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We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things
must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3)
Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is a passion?
(2) Whether delight is subject to time?
(3) Whether it differs from joy?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?
(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of
the lower;
(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;
(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
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Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De
Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that
"operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a
movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii,
3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved;
for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a
passion.
Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is
delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But
to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as
stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a
passion.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly
called passions, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]). Now every emotion arising
from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite:
and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the
Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and
a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature
of the thing."
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this
happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur
all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at
once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural
things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming
their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this
perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive
appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by saying that
delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying
that it is "an establishing in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e.
with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz.
the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all
at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in
the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete
establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is
not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete
fact," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this
establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible
things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since
delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension
of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second
perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is
established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight
follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above.
Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not
its essence, but its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one,
according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite;
the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external
operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in
which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends
to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease,
since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards
does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a
certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the
pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains
the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which
delight is a kind of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those
passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily
ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a
tendency to something good, as stated above (Question [23], Articles [1],4): and in this
sense delight is called a passion.
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Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of
movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in
time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect
of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in
time.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some
passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes
pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself;
secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For
since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of
themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something
pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech
and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by
reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is
not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the
fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is
not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being
begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in
this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time:
for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the
movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight
therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether
unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason
of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is
"the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in
potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.
Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something
existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like,
also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of
itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as
it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.
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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because
the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But delight
and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is
altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the
same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight
and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is
equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness
from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But
this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas
we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of
delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are
natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above
(Question [30], Article [3]), so also some delights are natural, and some are not
natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory
of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of
the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For we take
delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them,
and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not
speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe
joy to irrational animals, but only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the
object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And
yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels
a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to
reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an
apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to
diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also
called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called
otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences (Question [30], Article [3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also:
so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to
desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence
there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of
movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived from
the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the
"dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is
derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly
in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and
"cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of
gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ
them save in speaking of rational beings.
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Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a sensible
movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power.
Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals.
Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common
with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (@Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." But
the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [3]), a certain delight arises from the
apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not
only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some
particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the
will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that
delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the
things we wish."
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word
"sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is
also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may say
that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking,
when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the
intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is
also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14)
that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of
De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible
delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb
animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De
Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights."
Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we
have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite,
which we have in common with the angels.
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Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than
spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible
pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily
pleasures are greater.
Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But
bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of the
body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily
pleasures are greater.
Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by
reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual
pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (@Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words
to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation
of wisdom."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), pleasure arises from union with a
suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul,
especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that,
since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections
of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because
actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections
rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by
the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid
actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain
good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from
them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures,
according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive
and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are
much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in
knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by
perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more
perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on
its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more
beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight
rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived
thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible
bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual
pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the
three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into
conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself.
For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a
sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures,
rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise
the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the
sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect
and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward
accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence;
for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect,
because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement,
which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived
all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part
is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures
of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are
without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once.
More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and
soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more
vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more
known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible
pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are
accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur
in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the
superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are
sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs
arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs
of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than
spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state
farther on (Question [35], Article [5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because
sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because
men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and
since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to
the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures,
inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty
which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and
checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is
itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
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Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than
the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest pleasure
seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the
pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tobias 5:12:
"What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the
light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the
greatest of sensible pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is loved
most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be
afforded by sight.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the
pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [25], Article [2], ad 1; Question [27], Article [4], ad 1),
everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in
Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for the purpose of
knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses
afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to man to
apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former
pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are
proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved for their
usefulness, are common to all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure
which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded
by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their
relation to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible
objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness: for the
touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal,
namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect,
the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the
end. For this reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible
pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other
senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for
dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . .
nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring
it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of
usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of
knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the
pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of
sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible
pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural
is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch that the
natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the
like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight,
inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight
are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater than
sensible.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above (Article [3]), denotes pleasure of the soul;
and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs
principally to the touch.
Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because
it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same passage
(Metaph. i, 1).
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in
another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is
the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant:
whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its
beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives
an impression of its image, which entices him to love it and to seek its
delight.
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Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to
the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a
natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither,
therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be
elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is
non-natural.
Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is
violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is
unnatural can give pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if
perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the Philosopher's
definition quoted above (Article [1]). But it is natural to every thing to be
established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural
end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things
are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord
with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken
in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal
part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific
nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man,
which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his reason:
for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in contemplating the
truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken
as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is common to man
and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey
reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the
body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the
like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to
afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find some
that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some
respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the natural
principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is
contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this
individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat.
Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man,
either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation of the body,
becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some
corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be either on the
part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever,
sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament;
thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on the
part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or
in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things,
which are not in accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.
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Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another.
Because the passions of the soul derive their species and contrariety
from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since
therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to evil,
and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure
is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in
Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is
not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on
account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But this
difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as
stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between one
pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures
impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures
are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Question [23], Article [4]). Now one repose
is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini;
thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place"
(Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one
pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good
and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may be
contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another
virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary
to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation
to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in this way one pleasure
can be contrary to another. That this is impossible with regard to the
good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on
fittingness in relation to some one thing---i.e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and
connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because
its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place of
violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural
repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and to the
natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is
contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the
objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal
difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because
difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and
passions, as stated above (Question [23], Articles [1],4; Question [30], Article [2]).