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We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are
required for it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?
(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the
intellectual part?
(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an
operation of the intellect, or of the will?
(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation
of the speculative or of the practical intellect?
(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it
consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz.
angels?
(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His
Essence?
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Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is happiness
itself."
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to
be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it
seems that happiness is the same as God.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends
naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to
God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.
On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [1], Article [8]; Question [2], Article [7]), our end is
twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus
for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or
possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say
that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the
intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense,
then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His
infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second
way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is
nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the
last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness
in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we
consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something
created.
Reply to Objection 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by
acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On
the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by
participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this
participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy,
is something created.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the
attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as
the attainment of the end is called the end.
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Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle
says (@Rm. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end,
life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of
living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an
operation.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does
not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one:
since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not
imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding
therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does
not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are
many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human
operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other
occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is
an operation according to perfect virtue."
I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness
is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is
actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently
happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that
operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher
calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can
be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially
considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said
to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must
of necessity consist in an operation.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of
the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (Question [2], Article [5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not
that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His
Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which
operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active
and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense
eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This
is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."
Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in
general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he
signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the
aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a happy
man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the
very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this
state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he
proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds
from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to cut." And
such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action
and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is
stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the
agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is
a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be
happiness.
Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according
as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of
perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For
in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His
operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels,
the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are
united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only
and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life,
the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united
to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently,
is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued.
And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness
cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's
happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and
after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men."
But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the
angels . . . in heaven" (@Mt. 22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far
as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we
fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of
happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more
continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with
many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is
busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any
time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can
always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by
sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the
latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to
Objections 5 and 6 are evident.
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Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the
senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of
the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective
operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot understand without a
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation
of the senses also.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some goods
are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore
it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in
Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in
all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore
happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is
his last end, as shown above (Article [1]): to Which man cannot be united by an
operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above
(Question [2], Article [5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body,
which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says
(Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain
overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will
be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (SS, Questions [82]-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not
depend on the senses.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is
required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the
aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of
all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this
imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice
for the most perfect operation of this life.
Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the
lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the
imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the
perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
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Question: 3 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness consists in
peace; wherefore it is written (@Ps. 147:3): "Who hath placed peace in thy
end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's
happiness is in the will.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of
the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.
Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the
last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general,
who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the
will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on
(Question [9], Articles [1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will.
Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's
most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the
will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation
of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (@1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems
that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he who
has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little further
on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires:
for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some
good---i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists in an act of the
will.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (@Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that
they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the last end,
as stated above (Article [2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [2], Article [6]) two things are needed for
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as
it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say,
then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it
to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been
said (Articles [1],2; Question [2], Article [7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last
end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of
the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it
desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it
is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the
end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will
from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present,
by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be
present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act
of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand,
or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it
is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an
intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by
an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end
when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were the
very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent
thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which
disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as
when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being
at rest.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither is
the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore,
from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will's
first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet
motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will
belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz.
delight or enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge
precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," as
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an
intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a
sensible end by an act of sense.
Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has
what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of
his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a
necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good
things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the
will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for
instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
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Question: 3 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical
intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God.
But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of
things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which
derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical
intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect,
which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference
to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the
perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said
to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's happiness consists in an
act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative
intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the
practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself,
viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's happiness consists in
an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
perfection of our joys."
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must needs
be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that of his
highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is
the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the
object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in
the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7,
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to
him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated
in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is
one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation
to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the
speculative intellect to God is one of union and "information"; which is
a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to
the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical
but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is
outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the
contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is
perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has
not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last
end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions
would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of
him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative
intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the
speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.
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Question: 3 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration
of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that
"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in
distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative
virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to
the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man's final
happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be
man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in
the consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is
perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the
human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative
sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences,
man's final happiness consists.
On the contrary, It is written (@Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of
these.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2], ad 4), man's happiness is twofold,
one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to
understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by
imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of
some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man,
with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is
in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular
instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is
virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher
clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end
of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration
of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles
can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot
consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by
something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something
higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is
lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form
of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to
that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or
something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to
that which is of itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be
through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been
shown (FP, Question [88], Article [2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms
there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration
of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (Article [2], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also
any likeness or participation thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the
consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect
act.
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First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 3 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of
separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi
in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we
fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he means final
happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by
contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be
united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature;
just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual
nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the
angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be
united to the angels by contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written (@Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [6]), man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown in the FP, Question [44], Article [1]. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.
Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by
contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by
the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should consist
in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with
his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in FP, Question [90], Article [3].
Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with
God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of
its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated
in the FP, Question [111], Article [2], ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps
man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First,
according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's final
perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that
of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus
the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found
the fulness of its formal object.
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First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 3 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision
of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that
which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something
altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not
altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect,
namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.
Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature.
But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine
intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not
reach to this, but consists in something less.
On the contrary, It is written (@1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is."
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an
intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to
know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause "what it is";
that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may
be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is.
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause,
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause,
"what it is." And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a
man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some
cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from
wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he
arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in
it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs
to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its
perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone
man's happiness consists, as stated above (Articles [1],7; Question [2], Article [8]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying
towards happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question [1], Article [8]), the end has a twofold
acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this
way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and
indeed of all things, as stated above (Question [1], Article [8]). Secondly, as to the
attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is
different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes
to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his
Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees
It indeed, but comprehends It not.