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Question: 99 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby
sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1)
Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
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Question: 99 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred
thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis
suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the
sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with
anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of
something sacred.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices,
"he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet public
offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that
sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
Objection 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things
receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be
violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of
a sacred thing.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
I answer that, As stated above (Question [81], Article [5]; FS, Question [101], Article [4]), a thing
is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just
as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good
end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to
the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which
reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence
for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of
sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good
of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a
commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine
providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His kingdom, you
have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever
savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment,
and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a
kind of likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of
Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are
sanctified." Wherefore it is written (@1 Pt. 2:9): "You are a chosen
generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people."
Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that
unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a
sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor.
Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is
honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves
irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence.
Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the
latter be not violated in itself.
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Question: 99 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated
(XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin
against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their
negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a word, deed
or desire contrary to the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of
sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance
under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a
consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one
steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as
the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11).
But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for
it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the
preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special
sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to
which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege
is a special sin.
I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there
must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived
chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now
in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation
of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.
Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it
honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as
acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred
thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God
and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine
law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are
guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege,
through perverting the words of the divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in
various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to
the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by
one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to
reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although
his act contains various kinds of sin materially.
Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through
its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing:
for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he
might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
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Question: 99 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished
according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate
species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to
be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and
that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of
sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.
Objection 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the
same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder,
theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore
they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently
it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance
with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred
things.
Objection 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,
therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred
person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a
sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore
the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.
On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now
the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (Article [1]).
Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the
sacred things.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), the sin of sacrilege consists in
the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a
sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of
sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects
of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the
greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against,
the more grievous the sacrilege.
Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who
are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to
certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to
the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written
(2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but
the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed against a
sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a
sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of
sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.
In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to
the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament
of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege
that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The
second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated
for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the
relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to
speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with
the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether
movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers.
And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of
sacrilege.
Reply to Objection 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in
one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates
and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ in the species
"colored thing," if one be white and the other black. In like manner it
is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material
acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect
of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by
copulation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation is
from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a trifle on a
priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and properly
speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it
is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated
to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other
instances.
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Question: 99 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be
pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a
criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is
punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13;
Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be
awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Objection 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment,
according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction." But
sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for
violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and
minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should
not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (@1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we taken
an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion of
covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the
violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting
punishment of sacrilege.
On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]:
"If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped
slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi": and
again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21):
"Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried
purest silver."
I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be
considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and
that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one
guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is
excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted
above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to
be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines,
that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem
that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not
sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from
him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he
is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the
Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary
punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from
sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.
Reply to Objection 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but
excommunication in its stead.
Reply to Objection 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from
sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to
inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of
excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.
Reply to Objection 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this
would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted
for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and
consequently involves no occasion of avarice.