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   WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of 
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior 
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, 
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
	
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  Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the 
absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God, Whom we 
love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of 
life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord" (2 
Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy.
  Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit  happiness. 
Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among those things 
whereby we merit happiness, according to Mt. 5:5: "Blessed are they that 
mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow, rather than joy, 
is an effect of charity.
  Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above 
(Question [17], Article [6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rm. 12:12: 
"Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
  On the contrary, It is written (@Rm. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured 
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." But joy is 
caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rm. 14:17: "The kingdom of 
God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy 
Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
  I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [25], Articles [1],2,3), when we were 
treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in 
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of 
the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and 
endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of 
benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend, 
though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love, either 
through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to 
which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil. 
Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He is His 
goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who 
love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that 
abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual 
joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
  Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be "absent 
from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is present to 
some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2 
Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Nevertheless, even in 
this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling of His 
grace.
  Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things 
that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same that 
charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to 
rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve for things 
that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
	
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  Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is 
compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to 
rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,6: "Charity . . 
. rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." But this joy 
is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Rm. 12:15: 
"Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep." Therefore the 
spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.
  Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), "penance 
consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we 
have deplored." But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore 
the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
  Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ 
according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with 
Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, 
according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!" 
Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.
  On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now 
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her 
conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity is 
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
  I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises 
from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with 
this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of 
charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good 
which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the 
Apostle says (@Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always."
   The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as 
participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything 
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is 
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for 
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or 
in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
  Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. 
Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence 
charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from 
participating in the Divine good.
  Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Is. 59:2; 
wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for 
those of others, in so far as they hinder us from  participating in the 
Divine good.
  Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a 
fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness 
of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine 
good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of 
glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine 
good.
	
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  Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity 
cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in 
Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we 
should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is infinite, surpasses 
the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be 
filled.
  Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy, 
even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater than 
another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
  Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness 
of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is finite, 
so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by 
any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God can be filled.
  On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (@Jn. 15:11): "That My 
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."
  I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on 
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as 
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in 
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to 
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be 
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one 
who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as 
stated above (FS, Question [25], Articles [1],2), when we were treating of the passions: 
and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when 
there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, 
the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains 
possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above 
(Question [24], Articles [4],7). When once, however, perfect happiness has been 
attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be 
full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, 
even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth 
thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at rest, not only our 
desire for God, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is 
full to  perfection---indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than 
they were capable of desiring: for "neither hath it entered into the 
heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him" (1 
Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure 
and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give 
into your bosom." Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly 
due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into 
man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Mt. 25:21: 
"Enter into the joy of thy Lord."
  Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the 
thing in which we rejoice.
  Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term 
appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will 
remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will 
approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be full 
with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet 
one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a fuller 
participation of the Divine happiness.
  Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of 
the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is 
however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have 
said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you may be 
filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual 
understanding."
	
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  Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to 
virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and 
envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
  Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is 
"good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. 
Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
  Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we 
are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in 
the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.
  On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor 
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from 
what has been said above (FS, Questions [57],60,62).
  I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [55], Articles [2],4), virtue is an 
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a 
certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed 
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which  follows from 
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous 
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is 
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those 
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we 
have said about the passions (FS, Question [25], Articles [2],4) that love is the first 
affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from 
it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the 
beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first 
of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, 
but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct 
from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is 
numbered among the Fruits (@Gal. 5:22).
  Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate 
self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the 
vices, as stated above (FS, Question [77], Article [4]); so that it was necessary to 
account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not 
arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of 
God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be 
referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and Article [2]).
  Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on 
the part of the object, a special character, viz. "difficult," and 
"possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. 
On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might 
cause a special virtue.
  Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit 
not its first act.