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We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Question: 116 [<< | >>]
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Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily
for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts of the
faithful to think that fate is anything real."
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb
'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by
fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to happen. Now what
is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen
by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De
Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper
order."
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause,
is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their
master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to
themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered
it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Question [22], Article [2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place
here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human
affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly
bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of
the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine
De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human
affairs: because we have proved above (Question [115], Article [4]) that human actions
are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and
indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things
that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the
cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen
accidentally: for it has been said (Question [115], Article [6]) that what is
accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every
action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible
for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural
principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that
a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that
a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore
its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that
any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by
accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause,
which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by
accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect
could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a
treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect
it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden,
might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there.
Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or
by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the
intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the
will, as shown above (Question [105], Article [4]). Consequently the ordering of human
actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God
alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the
use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a
certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the
will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."
For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first
objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by
chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to
Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as
Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 24).
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Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called fate."
But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore
fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their
cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that
of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone,
as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an
accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the
number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only,
it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Question [22], Article [3]; Question [103], Article [6]), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes.
We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways.
Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is
called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the
mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus
it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv):
"Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits;
whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by
the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by
the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the
chain of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above
(Article [1]; Question [104], Article [2]; Question [110], Article [1]; Question [113]; Question [114]). It is therefore
manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God
to the production of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De
Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature of fate,
except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be
called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very
disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second
causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is
a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which
is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in
relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be
considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this
fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
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Question: 116 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to
that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is
the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence."
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved,
what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to
changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is
changeable.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens
unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can
be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which
are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle,
namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that
the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so
that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each
effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of
necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Question [115], Article [6]).
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate
could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason
that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes,
is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain
unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this
sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God
foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius,
having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards
adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must
also itself be unchangeable."
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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Question: 116 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars,
tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal
transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and
perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed."
Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something
real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is
cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1
seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Question [9], Article [2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject
to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), fate is the ordering of second
causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to
second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately
by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject
to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances,
and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that
"those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and
exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further
a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of
fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by
means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order
of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to
its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is
subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already
stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some
of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these,
therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.