. Seneca’s phrase, TO REAR UP CHILDREN, we express in the vernacular by the verb “to raise.” Terence, *Heaut.*

[4.1.1314.626-627]: *Do you remember my being with child and your express order / That if it were a girl you wouldn’t have it raised as yours?* Curtius [9.1.25]: *The children that are born they raise and nourish, not according to the discretion of their parents, but of those to whom the charge of the physical examination of children has been committed.* Pliny the Younger [*Panegyr.,* 26.5]: *The rich are charged to rear up children by large rewards and equivalent fines: the poor have but one reason to bring up children — the beneficence of the prince.*

**NEEDS NO BODYGUARD**

For, as Horace [C., 1.22.14] says:

*The man of the unblemished ever,*  
*Of hand unstained by evil deed,*  
*Nor Moorish darts nor bow nor quiver*  
*With poisoned arrows stuffed will need...*

**THE ARMS HE WEARS ARE FOR ADORNMENT**

Insignia of rule by which he makes himself venerable to the people, and full of majesty.
CHAPTER 14

1. What, then, is his duty? It is that of good parents who are wont to reprove their children sometimes gently, sometimes with threats, who at times admonish them even by stripes. Does any father in his senses disinherit a son for his first offense? Only when great and repeated wrongdoing has exhausted his patience, only when what he fears outweighs what he reprimands, does he finally resort to the decisive pen; but first he makes many an effort to reclaim a character that is still unformed, though inclined already to the more evil side; only when the case is hopeless, he tries extreme measures. No one resorts to dire punishments until he has exhausted all the means of correction.

2. This is the duty of a parent, and it is also the duty of a prince, whom not in empty flattery we have been led to call “the Father of his Country.” For other designations have been granted merely by way of honor; we have styled men “the Great,” “the Fortunate,” and “the August,” and we have heaped upon pretentious greatness all possible titles as a tribute to such men; but to “the Father of his Country” we have given the name in order that he may know that he has been entrusted with a father’s power, which is most forbearing in its care for the interests of his children and subordinates his own to theirs.

3. Slow should a father be to sever his own members; aye, after severing he would yearn to restore them, and while severing he would groan aloud, hesitating often and long; for he comes near to condemning gladly who condemns swiftly, and to punishing unjustly who punishes unduly. [c. 15 § 1] Within my memory the people in the forum stabbed Erixo, a Roman knight, with their styluses because he had felled his son with lashes; Augustus Caesar’s authority barely rescued him from the indignant hands of fathers no less than of sons.

After that long contention, whereby he was comparing tyrant and king with one another, he now gives the prince the best example from which he may learn both the measure of clemency and restraint in meting out punishment. Moreover, this question depends upon that which preceded the contention: Whether kings are also accustomed to kill? He had
answered that the king also kills, but only when public welfare demands. But since this was also not clear enough, he now proceeds with an example. A father at first gently admonishes his son. If words are not effective, he threatens. If he accomplishes nothing by threats, he finally has recourse to whipping. Thus the prince, who is father of this country, should also consider his citizens as sons, and urge them at first with words and proclamations, before he resorts to punishment. In this vein Chrysantas speaks in Xenophon [Cyrop., 8.1.1]: *I have very often thought that a good prince is no different from a good father*, etc. Pliny, *Panegyr. to Trajan* [21.4]: *And by what good will, what gentleness, do you justify this name? To the extent that you live with your citizens as a parent with his children.*

**DOES ANY FATHER**

There are fourteen causes in law under which a father can disinherit his son. [*C.J.C., Novell. 115.3*]: The right to disinherit, which Quintilian [*Deal., 9.10*] calls the *final lightning-bolt of the father’s power*, was abrogated by a constitution of Justinian.

**WRONG DOING HAS OVERCOME HIS PATIENCE**

A father should not be aroused by the first offense to disinherit his son. Let him rather overlook much, wink at much, until the flood of evil has risen to such a point that it cannot be overlooked any longer. Ovid also uses this expression [*Arnores, 3.11.1*]:

*Much and long have I suffered; my patience is worn out by evil.*

And Mamertinus, *Panegyr to Julian*, [6.1]: *All these things at last overcame the persistent and staunch patience of the prince.*

**ONLY WHEN WHAT HE FEARS OUTWEIGHS**

Either he refers to that saying of Plato [*Laws, 11.11, 932C*] — that no prudent man punishes because there is sin, but lest sin be committed afterwards; or he is simply saying that *a father fears more than he condemns*, who does not believe himself safe when his son is under the same roof with him, who has plotted parricide or some similar crime.
DOES HE RESORT TO THE DECISIVE PEN

By **DECISIVE PEN** (decretorium stylum) he signifies harsh censure, the harshest in fact that the father can take toward his son. For **stylus**, understood metaphorically, signifies this by itself, and **decretum** to the Latins means what **arestan** does for the Greeks, that is: “a set and determined sentence”, whence **decretorium** which for the Greeks is **kritikdn**. Accordingly, Pliny speaks of the lesser dogstar as the star decisive for the grapes, and the day decisive for the flowering olive-tree, on which the Eagle rises On the pen, Cicero speaks [Cluehr., 44.1231:... *lest the censor pen, whose point our forefathers took so many precautions to blunt, may hereafter inspire us with as much terror as did once the dictator’s sword.* Latinus Pacatus, Panegyr. to Theodosius [28.3]: Thus when the pen and sword of the unmerciful Tyrant were feared, poverty turned into something longed for. And [Cod. Just., 9.49.7]: If anyone within a province incurs sentence (the pen) of proscription because of the character of the crime, then through the responsibility of the ordinary office... etc. This metaphor is derived from the fact that in ancient times sentences were written with a stylus on waxed tablets.

**BUT FIRST HE MAKES MANY AN EFFORT TO RECLAIM A CHARACTER THAT IS STILL UNFORMED**

So long as there is hope that he can, by light remedies, be recalled “to a fruitful life,” the father does nothing harsh to him and he does not give up his efforts until every hope of his improvement has been finally abandoned.

**HE TRIES EXTREME MEASURES**

This expression is properly used in circumstances of despair. Curtius [5.3.4]: **Madathes was prefect of this district, scarcely to be sure a man for varied circumstances; in fact he had decreed that extreme measures be tried instead of simple trust.** Sallust [Cat., 26.5]: When the day of the elections came and neither Catiline’s suit nor the plots which he had made against the consul were successful, he resolved to make war and try all extreme measures.
2. THIS IS THE DUTY OF A PARENT, AND IT IS ALSO THE DUTY OF A PRINCE

Now he accommodates the example to the argument appended.

WHOM WE HAVE CALLED...
“THE FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY”

Nearly all the Caesars were commonly hailed by the senate as “fathers of their country,” so that this was almost a regular title of the emperors, from the time it was bestowed upon Julius. And Tacitus [Ann., 11.25.4] even calls it a common… title. See Suetonius. This name had its origin from Cicero who, after the suppression of the conspiracy of Catiline, was called “father of his country,” as Appian [BC, 2.7.24f] testifies. And elsewhere, speaking of Caesar the dictator: He was called “father of his country”, a title which Cicero first merited. Juvenal [Sat., 8.243f]:

... But Rome, free Rome,
Called Cicero the Parent, Father of his Country.

Pliny [H.N., 7.30.117]: Hail, first of all men called Parent of your Country! Plutarch in his Life of Cicero [23.3] states that Cato was the author of this title. Whether this is true, I leave an open question, yet I append Plutarch’s own words and Cicero’s passage, in order that my readers may more easily decide for themselves. Plutarch [Cic., 23.3] says: The good services which Cato rendered both to Cicero and to the whole state, were considerable. Relying on his powers as a tribune of the people, he pursued his political aims with an authority equal to that of his opponents, and with a reputation far greater than theirs. With ease he broke through all opposition, and in a public speech in the forum represented Cicero’s consulship in such a glorious light, that he declared Cicero to be worthy of the very highest honors, and called him Father of the Fatherland. This title, first given to Cicero in that speech of Cato’s, is generally thought to have spread from there to the rest of the people.

Cicero himself in his speech Pro Sexrio [56.120] speaks as follows: What then, do you think of this? That that supreme artist... (the tragic actor Aesopus) weeping for joy still fresh and deep-felt sorrow, and out of sheer longing for me, pleaded..., openly my cause in much weightier words than I
could ever have pleaded myself! For he expressed the genius of that great poet (L. Accius), not only by the exercise of his art, but also by his own grief. [Ibid., 57.121]: Then how the Roman people groaned when (shortly afterwards in the same play) these words were delivered (by the same actor): O father! — Me, me in my absence, he considered as a father to be mourned — me, whom Q. Catulus and many others had often in the senate called Father of the Fatherland. How he wept, when he lamented the father’s exile, the affliction of his country, and the burning and ruin of his house! So pathetic was his acting that, after having described that man’s former prosperity... he drew tears even from my enemies and detractors. [Ibid., 58.123]: I was even mentioned by name in the ‘Brutus’.

Now here he mentions Q. Catulus by name; there is no mention of Cato; and he positively states that he was so called in the senate, not in the popular assembly. It is obvious that one who makes such a boast of actors, would not neglect to mention a man like Cato, already in other respects a magnificent exponent of his accomplishments.

Certain inconsistencies of the same kind are also to be found in Plutarch: statements which rely on the authority of the author only, and not on the facts of history. For example, he writes [Cic., 45.1] that Cicero took up such a humble attitude towards the youthful Octavius, that he sometimes addressed him as ‘Father’; and then he immediately goes on to say: For this reason Brutus, in his letters to Atticus, expressed his indignation against Cicero and chided him, saying that he was courting the favor of Caesar out of fear for Antony, and that he seemed not to care for the liberty of his country, but only to obtain a gentle master for himself.

Very different, however, is the sound of Brutus’ own words in his letter to Atticus [Ep. Art., 1.17.5]. “Let Octavius”, he says, “call Cicero ‘father’ as much as he likes, let him defer to him in everything, let him praise him and thank him: it will yet appear that his words go contrary to his acts.”

Of the same sort is also Plutarch’s assertion that Cicero, when the senate decreed a triumph for him on his return from the province, replied he would be more pleased to follow in the train of Caesar’s triumph. But it is clear from Cicero’s words that he not only eagerly desired that triumph and did not spurn it when offered, but that he even put off his own hope in order to triumph with greater that, when the affairs of the city would be
settled, and the sedition quelled. Nor did he abandon his intention until the
time he took refuge with Pompey, for he showed great concern about the
expenses and went about accompanied by laurel-bearing lictors. Don’t take
my word for it; listen to Cicero himself discussing the matter with Atticus
[Ep. Art., 6.8.5]: See what you think I should do about the triumph, to
which my friends invite me. I should have been quite happy, had no Bibulus
been striving passionately after a triumph, though the man never set his
foot outside the city gate so long as there was one enemy in Syria any more
than he set foot out of his house in town when he was consul. But as it is” ‘
were base to hold one’s peace.” Ibid. [7.1.7]: But as to my position, you
will consider first by what scheme we can retain Caesar’s good will: and
then my triumph itself, which, barring political obstacles, seems to me easy
to get... Ibid. [7.1.9]: I have written to Terentia, and to him (Precianus) that
I shall deposit with you any money he may collect, for the equipment of the
triumph I anticipate. Ibid. [7.2.6]: As for a triumph, I had no desire for one
up to the time Bibulus sent his shameless despatches and got a
thanksgiving voted in the most complimentary way. Now, if he had done
what he professed to have done, I should have been glad and supported the
honor, but, as it is a disgrace to us — to both of us: for I include you in the
business — that I — is; whose army his army relied, should not get the
same rewards as a man who my foot outside the city gates so long as there
was an enemy on this side of the Euphrates. Therefore, I shall make every
effort, and, as I hope, shall succeed. Let the reader now weigh for himself
whether these and similar matters which one reads in scattered contexts of
his letters are the words of a man refusing a triumph. Let us return to
Seneca. He therefore says that the title “father of his country” was not
imposed upon the Caesars by flatterers, but in order that the people might
show that these princes had no more right over their subjects, than parents
have over their children.


The name “AUGUST” was passed on by Octarian to his successors as a
sort of hereditary title. Suetonius [Aug., 7.2]: He afterwards assumed the
name of Caius Caesar, and then of Augustus; the former in compliance
with the will of his greatunch, and the latter upon a motion of Numatius
Planem... For when some proposed to confer upon him the name of
Romulus, as a sort of second founder of the city, it was resolved that he should rather be called Augustus; etc. For the etymology of the word, consult Ovid [Fasti., 1.590], and Servius Comm. Georg. [4.329]. The name “Fortunate,” as far as my knowledge goes, L. Sulla first applied to himself, as a title obtained from public misfortune. Hence that infamous boast [Suet., Tib., 59.2]:

See Sulla, Romulus, fortunate to himself, but not to you.

3. FOR HE COMES NEAR TO CONDEMNNE GLADLY WHO CONDEMONS SWIFTLY

For. if speed in judging is criminal, and as Juv., Sat. [6.221], says:

No delay concerning the death of a man is ever long,

He who condemns swiftly, condemns gladly. The saying of Alexander is well known, worthy of a far different sort of ruler from that he himself afterwards became: When asked by his mother to grant the death of an innocent man, he said, “Ask another favor. For the life of a man is compensated by no benefit.”

[C. 15§1] ERIXO

This story is so little known that some editions have Trixo, others Buxo.

BECAUSE HE HAD FELLED HIS SON WITH LASHES

Even though the power of the father was great among the Romans, this was thought contrary to liberty, for a freeborn youth to be subjected to slavish abuse. It was, in fact, slavish to be beaten with flogging. Seneca refers to this in The Pumpkinification of Claudius [15.2] when he says: C. Caesar suddenly appeared, and began to summon him into servitude; he brought forward witnesses who saw him being flogged by him with lashes, rods, and fisticuffs. The case was decided in C. Caesar’s favor. And in the law [Dig. Just., 48.19.10]: Freeborn persons are beaten with sticks, slaves with whips. Therefore servants were particularly called flagriones (subject to whipping).
STABBED... WITH THEIR STYLUSES (GRAPHIIS)

A *graphium* is a very sharp steel stylus, with which one writes on writing tablets. Ovid, *Ars Poetica* [1.11.23]: *What need is there to weary the fingers with holding the stylus?* Suetonius, *Caligula*. [28]: *Caligula employed some persons to call him a public enemy, fall upon him as he entered the senate house, stab him with their pens, and deliver him to the rest to tear asunder.* The word is derived from the Greek verb *graphein*, “to write.”

THE INDIGNANT HANDS OF FATHERS NO LESS THAN OF SONS

Of the fathers, because by his cruelty he had made the parents hated by the sons; of the sons, because he had furnished an example whereby the parents might rage cruelly against their sons. Similar is Livy’s statement, insofar as it pertains to the sons [8.12.1]: *On Titus Manlius’ approach only the elders went to meet him, and the young men, then and for all the remainder of his days, abhorred and execrated him.*
CHAPTER 15

2. Tarius, who detected his son attempted parricide and condemned him to exile when after investigating the case he found him guilty, won the admiration of every one because, satisfied with exile — and an assigned exile he detained the parricide at Marseilles, furnishing him with the same liberal allowance that he had been in the habit of giving him before his guilt; the effect of this generosity was that, in a community where a villain never lacks a defender, no one doubted that the accused man had been justly condemned, since the father who could not hate him had found it possible to condemn him.

3. I will now use this very case to show you an example of a good prince with whom you may compare the good father. When Tarius was ready to open the inquiry on his son, he invited Augustus Caesar to attend the council; Augustus came to the hearth of a private citizen, sat beside him, and took part in the deliberation of another household. He did not say, “Rather, let the man come to my house;” for, if he had, the inquiry would have been conducted by Caesar and not by the father.

4. When the case had been heard and all the evidence had been sifted — what the young fellow said in his defense and what was brought up in accusation against him - Caesar requested each man to give his verdict in writing, lest all should vote according to his lead. Then, before the tablets were opened, he solemnly declared that he would accept no bequest from Tarius, who was a rich man.

5. Some petty spirit will doubtless say: “He feared that he might seem to be trying to clear the field for his own prospects by sentencing the son.” I think differently; any one of us might well have had enough faith in his own good conscience to withstand hostile criticism, but princes are bound to give much heed even to report. He solemnly declared that he would not accept a bequest.

6. Tarius did indeed on one and the same day lose a second heir also, but Caesar saved the integrity of his vote; and after he had proved that
his severity was disinterested — for a prince should always have regard for this — he said that the son ought to be banished to whatever place the father should decide.

7. His sentence was not the sack, nor serpents, nor prison, since his thought was not of the man on whom he was passing sentence, but of him for whom he was acting as counselor. He said that the mildest sort of punishment ought to satisfy a father in the case of a son who was very youthful and had been moved to commit this crime, but in committing it had shown himself fainthearted which was next door to being innocent; therefore the son should be banished from the city and from his father’s sight.

He first set forth an example, in which to describe to us an evil father. Now he sets forth an example of a good father. Each of these is intended to confirm what he had said: that a good father is he who is WHAT TO REPROVE HIS SON SOMETIMES GENTLY, SOMETIMES WITH THREATS, to hear many things, to wink at many, to try everything before APPLYING EXTREME MEASURES. Let the reader moreover note the series of arguments. Seneca argues from authority. For he makes some sort of prejudgment from the opinion of men. THE PEOPLE... STABBED ERIXO... WITH THEIR STYLUSES because he punished his son with excessive harshness. Therefore the father’s savagery has been condemned by the opinion of men. Again, if all have praised Tarius, because he punished his son’s terrible crime modestly and with restraint, then, by public decree the father’s gentleness has been approved. But if it is fitting for a good prince to be formed to the pattern of a good father, then evidently he needs the same gentleness. This Taxius of whom Seneca speaks is he who is mentioned by Pliny [H.N., 18.6.37], a man of humble birth, raised from abject poverty to the highest pinnacle of fortune and even elected consul through Augustus’ kindness.

2. SATISFIED WITH EXILE — AND AN ASSIGNED EXILE

In this respect the father showed self-restraint: satisfied with exile, he remitted the death penalty, and what is more, he assigned and designated Marseilles as the place of exile, a city esteemed for its ancient dignity,
exceptional riches, and its ornaments. It could seem that one relegated to that place was not really exiled. Marseilles is a city of Gaul, set in a rocky place, built by the Phocaeans. On it read Strabo [4.179-181], Justinus [43.3.4-12], Pomponius Mela [2.(1.17.3)]. On its praises see Cicero (many passages) and others. In that place Milo was exiled. Hence it is clear that those who emigrated on account of exile, chose that location as the most suitable, if they were not limited as to place.

AND... ALLOWANCE

That is, a yearly allowance, or annual pension. Thus maintenance for a year at a time is called simply “annua.” Suetonius, Tib. [50.1]: He even wronged her of the dowry given her by her father, and of her yearly allowance, by a quibble of law, because Augustus had made no provision for it in his will.

3. AN EXAMPLE OF A GOOD PRINCE WITH WHOM YOU MAY COMPARE

To the good prince Augustus he compares the good father Tarius: of whom in the same case one shows himself a good father, the other, a good prince after the likeness of a good father.

WHEN TARIUS WAS READY TO OPEN THE INQUIRY ON HIS SON

The kindness of Augustus is seen in the fact that he permitted the father to conduct a judicial investigation of his son, when Augustus could have haled him before himself; because he anticipated the father was going to act most leniently — whereas any outside judge might punish him according to the letter of the law; then, in the fact that he was present with the father in council and, when he was requested to give his judgment, remembered with whom he was present in council. Therefore he not only levied sentence so to speak on the parricide, but on the son.
THE INQUIRY (cognitio) WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY CAESAR

That is, inquest, examination. Livy [1.49.4]: He adopted the practice of trying capital causes (cognitiones capitallure rerum), without advisers. Juvenal [Sat., 16.17f]: Most right and proper it is / That a centurion should pass sentence on a soldier... Elsewhere the advocate (cognitor) is the most intimate defense attorney, who knows the cause of the present defendant and thus looks after the cause as his own, as Asconius [Comm. Cic. Caecil. Div.] interprets the term. Cicero often understands the word in this sense.

4. EACH MAN TO GIVE HIS VERDICT IN WRITING

This procedure was customarily observed in public trials: the judges, when the cause was heard, wrote out their verdict and cast it into the urn, so that they were ignorant of one another’s verdict, and everyone of all the rest. Then the praetor who presided over the trial gave his verdict according to the majority of the votes. Yet that was not without exception, as is certain from Cicero’s statement in his speech, Pro Cluentio [20.55]:... the President of the Court, G. Junius, in accordance with the law of Sulla, which was then in force, asked the accused whether he wished the voting on his case to be secret or open. As Oppianicus said that Junius was Habitus’ friend, Scamander acted on this suggestion and replied that he wished it to be secret. The jurors considered their verdict. By every vote but one, which Staienus admitted to be his, and at the first hearing of the case, Scamander was found guilty. Those who think the verdicts were always written down are therefore mistaken.

LEST ALL SHOULD VOTE ACCORDING TO CAESAR’S LEAD

That is, lest, if Augustus had openly set forth his verdict, all would follow his authority like a prejudgment. Thus they were freer when they wrote their verdicts. Consequently, Cicero in the De Lege Agrar. [2.2.4] calls the tablet on which the votes were carried, the sign of silent liberty and elsewhere [Ep. Faro. 3.12.1], the secret tablet.
HE SOLEMNLY DECLARED THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT NO BEQUEST FROM TARIUS, WHO WAS A RICH MAN

Why Augustus SOLEMNLY DECLARED, Seneca afterward reveals, namely, lest he should seem by his desire for plunder (as they say) “to slay the beast,” and therefore cast the son from his paternal inheritance, that he himself, made the heir, might succeed to the inheritance in his place. We can well believe Seneca, himself a very rich man, when he calls Tarius a wealthy man. Indeed Tarius, as Pliny writes [18.6.37] in the passage we have cited, had accumulated through the generosity of Augustus 100 million sesterces which he spent in buying up farms. This sum comes to twenty-five times one hundred thousand of our coins, or 2,500,000 crowns, as we infer from Budaeus’ reckoning [DA, 5, p. 271]. Nor is it any concern of mine what Porcius Latro Vicentinus gabbles. The meaning of the phrase adire haereditatem, which is the same as cernere haereditatem, is a commonplace almost any jurisconsult knows. For it means “to declare oneself heir,” and “to assume to be an heir (to act as heir).” Hence Cicero says metaphorically [Ep. Faro., 9.14.4]: to enter upon an inheritance of praise belonging to another: and [Ep. Art., 6.1.10] to inherit a liking. Remarkable is that error of Marcellus [Non. Marc. 4 (p. 261)], whose words are: “Cernere” means to cede: hence sons are said to cede [cernere] an inheritance to their fathers, that is, to bequeath it. Whereas sons enter (cernunt) upon their fathers’ inheritance.

5. HAVE HAD ENOUGH FAITH IN HIS OWN GOOD CONSCIENCE

For it is not the part of a wise man to seek outside himself, and to lean upon rumors, but rather to rely upon faith in his own conscience, as the philosophers preach. Cicero [Ep. Art., 12.28.2]: My own conscience is more to me than men’s talk. Again [Ibid., 13.20.4]: About my reputation I don’t care a straw; though I did once write to you foolishly. For there is nothing one should take better care of... than in all your life not to stray a nail’s breadth from the straight path of conscience. This may be the conviction among the philosophers; our religion prescribes something far different. For as Augustine [Serra., 355.1.1] says: Conscience and
reputation are two different things: conscience is necessary for you, reputation for your neighbor. He who trusts only in his conscience and neglects reputation is cruel.

**BUT THE PRINCE IS BOUND TO GIVE MUCH HEED EVEN TO REPORT**

For, as Quintilian [Dec., 3.13] says in “Miles Marianus”: The higher honor one attains, the more he lies open as an example to those who watch him. And: This is the condition of superiors, that whatever they do, they always seem to set an example. Hence, no wonder, if they ought TO GIVE HEED TO REPORT.

**HE SOLEMNLY DECLARED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A BEQUEST**

Some call this rhetorical scheme *ploce*; others, *anadiplosis*. It can be expressed in Latin by *repetitio, replicario*.

**6. AND AFTER HE HAD PROVED THAT HIS SEVERITY WAS DISINTERESTED**

That is, not calculated to confiscate the inheritance.

**7 HIS SENTENCE WAS NOT THE SACK, NOR SERPENTS**

The punishment of parricides, who after being flogged with bloody cudgels, were sewn into a sack with a dog, ape, serpent, and cock, and cast into flowing water, or, if the sea was too far away, cast down among wild beasts. This punishment had been established by the Comelian Law, which some think to have been promulgated by Sulla. I disagree. For Cicero in his speech *Pro Roscio* [25.70f] says: *How much more wisely did our ancestors act! For as they understood that there was nothing so holy that audacity did not sometimes violate it, they devised a singular punishment for parricides in order that they whom nature herself had not*
been able to retain in their duty, might be kept from crime by the enormity of the punishment. They ordered them to be sewn alive in a sack, and in that condition to be thrown into the river. He attests that this law was given by the ancestors, while he conducted the case during Sulla’s lifetime, according to Plutarch [Life of Cicero, 3.4]. Yet whoever that Cornelius (the first lawgiver) was, Pompey the Great called this almost obsolete law back into use, adding nothing to the punishment, as Marcianus the Jurisconsult writes. [Dig. Just., 48.9.1]. Of that text, Zasius the Jurisconsult has most learnedly commented that two words should be omitted. Besides, this punishment was not first devised for parricides; but after M. Tullius the duumvir, because he had given the book containing the secrets of the civil rites to Petronius the Sabine to copy, was by the order of King Tarquin sewn in a sack and cast into the river, this kind of punishment was transferred to parricides. Indeed, it is fair that violation of gods and parents be expiated in equal fashion, says Valeflus. In the texts of Dionysius of Halicarnassus is to be found the reading, Mr. Attilium. I consider that M. Tullure ought to be replaced on the evidence of Valerius [1.1.13]. You can read more on this question in Cicero’s speech, Pro Roscio, which I have quoted above. Juvenal [Sat., 8.213f] alludes to this in speaking of Nero, the partially and matricide:

For whose chastisement no single ape or adder,
No solitary sack, should have been provided.

And elsewhere Sat., [13.155f]:

And the man who should be cast into the sea inside an ox’s hide,
With whom a luckless destiny encloses a harmless ape.

HE SAID THAT THE MILDEST SORT OF PUNISHMENT

Says Terence [Andr. 5.3.32.903]: For great sin a very little / Of punishment is enough for a father. For this reason, the Divine Hadrian is reported to have banished to an island a man who had killed his own son in hunting, because he committed adultery with his stepmother, since he had killed him more by right of robber than of father. For the power of the father ought to consist in piety, not in cruelty. Marcianus the Jurisconsult relates this [Dig. Just., 48.9.5].
IN THE CASE OF A SON WHO WAS VERY YOUTHFUL

Argument from circumstances: first, that the youth, in that slippery age, lapsed into crime; then that he was not bold and determined in the doing of the misdeed.
CHAPTER 16

1. How worthy he was of being asked by parents to share their counsels! how worthy of being recorded a coheir with the children who were innocent! This clemency befits the prince: wherever he goes he should make everything more peaceable. In the eyes of a ruler let no man count for so little that his destruction is not noted, whatever part of the realm he is.

2 From the forms of lesser power let us draw a parallel for great power. There is more than one kind of power: a prince has power over his subjects, a father over his children, a teacher over his pupils, a tribune or a centurion over his soldiers.

3 Will he not seem the worst sort of father who controls his children by constant whippings for even the most trifling offenses? And of teachers, which will reflect more credit upon the liberal studies — the one who will draw the blood of his pupils if their memory is weak, or if the eye is not quick and lags in reading, or the one who chooses rather by kind admonition and a sense of shame to correct, and so to teach his pupils? Take a tribune or centurion that is harsh; he will cause deserters, who all the same are pardonable.

4 Is it just, I ask, that man should be subjected to severer and harsher rule than dumb beasts? And yet the horse is not plied with the lash and terrified by the horse breaker who is an expert; for it will grow fearful and obstinate unless it is soothed with caressing hand.

5 The same is true of the hunter, whether he is teaching young dogs to follow the trail, or makes use of those already trained for routing out the game or running it down; he neither employs constant threats (for that will break their spirit, and all their native qualities will be gradually lost in a timidity unworthy of their breed), nor does he allow them to range and roam around without restraint. This applies also to the drivers of the more sluggish beasts of burden, which, though they are born to abuse and misery, may be driven to refuse the yoke by too much cruelty.
1. BY PARENTS TO SHARE THEIR COUNSELS!

Who so faithfully gave advice to parents which was so in keeping with parental gentleness.

A CO-HEIR WITH THE CHILDREN WHO WERE INNOCENT

Who did not eagerly pursue inheritances by making use of the children’s crime, nor cast lawful heirs from that status in order to push himself in.

OF BEING RECORDED A CO-HEIR

He says to RECORD AS HEIR in accordance with a difference maintained in law, that the recorded heir is distinguished from the named heir. Julian [Dig. Just., 37.11.8]: For as possesdon of the property can be given separately to a son who is the recorded heir from the heirs of the father, so (it appears) can it be given to a named heir separately from the recorded heirs of the father. And in the same place, substitution by naming. Ulpian [Dig. Just., 28.1.21]: Heirs are to be named before witnesses, so that it can be clearly heard. It will therefore be permitted to the testator either to name or to record the heirs. But if he names them it must be done openly. Ibid. [28.1.21]. But suppose someone either names or records an heir somewhat obscurely in a will; there is a question whether it can be settled according to the common practices. Therefore a recorded heir is one whom the testator has recorded with his own hand; a named heir, one whose name the testator dictated to a receiving scribe. Suetonius [Aug., 17.1] shows this in these words: He caused a will of his, which he had left at Rome, and in which he had named Cleopatra’s children, amongst others, as his heirs, to be opened and read in an assembly of the people. For Cleopatra’s children had been written as heirs in the will, but by an amanuensis, with Antony naming or dictating. Juvenal [Sat., 3.161]: What pauper is recorded as heir? The same [Sat., 6.218]: But you will have to dictate among your heirs more than one rival of your own. “Dictate,” that is, “name.”

In this manner Pliny the Younger [Ep. 8.18.5] speaks of a “dictated will.”
2. FROM THE FORMS OF LESSER POWER LET US DRAW A PARALLEL FOR GREATER POWER

He argues from similarities. As, he says, “the prince has power over his subjects, so the father over his children, a teacher over his pupils, a tribune or centurion over his soldiers.” But he is not a good father, who is harsh toward his son; nor he a good teacher, who is harsh toward his pupils, nor he a good officer, who is harsh toward his men. Therefore neither ought the good prince to conduct himself harshly and cruelly toward his subjects. Nor is it superfluous that Seneca again draws his comparison from the father. For there are various likenesses. Previously he compared the prince with the father, because the prince is the father of his country and ought to rule his subjects as [freeborn] children. Now he compares the father with the prince, because the father is a sort of ruler among his sons.

3. WILL HE NOT SEEM THE WORST SORT OF FATHER

For that father is a prodigy of nature who does not manifest that emotion of love toward his children, with which nature has endowed even all animals, and which is called in the Greek proverb, natural love toward one’s offspring [Cic. Ep. Att., 7.2.4].

AND OF TEACHERS, WHICH WILL REFLECT

Well-known is Quintilian’s advice, not to rage too harshly at freeborn boys. Yet this is heeded not at all by these lash-loving executioners of ours. (For I date not call them “pedagogues,” when they bring shame upon that name.)

OR IF THE EYE IS NOT QUICK AND LAGS IN READING

Which nevertheless ought not to be exacted from a boy. For Quintilian advising on the improvement of reading, writes as follows [Inst. Or., 1.1.33f]: Let reading, therefore, be at first sure, then continuous, and for a long time slow, until, by exercise, a correct speed is gained. For to look to
the right, as everybody teaches, and to look forward, depends not merely on rule, but on habit, since while the child is looking to what follows, he has to pronounce what goes before, and, what is very difficult, the direction of his thoughts must be divided, so that one duty may be discharged with his voice, and another with his eyes. The same [10.7.11]: There is accordingly a certain irrational... habit, which the Greeks call “dogos tribe”, whereby the hand runs on in writing, and the eye, in reading, sees whole lines with their turns and transitions, at once, and perceives what follows before the voice has uttered what precedes. In the vernacular the French call it “ruse.”

TAKE A TRIBUNE OR CENTURION WHAT IS HARSH

This is the order of military discipline: that centurions obey the commands of tribunes; tribunes those of legates; while legates are under the command of the consuls. For centurions are in charge of one hundred soldiers, but tribunes over a thousand, called by the Greeks chiliarchoi, a word used by Curtius [5.2.3]. If therefore either centurions wield their authority so imperiously over their centuries, or tribunes over their thousands, that they punish most severely even the least infraction, “they make them deserters.” Yet we pardon such deserters, because the whole blame rests upon those whose cruelty gave them cause to desert. Thus one reads in Livy concerning Appius, that harsh and intractable man [2.58.6-8]: His resentment and indignation at this, excited him to harass the army by the rigor of his command; nor could the army however be subdued by any means, such a spirit of opposition had they imbibed. They executed every measure slowly, indolently, negligently, and with stubbornness: neither shame nor fear could compel them. If he wished the army to move on with expedition, they designedly went more slowly; if he came up to them to encourage them in their work, they all relaxed the energy which they before exerted of their own accord: when he was present they cast down their eyes, and silently cursed him as he passed by.

DESERTERS

Says Modestinus [Dig. Just., 49.16.3]: A deserter is one who having wandered about for a considerable time, is brought back to the camp. Yet this word has also another meaning. For some desert military service
altogether, others only their rank and station. Sallust [By, 38.3]: *He corrupted some of the centurions and cavalry leaders to come over to him, and others to desert their posts at a given signal.* Those who desert from military service are said simply “to desert,” without any modifier. Quintilian [9.2.85]: *A man who had acted bravely before, and had in a subsequent war asked to be exempted from service according to the lava, because he was fifty years of age, but, being opposed by his son, had been compelled to take to the field, deserted.* In this sense Turnus [Virgil, A., 12-15] calls Aeneas *the deserter of Asia,* as if he were a betrayer of his country. Servius ineptly interprets this as “exile.”

**4. IS IT JUST**

The preceding arguments were based on similarities. Now he argues from the greater (to the lesser). For if to the master of a dumb beast all things are permitted with impunity, and despite this he does not exercise heavy and harsh rule, it follows *a major* that the rule of man over man ought to be moderate. Afterwards he descends to species, and sets forth examples from horses, hunting dogs, and even asses and oxen. If these are harshly and sternly treated they become hardened against blows, instead of being broken in.

**AND YET THE HORSE**


> ... *For ere the breaking*  
> *They will raise their mettle too high, and when caught will scorn*  
> *To submit to the pliant lash, or obey the cruel curb.*

Statius, *Achilleid.* [1.277-282]:

> ... *Even so, should one try to subdue*  
> *With the first rein a horse full of the mettlesome fire of ungoverned youth,*  
> *he having long delighted in stream and meadow and his own proud beauty,*  
> *Gives not his neck to the yoke, nor his fierce mouth*  
> *To the bit, and refuses to pass beneath a master’s way,*  
> *And marvels that he learns another gait.*
BY THE HORSE BREAKER WHO IS AN EXPERT

That is, an animal tamer. He has observed the proper meaning of the word, since he spoke of horses, which (according to Servius [Comm. Aeneid., 6.80]) we properly speak of as “to be broken.” Cicero. Off. [1.26.90]: as horses, grown unruly and fierce by being in frequent fights, are delivered over to be tamed by horse breakers, so that they may become more governable.

5. FOR THAT WILL BREAK THE SPIRIT

That is, will blunt. A metaphor drawn, as Donatus says, from blacksmiths, who by frequent repetition pound something with a hammer and dull it. Pliny, Panegyr., [44.6]: You love independence in the citizens; and you do not, like others, break (contundis) and oppress those spirits that are proud and energetic, but you foster and uplift them. Latinus Pacatus, Panegyr. [42.2]: She, she has blinded the counsels of the tyrant; and she has dulled (obtudit) his mind and his sword. Quintilian [10.5.16]: For if our sole material for thought is derived from law cases, the gloss of our oratory must of necessity be rubbed off, its joints must grow stiff, and the points of its wit be blunted (retundatur) by daily encounters. Ovid, Ars. Amat. [1.11f] otherwise understands “contunere animos” for the task of gentling and softening excessive ferocity:

Chiron, son of Philyra, put Achilles in charge of the lyre, And with gentle art he tamed (contudit) the wild spirits.

TO THE DRIVERS OF THE MORE SLUGGISH BEASTS OF BURDEN

Namely, asses and oxen, although Ulpian [Dig., 33.7.26] did not think the latter to be included under the term “jumenta.” But if you take etymology into account nothing will prevent one from calling these “jumenta,” whether the word be derived from yoking (jugando) as Varro [De Ling. Lat., 5.135] would have it, or from helping (juvando) as other grammarians teach.
TO REFUSE

In the other texts one reads not *detrectare*, but *detractare*. Both readings are possible. For although *detrectare* is more often found in this sense, still the other is also found. Virgil, *Georg.* [3.57]:

*Or refusing the yoke, at times fierce with the horn...*

Curtius [9.1.362.1]:

... *refusing nothing which he ordered. The king remained with him for two days.*
CHAPTER 17

1. No creature is less tractable, none needs to be handled with greater skill, than man, and none should be treated more tolerantly. For what is more senseless than to subject man to the foulest treatment, while one will blush to vent his anger on beasts of burden and on dogs? We do not get angry at diseases we try to cure them; yet here too is a disease, but of the mind; it requires gentle treatment, and one to treat it who is anything but hostile to his patient.

2. It is a poor physician that lacks faith in his ability to cure; and he who has been entrusted with the life of all the people ought to act upon the same principle in dealing with those whose mind is affected; he ought not to be too quick to give up hope or to pronounce the symptoms fatal; he should wrestle with their troubles and stay them; some he should reproach with their malady, some he should dupe with a false treatment to make a quicker and a better cure by using deceptive remedies; the aim of the prince should be not merely to restore the health, but also to leave no shameful scar.

3. No glory redounds to a ruler from cruel punishment — for who doubts his ability to give it? — but, on the other hand, the greatest glory is his if he holds his power in check, if he rescues many from the wrath of others, if he sacrifices none to his own.

NO CREATURE

Clausula, by which what goes before would be aptly concluded, if immediately there had followed what he will a little later append concerning servants. For since in the comparison of creatures of a divers sort it was fitting, THAT NONE SHOULD BE TREATED MORE TOLERANTLY THAN MAN, it should also have been added, “that among men no more mercy be shown to any one than to a free man.” Now he mixes it up with matters inappropriate to this place; if these were removed to another place, they would fit very well. Therefore, we take these things to be said as a sort of digression.
WE TRY TO CURE DISEASES

As if to say, when a prince inflicts punishment on anyone, he advances no other reason except that thus is corrected the depravity of men who otherwise could not be controlled, that the public cancer is cured, that the diseased members are amputated, in order that the evil may not creep throughout the body. The physicians follow this practice. Indeed, the prince is more truly the physician of the mind, since a vice is a disease of the mind. Let princes, then, imitate good physicians, who prudently afflict the sick, who first try gentle cures and deceptive remedies, and do not despair so long as they are able to attempt something. THEY DO NOT GET ANGRY AT DISEASES THEY TRY TO CURE THEM.

2. WHOSE MIND IS AFFECTED

That is, ill-humored and ill-disposed, as men commonly say. For the word “affected” is almost always taken in a bad sense when it is without a modifier. Livy [9.3.5]: In his affected body, the power of his mind and judgment was still vigorous.

THE SYMPTOMS FATAL

He is alluding to the prognostications of the physicians, by which they write that certain death is foretold.
CHAPTER 18

1. It is praiseworthy to use authority over slaves with moderation. Even in the case of a human chattel you should consider not how much he can be made to suffer without retaliating, but how much you are permitted to inflict by the principles of equity and right, which require that even captives and purchased slaves should be spared. With how much more justice do they require that free, freeborn, and reputable men should not be treated as mere chattels, but as those who, outstripped by you in rank, have been committed to your charge to be, not your slaves, but your wards.

2. Even slaves have the right of refuge at the statue of a god; and although the law allows anything in dealing with a slave, yet there is something in dealing between man and man which the right common to all living creatures refuses to allow. Who did not hate Vedius Pollio even more than his own slaves did, because he would fatten his lampreys on human blood, and order those who had for some reason incurred his displeasure to be thrown into his fishpond — or why not say his snake preserve? The monster! He deserved to die a thousand deaths, whether he threw his slaves as food to lampreys he meant to eat, or whether he kept lampreys only to feed them on such food!

3. Even as cruel masters are pointed at with scorn throughout the whole city, and are hated and loathed, so with kings; while the wrong they do extends more widely, the infamy and hatred which they incur is handed down to the ages. But how much better not to have been born than to be born to be counted among public misfortunes!

From the greater to the less: If all things are not permitted to a master over a slave, then neither to a prince over a subject. For the master should so rule the slave that he recognizes at the same time he is a man. The prince ought so to rule the subject that he recognizes him as a man and as a free man. From the less: If cruel masters whose cruelty is confined within private walls, are pointed out with scorn throughout the whole city; the savagery of kings, which is exercised against the people, brings
infamy among the multitude, and passes on also to the memory of posterity.

**TO USE AUTHORITY OVER SLAVES WITH ADORATION**

As Cicero *[Off., 1.13.41]* says, *even the lowest of mankind are to be dealt with justly*. These are the slaves; they prescribe wisely who enjoin us to put them upon the same footing as hired laborers, obliging them to do their work, but giving them their dues. Also Plato, *Laws*, [6.19,777D] says: *This is the right education of slaves: to inflict no insult upon them, so that injustice be much less inflicted upon them, if possible, than upon equals.* Yet some measure must be kept. For, as he immediately adds *[Ibid., 6.19,777E]*: *One always has the right to chastise and flog slaves, and one should not warn them like free men, lest they be made softer; every conversation with slaves must as it were be a command,* etc.

**BY THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND RIGHT**

Budaeus sufficiently shows in *his Annotations* *[AP, 1 AB]* what equity and right are, in contrast to the letter or rigor of the law. For while law demands complete and unwavering rectitude, equity remits something of the law. These terms the Greeks called *epieikeia* and *to kata ton nomon dikaion*, respectively. The meaning therefore is: masters are not to be concerned with how much power they have, legally, over their slaves, but to temper their authority by the standard of equity.

**THAT EVEN CAPTIVES SHOULD BE SPARED**

The same equity also enjoins that those defeated and taken captive in war be spared. For if it is a question of the letter of the law especially in the midst of the tumult of war, there is place neither for mercy nor gentleness. And as Pyrrhus says in Seneca’s *Troades* [333]: *No law spares the captive or stays the penalty.* With more sense of equity Agamemnon replies *[Ibid., 334]*: *What law forbids not, shame forbids be done.* Cicero, *Off.* [1.11.35]: *When we obtain the victory, we must spare those enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war.* Horace, *Epist.* [1.16.69f]:

*When you can sell a captive, don’t kill him; He will make a useful slave. If hardy, let him be shepherd or plowman.*

\textit{Remember thou, O Roman, to rule the nations with thy sway —
These shall be thy artstoro impose the rule of peace,
To spare the humbled, and to tame in war the proud!}

And Alexander in Curtius [4.1.14]: \textit{I know both how to conquer and how to treat the conquered.}

**FREE, FREE BORN, AND REPUTABLE MEN**

Who cannot bear slavish insults and base complaisance. Hence, Hermolaus speaks to Alexander [Curtius, 8.7.1f]: \textit{We made a plot to kill you because you had begun, not to rule us as free men, but to lord it over us as if we were slaves.} Seneca said, “free and freeborn,” because these terms differ from one another. For free men are sometimes made so, but freeborn are always so from birth. See the Jurisconsults.

**2. EVEN SLAVES HAVE THE RIGHT OF REFUGE AT THE STATUE**

For slaves, if pressed by their masters’ unbearable cruelty, used to take refuge at the emperors’ statues, and if they implored assistance with just reason, they were released from their former master’s power. In *Inst. Just.* [1.8.2] Antoninus, consulted by certain governors of the provinces concerning slaves who flee to a sacred temple, or to the statues of the princes, ruled that if the savagery of the masters seems unbearable, they be compelled to sell their slaves at good terms. Of the same sentiment is the constitution of Valeflus, Theodore, and Arcadius, *Codex Just.* [1.25.1]. Suetonius [*Tib.*, 58]; \textit{Gradually this kind of reproach proceeded to the point that to have killed a slave or changed one’s clothes at a statue of Augustus also became capital offenses}, etc. This right of asylum was later transferred to the basilicas of the Apostles and Martyrs, as we read in many places of the law. See Augustine [*DCD*, 1.4].
ALTHOUGH THE LAW ALLOWS ANYTHING IN DEALING WITH A SLAVE

As toward him over whom the power of life and death is permitted to the master.

THERE IS SOMETHING IN DEALING BETWEEN MAN AND MAN

For nature endowed all living things with society, each in its own kind, in order that man may not violate man, nor dog dog, nor horse horse. In order that this meaning might be brought out clearly, I have changed the old reading.

WHO DID NOT HATE VEDIUS POLLIO

Argument from contraries. For if Vedius Pollio excited hatred on every side by casting slaves into his fish pond to be devoured by muraenae (lampreys), this is then something not permitted by the common code of living beings for man to do to man. What Seneca has to say about Vedius Pollio agrees with the authority of Pliny, whose words are [9.23.(39).77]: Vedius Pollio, knight of Rome, one of the friends of the deified Augustus, found in this animal (the lamprey) a means of displaying his cruelty when he threw slaves sentenced to death into ponds of lampreys — not that wild animals on land were not sufficient for this purpose, but because with any other kind of creature he was not able to have the spectacle of a man being torn entirely to pieces at one moment. For this reason Tacitus [Ann., 1.10.5] reckons among the charges against Augustus by detractors, the excesses of gedius Pollio, because he was Augustus’ friend. In Ann. [12.60.3] Tacitus lists Vedius among the names of influential Roman knights, who had great power during Augustus’ reign. I wonder what Erasmus had in mind when in his second edition of Seneca he replaced Vedium with Atedium in On Anger [3.40.2], where Seneca relates the same story, when Coelius Rhodiginus [Lex. Ant., 12.52] has set forth the correct reading, referring to the words of Seneca himself, although without mentioning the author by name. Seneca’s words are: When Augustus was dining with Vedius Pollio, one of the slaves had broken a crystal goblet. Vedius ordered him to be led away to die, and that too in no common
fashion. He ordered him to be thrown to feed the muraenae, some of which fish he kept in a pond of great site. Who would not think he did this out of luxury? But it was out of cruelty. The boy slipped through the hands of those who tried to seize him, and flung himself at Caesar’s feet in order to beg for nothing more than that he might die in some different way, and not be eaten. Caesar was shocked at this novel form of cruelty, and ordered him to be let go, and all the crystal mare to be broken in his presence, and the pond to be filled up.

**MURAENAE (LAMPREYS)**

Muraena (which the Greeks call *myraina*) according to Varro [*Ling. Lat.*, 5.77] was a fish considered to be a prime delicacy, and which even now is considered very costly in its right season: to what extent I can judge from the description by Pliny and others. This fish is commonly called “lamprey,” not too different from the eel. As proof of how highly the Romans esteemed the muraenae: *Antonia, wife of Drusus, put earrings on a muraena which she loved;* [Pliny, 9.55.81.172] and Crassus, a severe man, putting on mourning, bewailed one lost as if it were his daughter. Also the Muraenae took their name from the muraena of which they were very fond. Notable is the error of Perottus who imagines them to be called “Muraenae” from the spots on the body, contrary to the evidence of Varro, Macrobius and Columella. He is also dreaming when he writes that Chirrus devised fishponds (vivaria) for them. For Pliny, Varro, Columella and Macrobius give his name as C. Hirrius, a man from whom Caesar received six thousand by weight when he gave a triumphal banquet for the people. Read more in Pliny [9.55.81 (171)], Macrobius [*Sat.*, 3.15], Varro [*De Re Rust.*, 3.17.3], Columella [8.16.5f; 8.16.10].

**FISHPOND (VIVARIUM)**

*Vivarium* here is used for *piscina*, contrary to the distinction made by Gellius [2.20.1] who defines a *vivarium* as a place where live animals are kept in the wild state, sometimes called *leporarium*, sometimes *roborarium*. Yet in this meaning one finds the word used more than once by writers. Juvenal [*Sat.*, 4.50f]:

> Ready to affirm that the fish was a run-away
> That had long feasted in Caesar’s fishponds.
Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* [90.7]: *But for my part, do not hold that philosophy devised these shrewdly contrived dwellings of ours which rise story upon story, where city crowds against city, any more than that she invented the fishponds, which are enclosed for the purpose of saving men’s gluttony from having to run the risk of storms...*

**WHICH HE MEANT TO EAT**

That is, was so doing for the sake of luxury.

**OR WHETHER HE KEPT LAMPREYS ONLY TO FEED THEM ON SUCH FOOD**

In order to exercise cruelty.

**3. THAN TO BE COUNTED AMONG PUBLIC MISFORTUNES**

Other codices have the reading *INTER PUBLICO MALO NAXOS* (among those born to the public harm); the meaning is just as good. For it is the same thing to say, “born to be counted among public misfortunes,” and “counted among those born to the public harm.” Suetonius, *Nero* [6.1]: *Domitius’ comment, amid the congratulations of his friends, was that nothing but what was detestable and pernicious to the public could ever be produced of him and Agrippina.* Ovid [*Amoris*, 2.5.4]:

*O lass born to my lasting harm.*
CHAPTER 19

1. It will be impossible for one to imagine anything more seemly for a ruler than the quality of clemency, no matter in what manner or with what justice he has been set over other men. We shall admit, of course, that this quality is the more beautiful and wonderful, the greater the power under which it is displayed; and this power need not be harmful if it is adjusted to Nature’s law.

2. For Nature herself conceived the idea of kingship, as we may recognize from the case of bees and other creatures; the king of the bees has the roomiest cell, placed in the central and safest spot; besides, he is without burden, but superintends the work of the others, and if they lose their king, the whole hive scatters; they never tolerate more than one at a time, and they discover the best one by means of a fight; moreover the appearance of the king is striking and different from that of the others both in size and beauty.

3. His greatest mark of distinction, however, lies in this: bees are most easily provoked, and, for the size of their bodies, excellent fighters, and where they wound they leave their stings; but the king himself has no sting. Nature did not wish him to be cruel or to seek a revenge that would be so costly, and so she removed his weapon, and left his anger unarmed. Great kings will find herein a mighty pattern; for it is Nature’s way to reveal herself in small matters, and to give the tiniest proofs of great principles.

4. Shameful were it not to draw a lesson from the ways of the tiny creatures, since, as the mind of man has so much more power to do harm, it ought to show the greater self-control. Would at least that a man were subject to the same law, and that his anger broke off along with his weapon, and that he could not injure more than once or use the strength of others to wreak his hatred; for he would soon grow weary of his rage if he had no instrument to satisfy it but himself, and if by giving rein to his violence he ran the risk of death.
5. But even as it is, such a man has no safe course; for he must fear as much as he wishes to be feared, must watch the hands of every person, and count himself a hunted man even when no one is for laying hold on him, and not a moment must he have that is free from peril. Does any one endure to live such a miserable life, when, doing no harm to others and consequently fearless, he might exercise his beneficent power to the happiness of all? For anyone is mistaken who thinks that a king can abide in safety where nothing is safe from the king; for the price of security is an interchange of security.

6. He has no need to rear on high his towering citadels, or to wall about steep hills against ascent, or to cut away the sides of mountains, or to encircle himself with rows of walls and turrets; through clemency a king will be assured of safety on an open plain. His one impregnable defense is the love of his countrymen.

7. And what is more glorious than to live a life which all men hope may last, and for which all voice their prayers when they are not under a watchman? to excite men’s fears, not their hopes, if one’s health gives way a little? to have no one hold anything so precious that he would not gladly give it in exchange for his chieftain’s safety?

8. Everything that happens to his leader, he should consider as befalling himself also. To that end he has shown by constant evidences of his goodness, not that the state is his, but that he is the state’s. Who would dare devise any danger for such a man? Who would not wish to shield him if he could, even from the chance of ill — him beneath whose sway justice, peace, chastity, security, and honor flourish, under whom the state abounds in wealth and a store of good things? Nor do they gaze upon their ruler with other emotion than, did they vouchsafe us the power of beholding them, we should gaze upon the immortal gods — with veneration and with worship. But tell me:

9. he who bears himself in a godlike manner, who is beneficent and generous and uses his power for the better end — does he not hold a place second only to the gods? It is well that this should be his aim, this his ideal: to be considered the greatest man, only if at the same time he may be considered the best.
After he has enumerated, by species, those who are in authority over others, and showed how they ought to act indulgently toward those whose superiors they are, now by a general statement he infers the chief gift of them all to be clemency, whether it be a father who is in authority over his son, or a teacher over his pupil, a tribune over a soldier, or a master over a slave. This especially applies to the king, because in the bees nature has provided him with a pattern to which he should conform.

**IF IT IS ADJUSTED TO NATURE’S LAW**

From the teaching of the Stoics, who bid us follow nature as the best guide.

**2. FROM THE CASE... OF OTHER CREATURES**

As among the cranes, which follow one another in “literal” order.

**THE KING OF THE SEES HAS THE ROOMIEST CELL**

One might well wonder why Seneca thus works out this poetic description in detail, when it is hardly to the point. But he has done so deliberately in order to represent so to speak the king’s majesty, lest the comparison seem inappropriate. What this inner and safest cell is, Virgil [*Georg.*, 4.210-212] indicates:

That the king has... the cell placed in the central and safest spot, Virgil explains [*G.*, 4.210-212]:

*Moreover, neither Egypt nor mighty Lydia, Nor the Parthian tribes, nor Median Hidaspes, Show such homage to their king.*

And Pliny [11.17.52-54]: *The plebs surrounds him with a marvelous obedience. When he goes in procession, the whole swarm accompanies him and is massed around him to encircle and protect him, not almoigne him to be seen... When they have started, each one wants to be next him and delights to be seen on duty...*
HE DOES NO WORK, BUT SUPERINTENDS

Virgil [G., 4.215-218]:

*He is the guardian of their toils; to him they do reverence; all*  
*Stand round him in clamorous crowd, and attend him in throngs.*  
*Often they lift him on their shoulders, for him expose*  
*Their bodies to battle, and seek in mounds a glorious death.*

Vaxro, *De Re Rust.* [3.16.8]: *They follow their king wherever he goes, and carry him when tired, and if he is unable to fly, support him in flight,* Etc.

AND IF THEY LOSE THEIR KING THE WHOLE... SCATTERS

Virgil [G., 4.212f]:

*... While the king is safe all are of one mind;*  
*When he is lost, straightway they break their fealty.*

Pliny [11.18.56]:

*When the leader is caught, the whole band is seized... they take flight to others. For they simply cannot be mirhour a king.*

THEY NEVER TOLERATE MORE THAN ONE AT A TIME

*Among the bees there is one ruler,* says Jerome in his Letter to Rusticus [Ep., 125.15]. But if we look at this more closely, this creature is proof that a joint kingship is not to be relied on, and that no kingdom can support two kings. For two kings so pull the multitude apart by factions, that they are prepared to fight to the very extinction of the tribe, unless the battle is broken off by the slaying of one of the kings.

MOREOVER THE APPEARANCE OF THE KING IS STRIKING

Columella [*Res. Rust.,* 9.10.1]: *Their kings, moreover, are a trifle larger, and more elongated than the other bees, with straighter legs, but less full wings, of beautiful and shining color, and light,* etc. Virgil [G., 4.92f]:

*... One is better, noble of mien*  
*And bright with gleaming scales... etc.*
3. BEES ARE MOST EASILY PROVOKED AND FOR THE SIZE OF THEIR BODIES

Virgil [G., 4.236-238]:

*Their rage is beyond measure; when hurt they breathe Poison into their bites, and fastening on the veins leave there Their unseen stings and lay down their lives in the mound.*

Curtius alluded to this in his *Alexander* [4·14.13]: *What you have heretofore pared as valor is nothing but rashness; and when this has spent its first force, it becomes weak, like some insects when they have ejected their sting.* And Cicero, *Pro Flacc.* [17.41]: *The man who was valuable only as long as he was coming forward with evidence is dead, his sting exhausted, his evidence given.* But writers are not agreed whether immediately they plant their sting they die, or only revert to drones. Puny [11.18(19).59(60)]: *Nature has given to the bees a sting firmly planted in their bellies. Now there are some who think that they die instantly, as soon as this sting has been implanted with a firm thrust; others, that they die only when the sting has been pressed so deep that the intestines go out, and that in most cases they just become drones, and do not make honey any more. Now you see those great men of science: how they do torture themselves on the most minute little questions! They cannot even agree on the stings of bees.* Yet it is a commonplace among our native farmers that the implanting of the sting does not bring death to the bees, but renders them useless to make honey.

**THE KING HIMSELF HAS NO STING**

Even the question of whether the king has no sting is not without controversy. Pliny [11.17.52]: *Authors do not agree whether the king alone has no sting, being armed with majesty only, or whether nature indeed gave it, but only denied him its use. There is agreement that the leader does not use his sting.* Aristotle and Columella are of the same opinion, with slight verbal differences. Aristotle *Animal. Hist.*, [5.21,5536910] affirms that they have a sting, but unarmed, and unsuited for combat. Columella calls it not a sting, but *as it we a rather thick hair* [9.10.1.]*] Whatever is correct, this is Seneca’s meaning: Nature has not
given the king bee a sting effective to do harm, lest he should be cruel or desirous of vengeance; whereby nature would set an example before kings, lest they should be armed with a sting, that is, inclined to anger and revenge.

4. SHAMED WERE IT NOT...
FROM THE TINY CREATURES

Quintilian [Deal., 13.16]: *How can I say this creature is a poor pattern for man?*

WOULD AT LEAST THAT A MAN WERE SUBJECT TO THE SAME LAW

That is, when men wish to harm another, would that they might also leave their very life in the wound, and balance at one and the same time another’s loss with their own misfortune. They would not be so shameless to do harm, if they realized they were pouring out wrath at the expense of their own life.

5. BUT EVEN AS IT IS, SUCH A MAN HAS NO SAFE COURSE

Now by rhetorical correction he subjoins that it is no safer for men than for bees to exercise their power in cruelty. And this he proves by the proverb so often quoted: *HE MUST FEAR MANY, WHOM SO MANY FEAR.* Therefore he who strikes constant terror in others must himself be disturbed about his own life at every single moment of time and ponder that new perils hourly threaten him. Cyprian to Donatus *On the Tyrant* [Ep., 1.13]: *A man is compelled to fear as much as he himself is feared. A lofty station inflicts punishment equally on the more powerful, although he has been hedged about by a band of satellites, and guards his person with the enclosure and protection of a numerous retinue. As secure as he does not allow his subjects to be, to that extent must he himself be not secure.*
DOES ANYONE ENDURE TO SEE SUCH LIFE

He reproaches the tyrants for their misery, since they could win men’s hearts to themselves in an easy way, if they rule them willing, not against their will.

ANYONE AS MISTAKEN WHO THINKS

This depends on the other statement: HE MUST FEAR MANY, WHOM SO MANY FEAR. For he fears all, who is the cause of fear for all. And he is in peril from all, who is himself the peril of all. Curtius [10.8.1] says the same thing: No one is altogether faithful toward him whom he fears.

FOR THE PRICE OF SECURITY IS AN INTERCHANGE OF SECURITY

The prince can be promised security by all provided he keeps all secure. Pliny [Panegyr., 85.2,3]: You have friends because you yourself are a friend. For love is not a thing that can be demanded from your subjects like certain other things. And there is no feeling nobler and freer and more unwilling to be dominated, nor that demands a greater response than love.

6. HE HAS NO NEED TO REAR

This tyrants do, who, when they dwell among their citizens, as if besieged by enemies fortify themselves with ramparts and camps. Plutarch, Life of Aratus [50], refers his words to Philip in this fashion: Robbers inhabit rocky places and cliffs and protect themselves by precipices; but for a king there can be no firmer fortification than good faith and kindliness. And Pliny [Panegyr., 49.1], speaks of Domitian as follows: Yet that man, with the very walls and fortifications by which he seemed to be protecting himself, shut up with himself treason, conspiracy, and God, the avenger of crimes.

CITADELS

The proper meaning of the word is not to be overlooked. Citadel (arx) often means the seat of a tyrant, as Pedianus notes [Comm. Cic. Div.].
A KING WILL BE ASSURED OF SAFETY ON AN OPEN PLAIN

Publilius Syrus means this, when he says: *Mercy prepares good protection.*

**HIS ONE IMPREGNABLE DEFENSE IS THE LOVE OF HIS COUNTRYMEN**

A beautiful exclamation, which embraces the whole. In this vein, see Pliny, *Panegyr.* [49.2f]: *How much safer, how much more secure is that same house, now that it is defended, not by guards of cruelty, but of love, not by solitude and enclosures!* Do we not learn by experience that the most faithful guard of a prince is his own innocence? Sallust [B.J., 10.4]: *D is not armies or treasures that are the defenses of a kingdom, but friends, whom you cannot acquire with arms or with gold; for they are acquired only by good offices and integrity.* [Pliny, *Panegyr.*, 49.3]: *This is an inaccessible citadel; this is an impregnable rampart, not to need a rampart. In vain will he gird himself about with terror, who is not hedged about with love. Arms are aroused by arms.* Plutarch, *Life of Aratus* [25.4] *True and staunch goodwill of the citizens is the best protection of the prince.* Also, Antigonus, Demetrius’ father, used to say that goodwill always seemed to him the best foundation of a kingdom and its safest protection.

**7. AND WHAT IS MORE GLORIOUS THAN TO LIVE A LIFE WHICH ALL MEN HOPE MAY LAST**

This one thing, by Hercules I ought to be enough for the prince to make himself beloved by all; because so all will as one man protect his life, and his death will be accompanied by public weeping.

**AND FOR WHICH ALL VOICE THEIR PRAYERS**

For his safety and prosperity. On set days the magistrates and priests were accustomed to voice ritual prayers for the Roman emperors, which were framed in a particular form of words. Meanwhile, also, when the occasion called for it, whether a general was setting out to war, or his life
was imperiled by grave illness, or when as before the monarchy of the Caesars, the consuls were about to enter upon the magistracy, or were going off to war, they voiced prayers for the state. Concerning public prayers, which were voiced on the Calends of January, Suetonius [Aug., 97.1] says: Upon observing this, he ordered his colleague Tiberius to voice the prayers which it is customary to make for the forthcoming lustrum. The same [Nero, 46.2]: When a great multitude of the several orders was already assembled for the voicing of prayers, the keys to the Capitol were found only with difficulty. On extraordinary prayers, Livy [10.7.6]: Who could complain of the prayers voiced on behalf of the state by so many plebeian consuls and dictators, either before setting out to their armies, or in the midst of wars? Tacitus Ann., [12.68.1]: The senate was in the meantime called together, and the consuls and pontiffs were voicing prayers for the recovery of the emperor. “Nuncupare vota” (to voice prayers) is to promise, or in our vernacular, “to make vows.” Cicero, Phillipp. [3.4.11]: Those solemn vows he was never to fulfill, he voiced...

Latinus Pacatus [Panegyr., 3.2]: I, about to carry out the vows which I had voiced, shall grace with prayer that time at which the Roman dawn begins. Now it is also to be observed in order to understand this passage, that after the consuls and priests had framed the voicing of their prayers with a definite form of words, the people voiced the same prayers. This is what Ovid [Trist., 2.57-60] means: I wished that late thou mightest attain the stars of the heavens; / And was a humble fraction of the multitude that prayed the same. / For thee, with pious feelings, have I offered the frankincense; / And with all the rest I myself, as one, have seconded [The prayers of the public with my own.

**NOT UNDER A WATCHMAN**

Therefore free, and conceived with a benevolent mind. From this I infer that the Neros and Domitians and emperors of the same type were accustomed to appoint watchmen over the citizens, lest they turn their prayers into curses. But such prayers were voiced more out of servitude and duty than out of love and benevolence. Yet those who wholeheartedly wish their prince well and pray for his welfare, need no watchman. “Watchman” is used for “spy,” as in Seneca, On Anger [2.33.4]: Caesar pledged him in a glass of wine, and set a watchman over him... the
emperor sent him some perfume and a garland, and gave orders to watch whether he used them. Suetonius, *Tib.* [12.3]:... he repeatedly begged that some person of any of the three Orders be placed as a watchman over his doings and sayings. Our common folk say “spy.” The ancients used to call “watchman” the subscriber or pleader in a cause who helped the lawyer in a rather subdued voice, warning him, lest he make a mistake. Cicero [*Q. Caec. Div.,* 16.51]: Appoint me, says he, as a watchman for Tullius. What? How many watchers shall I have need of, if I once allow you to meddle with my bag? as you will have to be watched not only to prevent your betraying anything, but to prevent your removing anything. There were also watchmen, assigned to jurors and questor, when the votes were cast into the urn, as far as I can gather from a passage in Asconius Pedianus. Individual judges, he says, used in less important cases to pronounce verdict from the tablet, and for that reason, there was no need of note or watchman. According to Budaeus, we can also call “watchmen” those whom the Greeks call *antigrapheis,* that is, “antigrapharii”, or “controleurs.” All these meanings amount to the same thing.

9. TO BE CONSIDERED THE GREATEST

The Romans expressed adulation to their Caesars with these titles, after the example of Jupiter, whom in antiquity they endowed with these titles. Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* [2.25.64]: Jupiter our ancestors called “best and greatest” because to benefit others is greater and more pleasing than to have the greatest power. The same in his speech *Pro Domo Sua* [57.144]: Wherefore I beseech and supplicate thee, God of the Capitol, to whom the Roman people have given the name of “Best” by reason of the blessings thou hast vouchsafed, and of “Greatest” by reason of thy might... Puny, *Panegyr.* [2.7]: Is there anything more fitting to a citizen, more fitting to a senator, than this title “Best” which me have bestowed upon him? [Ibid., 88.4f]: Is it for just reasons that the Senate and the Roman people have added to your titles that of “Best”? It is common, so to speak, and banal, yet new. You should know that no one previously deserved this title, that it was not conceivable even if someone had deserved it. Would it be better, perhaps, to call you “Happy”? But this is given not for moral character
but rather for the gifts of chance. “Great”? To this title more envy than comeliness attaches. [Ibid., 88.8]: The Father of the gods and of men is worshipped first under the name “Best,” and then under that of “Greatest.” Therefore your praise is all the more glorious, because everyone knows for certain that you are not only “Best” but also “Greatest”/Suetonius, Calig. [22.1]: He assumed a variety of titles, such as “Pious,” “The Child of the Camp,” “The Father of the Armies,” and “The Best and Greatest Caesar.” See how Suetonius and Puny disagree among themselves. One of them asserts that the title “Best” was first attributed to Trajan [Pliny, Panegyr., 2.7]; the other reports that it was also conferred upon Caligula, who reigned long before Trajan [Suet., Calig., 22.1].
CHAPTER 20

1. A prince usually inflicts punishment for one of two reasons: to avenge either himself or another. I shall first discuss the situation in which he is personally concerned; for moderation is more difficult when vengeance is owed to resentment rather than to example.

2. At this point it is needless to caution him to be slow in believing, to ferret out the truth, to befriend innocence, so that it may be evident to all that he (the prince) is not taking the side of the judge any more than he is taking that of the man on trial. But all this concerns justice, not clemency. What I now urge is that, although he has been clearly injured, he should keep his mind under control, and, if he can do so in safety, should remit the punishment; if not, that he should modify it, and be far more willing to forgive wrongs done to himself than those done to others.

3. For just as the magnanimous man is not he who makes free with what is another’s, but he who deprives himself of what he gives to someone else, so I shall not call him clement who takes it greatly when the smart is another’s, but him who, though the spur galls himself, does not become restive, who understands that it is magnanimous to brook injuries even when you are in supreme authority, and that there is nothing more glorious than a prince who, though wronged, remains unavenged.

This division adds much clarity to the discourse and would have added still more if it had embraced the work as a whole. For under these members could have been included the things discussed in the entire work. Yet one should not disapprove the plan of Seneca, who first discussed the matter in general, and then digested and assembled into the form of division the matters which were spoken of in scattered fashion. Now let us briefly explain the division. He sums up the matter in this twofold proposition: that the prince punishes for these two reasons: to avenge either injury to himself or to another. (1) With respect to the first member: REVENGE CAN EITHER COMPENSATE THE PERSON INJURED OR ENSURE HIM FOR THE FUTURE [1.21.1]. But neither of these motives should be found with a prince.
Therefore it is not lawful for him to punish just in order to take revenge. The minor premise can be proved by these reasons: (a) that the prince’s fortune is greater than to need such compensation, (b) that his power is more manifest than to seek thence for himself a reputation of strength; and so on. (ii) Concerning the second member, the offenses of others are avenged either (a) in order to reform by punishment him who has inflicted the injury, or (b) by an example to strike others with terror, or (c) BY REMOVING BAD MEN TO LET THE REST LIVE IN GREATER SECURITY [1.22.1]. These three purposes are better served by a lighter penalty than a heavier one; therefore we should forego the letter of the law. After this he pursues these points separately.

**MODERATION IS MORE DIFFICULT**

For then the prince does not consider himself a prince, but as if he has to deal with a major enemy, he plots whatever his resentment can devise.

**2. AT THIS POINT IT IS NEEDLESS**

*Paralepsis or preterition, when under pretense of passing over certain matters, we nonetheless mention them,* as here he pretends to remain silent concerning the duties of justice, because they do not apply to the present matter, but nevertheless in the meantime he admonishes the judge to take them into account.

**TO BE SLOW IN BELIEVING**

Because it almost always so happens that ears which are open to informers are closed to truth. But why should the prince believe the accuser, whose reward is not conscience, but, as Celsus [Quint., Inst., 2.15.32] says, victory? Ammianus Marcellinus [18.1.4]: Notable is that reply of Julian to Cephidius the accuser who said: “Everyone could always be innocent if to deny the accusation were sufficient”; “And who could be innocent, if it were enough to have merely accused him?” And Publilius Syrus: *One ought to give a deaf ear to accusations.*
TO FERRET OUT THE TRUTH

Let him attribute nothing to conjectures or suspicions, nor put trust in the words of litigants, but elicit the truth by manifest proofs. Phocylides the Greek poet has expressed this thought in a beautiful verse:

*Do not pass sentence before you hear both sides.*

TO BEFRIEND INNOCENCE

Always let him, readier to absolve than to condemn, consider a man innocent whom he has not caught “tedhanded.” The laws also hold to the principle that it is considered more sacred to leave unpunished the crime of a wicked person than to let an innocent one be condemned.

ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN CLEARLY INJURED, HE SHOULD KEEP HIS MIND UNDER CONTROL

These are the characteristics of clemency, that the prince should spontaneously condone those offenses which he could justly vindicate, and control his resentment lest he yearn after vengeance. For we are said to have control over our mind when not carried away by any mood and not subject to passions of the mind, because such perturbations deprive us of judgment (arbitrium) and freedom of will. Cato in his speech *On Behalf of the People of Rhodes* [Gell. 6.(7).3.14]: *Therefore it is with the greater emphasis that I advise and urge that this matter be put off for a the days, until we regain our self-command after so great rejoicing.*

3. FOR JUST AS THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN IS NOT HE

fix very apt comparison. Just as, he says, this preposterous liberality, which robs from the one what it lavishes on the other, is not worthy of a magnanimous person, so is this readiness to pardon which condones others’ offenses not worthy of the name of clemency. For when those who wish to seem beneficent at another’s expense, *commit the same injustice and so turn another’s possessions into their very own*, they do nothing worthy of praise. See Cicero, *Off* [1.14.42f].
WHO MAKES FREE WITH WHAT IS ANOTHER’S

Erasmus cites this passage among the proverbial sayings in his Adagia [3.10.50]. It is like Homer’s lines [Odyss., 17.451f]:

… For there is no restraint or scruple
In giving freely of another’s good...

For there is nothing to prevent one from being prodigal of what belongs to another, nor is it honest. Seneca [Ep. Mor. 16.7] repeats the same words: You need not wonder at my mind, for as yet I have been free handed with the possessions of others. Apuleius [Metam., 7.11] expresses the same thought by the words “to gamble with another’s skin.” For the opposite expression, see Cicero [Ep. Faro., 3.8.8.]:... seeing that it has ever been my nature to fight shy of extravagance at the expense of others...

WHO TAKES IT GENTLY WHEN THE SMART IS ANOTHER’S

That is, indulgent, and ready to listen to entreaty (exorable), and prepared to pardon, as Servius interprets Virgil [Buc., 3.9]:

And in what chapel — but the gentle Nymphs laughed.

The same [Georg., 4.535]:

Offer... peace, and do homage to the gentle maidens of the woods.

Suetonius, Tib. [13.2]: The latter was at that time out of humor with M. Lollius, and therefore gently disposed and favorable to his father-in-law.

Donatus [Comm. Ter. Adelph., 4.1.35.648]: Gentle he, whose anger is quickly dissipated; clement, whose anger does not flare up quickly.
CHAPTER 21

1. Revenge generally accomplishes one of two purposes: it either compensates the person injured or ensures him for the future. But a prince’s fortune is too exalted for him to feel the need of such compensation, and his power is too evident to lead him to seek a reputation for power by injury to another. That, I say, is so, when he has been assailed and outraged by his inferiors; for in the case of foes whom he once counted his equals, he has vengeance enough if he sees them beneath him. A slave, a snake, or an arrow may slay even a king; but no one has saved a life who was not greater than the one whom he saved.

2. Consequently he who has the power to give and to take away life ought to use this great gift of the gods in a noble spirit, especially in the case of those who (as he well knows) formerly opposed his supremacy. Having attained this mastery, he has already sated his revenge and accomplished all that genuine punishment required; for that man has lost his life who owes it to another, and whosoever, having been cast down from high estate at his enemy’s feet, has awaited the sovereign verdict of another upon his life, lives on to the glory of his preserver, and by being saved confers more upon the other’s name than if he had been removed from the eyes of men. For he is a lasting spectacle of another’s prowess; in a triumph he would have passed quickly out of sight.

3. If, however, it has been possible in safety to leave also his throne in his possession, and to restore him to the height from which he fell, the praise of him who was content to take from a conquered king nothing but his glory will rise in increasing greatness. This is to triumph even over his own victory, and to attest that he found among the vanquished nothing that was worthy of the victory.

4. To his fellow countrymen, to the obscure, and to the lowly he should show the greater moderation, as he has the less to gain by crushing them. Some men we should be glad to spare, on some we should scorn to be avenged, and we should recoil from them as from
the tiny insects which defile the hand that crushes them; but in the case of those whose names will be upon the lips of the community, whether they are spared or punished, the opportunity for a notable clemency should be made use of.

This partition, as we have said, is to be referred to the first member of the first and principal partition, where the king wishes to punish injuries done to himself. Commonly one calls this a “subdivision.” The argument is what rhetoricians call *ex remotione*, in which the parts are cancelled, so that the whole also may be cancelled; as this: *revenge* is sought either for COMFORTEST or for INSURANCE; neither befits the prince; therefore neither does revenge befit him.

**IT EITHER COMPENSATES HIM**

Cicero uses the same partition in his speech *Pro Cluent.* [61.169]: *Men wish their enemies to be taken by death either because they fear them or because they hate them.* Callistratus [*Dig. Just.*, 48.19.28] touched upon the prior part: in order that *there may be compensation to blood and married relatives of murdered persons, let the penalty be paid at the same place where the robbers committed the murder.* And Ovid [*Arnores*, 1.7.63]: *But you, stay not — for vengeance will lessen grief — / From straight assailing my features with your nails.*

**OR ENSURES HIM FOR THE FUTURE**

Statius [*Theb.*, 1.127] elegantly alluded to this part when he called *fear the parent of hatred.*

**BUT A PRINCE’S FORTUNE IS FAR TOO EXHALTED**

He replies that this sort of compensation is not at all kingly, which lowly persons seek, to have adversaries not scoff at them; no, the king’s majesty is beyond controversy.

**REPUTATION**

Esteem, in the passive sense, that is, to give the people confidence in his power. Cicero, *Top.* [20.78]: *In the case of a man it is his reputation for*
virtue which is most important. To Caecina [Cic., Ep. Fam. 6.5.3]: This very opinion he holds of your ability will weigh very heavily in your favor with the great man himself. In Sallust. [2.2.4]: I would wish him to tell me of what estimation or fame were the Scipios and Metelli (whom he mentions)... before their exploits and a life of honor recommended them to notice.

THAT, I SAY, IS SO, WHEN HE HAS BEEN ASSAILED AND OUTRAGED BY HIS INFERIORS

Again this member is divided. As has been said above: either the prince wishes to punish an injury inflicted by an inferior but has no need at all of such compensation. Or he wishes to avenge an offense committed by an equals when, having been attacked in war by a foreign prince, having defeated, and subjected the latter to his power, the latter is punished sufficiently by the formals good fortune and victory, because he who was his equal when the injury was committed is now in subjection to the man he wronged. Other arguments are subjoined to prove the same point.

A SLAVE... MAY SLAY EVEN A KING

The same thought as expressed above. Since the power of the king consists in destroying and preserving, he should not highly esteem what he has in common with many; it is his privilege to preserve, which is truly a kingly and glorious work. Let him then exercise his power by preserving rather than by destroying.

2. FOR THAT MAN HAS LOST HIS LIVE WHO OWES IT TO BOTHER

He touches upon that common saying: “It is better for a free man to die a thousand deaths than to obtain his life as a favor from another”; so that he who has thus been spared, should have to live by the will of someone else.
IN A TRIUMPH HE WOULD HAVE PASSED QUICKLY OUT OF SIGHT

He alludes to the ancient custom practiced by the Romans at their triumphs. For the captive enemies used to precede the chariot of the victor, and when they had been led through the public streets in procession, they were thrust into prison, ready to be punished. Cicero, Verr. [2.5.30.77]: As their chariots swing round to leave the Forum for the Capitol, they bid their captives be led off to prison, and the day that ends the authority of the conqueror also ends the lives of the conquered. Therefore Seneca says that greater praise will come to him who spares rather than destroys the life of his conquered enemies, “because as long as they live they will be witnesses to your clemency.” The pomp of triumph passes away, and disappears at once from men’s sight the spectacle of a moment.

3. THIS IS TO TRIUMPH EVEN OVER HIS OWN VICTORY

A very elegant manner of speaking: “to conquer victory itself” or TO TRIUMPH OVER VICTORY. Very many there are who know how to conquer, but having won victory, know not how to use it. Thus they abuse their own good, while they intemperately exult and carry on unrestrainedly; in short, they are conquered by their own victory. Those who act modestly are truly greater than their own victory.
1. Let us pass now to the injuries done to others, in the punishment of which these three aims, which the law has had in view, should be kept in view also by the prince: either to reform the man that is punished, or by punishing him to make the rest better, or by removing bad men to let the rest live in greater security. You will more easily reform the culprits themselves by the lighter form of punishment; he will live more guardedly who has something left to lose. No one is sparing of a ruined reputation; it brings a sort of exemption from punishment to have no room left for punishment.

2. The morals of the state, moreover, are better mended by the sparing use of punitive measures; for sin becomes familiar from the multitude of those who sin, and the official stigma is less weighty if its force is weakened by the very number that it condemns, and severity, which provides the best corrective, loses its potency by repeated application.

3. Good morals are established in the state and vice is controlled if a prince is patient with vice, not as if he approved of it, but as if unwillingly and with great pain he had resort to chastisement. The very clemency of the ruler makes men shrink from doing wrong; the punishment which a kindly man decrees seems all the more severe. You will notice, besides, that the sins repeatedly punished are the sins repeatedly committed.

This is the second member of the first partition, which itself is divided into three parts, to remove severity bit by bit in each of these parts also, and to recommend clemency. He says, then, that THERE ARE THREE AIMS KEPT IN VIEW BY THE LAWS in avenging INJURIES DONE BY OTHERS, which ought also to be set before the prince, who is the living law, and who must, in this matter, yield not even a trifle to the feelings, but do all things according to the prescription of the law. What these are, and of what sort, let us briefly explain.
EITHER TO REFORM THE MAN THAT IS PUNISHED

For it is a commonplace that *impunity is an enticement to sin* [Cic., Mil., 16.43], and as Memmius says in Sallust [B.J., 31.28]: *It is far better, in any government, to be unmindful of a service than of an injury; for a good man, when you neglect him, only becomes less active, a bad man more daring.* They who cannot be led back into the right path in any other manner must be corrected therefore by punishment, lest they become more unbridled with license and more corrupt. Accordingly Solon used to say: *The state is controlled by two means, reward and punishment.* Pliny [Panegyr., 44.7] speaks in this vein: *Rewards of good and bad men make good and bad men.* The Greeks call this kind of punishment “warning,” and *rectio,”* and “advising,” as one might say in Latin, *monitio* and *animadversio.* So writes Gellius [7(6).14] when he speaks of these three reasons for punishing, and in the same sense as Seneca, except that he differs in the third. For he calls *timoria* that punishment imposed to protect the dignity and authority of him against whom some wrong has been committed, *lest if punishment be neglected, contempt for him will be engendered.* Yet if we should look more closely, it leads to the same end. Plato gives only two reasons, not mentioning the third; still he ought not to have overlooked it. For he writes in the *Gorgias* [81, 525B] that it is fitting that he who is punished should be made a better man by the one who punishes him, or that he should be made an example to others, who, seeing him suffer pain, are restrained by fear. And elsewhere [Laws, 11.11, 932C]: Punishments must be useful both to those who undergo them and to those who watch.

OR BY PUNISHING HIM TO MAKE THE REST BETTER

The Greeks call this sort of punishment *paradeigma,* the Latins, *exemplum,* when the punishment of one is the fear of many, as Gratian and Valens [Cod. Just., 9.27.1] say, for which reason punishments are sometimes made more severe than usual [Claud, Dig. Just., 48.19.16]. Plutarch, *On the Slowness of Divine Vengeance* [19, Moralia, 561C]: *The punishments of criminals are openly displayed to all, inasmuch as the function of vengeance inflicted with reason is to deter and restrain some by the chastisement of others.* Cicero [Ep. Brut., 1.15.10]: *... and not so much out of revenge as in order that I might for the present prevent unprincipled*
men by this terror from attacking their country, and might for the future establish a warning for all lest anyone be minded to imitate such insanity. Cicero [Off., 1.11.33: I am not certain whether it is enough for the offender to repent of his deed, in order that others may be slower to sin.

OR BY REMOVING BAD MEN TO LET THE REST LIVE IN GREATER SECURITY

This part was omitted by Plato; yet to it applies what Ulpian [Dig. Just., 1.18. 13. 1] says: It befits, he says, a good and serious governor to take care that the province he rules be peaceful and quiet, which he will achieve without difficulty, if he takes pains that his province be rather evil men, and searches them out.

YOU WILL MORE EASILY REFORM

As to the castigation of him who is being punished, he shows that more can be accomplished by gentleness and clemency, than by extreme severity.

A SORT OF EXEMPTION FROM PUNISHMENT

Curtius hints at this [5.12.2]: And it was not surprising, he said, that a man hired for a fee made everything a matter of traffic; that being without wife or child, without a home, banished from the whole world, he was a treacherous enemy, tossed round the salesroom at the nod of bidders.

2. THE MORALS OF THE STATE

This is said with regard to the exemplary value of punishment.

BECOMES FAMILIAR

The statement can be taken in either sense. For how does the multitude of sinners make sinning something familiar unless as Cicero [Ep. Faro., 4.3.1] says: What is done by example they also think to be done by right? But if anyone was previously punished, they would certainly not protect the guilty by making use of examples, says Demosthenes. Cyprian speaks in
the same sense in his Letter to Donatus [1.10]: *There is no fear of the laws, of the questor, of the judge, no dread. What can be bought off, is not feared. To be harmless among those who harm is a crime. Whoever does not imitate the wicked, offends. The laws have begun to fit in with sins, and what is public begins to become lawful.* Lucan [*Phars.*, 5.260]: *Whatever is sinned by many goes unpunished.* And Juvenal, *Sat.*, [2.45f]: *These do more wrong; but sheer number / Defends those.* Seneca draws the argument in another direction: it would then at last appear how great a number of wrongdoers there are when so many wrongdoers are punished.

3. GOOD MORALS ARE ESTABLISHED

*Surely fear is a very poor teacher of morality,* says Puny [*Panegyr.*, 45.6), an idea he has taken from Cicero. For Cicero [*Philipp.*, 2.36.90] thus speaks on Antony: *For it was fear — no steadfast teacher of duty — that made you good.* Similar is Latinus Pacatus’ statement in *Panegyr.* [14.4] *When the threats of the laws are at rest, each person is privately visited by his own repentance. So indeed it is: so it is; forced correction irritates men; by example man is most gently admonished.*
CHAPTER 23

1. Your father within five years had more men sewed up in the sack than, by all accounts, there had been victims of the sack throughout all time. Children ventured much less often to incur the supreme sin so long as the crime lay outside the pale of the law. For by supreme wisdom the men most distinguished and deeply versed in nature chose rather to ignore such a crime as incredible and passing the bounds of boldness, than by punishing it to point out the possibility of its being done; and so the crime of parricide began with the law against it, and punishment showed children the way to the deed; filial piety was truly at its lowest ebb after the sack became a more common sight than the cross.

2. In that state in which men are rarely punished a sympathy for uprightness is formed, and encouragement is given to this virtue as to a common good. Let a state think itself blameless, and it will be so; its anger against those who depart from the general sobriety is greater if it sees that they are few. Believe me, it is dangerous to show to a state in how great a majority evil men are.

He proves by example what he had stated: immoderate frequency of punishment often does not so much correct the morals of the state, as worsen them.

1. YOUR FATHER

Claudius Caesar, adoptive father, by whom, at the urging of Agrippina, Nero had been adopted at the age of eleven. See Suetonius and Tacitus. Suetonius [Claud., 34.1]: When any person was to be put to the torture, or criminal punished for parricide, he was impatient for the execution, and mould have it performed in his presence.
THE SUPREME SIN

That is, the worst and most wicked. Curtius [5.12.17]:... and laden with booty, acquired by the supreme crime, the traitors hastened to flee. Ibid. [6.9.11]: No doubt this silence conceals a purpose, and the eager hope for royal power drove his mind headlong to the supreme sin. Ammianus Marcellinus [15.7.9]: Often exclaiming that the supreme sin was to condemn a man unseen and unheard. Thus Quintilian speaks of the supreme sin, perverted venery.

FOR BY SUPREME WISDOM THE MEN OF THE HIGHEST DISTINCTION

Seneca hints at Solon who, after having given them to the Athenians, being asked why he had established no punishment for those who killed their parent, replied that he thought no one mould do it. He is said to have acted wisely, says Cicero, who set no penalty against what had not previously been committed, lest he seem not so much to forbid as to enjoin. Romulus, in imitation of this, according to Plutarch, Romul. 22.4, when he established the laws, wished no penalty to be set for parricide, but called all homicide parricide because he considered the one impious and wicked, but the other impossible. And for many ages he seemed rightly not to have anticipated such a misdeed. For no one, during the six hundred years that followed, ever committed such a crime. But after the war of Hannibal, L. Hostius is reported to have been the first to kill his father. These are Plutarch’s words in his Life of Romulus. Livy disagrees with him, as in Florus’ Epitome [68] he writes that P. Malleolus was the first of all to be sewn in a sack after he killed his mother, and be cast into the sea, during the fifth consulate, unless I am mistaken, of C. Marius.
CHAPTER 24

1. A decree was once passed in the senate to distinguish slaves from free men by their dress; it then became apparent how great would be the impending danger if our slaves should begin to count our number. Be sure that we have a like danger to fear if no man’s guilt is pardoned; it will soon become apparent how greatly the worse element of the state preponderates. Numerous executions are not less discreditable to a prince than are numerous funerals to a physician; the more indulgent the ruler, the better he is obeyed.

2. Man’s spirit is by nature refractory, it struggles against opposition and difficulty, and is more ready to follow than to be led; and as well-bred and high-spirited horses are better managed by a loose rein, so a voluntary uprightness follows upon clemency under its own impulse, and the state accounts it worthy to be maintained for the state’s own sake. By this course, therefore, more good is accomplished. Cruelty is an evil thing befitting least of all a man, and is unworthy of his spirit that is so kindly; for one to take delight in blood and wounds, and, throwing off the man, to change into a creature of the woods, is the madness of a wild beast.

Here also he proves by example, how the punishment of the wicked does not always provide security for the good.

A DECREE WAS ONCE PASSED

As the laticlavus and shoes with the crescent distinguished the senators from the knights, the knights were distinguished from the plebs by a gold ring. But at what time or under what consuls this decree of the senate was passed, I nowhere remember reading, nor dare I offhand declare it can be found. Indicere for denunciare is a legal term as Servius has noted in Aeneid [5.758]: Proclaims (indicit) a court, and gives laws to the assembled senate. Propertius Eleg., [4.8.81]: He has proclaimed the laws; I have answered, I shall obey the laws. Servius however elsewhere calls it a military term. Virgil, A., [7.467f]: 
Therefore, profaning peace, he orders (indicit) his chief warriors
To march upon King Latinus...

HOW GREAT WOULD BE THE IMPENDING DANGER

To this applies what is said in the proverb: *In the household one has as many enemies as there are slaves.*

**IF OUR SLAVES SHOULD BEGIN TO COUNT OUR NUMBER**

No one will wonder that Seneca said this, who pays heed to the words of Pliny [H. N., 33.1(6). 26]: *Whereas nowadays even articles of food and drink have to be protected against theft by means of a ring: this is the progress achieved by our legions of slaves — a foreign rabble in one’s home, so that an attendant to tell people’s names has to be employed even in the case of one’s slaves! This was not the way with bygone generations, when a single servant for each master, a member of his master’s clan and bearing his master’s name, took all his meals with the family in common. Juvenal, Sat. [3·140142]:*

> The first question asked will be as to his wealth, the last
> About his character: How many slaves does he keep? How many acres
> Does he own?

*Ibid. [3.166f]:*

> … You must pay a big rent for a wretched lodging,
> A big sum to fill the bellies of your slaves...

*Ibid. [7.141143]:*

> The first thing a litigant looks to is: Have you
> Eight slaves and a dozen retainers? Have you a litter to wait on you
> And gowned citizens to walk before you?

Tacitus Ann., [4.27.2]: *The free born plebs already alarmed on account of the multitude of slaves that were increasing immensely...* The same writer in Tiberius’ letter to the Senate: *[Ibid., 3.53.4]: But what am I first to prohibit, what excess retrench to the ancient standard? Is it to be the villas, spacious without bounds? Or the number and varied nationality of our slaves? And not to tarry longer over this, the household of one man will teach us how dangerous it would have been for the citizens to be counted by their slaves* For Puny [33.10(47). 135] writes in this manner: *Claudius*
Isidore stated in his will that, however much he had lost in the civil war, yet he left 4,000 slaves, 3,600 yoke of oxen, and 250,000 other beasts. Hence infer how great herds of slaves those spendthrifts, the Crassuses, Pompeys, Luculluses possessed, when that Isidore, who was not the most notorious for wealth, and was exhausted by the disasters of wars, left 4,000 slaves. I have all the more willingly mentioned these matters, because here and there in various authors occur uprisings of slaves which sometimes spared not even the Capitol itself.

THE MORE INDULGENT THE RULER

who would be loved should reign with a gentle hand, Seneca says in the Phoenissae [659].

2. AGAINST OPPOSITION AND DIFFICULTY

We always strive for what is forbidden, and yearn for what is denied, says Ovid Arnores, [3.4.17]. And Augustine, Spirit and Letter [4.6]: Those things we long for, for some reason or other we strive for much more ardently, if they are forbidden.

AND THROWING OFF THE MAN, TO CHANGE INTO A CREATURE OF THE WOODS

We customarily use this expression to designate a crime unworthy of man, in which he who has perpetrated it has not behaved like a human being. Now what difference does it make, says Cicero [Off., 3.30.82], whether from a man one transforms himself into a beast, or under the form of man, bears the savage nature of a beast? Quintilian [Decl. 12.14]: If someone so puts off the man as to seek to punish inhere there is no feeling of sorrow, he will doubtless cast corpses to wild beasts.
CHAPTER 25

1. For what difference does it make, I beg of you, Alexander, whether you throw Lysimachus to a lion, or yourself tear him to pieces with your teeth? That lion’s maw is yours, and yours its savagery. How pleased you would have been had its claws been yours instead, and yours those gaping jaws, big enough to swallow men! We do not require of you that that hand of yours, the surest destruction of familiar friends, should save the life of any man, that your savage spirit, the insatiable curse of nations, should sate itself with anything short of blood and slaughter; it is called clemency if to kill a friend the butcher is chosen among mankind.

2. The reason why brutality is to be abhorred is this: because it transgresses first all ordinary, and then all human, bounds, searches out new kinds of torture, calls ingenuity into play, invents devices by which suffering may be varied and prolonged, and takes delight in the afflictions of mankind; then indeed that disease of a cruel mind has reached the farthest limit of insanity, when cruelty has changed into pleasure and to kill a human being now becomes a joy.

3. For hot upon the heels of such a man follows his downfall. Hatred, poison, and the sword — he is assailed by as many perils as there are many men to whom he is himself a peril, and he is beset sometimes by the plots of individuals, at times, indeed, by an uprising of the community. For whole cities are not roused by the trivial destruction of single individuals; but that which begins to rage widespread and aims at all becomes the mark of every weapon.

4. Tiny snakes pass unnoticed and no organized hunt is made for them; but when one has exceeded the usual size and has grown into a monster, when it has poisoned springs by drinking from them, and with its breath scorches and destroys, then, wherever it advances, it is attacked with engines of war. Petty evils may cheat and elude us, but we go out against the great ones.
So, too, one sick person causes no confusion even in his own household; but when repeated deaths show that a plague has broken out, there is a general outcry and flight of the community, and threatening hands are lifted toward the gods themselves. If a fire is discovered beneath some single roof, the inmates and the neighbors pour on water; but a widespread conflagration that has already consumed many homes is put down only by the destruction of a whole city quarter.

FOR WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE

To this is to be referred what he had said in the previous chapter, THROWING OFF THE MAN, TO CHANGE INTO A CREATURE OF THE WOODS, TO TAKE DELIGHT IN BLOOD AND WOUNDS, Now (through apostrophe or aversion), he says, to Alexander: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE, whether you perform your own cruelties, or whether YOU RAGE WITH THE TEETH OF A LION. ETC.

This figure is called metabasis by Rutilius Lupus.

LYSIMACHUS

Here there is no agreement among writers, because many declare that Lysimachus was cast to the lion by Alexander; one, Q. Curtius, refutes that opinion. For Seneca himself [On Anger, 3.17.2], Valerius [9.3.8. Ext. 1, p. 695], and Justin [15.3.8] agree that he was cast to the lion, but that after the lion, aroused by the sight of him, attacked, he plunged his hand covered with a metal glove into the animal’s mouth, ripped out its tongue and killed the beast. But Curtius says [8.1.1417]: Among these when a lion of extraordinary site rushed to attack the king himself, it happened that Lysimachus, who was afterwards a king, being beside Alexander, began to keep one animal at bay with his huntsingspear; but the king pushed him aside and ordered him to retire, adding that a lion could be killed by himself alone as well as by Lysimachus. And in fact Lysimachus, once when hunting in Syria, had indeed alone killed a lion of remarkable site, but had had his left shoulder torn to the bone and thus had come into great peril of his life. The king, taunting him with this very experience, acted more vigorously than he spoke; for he not only met the wild beast, but
killed him with a single mound. I am inclined to believe that the story which
without evidence spread the report that Lysimachus was exposed by the
king to the attack of a lion arose from the incident which we have just
mentioned. There is no mention of this in Plutarch. Yet to the
philosophers and orators, whose task is not to weave a continuous
history, it is permitted to put to their own use matters of doubtful
authenticity, according to what they need for a specific passage. Yet
Seneca does not always observe this. In his On Anger [2.23.2]; he has
actually invented something about Alexander which, as far as I know, has
not been handed down by any other author: After reading his mother’s
letter warning him to beware of poison from his physician Philip,
Alexander nevertheless drank undismayed the medicine given by him/ Yet
according to Plutarch [Alex., 19.2f] and Arrian [Anab., 2.4.8f] among the
Greeks, and of the Latins, Curtius [3.6.9.] and Justin [11.8.5f], this letter
was not from his mother but from Parmenion.

WE DO NOT REQUIRE OF YOU

By way of concession he proceeds step by step until he arrives at that
which is the greatest of all, thus increasing the indignation of the reader.
And this is “amplification by reasoning” as Quintilian teaches [Inst.,
8.4.3,15]: We do not ask that you benefit anyone, accustomed as you are
to ruining your own domestic slaves, not to mention outside slaves. We do
not require you to refrain from harm, born as you are for the destruction of
all nations. We only would have you control your anger and not exceed
your wonted cruelty. Such is that utterance of Venus in Virgil [A.,
10.4250] as an example of concession:

I am not stirred by thought of empire; so did I hope
While Fortune smiled; let those thou dost prefer now conquer.
If there is no country for thy harsh consort to give the Trojans,
By smoldering ruins of fallen Troy, I beg thee,
Father, let me dismiss Ascanius unscathed;
Let my grandson still survive!
Aeneas, indeed, may be tossed on unknown waves,
And follow whatever way Fortune has given:
But let me protect his son, remove him from the frightful war.

For Jupiter had promised rule and victory and safety to Aeneas.
THE SUREST DESTRUCTION OF FAMILIAR FRIENDS

Doubtless the destruction which transfixed Clytus, in the midst of the banquet, when he was crossing over shamefully from a free Macedonian, into Persian servitude. For Alexander killed Parmenion and his son Philotus, noble men of the purple and prime leaders of the army, not by his own hand, but turned them over to be killed by his executioners. Trogus [Justin, 9.8.14] says of him and his father Philip: The father would dissemble his wrath and often subdue it: when the other (Alexander) flared up, there was no delay in his revenge, nor any moderation in it. [Ibid., 9.8.17] Philip chose to reign with his friends, Alexander to exercise his kingly power upon his friends. The father chose to be loved, the son to be feared.

IT IS CALLED “CLEMENCY”

Erasmus has learnedly restored this passage, so that it agrees with Virgil’s verse [A., 3.606]:

*If I die, it will be a soon to have died at human hands.*

2. TO INVENT DEVICES BY WHICH SUFFERING MAY BE VARIED

For it is not enough for tyrants to inflict death, but they are always devising new methods by which those whom they wish to perish ultimately may languish long in pain: in order really to feel themselves die, [Suet., Galig., 30.1] as Caligula used to boast. Lycus, in Seneca’s Hercules Furens [511-513]:

*He who inflicts on all the penalty of death / Knows not how to be a tyrant. Impose contrasting penalties: / Forbid the wretched, command the happy man to die. Thus also speaks Aegisthus, in Seneca’s Agamemnon [995]: Untutoredis the tyrant who punishes with death alone! Hence the bull of Phalaris and Nero’s mockeries against the Christians [Tacit., Ann., 15.44.4]: when they were covered with the hides of wild beasts and mangled to death by dogs.*
WHEN CRUELTY HAS CHANGED INTO PLEASURE.

For although the philosophers [Sen., Ben., 4.17.3] do not think anyone can so depart from natural law, as to be evil for the sake of pleasure, yet in some way or other, I do not know how, it has become a fact of everyday experience that certain people are just wicked for no reason at all, and are so mad with the pleasure of sinning, that the very sinning itself is their delight, even though there be no cause.

4. TINY SNAKES PASS UNNOTICED

He is playing in his usual way with a few similes, all of which converge to this thought: the more widely the tyrant’s madness rages about, the more persons he has to fear.

BUT WHEN ONE HAS EXCEEDED THE USUAL SIZE

Such was the one sent to Rome by Regulus, of monstrous size, and quite exceeding credibility, were it not for the fact that so many writers unanimously affirm it.

WITH ENGINES OF WAR

Among the ancients there were various forms of ballistae (engines of war), as is clear from Livy [26.47.57] where larger and smaller ballistae, such as larger and smaller scorpions, and also catapults are mentioned. These three differ from one another as follows: The ballista hurls stones, although sometimes also darts, as Vegetius [4.22] states. Catapults, as far as I can gather from Vitruvius [10.1013], Vegetius and Nonius Marcellus [19 (p. 552)], were very ingenious engines which cast arrows, yet were at that time falling into disuse. The “scorpions” might perhaps not improperly be called with a Latin name the “arcuballistas” (arquebuses) of our time. Ballista is derived from the Greek word ballo, “I throw.”

MAY CHEAT US

Those, namely, which harm us before we can foresee them or take precautions against them. “Verba dare” [to cheat] can even mean “to
deceive without words,” as Gellius states [17.2.24]. This comes from the fact that those who promise many and great things, in most cases actually furnish nothing. Cicero, *Philipp.* [13.16.33]. Of course we cheated, we deceived them... Quadrigarius [Gell., 2.19.7]: *When the Lucanians discovered that they had been cheated through trickery.* Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 49.6]:... that we may not be cheated, and judge anything great and secret to be in these pursuits.
CHAPTER 26

1. The cruelty even of private citizens has been avenged by the hands of slaves despite their certain risk of crucifixion; nations and peoples have set to work to extirpate the cruelty of tyrants, when some were suffering from it and others felt its menace. At times the tyrants’ own guards have risen up against them, and have practiced upon their persons the treachery and disloyalty and brutality and all else that they themselves had taught them. For what can anyone expect from him whom he has himself taught evil? Wickedness is not obsequious long, nor does it confine its sin within seemly limits.

2. But suppose that cruelty is safe, what sort of dominion has it? Nothing but the bare outlines of captured cities and the terror-stricken countenances of widespread fear. Everywhere is sorrow, panic, and disorder; even pleasures are feared; Feasts are not safe, for there the tongue even of the drunkard must carefully guard itself, nor public shows, where the material is sought for accusation and ruin. “Although these be got up at huge expense,” one says, “and with kingly magnificence, and with artists of the finest reputation, yet who wants to go from the games to the prison?”

3. Ye gods! What curse is this — to kill, to rage, to take delight in the clank of chains and in cutting off the heads of fellow countrymen, to spill streams of blood wherever one may go, and by one’s appearance to terrify and repel? Would life be any different if lions and bears held sway, if serpents and all the creatures that are most destructive were given supremacy over us?

4. These, devoid of reason and condemned by us on the charge of bestial cruelty, yet spare their kind, and even among wild beasts likeness of habits and kind forms a safeguard; but among men tyrants do not withhold their fury even from their kin, and strangers and friends are treated just alike, so that, the better practiced in the art, it may be able to creep on, from the murder of one and again another, to the wiping out of nations; and to hurl the firebrand on the roofs of houses and to drive the plough over ancient cities are considered a sign
of power, and to kill only one or two is believed to be too small a show of royal might; unless at one time a herd of poor wretches stands beneath the blade, rage regards its cruelty as reduced to order.

5. True happiness consists in giving safety to many, in calling back to life from death itself, and in earning the civic crown by clemency. No decoration is more worthy of the eminence of a prince or more beautiful than that crown bestowed for saving the lives of fellow citizens; not trophies torn from a vanquished enemy, nor chariots stained with barbarian blood, nor spoils acquired in war. To save life by crowds and universally, this is a godlike power; but to kill in multitudes and without distinction is the power of conflagration and ruin.

In this entire chapter, he partly infers how dangerous it is to exercise cruelty and brutality, of which so many vindicators exist; partly, even if it is completely safe, Seneca shows the spectacle of cruelty to be of itself so foul and horrible that it can if only for this reason be accursed. Finally, he explains how far removed the prince should be from this monstrous passion for cruelty. To destroy is THE POWER OF RUIN AND FIRE; the majesty of the prince consists in providing safety BY CROWDS AND UNIVERSALLY.

THE CRUELTY OF PRIVATE CITIZENS

Argument a minori. For if slaves, who are of such degraded character that they dare do nothing distinguished, have avenged the cruelty of private men, (who do not rage as far and wide as princes) and have done so with certain peril of death, why do not free men, who have been born to valorous deeds, avenge even more the cruelty of tyrants, which oppresses so many peoples and so many lands, when they can do it with reasonable assurance of going unpunished? Memmius says in Sallust [B.J., 31.11]: Slaves, purchased with money, will not submit to unjust commands from their masters; yet you, my fellow citizens, who are born to empire, endure servitude?
2. BUT SUPPOSE CRUELTY IS SAFE

Rhetorical concession or permission.

EVEN PLEASURES ARE FEARED

Even though all these things apply equally well to tyrants and to men oppressed by tyranny, still the passage demands that we understand it as said of those who live under a tyrant. This is easily perceived from what follows.

FEASTS ARE NOT SAFE, FOR THERE THE TONGUE EVEN

For as Horace says [A.P., 434-436]:

Kings, we are told, ply with many a bumper
And test with wine the man they are anxious to see through,
Whether he be worthy of their friendship.

Well known also is Pliny’s [14.22.(28).141] statement:...

others let out facts of fatal import, and do not keep to themselves words that will come back to them through a slit in their throat...

NOR PUBLIC SHOWS WHERE

He has well said that material for accusation and ruin is sought from plays (theatrical shows). For the actors could not resist twisting famous passages from tragedies and farces against evil princes, if it seemed to apply to their characters. If this was received with the consent and applause of the people, both actors and audience were seized for punishment. We shall append a few instances by way of example. In the reign of Tiberius, when [Suet., Tib., 45] in a comic passage of a farce, the old goat licked the genitals of wild she-goats; this was taken as a personal slant at Tiberius. And while the Emperor Maximin looked on (he thought, because of the hugeness of his body, that he was immortal) these verses were declaimed [Jul. Capit., Maxim., 9.4]: He who cannot be killed by one, is killed by many. / The elephant is huge, and is killed; / The lion is strong, and is killed; / The tiger is strong, and is killed; / Beware of many, if you fear not individuals. Hence it came about that princes stricken with a bad
conscience, became convinced through their own guilty suspicion that certain statements applied to them, just as if these were actually spoken about them.

“ALTHOUGH THESE BE AT HUGE EXPENSE,”

This is said in the person of some citizen who decides rather to stay away entirely from shows, than at such cost to purchase a brief happiness, in order to be dragged from the games to the prison.

3. WOULD LIFE BE ANY DIFFERENT

Exaggeration by comparison.

4. THESE DEVOID OF REASON

Another exaggeration by contrast. For these things are compared among themselves, animals DEVOID OF REASON and man possessing reason; animals condemned on the charge of bestial cruelty, and man himself, who condemns them; animals abstaining from their own kind, while man not only spares not men, but not even his kin. Pliny [7.1.5] speaks along the same lines: In fact, all other living creatures pass their time worthily among their own species: we see them herd together and stand firm against other kinds of animals — the fierceness of lions is not directed against lions; the serpent’s bite attacks not serpents; even the monsters of the sea and the fishes are only cruel against different species; whereas to man, I vow, most of his evils come from his fellowman.

Quintilian [Deal., 12.26f]: Not all wild beasts do this; and although dumb animals lack reason, still most of them feed on harmless foods (as also they are accustomed to do among men). Also if any of them leaves a tooth print on another’s members, they still refrain from tearing one another. Nor is there any beast upon the earth so mad as not to holy sacred his own image.

Juvenal [Sat., 15.159-164]: 
Greater is amity today among snakes than men,  
Like spotted beasts show mercy to each other.  
What stronger lion slays his weaker brother?  
What boar kills with his tusks a smaller boar?  
India’s fierce tigress lives among her kind at peace  
While savage bears dwell in lasting harmony.

Horace [Epod., 7.11f]: Such habit ne’er belonged to wolves or ravening brutes, / Where fierceness is turned only against beasts of other kinds.  
Also Augustine [DCD, 12.23]: Nor do lions or even dragons fight among themselves as men wage mar against one another.

YET SPARE THEIR KIND

Different constructions of syntax are found with this word in this connotation. Livy [1.1.1]: From two, Aeneas and Antenor, the Greeks withheld all the rights of mar. Horace [C., 3.27.69f]: Refrain / From anger and hot passion, she exclaimed. Livy [21.6.4]:... and to warn Hannibal that he should refrain from the Saguntines, the allies of the Roman people. In these several examples the syntax varies. While Seneca here used the form “abstinere suis,” Livy [1.29.6] said “temperate,” to spare: Only the temples of the gods, however, for such had been the orders given by the king, were spared.

CONDEMNED BY US ON THE CHARGE OF BESTIAL CRUELTY

A full expression, as in Ovid [Fasti, 6.189]:

He lived that he might die, condemned on the charge of despotism.

And Cicero, gerr. [2.5.5.11]: These men, after being convicted of the crime of conspiracy, mere bound to the stake and given over to be executed. For when we say iudico, damno, arguo, accuso to caedis, the words crimine or causa, or something of the sort, are understood. Servius, commenting on Aeneid [11.383], notes that this is said in imitation of the Greeks. For when they say katgorg se phonou (I accuse you of murder), they understand heneka (for reason of). Cicero’s phrase in Philipp. [2.23.56] is less common: Licinius Lentivula, his fellow gambler, a man convicted of dicing, he reinstated. It is as if one said, “To be condemned concerning (de) a crime.”
ARE TREATED JUST ALIKE

That is to say, the tyrant puts them on equal footing, acting no more humanely toward relatives than toward strangers. For “to treat” (habere) sometimes means “to value” (aestimare). Sallust [Cat., 51.11]:... for to no mortal do injuries to himself seem a light matter; many men have treated them more seriously than was right.

TO DRIVE THE PLOW OVER ANCIENT CITIES

Periphrastically he designates the destruction of cities, for the founding and overturning of which it was customary to use the plow. Virgil, Aeneid [5.755]:

Meanwhile Aeneas traced out the city with a plow.

Horace [C., 1.16.1721]:

‘Twas anger that laid Thyestes low in dire
Destruction, and that has ever been the primal cause
Why lofty cities perished utterly
And the hostile army in exaltation
Ran the plow over their fallen walls.

REDUCED TO ORDER

That is, reduced to the limits of a private citizen, as if he were just one of the multitude. This metaphor, as some would have it, is derived from military discipline, whereby ordinary soldiers are forced each into his own place and rank. Priscian [18.182]: Reduced to order, counted among mean and lowly folk. Livy [6.38.12]: He could either resist this order, by which he saw himself reduced to order, or he could not obstruct even those others on account of which this was introduced.

5. IN EARNING THE CIVIC CROWN BY CLEMENCY

In order that the reader may more easily grasp the sense of this passage, here is a short explanation: the civic crown was customarily given in ancient times to him who had saved a citizen in battle, as a sort of token of life and safety received. It was usually made from oak leaves, because, as Gellius [5.6.12] says, the very earliest food was made of acorns. Plutarch gives different reasons both in his Problems [Act. Rom., 92, Mor., 285E-
286A] and in his Life of Coriolanus [3.3]: either because the oak is sacred to Jupiter, or because it furnishes ready food for soldiers, widespread and readily available, or because it is the most fruitful of all the forest trees, giving us acorns as food, honey as drink — and dainty dishes from beasts and birds fattened on acorns. The crown also used to be made from the lex, a species very nearly related to the above. The right to the civic crown was not rashly granted. He who had been saved had to recognize his savior. But if he did not freely confess it, he was compelled by law to make confession, as Cicero testifies in his speech Pro Plancio [30.72]. Lucan, Pharsalia [1.358]:

Winner of an oak leaf badge for saving a fellow citizen’s life...

In a similar way, this honor was given to the Caesars in the name of the state as sort of saviors of the human race, and it was hung on the door posts of the palace as a sign of clemency. Seneca intended to allude to this in passing. Valerius [2.8.7 (p. 226)]: Moreover, the people stretch out their hands to the oak, when, as reward for saving the lives of citizens, that crown has to be awarded which bestows eternal glory and triumph to the doorway of the imperial palace. Ovid, [Tristia 3.1.35f]:

Lo, this is the house of Jove, said I;
An oak wreath prompted me so to think.

A little later [Ibid., 47f]:

The wreath suspended there, inscribed,
Declares that citizens were by his aid preserved.

Seneca’s use of civica, without the noun, is a familiar expression among authors, and many examples could be cited from Puny and Suetonius. Virgil, contrary to the practice of the others, said “civil” in Aeneid [6.772]:

But they whose brows are shaded by the civil oak!

NOT TROPHIES TORN FROM A VANQUISHED ENEMY

It is as if he said that no triumph was to be compared with the glory of this crown; as Scipio used to say, he preferred to save one citizen rather than slay a thousand enemies.
THIS IS GODLIKE POWER

The rhetoricians call this figure *paradiastole*, disjoining two or more things which seem to have a single meaning.

END OF BOOK ONE
1. I have been especially induced to write on mercy by a single utterance of yours, Nero Caesar, which I remember, when it was made, I heard not without admiration and afterwards repeated to others — a noble, high-minded utterance, showing great gentleness, which suddenly burst from you, unpremeditated and not intended for others’ ears, and brought into the open your kindheartedness, quarrelling with your lot.

2. Burrus, your prefect, a rare man, known to a prince like you, was about to execute two brigands, and was bringing pressure upon you to record their names and the reasons why you wished their execution; this, often deferred, he was insisting should at last be done. He was reluctant, you were reluctant, and, when he had produced the paper and was handing it to you, you exclaimed, “Would that I had not learned to write!” What an utterance! All nations should have heard it — those who dwell within the Roman empire, and those on its borders who are scarcely assured of their liberty, and those who through strength or courage rise up against it.

3. What an utterance! It should have been spoken before a gathering of all mankind, that unto it princes and kings might pledge allegiance. What an utterance! Worthy of the days of universal innocence of mankind, in favor whereof that long past age should be renewed.

4. Now assuredly it were fitting that men, thrusting out desire of another’s goods from which springs every evil of the heart, should conspire for righteousness and equity, that piety and uprightness along with faithfulness and temperance should rise, and that vice, having
misused its long reign, should at length give place to an age of happiness and purity.

The preface is not much different from that of the first book: it exhorts Nero to continue to be like himself rather than to learn clemency. And Seneca does this more by a show of praise than of precept. For it is in this way that princes are to be “softened up,” whose ears, touchy about hearing the truth, cannot bear a harsher discipline. This book, moreover, as Erasmus also judged, is not only very short, but also defective. Consequently no one can easily believe that what we now possess was composed in this form by Seneca. And yet we are not so badly off to have at least something come down to us. It seems, moreover, that Seneca’s plan in this book was far different from his plan in the first. While in the first Seneca accommodated himself to the popular understanding, the second he sprinkled with Stoic paradoxes and scholastic subtleties.

**BY A SINGLE UTTERANCE OF YOURS**

The author of this anecdote is Suetonius [Nero, 10.2], differing from Seneca in this respect only, that he writes, that Nero was called upon to subscribe the sentence, according to custom, of a criminal condemned to die...

**UNPREMEDITATED**

That is, not skillfully devised for show or pretense: when orations have been artfully composed, they are for the most part sophistical and prepared in order to deceive; just as, on the other hand, the speech of truth, is called “simple” (honest). Sallust [B.J., 85.31]: My speech, they say, is unpremeditated 2’ do not care about that.

**NOT INTENDED FOR OTHERS’ EARS SUDDENLY BURST**

That is, not spoken to please the hearers, so as to do nothing but charm ears. C. Trebonius [Cic. Ep. Faro., 12.16.1]: Do not think, my dear Cicero, that I have intended this for your ears... It is as if he said that this utterance of Nero came forth from the depths of his heart and his inmost affection.
2. BURRUS, YOUR PREFECT

That is, Afranius Burrus, mentioned by Tacitus [Ann., 12.42; 13.2; 14.51, etc.] and Suetonius [Nero, 35.5], who with Seneca served as adviser during the young emperor’s first five years, when Nero showed himself to be such a notable prince. To him Nero afterward promised a remedy for a swollen throat, but sent him poison [Suet., Nero, 35.5] obviously in order that he might do his worst without having such a witness and judge. He was a man distinguished for his military deeds and his justice [Tacitus, Ann., 13.2].

YOUR PREFECT

Seneca has in mind the pretorian prefect, an office of the very first rank at Rome under the Caesars. The jurisconsults Aurelius [Dig. Just., 1.11.1] and Pomponius [Ibid., 1.2.2.19] attest this. Aurelius writes that the pretorian prefect was like the master of the cavalry; Pomponius states that this office was almost the same as that of the tribune of the knights under the kings, the master of the cavalry under the dictators. As Plutarch says [Ant., 8.3]: There was moreover a master of the cavalry of second rank if the dictator was present; in his absence, of the first rank. This statement does not please Andreas Alciatus of Milan, because it contradicts the constitution under the title, “On the Pretorian or Urban Prefect” [Cod. Just., 12.4.1], which puts the pretorian prefect on an equal footing with the masters of the cavalry and infantry. From this evidence he infers that these were separate offices. Let us now look into the nature of the matter. First, he thinks that during the reign of Romulus, he who was in charge of the pretorian guard was also accustomed to come forth in mars, under the name “master of the cavalry.” Here I should wish he would explain to us who this “master of the cavalry” was, who was in command of the pretorian cohorts around Romulus’ palace, whom not even Romulus himself, I think, knew. For all our authorities agree that he was called, not master of the cavalry, but tribune of the knights; and these same knights, according as conditions required, were accustomed sometimes to fight on horseback, sometimes on foot. A little later he adds: when the resources of the Romans increased, these became separate offices, so that the pretorian prefect stood guard over the safety of the prince; while the master of the
cavalry protected his reign against enemies. Here Alciatus has made two or three mistakes. For he fancies that the master of the cavalry was a separate magistrate, when at that period those who ruled the provinces with the army were called without distinction “masters of the cavalry.” For this reason Ammianus Marcellinus [21.12.16] said “master of the infantry” and Aelius Spartanus [Hadr., 10.2] “master of the army,” for ruler. And if Alciatus brings forward that constitution to cover his error, let him pay attention to the rubric to which this constitution is to be referred: that it speaks not of “master of the cavalry” but of “masters of the soldiers and of the infantry,” as if one said “prefects of the armies,” whether they were proconsuls or praetors, or by whatever other name they may be called. To this let Alciatus reply what he pleases, provided he doesn’t play his di tricks under the mask of Albutius. Now let us explain those details about the pretorian prefect which pertain to this passage. He was the highest magistrate, as stated above, but promoted from small beginnings to such a pinnacle. Suetonius [Aug., 49.1] states that Augustus selected a certain number of the military forces, partly to guard the city, partly to guard himself. And I have observed in writers that the former were called “urban soldiers,” the latter, “praetorian.” Tacitus [Hist., 2.93]: Sixteen pretorian cohorts and four urban cohorts were enlisted, each to consist of a thousand men. [Ibid., 1.74]: Fabius Valens, besides, wrote letters in the name of the German army to the pretorian and urban cohorts, vaunting the strength of the party, and offering a treaty of peace. [Ibid.].... then legions and fleets, and something rarer, the pretorian and urban soldiery deployed in battle formation. Suetonius [Aug., 101.2] He left in legacies., to the pretorian troops a thousand to each man, to the urban cohorts five hundred, and to the legionaries three hundred. On this account I am not sure whether Polifianus has accurately rendered by “prefect of the urban cohorts” what Herodian [3.10.5] called eparchontos ten stratopeden in speaking of Plaufianus; and elsewhere by “urban cohorts” what Herodian [2.13.1] had called tous en to Romi stratigtas, when it is sufficiently clear that Herodian spoke of “pretorians.” Now the pretorian cohorts scattered over all the inns, wandered about, until Tiberius built a single camp right next to the city. This pretorian camp is called by Herodian [4.4.5], simply ta basileia. In this camp they had the standards, but individual cohorts went on duty by turns, and stood guard at the palace. Suetonius [Otho, 6.1]: He had intended, after the adoption [of
Piso by Galba, to seize the camp, and fall upon Galba in the palace while he was eating; but he was restrained by a regard for the cohort on duty at the time, lest he should bring too great an odium upon it; because it happened that the same cohort was on guard before, both when Caius was slain, and when Nero was deserted. In Herodian [3.11.6] Plauianus the Pretorian Prefect speaks as follows: You alone are permitted to enter the bedchamber where they are sleeping, when you take your turn as night guard, etc. [Ibid., 4.4.4]: At the same time he orders the soldiers, the guards of the palace, to withdraw into the camp. [5.8.5] Yet enraged, they, with their minds inflamed by that rumor, did not send the customary guard to Antoninus, and, shut up in the camp, they kept on saying that they wished to see Alexander in the temple itself. Augustus created two prefects over the cohorts. For so I interpret Dio’s words [55.10.10]: duo eparchous tan doruphoren, since Suidas [1985] for the same word sometimes uses eparchon tan doruphoren, sometimes eparchon tan praiterianen. Herodian [5.4.8]: somatophilakes kai doryphoroi hous dg praitgrianous kaloesin, that is, bodyguards and spearmen, whom they call pretorians. Yet this was not permanent, for according to the varying times and conditions, we read sometimes of one, sometimes of two, prefects. For Cornmodus after Perennius’ murder entrusted the prefecture to two officers, in order to make it, divided into parts, weaker against the prince [Herod. 1.9.10]. And many emperors, when they were leading the army against the enemy, had one of the pretorian prefects with them, and left the other in the city; when they were in the city they were content with one only. Also one must not pass over in silence the fact that the Roman knights were customarily received into that rank, a rank never extended to a senator before Titus took it upon himself in the reign of his father Vespasian. See Pliny the Elder, and Suetonius [Tit., 6.1]. But if we are to believe Cornelius Tacitus [Hist., 4.68], Arretinus Clemens had previously held that office by favor of Muffanus, a man of the senatorial order, and related by marriage to the house of Vespasian. [Ibid.] But what Pliny and Suetonius [Tit., 6.1] write concerning Titus, Aelius Spartanus seems not to have known. In his biography of Alexander Severus [21.34], he speaks as follows: To the pretorian prefects he gave senatorial rank, so that they might both be and be addressed as “viri clarissimi”. Previously, this had rarely or not at all been the case, to the extent that whenever one of the Caesars wanted to have the pretorian prefect replaced by a new man, he
simply presented him with a broad hemmed toga, carried by a freedman. Alexander for this reason wished the pretorian prefects to be senators, lest a nonsenator pass judgment on a Roman senator. To be added, finally, is that passage from Julius Capitolinus [Marc. Aur., 3.4]: the Caesars were accustomed to salute their prefects with a kiss as a mark of honor. Gradually the power of this officer developed, first military, thence embracing civil affairs, which he administered with free jurisdiction and without provocation, so that very many did not hesitate from that rank to aspire to rule, and Philippus actually succeeded in the attempt. We can also infer the greatness of the office from the evidence that when Gordian his nephew wished to confer upon Misitheus his father-in-law everything except participation in rule, he had nothing greater than the prefect’s office to offer him. To those of our nation I cannot describe this office otherwise than as a combination of the offices of Constable and High Chancellor. This note has exceeded the length I had planned.

3. THAT UNTO IT PRINCES AND KINGS MIGHT PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE.

That is, that they might agree to the words of this utterance and as it were make an accord by oath, when Nero dictates the words and they themselves swear an oath in the words he has composed. Thus Acron and Porphyrian understand that saying of Horace [Epod., 15.3f]:

When you were about to offend against the great gods’ will
You used to pledge allegiance to me.

Livy [7.5.5] also clearly shows the meaning of this expression:... and standing over the couch with his dagger drawn, he threatens that he will immediately stab him, unless he will smear in the words which he will dictate, that “he never will hold a meeting of the plebs for the purpose of prosecuting his father.” Moreover, one who dictates words to another is said “to bind to the words.” Livy [7.5.6] says: The tribune alarmed., smears in the words to which he was bound. Gellius [16.4.2]: In ancient times when recruiting was done, and soldiers enlisted, the military tribune used to bind them to an oath in these words... Tacitus [Hist., 2.14]:... was threatening the province of Narbonian Gaul which was bound by oath to
gitellius etc. In the same way one says: “to swear by the name of the prince,” and “to swear by the laws.”

IN FAVOR WHEREOF THAT LONG VAST AGE SHOULDBE RENEWED

Because in that golden age, men lived so uprightly of their own accord that they had no need of laws, as almost all poets, after Hesiod, sing. Hence according to the moral conduct of the princes the ages are sometimes called “golden,” sometimes “iron.” Virgil [Bur., 4.6]:

*The reign of Saturn returns.*

The same [4.9]:

*And the golden race mill rise up o’er the whole regard.*

And the Aeneid [6.792f]:

*Augustus Caesar born of the gods mill found the age Of gold.*

A poem flung against Tiberius is referred to by Suetonius [Tib., 59.1]:

*No more the happy Golden Age we see; The Iron’s come, and sure to last with thee.*
CHAPTER 2

1. We are pleased to hope and confess, Caesar, that in large measure this will happen. That kindness of your heart will be recounted, will be diffused little by little throughout the whole body of the empire, and all things will be molded into your likeness. It is from the head that comes the good health of the body; it is through it that all the parts are lively and alert or languid and drooping according as their animating spirit has life or withers. And there will be citizens, there will be allies worthy of this goodness, and uprightness will return to the whole world; your memory will everywhere be respected.

2. Permit me to linger on this point, but not merely to flatter your ears; for that is not my way — I would rather offend with the truth than please by adulation. What then is the reason why I wish you to be as familiar as possible with your own good deeds and words? This, namely, that what is now a natural impulse may become a matter of considered principle. I reflect upon this, that many great but odious sayings have made their entry into human life and are bandied about as famous; as for example, “Let them hate if only they fear,” and the Greek verse, similar to it, in which a man would have the earth convulsed with flame when once he is dead, and others of this type.

3. Yet somehow or other, men of cruel and hateful character have always found more promising material for the expression of striking and passionate thoughts. Never, until now, have I heard from good and gentle lips a spirited utterance. What then is the conclusion? That only seldom, against your will, with great reluctance, and after much procrastination you will sign the warrants of punishment and death.

AND ALL THINGS WILL BE MOULDED INTO YOUR LIKENESS

What he had called previously an utterance FOR WHICH THAT GOLDEN AGE SHOULD BE RENEWED, lest the people who dwell under the Roman Empire should be unworthy of such a good prince, this he now predicts will come to pass, in order that Nero may know that it is not only his personal concern to cultivate piety and gentleness, but that it also contributes and
conduces a great deal to public morality. For, as Herodian [1.2.4] says, *Men are accustomed to emulate the life of their prince.* Cicero says in the *Laws* [3.13.30]: *For as a whole state is infected by the licentious passions and vices of princes, so it is often reformed and corrected by their moderation...* [Ibid., 3.14.31]; *And it is not so great an evil for the princes to sin — though it is indeed a great evil of itself as the fact that there are very many imitators of the princes...* [Ibid., 3.14.32] Accordingly, princes of a vicious life are all the more pernicious to the state: because they not only commit vices themselves, but spread them throughout the country. They do injury not only because they themselves become corrupt, but also because they corrupt others. They do more harm by their example than by their actual sin. Plato [in Cic., *Ep. Faro.*, 1.9.12] also writes: *As princes are in the state, so are the remaining citizens wont to be.* The same meaning is expressed by a Greek proverb [cf. Cic., *Ep. Art.*, 5.11.5]: *Like mistress, like maidservants. The prince’s life, as Pliny [Panegyr., 45.6] very truly says, is the office of a censor, and a perpetual one. To it me are directed, to it me are turned. We need not so much rule as example.* Similar is this to Ovid’s statement [*Fasti*, 6.647f]:

*Thus is his censorship discharged, thus are examples given: When the judge himself does what he enjoins others to do.*

**FROM THE HEAD... THE GOOD HEALTH**

Drawn from the physicians, who, although they agree that a mutual sympathy inheres in all the members of the body, still consider the head as the particular seat of life, inasmuch as from it all the nerves take their origin; so that not without good reason it be said: the head in man is like the root in a tree.

**YOUR MEMORY WILL EVERYWHERE BE INSPECTED**

This ought to be the particular care of princes, what renown and what name they are going to have among posterity. For however much while they live they may be able to curb the tongues of all, surely when they are dead they cannot control men’s tongues. Indeed, toward those under whom nothing is permitted, men at last all the more eagerly pour out all their dammed up insults, once they are freed by the tyrant’s death to do
so. Says Puny [Panegyr., 53.5]: There is no time when the shades of evil princes rest from the reviling of posterity.

2. GREAT... SAYINGS

Which are in appearance great and brave, yet actually unworthy of a great mind. Nothing is great for the Stoics which is not also good and inwardly sound. See Seneca, On Anger [1.20.6].

LET THEM HATE IF ONLY THEY FEAR

These are Atreus’ words in the ancient tragedy, as we have stated in Book I.

AND THE GREEK VERSE SIMILAR TO IT

When I am dead let fire devour the world.

This is an iambic trimeter, which can be rendered into Latin as:

When I have died, let earth be mingled with fire.

Referred to by Erasmus in his Adagia [1.3.80], we are told by Suetonius in Nero [38. i] that it was a proverbial saying, which he relates: Somebody in conversation quoting that verse, Nero replied, Let it be while I am living. Claudian [Rufin., V, 2.19f] alludes to this senacus, and has Rufinus speak thus:

With world o’erturned I wish to die; the common ruin
Will sweeten death for me.

And Seneca himself praises a similar saying [Nat. Quest., 6.2.7]: Well spoke my favorite Vagellus in that renowned verse: If fall I must, from highest heaven I’d like to fall. It is the same as if one said: If I must fall, let me fall when the world is convulsed. Not because it is right to wish for public ruin, but because it is a great solace in dying, to see that earth self must also die some day.
AND OTHERS OF THIS TYPE

Of this kind, and sort. A metaphor from the mint where coins are stamped. Seneca [Ep. Mor., 34.4] when he would like to demonstrate that the deeds and words of a wise man are of the same sort, says: *Let them correspond to each other, and be stamped with the same image.* The reason for this is, as Paul the Jurisconsuk says [Dig. Just., 18.1]: *The device with which money is marked, gives it a permanent value.* Seneca, Medea [906f]: *How light they were, and of what common type The crimes I lent myself to do.* Seneca [Ep. Mor., 110.1]: *To each one of us a god is given as guide, not indeed an ordinary god, but one of a lower type.*

3. SO THAT ONLY SELDOM, AGAINST YOUR WILL

Erasmus notes that in the oldest codex there is a different reading of this passage, yet not without error, as he himself thinks, and I also consider. For it ought to be taken as a defective sentence in which the main verb is understood, with this sense: *SO THAT ONLY SELDOM, AGAINST YOUR WILL, AND WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE... AFTER MUCH PROCRASTINATION, you will affix your signature to warrants and death sentences. For thus what is now a natural impulse will become a matter of considered principle.*
CHAPTER 3

1. And in order that we may not perchance be deceived at times by the specious name of clemency and led astray to something which is its very opposite, let us see what clemency is, what is its nature, and what its limitations. Clemency means restraining the mind from vengeance when it has the power to take it, or the leniency of a superior towards an inferior in fixing punishment. In the fear that one definition may not be comprehensive enough, and, so to speak, the case be lost, it is safer to offer several: and so clemency may also be termed the inclination of the mind toward leniency in exacting punishment.

2. That definition will encounter objections, however closely it approaches the truth. Now if we shall say that clemency is the moderation which remits something from the punishment that is deserved and due, it will be objected that no virtue gives to any man less than his due. [2.4.1] Everybody, however, understands that the fact of the case is that clemency consists in stopping short of what might have been deservedly imposed. The ill-informed think that its opposite is strictness; but no virtue is the opposite of a virtue.

In this chapter Seneca’s sole intent is to set forth a clear definition of clemency, which in the division of the whole work he had promised he would provide in the second place, when we observed that he follows another order than he proposed. How true that is, it is now up to the readers to judge. The usual practice, however, is rather that a subject should not be defined in the second place only, but rather that the whole train of argument should start from the definition. Why Seneca should have decided otherwise is not clear to me.

BY THE SPECIOUS NAME OF CLEMENCY

This is always the pretense when vices imitate virtues, as in the case of mercy. Seneca elegantly says, THE SPECIOUS NAME, for a counterfeit and deceptive pretense. Ovid, [Metare., 7.69f]: And do you, Medea, give / To your guilt a specious name? Cornelius Tacitus [Hist., 4.73]: But liberty and
clemency means restraining the mind

First definition, which is not consistent, because a man who has not the immediate power of taking vengeance, does not for that reason cease to be clement; it is sufficient that he be so disposed, that even if he were to have the greatest opportunity to take vengeance, he would still not make use of it. Nor is the second definition much better. For it is possible for equals to conduct themselves clemently toward equals, and also for inferiors toward superiors: since it is a question not of effect, but of a state of mind.

IT IS SAFER TO OFFER SEVERAL

Not in words, but that the difference may be more widely exposed, and be limited to the term “clemency.”

THE CASE BE LOST

That is, lest the definition fall foul of that formal law, which the dialecticians demand in every definition, namely that it must apply to all things which can fall under the item defined, and that it should not be applicable to other things.

INCLINATION OF THE MIND TOWARDS LENIENCY IN EXACTING PUNISHMENT

This definition alone fits all cases.

[2.4.1] THE ILLINFORMED THINK THAT ITS OPPOSITE IS STRICTNESS

For since every virtue is a sort of mean between extremes, of which the one tends to defect, the other to excess, the defect as it were is diametrically opposed to the virtue to which it refers, the excess rather imitates the virtue. Here therefore it is a question of extreme in defect,
which certain people think to be strictness. Seneca shows that such people
are deceived in their opinion, for strictness is a virtue, and virtues cannot
contend against virtues. For virtues can be diverse, not contrary: as
clemency and strictness indeed have a varied character, but can still stand
at the same time: whence also they have the same extremes, but in
different ways. For cruelly is the defect of clemency, the excess of
strictness; but pity is the defect of strictness, the excess of clemency.
CHAPTER 4

1. What then is set over against clemency? It is cruelty, which is nothing else than harshness of mind in exacting punishments. “But,” you say, “there are some who do not exact punishments and yet are cruel, such as those who kill the strangers they meet, not for the sake of gain, but for the sake of killing, and, not content with killing, they torture, as the notorious Busiris and Procrustes, and the pirates who lash their captives and commit them to the flames alive.”

2. This indeed is cruelty; but because it does not result from vengeance (for no injury was suffered) and no sin stirs its wrath (for no crime preceded it) it falls outside of our definition; for the definition included only a lack of self-control in the exaction of punishment. That which finds pleasure in torture is not cruelty, we may say, but savagery we may even call it insanity; for there are various kinds of insanity and none is more unmistakable than that which reaches the point of murdering and mutilating men.

3. Those, then, that I shall call cruel are those who have a reason for punishing, but do not have moderation in it, like Phalaris, who, they say, tortured men, even though they were not innocent, in a manner that was inhuman and incredible. Avoiding sophistry we may then conclude that cruelty is an inclination of the mind toward excessive harshness. This quality clemency repels far from her; for with strictness she is certainly in harmony.

4. At this point it is pertinent to ask what pity is. For many commend it as a virtue, and call a pitying man good. But this is a mental defect. We ought to avoid both pity and cruelty, closely related as they are to strictness and to clemency, lest under the guise of clemency we lapse into pity. In the latter case a lighter risk is involved, it is true, but the error is equal in both, since in both we fall short of what is right.

Since it has now been laid down that strictness cannot be set over against clemency, lest virtues contend among themselves, therefore what is contrary to clemency, is to be considered a vice. It will be
CRUELTY: the inclination of the mind to harshness. For if one should speak of HARSHNESS IN EXACTING PUNISHMENTS, then an opposite of clemency will be given which contains more than is contained by the term clemency. For those who RAGE without cause are indeed cruel, yet they are not harsh in exacting punishments; those WHO EXACT PUNISHMENTS have cause to do so but do not keep within limits.

THE NOTORIOUS BUSIRIS

King of the Egyptians, son of Neptune and Libya, who, on the advice of Thrasius, used to sacrifice unknown visitors, accused of no crime, in order by their blood to call down rain from heaven: for Egypt has suffered nine years of drought. At last he was slain by Hercules, as certain writers relate. For Strabo [17.8] thinks the whole story about him to be mere fable.

PROCRUSTES

A thief of the region of Attica, subjected by Theseus to the same kind of punishment with which he himself had previously afflicted many others. For he laid people on a bed, and stretched them out to full length. If larger than the couch, they were cut off to fit; it smaller, they were stretched by force to the same size. His name is derived from prokrouo, that is, to stretch out. Ovid recalls the story in many passages.

2. WE MAY EVEN CALL IT INSANITY

He seems to have used the term “insanity” for “madness,” as writers frequently do, although Cicero in the Tusculan Disputations [3.5.11] distinguishes between the Latin insanity (Greek, mania) and madness (Greek, melancholy). But Celsus 3.18 calls insanity phrenesis, and distinguishes three kinds of phrenetics.
3. THOSE, THEN, THAT I SHALL CALL CRUEL ARE THOSE WHO HAVE A REASON

Do not consider this to be an insipid fabrication of Seneca, for in the same manner Servius interprets *cruel punishments* [A., 6.585) as *excessive and savage, but not undeserved*. Virgil’s words [A., 6.585] are:

> I have also seen how Salmoneus was cruelly punished.

**LIKE PHALARIS**

He was a tyrant of the Agrigentines, for whom Perillus fashioned a brazen bull. When condemned persons placed therein were roasted, they caused the bull to bellow. At last all the Agrigentines attacked him in a body, because he did not know how to impose a limit upon punishments. Seneca, *On Anger* [2.5.1], places him among those who intentionally exercise cruelty against those *from whom they have received no injury*. But here he is mistaken, since all other writers differ from him, and he contradicts himself as this passage shows.

4. WHAT PITY IS

Here it is a question of extreme to excess, namely pity. Although it conforms, in appearance, to clemency, yet because it carries with it perturbation of mind, it fails to qualify as a virtue (according to the Stoics). Aristotle, *Ethics*, poeits altogether other extremes, but in accord with the opinion of the Peripatetics, who allow passions TO BEFALL THE WISE MAN. But this will be better explained in the next chapter.

**AND CALL A PITYING MAN GOOD**

Obviously we ought to be persuaded of the fact that pity is a virtue, and that he who feels no pity cannot be a good man — whatever these idle sages may discuss in their shady nooks. To use Pliny’s words: *I know not whether they are sages, but they certainly are not men. For it is man’s nature to be affected by sorrow, to feel, yet to resist, and to accept comforting, not to go without it*. Rightly, therefore, the Athenians in
ancient times consecrated an altar to Pity. Cicero, *Pro Ligario* [12.37]: *Nothing is so dear to the people as kindness, and none of your many virtues arouses such admiration and such pleasure as your pity.*

Juvenal, *Sat.*, [15.131-133]:

> ... *Nature confesses*  
> *That she gives the tender hearts to humankind,*  
> *Who gave us tears: this is the best part of our feelings.*

Hence among writers “unweeping” is the name of a vice. Horace [C., 2.14.57]:

> *Not if you sacrifice three hundred bulls each on as many days,*  
> *Will you, dear friend, placate*  
> *Unweeping Pluto.*

Virgil, *Aeneid*, [4.369f]:

> *Did he once groan at my weeping? Avert his eyes?*  
> *When conquered, weep one tear? Or pity once my love?*

In favor of pity, against the Stoics’ opinion, read Augustine [*D.C.D.*, 9.45; 14.89].

**IN THE LATTER CASE A LIGHTER RISK**

Because it is in the excess, which has greater likeness to the virtue than does the defect. And furthermore, because it is better to let a harmful man go unpunished than to punish a harmless one.

**BUT THE ERROR IS EQUAL**

It is a paradox of the Stoics [Cic., *Par. Stoic.*, (3,20)]: *To transgress is to cross over the lines, which once done, an offense has been committed; how much farther you go when once you have crossed the lines has no effect in increasing the offense.*
CHAPTER 5

1. Consequently, as religion honors the gods, while superstition wrongs them, so all good men will display clemency and gentle-dealing, but will avoid pity; for it is the failing of a weak nature that succumbs to the sight of other’s ills. And so it is most often seen in the poorest type of persons: there are old women and wretched females who are moved by the tears of the worst criminals, who, if they could, would break open their prison. Pity regards only the plight, not the cause of it; whereas clemency agrees with reason.

2. I am aware that among the ill-informed the Stoic school is ill-reputed because it is excessively harsh and not at all likely to give good counsel to princes and kings; the criticism is made that it does not permit a wise man to show pity, does not permit him to pardon. Such doctrine, if stated in the abstract, is hateful; for, seemingly, no hope is left to human errors, but all failures are brought to punishment. Yet if this is so, what value is there in a system that bids us unlearn our humanity, and closes the surest refuge against ill-fortune, the haven of mutual help?

3. But the fact is, no school is more kindly and gentle, none more full of love to man and more concerned for the common good, so that it is its avowed object to be of service or assistance, and to regard not merely self-interest, but the interest of each and all.

4. Pity is a sickness of the mind brought about by the sight of the distress of others, or sadness caused by the ills of others which it believes come undeservedly. But no sickness befalls the wise man. His mind is serene, and nothing can happen to becloud it. Nothing so much befits a man as greatness of mind. But the great mind cannot be itself if fear and sorrow blunt it, cloud and shrink it. This will not happen to a wise man even in the case of personal calamity, but he will beat back all the rage of fortune and break it down before him; he will maintain always the same calm, unshaken appearance, and he could not do this if he were accessible to sadness. [2.6.1] Consider, further, that
the wise man uses foresight, and keeps in readiness a plan of action; but what comes from a troubled source is never clear and pure. For sorrow is not adapted to the discernment of fact, to the discovery of expedients, to the avoidance of dangers, or to fair judgment. He, consequently, will not feel pity, because even without mental suffering he does all else that those do who feel pity.

**RELIGION HONORS THE GODS.**

Superstition bears the same relationship to religion as pity does to clemency; just as cruelty stands in the same relationship to clemency as impiety does to religion. Superstition is disparaged; so also then is pity. Quintilian [8.3.55]: *As a busybody differs from an industrious man, so does superstition differ from religion.* Cicero, [N.D., 2.28.71f]: *Not only the philosophers, but our ancestors as well have separated superstition from religion. They who prayed whole days and sacrificed, that their children might survive them, were called superstitious; afterward the term became more general. But they who diligently reexamined, and so to speak “reread” everything related to the cult of the gods, were called “religious.”... Thus the one became a term of reproach, the other of praise.*

Still, not all authorities accept the etymology which Cicero has given for the word *superstition*. Servius [*Comm.*, 4., 8.187] and Donatus [*Comm. Ter. Andr.*, 3.2.7.487] think superstition derives from the fact that it is frequently found in old women who survive many of their contemporaries. Lucretius describes it as the empty worship of things standing over us, i.e., of celestial beings. Servius gives the same etymology [*Comm. ,Aen.*, 12.182]: because all religion “stands above our heads.” Lactantius [*Inst.*, 4.28] and Macrobius [*Saturn.,* 3.3.8] disagree with Cicero [N.D., 2.28.72] on the term “religion.” One derives it from “rereading”; (relegere); the other from “leaving behind” (relinquere). See also Augustine’s remarks [*DCD*, 6.2; 6.9.2].
2. I AM AWARE THAT... IS ILLREPUTED (MALE AUDIRE)

Before giving the reason why the Stoics disapprove of pity, by means of prolepsis he refutes the opinion of those who count it a defect of the Stoics that they are without emotion or sympathy for others’ ills. And obviously, though they speak evil, who take the Stoics’ dogma so precisely, as if they forgive no one: still the Stoics themselves have put forth a theory more subtle than true. Cicero mocked them at great length in his speech Pro Murena [29.61]: There was once a man of the greatest genius, whose name was Zeno, the imitators of whose inventions are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of this sort: that a wise man is never influenced by favor; never pardons any man’s fault; that no one is merciful except a fool and a trifler; that it is not the part of a man to be moved or pacified by entrearies; that they are the only wise men, let them be ever so deformed,... etc. And much in the same vein. And Horace [cf. Sat., 1.3.124ff]. In imitation of the Greeks we say bene audire and male audire for “to be praised” and “to be reproached.” Cicero [Ep. Att., 6.1.2] says:... Who think that I wish to be praised in order for him to be reproached, and am acting honorably not for my own reputation, but to cause him shame. [Ibid., 10.8.9]. Who wishes me to act rightly and be well-reputed. Terence [Phorm., Prol., 20]: If he had fought with fair words, he would have been / praised himself. And [Ibid., 2.3.12.359]: If you charge your master with avarice, you will be reproached. Quintilian [Decl., 6.22]. Where is virtue? Where is piety? You perish, poor man, and suffer reproach.

4. PITY IS A SICKNESS OF THE MIND

This is the hinge on which the whole matter turns: The Stoics reject pity, because it is a sickness of the mind. But passions, because they disturb the health and tranquility of the mind, are always vicious. Therefore pity is a vice. Sallust, in Caesar’s speech [Cat., 51.1]: It becomes all men., who deliberate on dubious matters, to be influenced neither by hatred, affection, anger, nor pity. The mind, when such feelings obstruct its view, cannot see what is right... Quintilian [Inst., 6.2.6]: For when judges begin to feel indignant, to favor, to hate, to pity, they fancy their own cause is
concerned; and, as lovers are not competent judges of beauty, because love oppresses the sense of sight, so a judge, when led away by his feelings, loses the faculty of discerning truth; he is hurried along as it mere by a flood, and yields to the force of a torrent. And so the same Quintilian [5. Pr. 1] says: There have also been authors, of high reputation, who have thought that the sole duty of an orator is to inform. Excitement of the feelings, they considered, was to be prohibited for two reasons: first because all perturbation of the mind is an evil; and secondly, because it is inexcusable for a judge to be diverted from the truth by pity or anger, and any similar passion. Augustine [DCD, 9.5] defines pity in the same sense though in different words: What then is pity, but a compassion in our hearts for another’s misery, by which we are compelled to give whatever help we can?

BUT NO (MENTAL) SICKNESS BEFALLS THE WISE MAN

As Cicero defines it [T.D., 4.7.14], Sickness then is a fresh sense of present misfortune, the subject of which thinks it right to feel depression and shrinking of soul... [T.D., 3.10.23]: And, as infirmity in the body, so sickness in the soul has a name which in meaning is not distinct from the meaning of pain. Yet you will often find these two words confused in authors, as to say infirmity of mind and sickness of body. Terence [Phorm., 5.1.23.750]: The poor mother herself died of sickness. Cicero [I.D., 4.11.26]: They define infirmity of mind as a violent belief concerning something undesirable, as if it should be very much desired. To this sickness, that is, shrinking of mind, is opposed eugnomosune, that is, equanimity.

HIS MIND IS SERENE

Here he now attributes [to the wise man] apathia and analgesia, so that no emotions may touch the wise man at all. Whether this is true is not part of our present purpose to discuss. Read the reasons on which Cicero’s Books 3 [T.D., 3.6.12] and IV [4.23.51] of the Tusculan Disputations, and Seneca’s On Anger [3.4143] rest.
5. SHRINKS AND CLOUDS THE MIND

For as men’s minds expand by happiness, so they are shrunk by (mental) sickness. Cicero [T.D., 4.31.66]: *For it is from one and the same defect that the mind is expansive in happiness or shrinks up in adversity...* Also in *On Friendship* [13.48]: *So that he swells, as it were, with joy at the good fortune of a friend, and shrinks at his misfortune.* Cicero [*Ep. Q.F.*, 1.1.4]: *not to let your heart shrink or sink, and not to allow yourself to be overwhelmed, as by a wave, by the greatness of your task.* Gellius [19.1.17]: *A wise man’s mind must for a brief moment be moved, and shrunk, and turn pale.* Seneca said: “to cloud,” meaning “to darken as if by clouds.”

[2.6.1] KEEPS IN READINESS A PLAN OF ACTION

Seneca [*Ep. Mor.*, 71.1]: *A plan ought to be hatched on the very day, nay on the very hour. Even this is too late: a plan should be born, as they say, out of hand!* But having a ready and prompt plan is incompatible with being beset by passions. For a plan needs to have reason well composed; passions cannot persist alongside reason.
CHAPTER 6

2. I wish to do willingly what another man will do with passion. He will bring relief to another’s tears, but will not add his own; to the shipwrecked man he will give a hand, to the exile shelter, to the needy alms; he will not do as most of those who wish to be thought merciful doweling insultingly their alms, and scorn those whom they help, and shrink from contact with them — but he will give as a man to his fellowman out of the common store; he will grant to a mother’s tears the life of her son, the captive’s chains he will order to be broken, he will release the gladiator from his barracks, he will bury the carcass even of a criminal; but he will do these things with unruffled mind, and a countenance under control.

3. The wise man, therefore, will not pity, but will succor, will benefit, and since he is born to be of help to all and to serve the common good, he will give to each his share thereof. He will extend a due measure of his goodness even to the unfortunates who deserve to be censured and disciplined; but much more gladly will he come to the rescue of the distressed and those struggling desperately. Whenever he can, he will intercept Fortune; for in what way will he make better use of his resources or his strength than in restoring what chance has overthrown? And, also, he will not cast down either his eyes or his spirit... but all the worthy he will aid, and will, like a god, look graciously upon the unfortunate.

4. Pity is akin to misery; for it is partly composed of it and partly derived from it. You may know that those are weak eyes which overflow with tears at the sight of another’s blearedness, just as always to laugh when other people laugh is, in faith, not merriment, but a disease, and for one to stretch open his mouth when everybody else yawns is a disease. Pity is a weakness of the mind that is overmuch given to suffering, and if any one requires it from a wise man, that is very much like requiring him to wail and moan at the funerals of strangers. [2.7.1] “But,” you ask, “why will he not pardon where he is free to do so?” Come then, let us now also decide what
pardon is, that we may perceive that the wise man ought not to grant it. Pardon is the remission of a deserved punishment. Why a wise man ought not to give this is explained more at length by those who make a point of the doctrine.

2. HE WILL BRING RELIEF TO ANOTHER’S TEARS, BUT WILL NOT ADD HIS OWN

By this standard especially the Stoics would like people to judge their “wise man,” if he as it were from his lofty citadel looks down on Fortune’s game in human affairs, and considers his own and others’ misfortunes to have nothing to do with him: if he is not sorrowful if anything unhappy befalls him: nor shows sympathy for another’s tears, but because he has been begotten for the common good [1.3.2], whom he can he succors and helps whom he can with his labor and effort.

TO THE SHIPWRECKED MAN HE WILL GIVE A HAND

That is, he will extend a hand to help him. The verb “to extend” (portigere) is more frequently used. Quintilian [Deal., 5.18]: If shipwreck should overtake two men equally, I would extend a hand to him whom, weakened by the struggling of his limbs, the waves were swallowing up. Virgil [A., 6.370]:

Give your right hand to a wretch, and lift me with you through the waves.

Yet this is also found. Quintilian [Inst., 2.3.7]:... as any fast walker, if he should happen to walk with a child, would give him his hand, relax his pace, and not go on more quickly than his companion could follow. Elsewhere, “to give the hand” [dare manum] means “to yield.”

FLING INSULTINGLY THEIR ALMS

Let the men of our times take heed of this, very many of whom are far, far away from this gentleness of the pagan philosophers: if at any time such persons come to give alms to a poor man, then as if it were beneath their dignity to hand it to him, they fling it down by way of insult.
THE CAPTIVE’S CHAINS HE WILL ORDER TO BE BROKEN

For instance, if a man has been captured by pirates, he will ransom him, and set him at liberty.

HE WILL RELEASE FROM THE BARRACKS

Either from the gladiatorial games or from public contests with wild animals. For slaves were assigned, some to “hunts,” who fought in the arena with wild beasts at the people’s pleasure; others to gladiatorial contests, who were committed to fight in pairs. Gladiators and hunters are said to “be released from the contest” when they are freed from that necessity. Also expressed as “to redeem from the contest.” Quintilian [Inst., 8.5.12]:... the young man whom his sister had several times redeemed from the contest, and who brought an action against her under the lex talionis, because she had cut off his thumb while he was asleep. Said she: “You deserved to have your hand whole,” meaning, “to go on fighting as a gladiator.”

3. HE WILL INTERCEPT FORTUNE

A very good metaphor. For just as tribunes used to “intercept” consuls and senators, when they opposed them, if they oppressed the people with their insolent power; so he intercepts Fortune, who, as we commonly say, opposes and faces its calamity, that he may protect another man from fortune’s injury. Pliny the Younger [Panegyr., 25.5]: To intercept calamities, to meet fortune. Examples occur here and there in Livy and other writers.! do not see why Erasmus prefers interdicere in Suetonius’ Life of Tiberius [2.4] where previously intercedere was read, in these words: ~4 Vestal Virgin likewise of the family, when her brother was resolved to have the honor of a triumph contrary to the will of the people, mounted the chariot with him, and attended him up to the Capitol, that it might not be lawful for any of the tribunes to interfere and forbid it.

HE WILL NOT CAST DOWN EITHER HIS EYES OR HIS SPIRIT

Cicero sometimes says “abjicere,” sometimes “demittere” (to cast down), Livy “defigere.” [1.29.3]:... gloomy silence and speechless sorrow so cast
down the spirits of all, that, through fear, forgetting what they should leave behind, what they should take with them, all counsel failing them, etc.

4. HIS EYES ARE WEAK:

He makes a comparison between the body and the soul (mind). IF THE EYES ARE WEAK, WHICH OVERFLOW WITH TEARS AT THE SIGHT OF ANOTHER’S BLEAREDNESS, then the mind is weak, which is moved by another’s misfortune to pity. Yet Alexander Aphrodiseus [Comm. Arist. Probl., 1.33] considers that this happens naturally,..., because the eyes are damp and soft, and exposed to the emotions. Then because health arises from a moderate, vice from an immoderate, disposition. That which is moderate can be changed and turned more readily by that which is immoderate than conversely. Therefore, blearedness, which is a certain immoderate disposition, easily worsens a health however moderate. Change moreover comes about by a natural agreement of bodies among themselves.

FOR ONE TO STRETCH OPEN HIS MOUTH WHEN VERYBODY ELSE YAWNS

Oscitatio (“yawning”) is derived from os and ciere, “to stir or move the mouth,” as Donatus [Comm. Ter. Andr., 1.2.10.181] states; it arises most commonly from carefree indolence or laziness. Yet sometimes it is a vice of nature rather than of man; hence it is called “an inclination to yawn,” as Gellius remarks [4.20.9]. And Alexander Aphrodiseus [Comm. Arist. prov., 1.32] thinks it natural that those who see someone yawning, should themselves also yawn; because living beings, especially irrational ones, have certain common feelings of likenesses as well as of the affections. Thus it comes about that when a donkey is urinating others likewise urinate, when they too are full of urine.

[2.7.1] FREE

That is, released and liberated from all emotion and passion of mind, whether pity or sickness, for that is what the word vacuus means when it is so used by itself. Ovid., Trist. [2.239]:

Or if (and would it had been sought) thou had perchance been free.
And in the Letter of Sappho [Heroid. Ep., 15.14]:

*These verses freely flow from a mind unoccupied.*

Cicero, *In Verr.* [1.9.26]:

*I began, with a mind much freer and much more at ease, to think of nothing and to do nothing except what related to this trial.*

**PARDON IS THE REMISSION OF A DESERVED PUNISHMENT**

A controversy over words: on the thing itself there is agreement. For why is he who gives pardon said rather to remit deserved punishment, than to pardon, and to temper punishment with a certain gentleness? Then there is nothing to prevent clemency from remitting something which severity would rightly and deservedly punish. Clemency can therefore remit deserved punishment if it does so with reason.
1. I, to speak briefly as if giving another’s opinion, explain it thus: “Pardon is given to a man who ought to have been punished; but a wise man does nothing which he ought not to do, omits to do nothing which he ought to do; therefore he does not remit a punishment which he ought to exact.

2. But in a more honorable way he will bestow upon you that which you wish to obtain by pardon; for the wise man spares, is considerate, and rectifies; he does the same that he would do if he pardoned, and yet he does not pardon, since he who pardons admits that he has omitted to do something which he ought to have done. To one man he will give merely a reproof in words, and he will inflict punishment if he sees that the other’s age will permit reformation; another who is clearly suffering from the odium of crime he will order to go free, because he was misled, because wine made him fall; he will let his enemies go unharmed, sometimes even with praise if they have girded themselves for battle with honorable motives — to maintain their loyalty, a treaty, or their liberty.

3. These are all the operations of clemency, not of forgiveness. Clemency has freedom in decision; it judges not according to precise legal form, but in accordance with what is fair and good; it may acquit and it may assess the damages at any value it pleases. It does none of these things as if it were doing less than is just, but as if the justest thing were that which it has resolved upon. But to pardon is to fail to punish things you judge worthy of punishment; pardon is the remission of punishment that is due. Clemency is superior primarily in this, that it declares that those who are let off did not deserve any different treatment; hence more complete than pardon, more creditable.

4. In my opinion the dispute is about words, but concerning the fact there is agreement. The wise man will remit many punishments, he will save many whose character, though unsound, can yet be freed from unsoundness. He will be like the good husbandmen who tend, not merely the trees that are straight and tall, but also apply props to
those that for some reason have grown crooked in order that they may be straightened; others they trim, in order that their branching may not hamper their height; some that are weak because set in poor soil they fertilize; to some suffering from the shade of the others they open up the sky.

5. Following these examples, the perfect wise man will see what method of treatment a given character should have, until the crooked is made straight again...”

Whatever Seneca is here discussing can be refuted in one word. For the argument does not go anywhere; he has remitted deserved punishment, therefore he has neglected what he ought to have done. For he has remitted a punishment with praise for clemency, which he might have demanded, with praise for strictness; and he who demands satisfaction from the author of an injury, asks only what is right, yet he does not neglect what he should have done, if he allows the injury to go unavenged.

2. FOR THE WISE MAN WILL SHOW COMPASSION

All these things are intended to demonstrate that the wise man can show reason for his clemency.

3. IT JUDGES NOT ACCORDING TO THE PRECISE LEGAL FORM

That is, strictly according to the prescription of supreme justice, as those judges who pronounce sentence according to the letter of the law.

Marcellus [Dig. Just., 48.19.11]: The sentencing judge ought to see to it that no sentence be either harder or more lenient than the cause itself demands. For he ought not to affect a reputation for either severity or clemency, but with balanced judgment, he ought to decide as the matter itself requires. Quintilian [5.13.5]: Deprecation should only rarely be employed, and solely before those judges who are confined to no definite form of pronouncing sentence.
“To assess damages” means not only to fix the limits of losses plus interest, as the Pragmatics say, but also to have criminal intent. In this manner, Cicero spoke in his speech *Pro Cluentio* [41.116], *to assess damages for a man’s life*. Both the judge himself and the prosecutor are said “to assess damages.” Plutarch says that Cicero, the accuser in the case of Vetres, *assessed the damages at 750,000 sesterces*. [Cic., 8.1]. Gellius [20.1.38]: *After assessing the damages, the judge fined the man.*

**Clemency may therefore assess the damages at any value it pleases,**

because its verdict ought not to be limited to the precise judicial form.

**THE END**

**Paris at the printing office of Louis Blauwbloem, the year of our salvation 1532, in the month of April**
John Calvin to Franqois Connan Most Learned in the Law, Greeting.

At long last our friend du Chemin’s *Apologia* is trying its luck like every other book, even though in writing it he did not intend it ever to be published. But it was proper also to publish what this illustrious man had only playfully written to exercise and excite his spirits, in order that de l’Etoile might not go undefended, and some Albucius or other might not strike up songs of triumph without shedding a drop of blood or sweat.

But if anyone prefers to read “Alciatus” instead of “Albucius,” I dare not affirm, nor wish to deny; but certain sharper folk have got wind that Alciatus might wish to hide under an assumed name, lest by right of tit-for-tat he should be paid back for his over-sharp eloquence and his impatient tongue!

Neither should anyone think that de l’Etoile had no defense, or interpret his silence as an admission of defeat, as if he were yielding the victory to Albucius. Rather let everyone understand that de l’Etoile is a man occupied with serious business, who is in this case upheld by his confidence in the truth, and is unwilling to waste effort on utterly insignificant matters. After all, this matter spoke plainly enough for itself. Otherwise he might have drawn his pen against a thousand Albuciuses, endowed as he is with such sharpness of wit, such industry, and finally
also with such skill in the law, that he has without question won preeminence over all his contemporaries.

Now du Chemin also cherished this conviction, and he would never have brought himself to publish his little book unless he had been persuaded by solid argument that to forbear writing would mean, to leave de l’Etoile in the lurch. For there were certain wranglers who whispered that de l’Etoile would not have remained silent on this matter if he could have defended himself in any way. Had he not steadfastly opposed a man like Zasius?

So our friend du Chemin, driven as it were by this necessity, changed his plan, and in order to destroy the calumnies of those men, now reveals in public what for almost two years he wished to keep to himself. But first he wished to see to it that it should not come into men’s hands in a mutilated and corrupt form. So, when he heard that I was preparing to make a journey to Paris, he requested me for the sake of our friendship to keep a diligent eye over the printing, lest any errors should creep in.

This duty I gladly took upon myself, yet on the condition that I should not be answerable for any blame but that of negligence. For I shall consider my duty well discharged, if I have exercised the diligence he desired. And as regards Alciatus, he ought not to take umbrage; for he should consider that he has been attacked with justice in the first place, and further also with modesty and truthfulness, and not without the deference he deserves. And I do believe that he has the public interest so much at heart, and has so much respect for the truth, that he will have no desire to object to this book simply under the cloak of his authority. Therefore, since he realizes that the truth of the matter has become totally submerged, he will also admit that it must be sorted out afresh by argument and counter-argument — provided, of course, one sees to it that the very truth one seeks does not get lost through too much bickering.

This I wanted to be said, so that by the same effort I might clear myself both with Alciatus and with you; for I was afraid that out of sheer zeal for Alciatus you might be more inclined toward the opposition, and might reproach me for not standing on Alciatus’ side. For I know with what enthusiasm you used to speak of him — doubtless as a most grateful student of the best of teachers.
But recently from our conversation and earlier from your frequent letters, I have learned what a fine opinion you have of de l’Etoile (whom you have also heard) and with what respect you speak of him. Hence, I cannot imagine your dragging any kind of prejudice into this quarrel. This is especially so, since our friend du Chemin is well enough known to you from his under taking to defend this matter in accordance with his own judgment. He is known to you as a man most deliberate in his studies, of penetrating insight, and what is most important of all — of utterly precise judgment. Perfectly educated in literature, he is now applying himself and has already applied himself to legal studies. Whatever concerns the present case, our readers should be free to judge, not indeed laymen, but persons who have penetrated a bit more deeply into the secrets of law. Indeed you yourself, most learned Connan, must judge — not as one of the common people, but as one outside of that number by virtue of your deeper learning. Certainly, as things now are, I believe this cause is one of such a character as assuredly to deserve the favorable judgment both of yourself and of every sincere reader. Farewell. Paris, 6 March [1531].
APPENDIX 2

THREE LETTERS

1. JOHN CALVIN TO PHILIPPE DU LAURIER, BOOKSELLER AT ORLEANS, 22ND APRIL, 1532.

Herminjard no. 379. Copy, Berne Library.

Latin Text:

Tandem jacta est alea. *Exierunt commentarii mei in libros Senecae de Clementia*, sed meis sumptibus excusi, qui plus pecuniae exhauserunt quam tibi persuaderi possit; nunc omnem operam do ut allquid colligatur. Aliquot professores excitavi *in hac urbe* qui praelegerent. *In scholis Biturigibus* amico persuasi, ut suggesturn conscenderet ad publicam professionem; tu etiam mihi nonnihil commodare poteris; si non gravaberis, hoc dabis veteri amicitiae nostrae, praesertim cum sita exisfimationis tuae dispendium hoc officium praestare nobis possis, quod publico etiam bono forte cessurum sit.

Si statueris hoc me beneficio obstringere, mittam centum exemplaria, aut quot tibi visum fuerit. Interim habe hoc tibi exemplar, quod dum accipis, ne putes dictam & me tibi aliquam legem; rolo per me tibi omnia esse libera.


Translation:

At last the dice have been thrown! My Commentary on Seneca’s book On Clemency has come out, but printed at my expense. It has cost me more money than you would ever believe; now I am
doing everything in my power to scrape together something. In this
city I have encouraged several professors to lecture on it. I have
persuaded a friend at Bourges University to mount the platform
and deliver a public lecture on the subject. You also might help me
a bit: if it is not too much trouble, you may do this for the sake of
our old friendship; the more so, since you can do me this turn
without sacrificing anything of your reputation. Perhaps your
service might even redound to the public good.

If you may decide to oblige me with this kindness, I shall send you
one hundred copies, or as many as you may think fit. In the
meanwhile please accept this copy as your own, and do not think
yourself under any obligation for that reason. I want you to be
absolutely free, as far as I am concerned.

Farewell, and answer soon. I have recently written to Pignaeus, but
he has not answered. To Brossaeus I had written long before, yet
since then I have had no word from him. I want him who shall hand
to Regius his copy, to greet him respectfully on my behalf. Paris,
22nd April.

The original of this letter had neither year nor address. But the contents
clearly point to the year 1532, the year when the Commentary was
published. As regards the address: the words Francisco Danieli ocuo were
added by Pierre Daniel, son of Francois Daniel, who round about 1560
made copies of these and other letters which he found among his father’s
papers. (Cf. Herminjard II, p. 278, n. 1). These copies are preserved in the
Public Library of Berne. The address added by Pierre Daniel cannot,
however, be correct, for reasons that will be given presently.

2. JOHN CALVIN TO FRANCOIS DANIEL, APRIL 1532.

Herminjard, no. 380. Copy, Berne Library.

Latin Text:

Redditae sunt milli utraeque tuae literae, eodem pene argumento et
iisdem fere verbis. De Bibliis exhausi mandatum tuum, in quibus
reperiendis pluris fuit opera quam pecunia. Cum res meas
componam, conjiciam inter sarcinas; puto rem ejus generis esse
quae possit differi id [l. differri in id] tempus. Superest ut tu vicissim mutuam operam milli accommodes.


*Chemino quid scribam plane non habeo*, cum ille, tories provocatus, non respondeat; *nec statui me ad iter accingere, nisi prius scripserit*. Quid enim, si dies aliquot mihi sub dio frigendum esset, dum Iocum huic corpori quaererem? De *Coiffartio* quid aliud dicam, nisi hominem esse sibi natum. Iterum vale. Parisils (1530).

Saluta mihi matrein et materteram.

Translation:

I have received both your letters, having more or less the same contents and the same wording. As regards the Bible, I have carried out your request; the trouble to find one was more than the money it cost me. When I pack up my things, I shall include this in my baggage; I reckon it is a matter that can be postponed till that time. Now it only remains for you to do me a good service in return.

Seneca’s books On Clemency have at last been printed, at my expense and through my personal effort. I now have to see that I get in again, from all quarters, the money I have lost. And next, for the sake of my good name, I would like you to write back to me, with what degree of warmth or of coldness the book has been received; and further, that you induce Landrinus to lecture on them. I send you one copy, which is to be your own. You will be so kind as to have the other five sent to Bourges: to Regius, to Pignaeus, to Agnetus, to Brossaeus, to Barrathramus. If Agnetus will undertake to lecture on it, he shall do me a considerable favor. Farewell! I
have nothing to write to Duchemin, since he has not answered me yet, in spite of all my letters; and I have decided not to make any preparations for the journey before I have had word from him. Just imagine that I should have to brave the elements under the open sky for several days while looking out for a roof over my head! And as regards Coiffart, what else can I say of him, but that he is a man born only for himself. Again, farewell. Paris. Give my regards to your mother and aunt.

This letter also had neither date nor address in the original. The date is determined by the contents, and the identity of the addressee by the contents of Letter no. 3 (Herin. 381). According to Hermifflard the Bible of which Calvin speaks here was probably the Latin Bible printed by Stephanus (Robert Estienne) in 1528. It was very much in demand, and was soon sold out. That would explain the trouble Calvin had in finding a copy for his friend.

3. FRANCOIS DANIEL TO JOHN CALVIN, 15TH MAY 1532.


Latin text:

Literas tuas mihi reddidit Philippus noster, quibus deprehendi nullum tuum officium omisisse. In his mittendis tibi acquiesco, si proMmum putas tuum adventure. Unum superest, desiderari a me occasionem qua possem, si non referre gratiam, saltem propensam promptamque animi voluntatem qual[cunque] officiolo meo larare: quam rogo experiaris, dum locum tuo corpori quaeris; videbis profecto tibi paratam habitationera, nec sub dio tibi frigendum esse, quamquam de Chemino sit minime dubitandum, cum tibi coram pluries receperit. Itaque itineri to accinge; fratrem habebis comitem, quem, dum isthic erit, tibi commendo.

Quod autem me tuorum commentariorum exemplari donaveris, gratias ago, hce nondum acceperim. Interea tamen Agneto et Regio literas parabo. Est apud Franc. Sylvium mihi consobrinus nomine Valentius. Is nuper, cum, parentum monitu, ad Dialectices artis professionem invitaretur, ad me scripsit quidnam sentirem de
futuro illius studio. Videas, rogo, per otium, quid in lingua latina profecerit, hum illius lectionis capax sit. Vale, amice integerrime.

Aureliae, Idib. Maiis 1531.

Translation:

Our friend Philippe has handed me your letter, from which I gather that you have neglected none of your duties. This letter may suffice, if you think that you will soon be arriving here. Only one thing remains, and that is, that I shall now look out for an opportunity which may enable me, if not really to repay your kindness, then at any rate to show by some small service that I bear you a willing and grateful heart. I beseech you to make a trial of this, when you “look for a roof over your head”; you will, I promise you, discover a lodging ready to receive you, and no necessity of “having to brave the elements under the open sky”; though there is absolutely no reason to doubt Duchemin’s sincerity, since he has repeatedly undertaken in your very presence (to do this). Therefore, prepare for your journey. You will have my brother as companion, whom I commend to your care until he arrives here.

I thank you for making me a present of a copy of your Commentary, although I have not yet received it. In the meanwhile I shall prepare letters to go to Agnetus and Regius. At the home of Franciscus Sylvius there is at the moment a cousin of mine by the name of Vaillant. At a hint of his parents he was recently invited to lecture on Dialectics, and now he has written to me, asking my opinion on his future course of studies. Will you please, when you have a moment to spare, see how strong his Latin is, and whether he will be able to undertake that lectureship.

Farewell, my sincere friend! Orleans, 15th of May.

This letter had both address and date in the original. The year can easily be supplied from the contents.

“Our friend Philippe” was, in all probability, a certain Philippe du Laurier, bookseller of Orleans (cf. Herminjard II, p. 333, note 8).
The exact relationship among these three letters, and more especially between the first two, nos. 379 and 380, has always presented something of a riddle to students. In their *Prolegomena* (vol. 33, p. 33) the editors of the *Corpus Reformatorum* declared: “There are in these letters (sc. 379 and 380) certain things which call for elucidation, and it is not easy to discover in what relationship they stand to each other. But it is not our purpose to go into that...”

Herminjard tried to explain the strange similarity between the two letters by referring to the practice of those days, when the uncertainty of postal services induced people to send copies of the same letter by different routes or with different carriers.

In this case, however, such an explanation cannot be satisfactory (cf. Hugo, *op. cit.*, p. 165 f.). It is true, Calvin begins Letter no. 380 by stating that he had received two almost identical copies of the same letter from Daniel. It would therefore seem logical to conclude that in nos. 379 and 380 we have before us two drafts of the same letter, written by Calvin at a short interval, and with minor differences of contents.

But such a view cannot be maintained. It remains inconceivable, on any grounds, that these two letters could have been addressed to the same person, i.e. Francois Daniel. That the two letters were written at the same time, there can be no doubt. But how does one explain the fact that the finding of a Bible copy for Daniel, which figures so largely in no. 380, is not at all mentioned in no. 379? This was a definite instruction of his friend which he had carried out, and if it was his purpose to make sure that Daniel would have news of it, how is it possible then, that he should omit it from one letter, while dwelling on it in the other? Surely this cannot be called a minor difference. More important still, how does one account for the fact that in no. 379 Calvin says that he will send the addressee *one hundred copies* (if the addressee will be prepared to dispose of them), whereas in no. 380 there is not a word about any such consignment, but only *of five copies*, which he is sending immediately, together with the letter?

It must be plain to everyone that these two letters could not possibly have been addressed to one and the same person. That no. 380 was addressed to Daniel, is evident from the answer which Daniel wrote to it (no. 381), and
in which he even quotes certain parts of it in a humorous way. To whom, then, was letter no. 379 addressed?

One thing is clear: the receiver of no. 379 must have been some one who would be informed of the contents of the letter going to Daniel. This must follow from the remark about the copy that must be given to Regius: a remark that could only make sense to a person who also knew that Calvin was sending five copies to be handed personally to five eminent persons, one of whom was to be this Regius. In other words, the receiver of letter no. 379 was not Francois Daniel, but must have been someone having very near relations with Daniel. And besides, this person must also have been a good friend of Calvin’s, because Calvin speaks to him of “our old friendship”, and has the confidence to send him a hundred copies to distribute!

On the strength of these considerations we put forward, a few years ago, the hypothesis that letter no. 379 might possibly have been addressed to Claude Framberge, an old student friend of Calvin’s, who lived in Orleans (cf. Hugo, p. 166). We now want to substitute for this very shaky hypothesis the almost certain solution that was kindly communicated to us by Prof. Hendrik Wagenvoort of Utrecht University.

Prof. Wagenvoort agrees with everything that has been said so far, and then continues: “Do we know anything about the anonymous person to whom no. 379 was addressed? I think we do. It is evident that he was not a scholar. He is not requested — as all the others are — to lecture on the Commentary. Yet Calvin wants to send him a hundred copies. What was he then? Evidently, a bookseller! And then it is only natural to be reminded of that ‘friend Philippe’ mentioned in no. 381, who was, according to Herminjard, Philippe du Laurier, a bookseller in Orleans. To him Calvin simultaneously sent two letters: no. 379 for himself, and no. 380 for Francois Daniel. The latter epistle was handed by him to Daniel (Litteras tuas mihi reddidit Philippus noster).”

“Of course we have to assume then”, Prof. Wagenvoort continues, “that there existed ties of close friendship between Daniel and Philippe. But this is hardly a matter for doubt. Not only is it clearly implied in ‘Philippus noster’, but I would also refer you to p. 9 of your thesis, where Calvin, in May 1531 — less than a year before the writing of the present letters —
re-quested Duchemin to give his regards to Francois Daniel, to ‘Philippus’, and to the rest of their little circle in Orleans. (Herminjard, no. 338.) I would therefore assume that Letter no. 379 originally carried the superscription ‘Jean Calvin ~ Philippe du Lauder & Orleans’.”

Our sincere thanks go to Prof. Wagenvoort for this very convincing solution of a riddle that has gone unsolved for the past hundred years.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The organization and content of the Bibliography reflect the source studies and annotations of the Seneca Commentary. In general, two kinds of editions of classical authors are included: (a) those printed before 1532, (b) modern critical editions of the 19th-20th centuries (usually of the Bibliotheca Teubneriana). While in most cases the exact edition used by Calvin has not been determined, his readings which are significantly variant from the Teubner (or equivalent modern) text have been noted in our apparatus for the convenience of readers. Of editions printed before 1532 statistical summaries of books examined have been given. If a specific edition is mentioned, it is usually starred (*) to indicate explicit use in the notes. Almost all of these early editions were consulted in the Niedersachs. Staats - und Universitats-Bibliothek, Gottingen, or the Herzog August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbuttel. To save space, year and place are alone mentioned, unless there is reason to note some special feature of the edition. In other words, here are listed editions which Calvin could have used.

Where a particular text was used extensively, it is starred (*). Entries bearing a dagger (†) are to concordances or full indices (usually of modern editions), which proved helpful in tracing quotations. Occasionally a later 16th, or 17th, century edition has been used, either because an earlier edition was not available, or in order to offer references to more commonly available editions (in the case of certain Renaissance writers-Sect. 6).

Only authors presumed to have been directly consulted by Calvin have been included in the list. For an exhaustive list of authors, see Ford Lewis Battles, “The Sources of Calvin’s Seneca Commentary.” Studies in John Calvin, Appendix, pp. 63-66.

Two kinds of translations are listed: (a) 15th-16th century Latin renderings of certain Greek authors, used by Calvin; (b) 19th-20th century English and French renderings of various classical authors, consulted by the translators in preparing the English version of the Commentary. Most of these are to be found in Bohn’s Classical Library, or in the Loeb
Classical Library; comparison of these with our renderings will, however, show considerable differences.

Separate sections (1-3) are devoted to Seneca. In listing the editions of Seneca, texts of the 16th-17th c. (to Lipsius) are included, as well as modern editions, since reference to these is made in the *apparatus criticus*.

A very short list of patristic writers (5) is provided for the sake of completeness, despite the fact that most of these references in the Commentary are probably derived from intermediate sources.

The final section (VII) is a short list of the literature consulted in preparing this edition; it does not presume to be exhaustive.

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   d. later editions (mainly those used in the *app. crit.*)
   e. translations of writings of Seneca, other than the *De Clementia*, used in preparation of the translation of the *Commentary*

III. Modern Separate Editions of Seneca’s *De Clementia*
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   b. translations (English and French)
   c. critical works used in the apparatus and notes

IV. Editions of Other Classical Authors mentioned in the *Commentary*

V. Editions of Patristic Authors mentioned or used in the *Commentary*
VI. Renaissance Authors actually or presumably used by Calvin in preparing his *Commentary*

VII. Literature Consulted in the Preparation of the Introduction and Notes
I. EDITIONS OF CALVIN’S COMMENTARY ON SENEA’S DE CLEMENTIA

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<td>Paris (Ludovicus Cyaneus = Louis Blaubloem) This, the original edition of Calvin’s Commentary, has two slightly variant impressions of certain pages of Sig. a, b, d, e, g. These are variously distributed in the four copies examined: Leiden, Wolfenbuttel, Bibliothoque Nationale/Paris and British Museum/London.</td>
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<td>1597</td>
<td>Geneva (P. Santandreanus) ed. Th. Beza</td>
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<td>1611-1612</td>
<td>Geneva (J. Stoer): in Joannis Calvini tractatus theologici omnes...</td>
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<td>1667</td>
<td>Amsterdam (Ebevier)</td>
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<td>1671</td>
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<td>1866</td>
<td>Braunschweig (Schwetschke) in Calvini Opera (Corpus Reformatorum) ed. G. Baum, et al. vol. 5, cols. 1-162.</td>
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II. EDITIONS OF SENECA’S WORKS.

a. BEFORE 1532

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<tr>
<td>1475</td>
<td>Naples (Matthias Moravus)</td>
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<td>Treviso (Bernardus de Colonia)</td>
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<td>Venice (Bernardinus de Cremona et Simon de Lucro)</td>
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<td>1492</td>
<td>Venice (Bernardinus de Coris de Cremona)</td>
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<td>1496</td>
<td>Naples</td>
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<td>1503</td>
<td>Venice (Bartholomeus de Zanis de Portasio)</td>
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(1) EDITIONES VETERES

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<td>[E²] Basel (Froben)</td>
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(2) EDITIONES ERASMIANAE

b. AFTER 1532, TO LIPIUS (1605) [EDD.]

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<td>Castigationes of F. Pincianus</td>
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<td>1537</td>
<td>Basel</td>
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<td>1552</td>
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<td>1555</td>
<td>Lyons</td>
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<tr>
<td>1557</td>
<td>Basel</td>
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(1) ERASMIAN AND DERIVED EDITIONS

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<td>Rome</td>
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<td>1587</td>
<td>(2) Paris</td>
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(2) RECENSION OF MURETUS, ETC.
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<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>Basel (with <em>Loci Communes</em> of Dionysius Goethefridus Godefroy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>1598f</td>
<td>Paris</td>
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<td>1602</td>
<td>Paris &amp; Lyons (2)</td>
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<td>1604</td>
<td>Heidelberg (with notes of J. Gruterus)</td>
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<td>1605</td>
<td>Antwerp (ed. of Lipsius)</td>
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c. SELECT LIST OF LATER EDITIONS, USED IN THE TEXTUAL APPARATUS OF THE PRESENT EDITION AND IN THE NOTES

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<tr>
<td>†1628</td>
<td>Geneva (ed. of I. Dalechampius &amp; T. de Iuges):</td>
<td>contains <em>Loci Communes</em> of D. Godefroy</td>
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<td>1658</td>
<td>Amsterdam (ed. J. F. Gronovius)</td>
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d. SELECT LIST OF MODERN EDITIONS, WHOLE AND PARTIAL, OF SENECA, USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS EDITION

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<td>Leipzig (Teubner) ed. F. Haase</td>
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<td>1898-1907</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner) ed. C. Hosius, A. Gercke, C. Hense</td>
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<td>1886</td>
<td>Copenhagen, <em>L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum libros 12 ad codicempraecipue Ambrosiahum recensuit</em>, M. C. Gertz</td>
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<tr>
<td>†1830</td>
<td>Paris (Lemaire), Index in Senecam Philosophum in <em>BibliothecClassica Latina</em>, vol. 108, Senecae Philosophia, 5), pp. 813-970</td>
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</table>
e. TRANSLATIONS OF OTHER WORKS OF SENECA, USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>1884ff</td>
<td>London; Bohn’s Classical Library</td>
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<td>1912ff</td>
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III. MODERN SEPARATE EDITIONS OF SENECA’S *DE CLEMENTIA*.

### a. TEXT

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<td>1876</td>
<td>Berlin, ed. M. C. Gertz (with <em>De Beneficiis</em>)</td>
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<td>1914</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>Paris, ed. F. Prechac</td>
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### b. TRANSLATIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH)

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<td>1908</td>
<td>New York (Macmillan), A. P. Ball,, <em>Selected Essays of Seneca...</em></td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>Paris, tr. F. Prechac</td>
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<td>*1928</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library, tr. J. W. Basore</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>Paris, tr. P. Faider</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Garden City, N.Y., tr. Moses Hadas in The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, pp. 137-168 (Book 1 only)</td>
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### c. CRITICAL WORKS USED IN THE TEXTUAL APPARATUS OF THE PRESENT EDITION AND IN THE NOTES (ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED)

- Axelson, B., *Neue Senecastudien*, 1929
IV. EDITIONS OF CERTAIN OTHER CLASSICAL AUTHORS, MENTIONED IN THE COMMENTARY

Note. Alphabetically arranged in the following order under each author: 1) before 1532; 2) modern critical editions used in the present study; 3) concordances and indices (marked †); 4) translations consulted. Editions prior to 1532 examined are summarized only, unless cited in notes.

1. Alexander Aphrodiseus, Comm. Arist. Problem. 6 edd. 1505-1525 examined

2. Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum Gestarum Libri. 3 edd. 1474-1518 examined

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3. Appianus Alexandrinus, De Civilibm Romanorum Bellis, 5 edd. 1472-1529 examined

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4. Lucius Apuleius Madaurensis, Metamorphoseon Libri XI (Asinus Aureus). 4 edd. 1500-1512 examined

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<td>1922</td>
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<td>†1934</td>
<td>Middletown, Conn., Oldfather, W. M., Index Apuhianus</td>
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5. Aristotle. 4 edd. 1493ff-1531 examined
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**5a. 1826** Cato Gottingen, *Catoniana*, ed. Lion

**6. Cicero**  
(Only editions of *Opera* are included, for the most part; editions of separate classes of works were also consulted.)

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<td>1960</td>
<td>Paxis (Les Belles Lettres), Ciceron, <em>Tusculanes</em></td>
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Various dates London, Bohn’s Classical Library (Eng. tr.)  
Various dates London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)

**6a. Pseudo-Cicero**

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<td><em>Scriptores de re militari</em></td>
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**6b. Asconius Pedlanus, *Commentarii in Orationes Ciceronis***

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<td>1912</td>
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**6c. Concordances, Indices, etc.**

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<td>Jena, Merguet, H., <em>Lexicon zu den Reden des Cicero</em>...</td>
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7. Claudianus. 6 edd. 1482-1530 examined

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8. Quintus Curtius Rufus, *De Gestis Ahxandri Magni*. 6 edd. 1481-1518 examined *s.a. & 1. (ed. Erasmus & Glareanus)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1825</td>
<td>London, The Delphine Classics, No. 81, Index in Q. Curtium, pp. 1-170</td>
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<td>1875</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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9. Dio Cassius
(See notes, *Comm.*, pp. v, 62, 66, 73-75).

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<td>1914-1927</td>
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10. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae et Sententiae Philosophorum*, 6 edd. (Latin tr.) 1475-1524 examined

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10a. Ennius

1903 Leipzig (Teubner), Joh. Vahlen


1927-1928 Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)

12. Herodianus, Historiarum Libri 8

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<td>*1517</td>
<td>Florence, Lat. tr. Angelus Politianus</td>
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<td>1855; 1867-1870</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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13. Homer
(See Epist. Calv. No. 2 to Pierre Daniel (CR 10b. 4f), wherein Calvin mentions having lent his copy of Homer’s *Odyssey* to C. Sucquet, a fellow student of Calvin’s (from Flanders) under Alciatus. But Calvin’s references to Homer are all derivative; hence, no list of editions is here given.)

†1880-1891 Leipzig (Teubner), Ebeling, H., *Lexicon Homericum*

14. Horace (including the Commentators, Porphyrion and Acro) 19 edd. 1477-1528 examined

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<td>Berlin (Weidmann), Q. <em>Horatius Flaccus ex recens. R. Bentley</em>, 3 ed., Vol. 2, Index in Horatium</td>
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### 15. Justinus, *Epitome* of Trogus Pompeius, 11 edd. 1476-1526 examined

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### 16. Juvenal (and Persius), 21 edd. 1473-1528 examined

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<td>1926</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>Budapest, Persius, <em>Satyra</em>, ed. G. Nemethy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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### 17. Livy *Ab Urbe Condita Historiarum Libri* 30 14 edd. 1480-1531 examined

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### 18. Lucan. 17 edd. 1475-1528 examined

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<td>Baltimore (Penguin), tr. R. Graves</td>
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<td>Washington, Deferrari, R. J., <em>et al</em>, <em>A Concordance of Lucan</em></td>
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19. Macrobius. 14 edd. 1472-1528 examined

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20. Martial. 14 edd. 1475-1528 examined
(See also N. Perottus, section VI, below)

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21. Nonius Marcellus, *De Varia Significatione Verborum*. 9 edd. 1470-1513 examined
(See also N. Perottus)

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22. Ovid. 7 edd. 1471-1523 examined

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23. Panegyrici

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<td>1910</td>
<td>Groningen (ed. W. A. Baehrens)</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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<tr>
<td>†1829</td>
<td>London, The Delphin Classics, No. 124, Index Vocabulorum Onmium quae in Reliquis Undecim Panegyricis continentur, pp. 1-134</td>
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24. Plato
(It is evident that Calvin used the Latin tr. of Marsilius Ficinus; editions prior to 1532 were not consulted for the present study.)

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<td>Frankfurt, Lat. tr. Marsilius Ficinus</td>
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<td>Leipzig (Weidmann), Ast., Fr., <em>Lexicon Platonicurn</em></td>
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<td>†1904-1924; 1926-1933</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner), Lodge, G., <em>Lexicon Plautinum</em></td>
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<td>1856ff</td>
<td>London, Bohn’s Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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<td>1938-1963</td>
<td>London/Cambridge (USA), Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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27. Pliny the Younger, *Epistolae et Panegyricus*. 7 edd. 1506-1531 examined 1908; 1923; 1933, Leipzig (Teubner)

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<tr>
<td>†1829</td>
<td>London, Delphin Classics, No. 123, 124, Index Omnium Vocabularium quae in Plinii Panegyrico Legitmtur, pp. 1-32 (123); pp. 33-70 (124)</td>
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</table>
28. Plutarch (a partial list of the various editions consulted)

### a) VITAE

<table>
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<th>Edition Details</th>
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<td>*1496</td>
<td>Venice (Bartholomeus de Zanis) Lat. tr. of Guarinus Veronensis, Leonardus Aretinus, Lapus Florentinus, Achilles Philor. Bochius</td>
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### b) MORALIA (PARTS)

<table>
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<td>Paris (Jehan. Petit.), <em>De Placitis Philosophorum</em>, Lat. tr. G. Budaeus</td>
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<td>1531</td>
<td>Basel, <em>eiusdem operis addita est Gulielmi Budaei interpretatio Latina</em></td>
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<td>1513</td>
<td>Nuremberg (Frid. Peypus), <em>Plutarchi Chaeronei Stoici ac Viri Clarissimi De His Qui Tarde a Numine Corripiuntur Libellus</em>, Lat. tr. Bilibaldus Pirckheimer</td>
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<td>1521</td>
<td>Louvain, <em>Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorurn</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1530</td>
<td>Mainz, <em>Apophthegmata</em>, Lat. tr. Raphael Regius</td>
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<tr>
<td>1620</td>
<td>Frankfurt, <em>Opera Omnia</em>, Lat. tr. Gulielmus Xylander</td>
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<td>1774-1782</td>
<td>Leipzig</td>
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<td>Leipzig (Teubner), <em>Vitae</em></td>
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<td>Leipzig (Teubner), <em>Moralia</em></td>
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<td>Leipzig (Kuehn/T.O. Weigel), Wyttenbach, Daniel <em>Lexicon Plutarcheum</em></td>
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### 29. Sextus Pompeius Festus, *De Verborum Significatione.* 7 edd. 1474-1529 examined.

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### 30. Priscian
(Early editions not detailed here; Calvin’s references are derivative.)

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### 31. Properflus. 5 edd. 1472-1495 examined

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<td>1487</td>
<td>Bologna, (with Comm. Philippians Beroald.)</td>
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<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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<td>1912</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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### 32. Publilius Syrus (Publius Mimographus)
(See text, p. 22, line 8, n.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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### 33. Quintilian
a) *OPERA*. 7 EDD. 1514-1529 EXAMINED
b) *DECLAMATIONE*. 3 EDD. 1482-1509 EXAMINED
c) *INSTITUTIONES*. 11 EDD. 1470-1528 EXAMINED

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34. *Auctores Rhetorici*  
(Romanus Aquila, P. Rutilius Lupus, Julius Rufinianus, Sulpicius Victor).

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35. *Sallust*  
(Most of Calvin’s references to this author seem to come through intermediaries.)  
*Opera Omnia*. 20 edd. 1474-1529 examined

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36. *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*. 7 edd. 1475-1527 examined
(Aelius Spartianus, Julius Capitolinus, Aelius Lampridius, Flavius Vopiscus)

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<td>(See Suetonius)</td>
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<td>1519</td>
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<td>(See J. B. Egnatius)</td>
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<td>(ed. Erasmus)</td>
<td>(See Suetonius)</td>
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<td>Leipzig, Lessing, Carolus, <em>Scriptorum historiae Augustae Lexicon</em></td>
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37. *Scriptores Rei Rusticae*. 11 edd. examined, together with various edd. of the separate authors. (Cato, Varro, Columella, .)

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<td><em>Columella Rei Rusticae Libri</em>, ed. V.</td>
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<td>Lindstrom et A. Josephson</td>
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38. *Statius*. 5 edd. 1483-1530 examined

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<td>Washington</td>
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39. *Stoics*

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40. Suetonius. 12 edd. 1472-1531 of the *Caesares* 12 examined
(See also Ph. Beroaldus, sect. 6)

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<td>Cambridge (USA), Howard, A. A. et C. N. Jackson, <em>Index Verborum C. Suetonii Tranquilli</em></td>
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41. Suidas, Lexicon

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42. Tacitus. 8 edd. c. 1470-1527 examined

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<td>1936-1949</td>
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<td>1925-1937</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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<td>1877-1890, 1891-1903</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner), Gerber, A. et A. Greef, <em>Lexicon Taciium</em></td>
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43. Terence and Donatus. 22 edd. 1479-1529 examined
(For Index to Donatus, see Virgil/Servius)

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<td>1901</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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<td>1912</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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<td>1932</td>
<td>Chapel Hill, N.C. (USA), Jenkins, E. B., <em>Index Verborum Terentianus</em></td>
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44. Valeflus Maximus, *Facia ei Dicta Memorabilia*. 27 edd. 1471-1526 examined

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45. Virgil (and Servius). 24 edd. 1479-1529 examined

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<td>*1911</td>
<td>New Haven (USA), Wetmore, M.N., <em>Index Verborum Vergilianus</em></td>
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<td>Leipzig (Schmidt), Merguet, H., <em>Lexicon zu Vergilius</em></td>
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<td>Ithaca, N.Y. (Cornell), Mountford-Schultz, <em>Index Rerum et Hominum in Scholiis Servii ei Aelii Donali Tractatorum</em></td>
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<td>1916-1922</td>
<td>London/New York, Loeb Classical Library (Eng. tr.)</td>
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46. Roman Law

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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Berlin, <em>Corpus Juris Civilis</em></td>
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<td>†1914</td>
<td>Berlin, <em>Vocabularium Jurisprudentiae Romanae</em> [VIR], ed. F. Lesser</td>
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<td>†1914</td>
<td>Jena, Seckel, E., <em>Neumanns Handlexicon zu den Quellen des Roemischen Rechis</em></td>
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47. Supplemental List of Classical Authors
### 1. PRIMARY SOURCES

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) CATO</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Goettingen, <em>Caloniana</em>, ed. H. A. Lion</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) ENNIUS</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. AELIUS HERODIANUS (THE GRAMMARIAN)</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Leipzig (Teubner)</td>
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<td>d) PHALARIS</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>Basel, <em>Epistolae</em>, Lat. tr. Thomas Naogorgus</td>
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<td>e) CORPUS INSCRIPTIONUM LATINORUM, VOL. 5</td>
<td>1872/1877</td>
<td>Berlin (Reimer)</td>
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### 48. Classical Dictionaries

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<tr>
<td>a) H. STEPHANUS</td>
<td>1848-1854</td>
<td>Paris (reprint), <em>Thesaurus Graeco-Latinus</em></td>
<td>contains many notes from G. Budaeus</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Egidio Forcellini</td>
<td>1864-1887</td>
<td><em>Lexicon totius Latinitatis</em>...</td>
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<td>d) Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Leipzig</td>
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<td>e) H. G. LIDDELL AND R. SCOTT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Oxford (Sth ed.) <em>A Greek-English Lexicon</em></td>
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<th>f) PAULY-WISSOWA</th>
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<tr>
<td>1894-</td>
<td>Stuttgart, <em>Real-Encyclopaedie der dassischen Altertumswissenschaft</em></td>
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</table>
V. EDITIONS OF PATRISTIC AND OTHER ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS MENTIONED OR USED IN THE COMMENTARY

Note: Most of the patristic references in the Commentary are paralleled in the Corpus Juris Canonici; Ambrose, Cyprian, and Isidore of Seville (*falso*: Greg. Magn.) are therefore not included.

1. Augustine
(Calvin could have used works in individual editions which had appeared earlier. Smits has shown that Calvin used the Erasmus edition in his later writings, rather than that of Amerbach.)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Edition Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>1505-1517</td>
<td>Basel (Amerbach, etc.)</td>
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<td>1528-1529</td>
<td>Basel (Froben), ed. Erasmus</td>
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Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vols. 33, 38, 39, 41, 44, have been cited in the notes

2. *Corpus Juris Canonici*

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<td>1879-1881</td>
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3. Eusebius (Jerome). 4 edd. c. 1475-1490 examined
*Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller (GCS)*, vol. 47 cited in the notes

4. Gregory the Great. 4 edd. 1490-1521 examined,
Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 76, cited in the notes

5. Jerome

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Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 22, cited in the notes
6. Lactantius. 19 edd. 1458-1524 examined
Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vols. 6-7, cited in the notes
VI. RENAISSANCE AUTHORS ACTUALLY OR PRESUMABLY USED BY CALVIN IN PREPARING THE COMMENTARY

1. Alciatus, Andreas

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>*1558 Basle</td>
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<td>*1617 Frankfurt</td>
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<th>DE VERBORUM SIGNIFICATIONE</th>
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<td>*1535 Leiden</td>
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2. Philippus Beroaldus the Elder

<table>
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<th>COMMENTARIES</th>
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<tr>
<td>*1496 Bologna, Commentariio Quaestionum Tusculanorum (Cicero)</td>
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<td>*1512 Paris, Commentarii in Asinum Aureum L. Apuhii</td>
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<td>*1512 Paris, Commentationes... in Suetonium, (including Comm. of Marcus Antonius Sabellicus)</td>
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<th>OTHER WORKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>*1509 Basel, Varia Opuscula (including the De Optimo Statu Libellus)</td>
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<td>1510 Pforzheim, Annotationes in Commentarios Servii Virgiliani Commentatoris</td>
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3. Gulielmus Budaeus

<table>
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<tr>
<td>*1557 Basel. (Two vols. bound as one, separately paged)</td>
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De Asse et Partibus Eius, Libri V. 5 edd. 1514-1556 examined (DA) Annotationes in Pandectas (AP); Annotationes Reliquiae in Pandectas (ARP). 8 edd. 1527-1557 examined

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<th><strong>COMMENIARII LINGUAE GRAECAE</strong></th>
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<th><strong>DE L’INSTITUTION DU PRINCE (POSTHUMOUS)</strong></th>
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4. Johannes Baptista Egnatius

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<th>Venice (Aldus), De Caesaribm Libri III</th>
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<td>1519</td>
<td>Florence</td>
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5. Desiderius Erasmus
(Not including editions of Seneca)
### OPERA

| *1703-1705 | Leiden, ed. LeClerc |

### ADAGIA. 10 EDD., 1508-1528 EXAMINED

| *1612 | Cologne, ed. Joan. Jacob. Grynaeus |

*Apophthegmata.* 2 edd. 1531 examined

### FLORES LUCII ANNAEI SENECAE

| *1528 | (See text, p. 20, lines 18-20, note) |

### DE RATIONE STUDII AC LEGENDI INTERPRETANDIQUE

| 1516 | Strassburg |

### ANNOTATIONES CURTII GEST. ALEXAND

| ? | Basel |

### PANEGYRICUS AD PHILIPPUM (SEE ALSO, PANEGYRICI)

| *1520 | Basel |

### INSTITUTIO PRINCIPIIS CHRISTIANI

| 1516 | Basel |
| 1519 | Basel |

### EPISTOLAE


**1521** Basel (Froben)

---

**ERUDIMENTA GRAMMATICI (MANY EDD.)**

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7. Angelus Politianus

**1517** Florence (See Herodian)

---

8. Porcius Latro Vincentius (Leonhardus Porcius Vincentinus), *De Sestertio, pecuniis, ponderibus et mensuris antiquis*, ed. J. B. Egnatius. 4 edd. examined

**1530** Basel

---


**1520** Basel (see Panegyrici)

---

10. Caelius Ludovicus Rhodiginus, *Lectionum Antiquarum Libri 16*

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<tr>
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11. Marcus Antonius Sabellicus, Annotationes Veteres et Recentes
12. Laurentius Valla

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Note: References to other writings of John Calvin are to one of the following editions:

**a. WRITINGS OTHER THAN THE INSTITUTIO CHRISTIANAE RELIGIONIS:**

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<td>Braunschweig, <em>Corpus Reformatorum (CR), Opera Calvini</em>, ed. Baum, Cunitz, Reuss</td>
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**b. INSTITUTIO CHRISTIANAE RELIGIONIS**

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<td>Munchen, <em>Opera Sehcta Calvini</em>, ed. Barth, Niesel</td>
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**c. SUPPLEMENTA CALVINIANA**

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<td>1961</td>
<td>Neukirchen Kreis Moers, ed. Rueckert, Barrois, Benoit</td>
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VII. LITERATURE CONSULTED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES


Anonymous, *Astrologia Theologigata*, 1617 Frankfurt

Bainton, Roland, *Sebastian Castellio, Champion of Religious Liberty in Studies of the Reformation*

Battles, Ford Lewis, “Against Luxury and License in Geneva” *Interpretation*, 19.2 (April, 1965) 182-202 (Translation and Commentary on Calvin’s *Consilium de Luxu*)


—, *New Light on Calvin’s Institutes: A Supplement to the McNeill-Batth's Edition* 1966 Hartford


Bohatec, Josef, *Budg und Calvin*, 1950 Graz (Boehlaus) *Calvins Lehre you Staat und Kirche*, 1936 Breslau (Marcus)

Bouche-Leclercq, l’*Astrologie Grecque*, 1899 Paris


Clark, A. C., *Ciceronianism*, 1912 Oxford

Delaruelle, Louis, *Guillaume Budg. Les origines, les debuts, les idees mattresses*, 1907 Paris

Doumergue, E., *Jean Calvin, Les Hommes et hs Choses de son Temps*, 1899-1927 Lausanne (Bridel)


Godefroy, F., *Dictionnaire de l’Ancienne Langue Francaise*, 1902 Paris

Haarhoff, T. J., *Vergil in the Experience of South Africa*, 1931 Oxford (Blackwell)

Hugo, Andre M., *Calvin en Seneca*, 1957 Groningen

Huizinga, J. H., *Erasmus*, 1936 Haarlem


—, *La Jeunesse de Calvin*, 1888 Paris

—, *La Fondation et les Commencements du Collège de France (1530-1542), in Le Collège de France (1530-1930)* 1931 Paris

Mann, Margaret, *Erasme et les Débuts de la Réforme française*, 1933 Paris


Mesnard, P. “Calvin a Orleans” in *Acres du Congras sur L’Ancienne Université d’Orleans*


Otto, A., *Sprichwörter der Romer*, 1890 Leipzig (Teubner)

Pannier, Jacques, *Calvin Ecrivain*, 1930 Paris

Pierson, A., *Studien über Johannes Kalvijn*, 1881-1891 Amsterdam


Ribbeck, O., *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, 1852-1855 Leipzig (Teubner)

Rose, H. J. *Handbook of Latin Literature*, 1943 London (Methuen)

Ruegg, W., *Cicero und der Humanismus*, 1946 Zurich


Schreiner, Th., “Seneca und das Christentum” *Bursians Jahresberichte* 281 (1943), for bibliography

Sevenster, J. N. *Paulus en Seneca*, 1961 Leiden (Brill)
Sizoo, A., *Augustinus’ Leven en Werken*, 1957 Kampen


Swords, J. K., “The Lost Years of Erasmus”, *Studies in the Renaissance*, vol. 9


Wendel, Francois, *Calvin, Sources et Evolution de sa Pensee religieuse*, 1950 Paris


FOOTNOTES


ft2 Plin., H.N., 1, praef., 32.