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We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2)
Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;
(8) Whether love conduces to action?
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity.
Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. But
Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in
the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same as
cupidity or desire.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the
object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz. the
future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Objection 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the
possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever is
accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion.
But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is
the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not
differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of
passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity
is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire
or cupidity.
I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now,
in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is
something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in
this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that
it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already
possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present
good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain,
for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's
power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or
cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs
to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty.
Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for
one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this
respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope
differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the
concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just
as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible
faculty, as stated above (Question [25], Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each
regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is
reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to
the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object
of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to another
power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated
in the FP, Question [81], Article [2]. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not
altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the
appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything
except under the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that
which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from
despair according to the difference of possible and impossible.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because
hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (@Rm. 8:25):
"If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But
awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by
"looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Objection 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a
man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to be
confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to
belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.
Objection 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But
certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive
power.
On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above (Article [1]). Now good, as
such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power.
Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power.
I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the
appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power;
since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas
the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of
the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are
in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by
presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various
movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the
apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite,
while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner
various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and of
something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something
considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something
impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power
ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to
obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
Reply to Objection 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a
twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two ways,
viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to
obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it, but
simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that
which he hopes to get by another's help as though to await [exspectare]
implied keeping one's eyes on another [ex alio spectare], in so far as
the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the
good which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he
hopes to get it; according to Ecclus. 51:10, "I looked for the succor of
men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on
account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it,
he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from
this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement
in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the
appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect
from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its
own act better than that of the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the
sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone is
certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the
movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the
certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope
is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But
knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose
knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future.
Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
Objection 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of
attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true and
the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph.
vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no
mind.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are
moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things unseen: "for
what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (@Rm. 8:24). Therefore there is
no hope in dumb animals.
On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty
is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from
their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb
animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it
makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas, if
it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching
it. Because as stated above (Question [1], Article [2]; Question [26], Article [1]; Question [35], Article [1]), the
sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of
insensible things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as
the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But
there is a difference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of
the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural
appetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is
the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb
animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the
actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a
procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of
art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
Reply to Objection 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal
is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though it
foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the
Divine Intellect that foresees the future.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating
the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate
to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power.
For such is the division of the possible given in Metaph. v, 12, i.e.
into the two kinds we have just mentioned.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under the
object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, an
animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to
one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear is contrary to
hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.
Objection 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and
despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the good,
whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining
good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.
Objection 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in
opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to
imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to
hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for good.
On the contrary, The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it
is contrary to hope [spes].
I answer that, As stated above (Question [23], Article [2]), there is a twofold
contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary
terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible
passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to
approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found
in the irascible passions, as stated above (Question [23], Article [2]). Now the object
of hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of
attraction, if it be considered in the light of something attainable; and
thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far
as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the character of a principle
of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an
impossibility they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to
this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and
consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good
and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible
passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible.
But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and
withdrawal.
Reply to Objection 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it
regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible to
obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a
recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible
to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither
hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to have. For this
reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because
experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But
hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as stated above
(Article [2]). Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are
slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems to follow
that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive
of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have
something to say about everything, without leaving anything out, is
sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to
great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore
inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful,
through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which
seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the object of hope is a future
good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a
cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to a man: or
because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is
caused by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength,
and, among others, experience: since by experience man acquires the
faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this is hope.
Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which
he is sure of having learned well."
In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think
that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may
be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so
far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his
experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience
can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man think possible
what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience
makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought
possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in two ways, despair in one
way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only
produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom,
which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself
adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows something to be
possible; and thus is a cause of hope.
Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in
so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence he adds
(Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them."
Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally
as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly
a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for
the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is
compared to an anchor (@Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are
wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore
youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article [5]), the cause of hope is chiefly
whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to
weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.
Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (Article [5]).
But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men
are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the
Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be
gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of
hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above
(Article [1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the
past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future,
it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on
account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their
heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends
to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful.
Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of
obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them.
Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own
shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good
hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat
and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and
shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons
attempt everything and are full of hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in
reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that
they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that
young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their
shortcomings.
Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in
some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (Article [5], ad 3).
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the
soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love
precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.
Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as
stated above (Question [25], Article [2]). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and
consequently is not its cause.
Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Question [32], Article [3]). But
pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.
On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mt. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac,
and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets
charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.
I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object,
the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something
difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that
what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but
through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which
something becomes possible to us.
In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused
by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But
in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to
us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very fact
that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved
towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas
from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except
accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love.
Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but
our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.
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Question: 40 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action.
Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which
hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Question [37], Article [3]).
But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (@Prov. 13:12): "Hope
that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action.
Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (Article [4]). But
despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is
written (@2 Kgs. 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair."
Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.
On the contrary, It is written (@1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that plougheth
should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to
all other actions.
I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it
more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object,
which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being
difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is
no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is
intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope,
as stated above (Question [32], Article [3]), causes pleasure; which is a help to
action, as stated above (Question [33], Article [4]). Therefore hope is conducive to
action.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an
evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear
rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence,
save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also
lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no
hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it
causes sorrow, as stated above (Question [32], Article [3], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain
hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to
fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they
fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe.