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Question: 103 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1)
dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those
who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their
commands.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?
(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?
(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above
us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?
(4) Whether it contains several species?
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Question: 103 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above (Question [81], Article [2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor is
the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual
things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more
excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal
things.
Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now
praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of
things internal and spiritual.
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows
that are widows indeed," and (@1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.):
"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both
of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of
corporal things.
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the
searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. wherefore
honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal
movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God's
excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as regards men,
one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when
one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for
instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by
offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor
consists of signs, external and corporal.
Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it
is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man honors
another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is
the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order that he may
be held in reverence by others.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to Mt. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First,
because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of
any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly,
because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person's
excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to
his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well
for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is
not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing
witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the
knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for "glory" is the
same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rm. 16:27 observes
that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise."
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Question: 103 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above
us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mt. 11:11, "He
that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the
Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him
(@Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us.
Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above (Article [1]; Question [63], Article [3]). But sometimes those who are
above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither
is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of
nature.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (@Rm. 12:10): "With honor preventing one
another," and we read (@1 Pt. 2:17): "Honor all men." But this would not
be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor
is not due properly to those who are above us.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten talents
of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and we read
(Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be
proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the king
hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also who are
beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due properly
to those who are above us.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due
to the best."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always
due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.
For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who
honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others,
or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some
respect and not simply.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor,
but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or again, he
forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity
of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels "according to
the hope of glory of the children of God": wherefore he refused to be
honored by him as though he were superior to him.
Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his
virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because the honor
paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for
the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as
enemies, rather than treated with honor.
Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it
possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, "In
humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus, too,
we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.
Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not
that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some
excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were
honored by kings.
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Question: 103 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to be
loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love God is
the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we
honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we
honor God.
Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is
the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing
represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to
the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22,23) that
"they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him."
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is
honored.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due to
man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their
masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which
denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God."
I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Question [101], Article [3]),
where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs
be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God
and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God
and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount
lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject
to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine
lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or
creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a
distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of
God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we
honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is
the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for
servitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence,
inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is
called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of
excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by
reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a
distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is
not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which
is communicated to a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that
which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the
charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our
neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in
respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner,
since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man,
and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same
virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing
represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is
referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to
the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing.
Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards
some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that
dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing
reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards
its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God
redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is
paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
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Question: 103 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show
honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the
object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale
differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between
latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special
affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother
of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one
being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of
God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we
find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image
differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must
distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since
honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the
wood of the Holy Cross.
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of
any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and
any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in
this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In
another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence
of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above
(Article [3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but
is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet.
ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a
soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master
under another, and so on in similar cases.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide
sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by
reason of his having an affinity to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational
creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally
subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the
same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the
same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).